Understanding Hostile Work Environment Sex/Gender Discrimination in Iowa

What is Sexual Harassment?

“Sexual harassment, as a broad category including both quid pro quo and hostile work environment, has devastating effects on a woman’s economic and employment opportunities and tends to be equally disastrous to a [person’s] physical health and psychological well-being.” (See State v. Watkins (2018) 914 N.W.2d 827, 863; Jennifer L. Vinciguerra, Note, The Present State of Sexual Harassment Law: Perpetuating Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in Sexually Harassed Women, 42 Clev. St. L. Rev. 301, 305–06 (1994).)

“The Iowa Civil Rights Act prohibits sex discrimination in employment in broad terms, making it illegal to: refuse to hire, accept, register, classify, or refer for employment, to discharge any employee, or to otherwise discriminate in employment against any applicant for employment or employee because of the . . . sex . . . of such applicant or employee, unless based upon the nature of the occupation.” (See Lynch v. City of Des Moines (1990) 454 N.W.2d 827, 833; Iowa Code § 601A.6(1)(a).)

“[M[aintenance of a sexually hostile work environment through sexual harassment is a form of illegal sex discrimination under section 601A.6(1)(a) of the Iowa Civil Rights Act.” (See Lynch v. City of Des Moines (1990) 454 N.W.2d 827, 833.)

Types of Sexual Harassment: Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Work Environment

“It is widely recognized that sexual harassment is a form of sexual discrimination actionable under Title VII.” (See McElroy v. State (2001) 637 N.W.2d 488, 499; Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico (1988) 864 F.2d 881, 897.)

“It is equally recognized that harassment can occur in two related ways. One type of harassment is linked to the grant or denial of tangible aspects of employment. This is known as quid pro quo sexual harassment. Additionally, in 1986, the United States Supreme Court decided the watershed case of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2405, 91 L.Ed.2d 49, 60 (1986), which held that a sexual harassment case could also be brought under Title VII on the basis of a hostile or abusive work environment.” (See Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico (1988) 864 F.2d 881, 897; Chambers v. Trettco, Inc. (2000) 614 N.W.2d 910, 915; State v. Watkins (2018) 914 N.W.2d 827, 861-62; e.g. , Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a ); McElroy v. State (2001) 637 N.W.2d 488, 499; Vivian v. Madison (1999) 601 N.W.2d 872, 873 [stating the legislature modeled the Iowa Civil Rights Act after Title VII of the United States Civil Rights Act]; Lynch v. City of Des Moines (1990) 454 N.W.2d 827, 833 [holding that sexually hostile work environment is illegal sex discrimination pursuant to the Iowa Civil Rights Act].)

“The former is a type of harassment [that] is linked to the grant or denial of tangible aspects of employment. The latter involves sexual harassment [that] is so ‘severe or pervasive [as] to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.” (See State v. Watkins (2018) 914 N.W.2d 827, 861-62; McElroy v. State (2001) 637 N.W.2d 488, 499; Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson (1986) 477 U.S. 57, 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2405, 91 L.Ed.2d 49.)

Prima Facie Case for Hostile Work Environment Claims

“In order to establish a valid claim of maintenance of a sexually hostile work environment through sexual harassment, it must be proven that:

1. the plaintiff belongs to a protected class;
2. the plaintiff was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment;
3. the harassment was based upon sex;
4. the harassment affected a term, condition or privilege of employment, and;
5. the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt and appropriate remedial action.”

(See State v. Watkins (2018) 914 N.W.2d 827, 843; Lynch v. City of Des Moines (1990) 454 N.W.2d 827, 833; Chauffeurs, Loc. U. 238 v. Civil Rights Com'n (1986) 394 N.W.2d 375, 378; Barrett v. Omaha Nat'l Bank (1984) 726 F.2d 424, 427.)

Remedial Actions of Employee Aware of Hostile Work Environment Sex/Gender Discrimination

“Once an employer is aware of sexual harassment, the employer must take both ‘prompt’ and ‘appropriate’ remedial action.” (See Gordon v. Eagle Tanning Co., No. 2-073 / 01-0657, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2002); Lynch v. City of Des Moines (1990) 454 N.W.2d 827, 833; Callicutt v. the Pepsi Bottling Group, Inc., Civil No. 00-95 (DWF/AJB) (D. Minn. May 13, 2002).)

“The action must be reasonably calculated to end the harassment.” (See id; Kopp v. Samaritan Health System, Inc. (1993) 13 F.3d 264, 269; Cherry v. Menard, Inc. (2000) 101 F. Supp.2d 1160, 1179.)

“Factors used to evaluate the reasonableness of remedial measures may include the amount of time between the notice and the action, the options available to the employer, such as training, reassignment, written warnings and reprimands, or termination, and consideration of whether the actions ended the harassment.” (See id.)

Burden of Proof and Standard of Review for Sex/Gender Discrimination

“The standards governing a hostile work environment are intended to filter out complaints attacking the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing.” (See State v. Watkins (2018) 914 N.W.2d 827, 843-44; Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White (2006) 548 U.S. 53, 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2415, 165 L.Ed.2d 345.)

“Accordingly, the plaintiff must establish that he or she subjectively perceived the conduct as abusive, [and] that a reasonable person would also find the conduct to be abusive or hostile.” (See id; Farmland Foods v. Dubuque Human Rights Comm (2003) 672 N.W.2d 733, 744.)

“To determine whether a reasonable person would find the challenged conduct to be abusive or hostile, the fact finder must examine all of the circumstances including:

1. the frequency of the conduct,
2. the severity of the conduct,
3. whether the conduct was physically threatening or humiliating or whether it was merely offensive, and
4. whether the conduct unreasonably interfered with the employee’s job performance.”

(See White v. State, No. 21-1898, at *11 (Iowa Apr. 12, 2024); Boge v. Deere & Co., No. 22-CV-2074-CJW-KEM, 2024 WL 690234, at *21-22 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 20, 2024); State v. Watkins (2018) 914 N.W.2d 827, 843-44; Farmland Foods v. Dubuque Human Rights Comm (2003) 672 N.W.2d 733, 744.)

“These factors and circumstances must disclose that the conduct was severe enough to amount to an alteration of the terms or conditions of employment. Thus, hostile-work-environment claims by their nature involve ongoing and repeated conduct, not isolated events.” (See id.)

Legal Precedents and Case Law on Hostile Work Environments and Sex/Gender Discrimination Claims

It is well settled that “a hostile work environment exists if the workplace is permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult’ that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victims employment and create an abusive working environment.” (See Couch v. Iowa Dep't of Human Servs. (2016) 888 N.W.2d 682; Farmland Foods v. Dubuque Human Rights Comm (2003) 672 N.W.2d 733, 744.)

It is also well settled that “when harassment is perpetrated by a nonsupervisory employee, an employer will be liable if the plaintiff proves the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take proper remedial action.” (See id; Haskenhoff v. Homeland Energy Sols., LLC (2017) 897 N.W.2d 553, 571; Stuart v. Gen. Motors Corp. (2000) 217 F.3d 621, 631.)