Motion to Strike in the District of Columbia

Understanding Motions to Strike as a Defense

“Courts disfavor motions to strike.” (Franco v. Natnl. Cap, 930 A.2d 160, 166-67 [D.C. 2007] citing e.g., Sweeney v. American Registry of Pathology, 287 F.Supp.2d 1, 5 [D.D.C.2003]; Nwachukwu v. Karl, 216 F.R.D. 176, 178 [D.D.C.2003]; WRIGHT MILLER, supra, § 1380, at 394.)

“Such motions are useful and appropriate tools ‘for weighing the legal implications to be drawn from uncontroverted facts.’” (Franco v. Natnl. Cap, 930 A.2d 160, 166-67 [D.C. 2007] citing United States v. 416.81 Acres of Land, 514 F.2d at 631.)

Trial Courts Denying a Motion to Strike

“[A] motion to strike a defense as insufficient will be denied ‘if [the defense] fairly presents a question of law or fact which the court ought to hear.’” (Franco v. Natnl. Cap, 930 A.2d 160, 166-67 [D.C. 2007] citing Securities Exchange Commission v. Gulf Western Industries, Inc., 502 F.Supp. 343, 345 [D.D.C.1980].)

“‘In sum, a motion to strike will not be granted if the insufficiency of the defense is not clearly apparent, or if it raises factual issues that should be determined on a hearing on the merits.’” (Franco v. Natnl. Cap, 930 A.2d 160, 166-67 [D.C. 2007] citing WRIGHT MILLER, supra, § 1381, at 427-28 [footnotes omitted].)

Understanding the Prevailing Rule for a Motion to Strike

The prevailing rule was noted in Systems Corp. v. American Telephone Telegraph Co., 60 F.R.D. 692, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1973):

Motions to strike defenses are not favored and will be denied ‘if the defense is sufficient as a matter of law or if it fairly presents a question of law or fact which the court ought to hear.’ Before this type of motion can be granted ‘the Court must be convinced that there are no questions of fact, that any questions of law are clear and not in dispute, and that under no set of circumstances could the defenses succeed.’” (citations omitted).

However, in Augustus v. Board of Public Instruction, 306 F.2d 862, 868 (5th Cir. 1962), the court refused to strike a portion of the pleading and made the following analysis:

A disputed question of fact cannot be decided on motion to strike. It is true, also, that when there is no showing of prejudicial harm to the moving party, the courts generally are not willing to determine disputed and substantial questions of law upon a motion to strike. Under such circumstances, the court may properly, and we think should, defer action on the motion and leave the sufficiency of the allegations for determination on the merits. (S.E.C. v. Gulf Western Industries, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 343, 345 [D.D.C. 1980] citing Augustus v. Board of Public Instruction. id.)

Granting a Motion to Strike

“The motion should be granted where it is clear that the affirmative defense is irrelevant and frivolous and its removal from the case would avoid wasting unnecessary time and money litigating the invalid defense.” (S.E.C. v. Gulf Western Industries, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 343, 345 [D.D.C. 1980] citing SEC v. Weil, [Current] Fed.Sec.L.Rep. (CCH) ¶ 97,541 [M.D.Fla. Feb. 7, 1980]; Narragansett Tribe of Indians v. Southern Rhode Island Land Development Corp., 418 F. Supp. 798, 801 [D.R.I. 1976].) “Additionally, defenses which would tend to significantly complicate the litigation are particularly vulnerable to a motion to strike.” (S.E.C. v. Gulf Western Industries, Inc., id., citing Louisiana Sulphur Carriers Inc. v. Gulf Resources Chemical Corp., 53 F.R.D. 458, 460 [D.Del. 1971].)