“A person is subject to liability to another for battery if that person acts intending to cause a harmful contact with the person of the other and a harmful contact results.” (See Nelson v. Winnebago Indus., Inc. (2000) 619 N.W.2d 385, 388; Carter v. Carter (2021) 957 N.W.2d 623, 635.)
“Battery is defined by the Restatement in two ways: (1) harmful contact and (2) offensive contact.” (See Nelson v. Winnebago Indus., Inc. (2000) 619 N.W.2d 385, 388; Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 13, 18 (1965).)
“[T]o commit an assault, the offender need only intend to do the act that constitutes the assault.” (See State v. Bartlett (2018) 922 N.W.2d 104; Bacon v. Bacon (1997) 567 N.W.2d 414, 417.)
“If the prohibited result may reasonably follow from the offender's act, the offender is guilty of assault regardless of whether or not the offender subjectively desired the prohibited result. The offender need only be aware that he or she was doing the act.” (See State v. Fountain (2008) 759 N.W.2d 3.)
“To support a conviction for assault, there must be proof that the defendant did an act he intended either:
(See Hittle v. Hester (2009) 772 N.W.2d 15; State v. Keeton (2006) 710 N.W.2d 531, 534.)
“The requisite intent may be inferred from the circumstances and the defendant's actions.” (See id; State v. Taylor (2004) 689 N.W.2d 116, 132.)
“An actor will generally be viewed as intending the natural and probable consequences that ordinarily follow from their voluntary acts.” (See id; State v. Bedard (2003) 668 N.W.2d 598, 601; State v. Taylor (2004) 689 N.W.2d 116, 132.)
“The requisite elements of battery are met by showing the wrongdoer intended to inflict a harmful or offensive contact upon the body of the plaintiff.” (See Moser v. Stallings (1986) 387 N.W.2d 599, 601-02; F. Harper F. James, The Law of Torts § 3.3, at 216 (1956).)
“The elements are met by showing the wrongdoer intended to inflict a harmful or offensive contact upon the plaintiff.” (See Moser v. Stallings (1986) 387 N.W.2d 599, 601; Musgrove v. McCray (2013) 834 N.W.2d 82.)
“The general legal principle is that the burden of proof in an action ordinarily rests with the party who is seeking recovery.” (See In re Marriage of Gust (2015) 858 N.W.2d 402, 418; In re Marriage of Bittner, No. 22-0550, at *7 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2023).)
It is well settled that “assault is a general intent crime under section 708.1(1), and occurs when a person, without justification, commits [a]ny act which is intended to cause pain or injury to, or which is intended to result in physical contact which will be insulting or offensive to another, coupled with the apparent ability to execute the act. Although the statute defines assault as a general intent crime, specific intent continues to be an element of the offense. However, a factfinder is allowed to infer that an individual specifically intends the natural and probable consequences of [their] voluntary actions.” (See Bruske v. Bruske, No. 17-0494, at *5-6 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2017); State v. Bedard (2003) 668 N.W.2d 598, 600-01; State v. Taylor (2004) 689 N.W.2d 116, 136.)
It is also well settled that “[a]n actor is subject to liability to another for battery if:
(See Schlichte v. Schlichte (2013) 828 N.W.2d 632; Nelson v. Winnebago Industries, Inc. (2000) 619 N.W.2d 385, 388–89 [quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 18(1) (1965)].)
“The supreme court explained “bodily contact is offensive if it offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity.” (See id.)
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