Motion to Strike in Iowa

Understanding the Purpose and Significance of a Motion to Strike

“Improper or unnecessary matter in a pleading may be stricken out on motion of the adverse party.” (See In re Condemnation of Certain Land (1962) 253 Iowa 1130, 1134.)

“A motion to strike...like a motion to dismiss, admits the truth of all matters pleaded.” (See Waits v. United Fire Cas. Co. (1997) 572 N.W.2d 565, 571-72; Fidelity Sav. Bank v. WormhoudtLumber Co. (1960) 251 Iowa 1121, 1126, 104 N.W.2d 462, 466; In re Carpenter's Estate (1930) 210 Iowa 553, 561, 231 N.W. 376, 380.)

“The party challenging the defense must establish the legal insufficiency of the defense from the face of the pleading attacked. We will affirm the trial court's striking of a defense if we conclude the defense alleged is legally inadequate.” (See id; See Jacobsen v. Moss (1936) 221 Iowa 1342, 1346, 268 N.W. 162, 164.)

Rule for Filing a Motion to Strike

Rule 1.434 of the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions to strike.

“Improper or unnecessary matter in a pleading may be stricken out on motion of the adverse party.” (See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.434.)

Discretion of the Court in Deciding a Motion to Strike

“[T]he matter of striking a pleading is so much within the discretion of the trial court that generally an appeal will not lie from such ruling.” (See Dorman v. Credit Ref. Rep. Co. (1932) 213 Iowa 1016, 1021.)

“We review the district court's grant of motions to strike for abuse of discretion.” (See Thies v. James (1971) 184 N.W.2d 708, 710; Lewison v. Howard R. Green Co. (2009) 770 N.W.2d 851.)

"A district court abuses its discretion when the grounds underlying a district court order are clearly untenable or unreasonable." (See Fenceroy v. Gelita USA, Inc. (2018) 908 N.W.2d 235, 241; Sioux Pharm, Inc. v. Eagle Labs., Inc. (2015) 865 N.W.2d 528, 535; Mediacom Iowa, L.L.C. v. Inc. City of Spencer (2004) 682 N.W.2d 62, 66.)

Legal Precedents and Case Law on a Motion to Strike

It is well settled that “irrelevant and redundant matter in all pleadings, may be stricken out on motion.” (See Iowa C.W. Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co. (1927) 204 Iowa 202, 204.)

It is also well settled that “motions to strike from pleadings should be sustained only when the allegations in the pleading attacked had no possible relationship to the controversy, and if there is any doubt as to whether under any contingency the pleaded allegations go to a material issue the motion to strike should be denied.” (See Parker v. Tuttle (1977) 260 N.W.2d 843, 845.)