Motion to Bifurcate or Sever Trial in Illinois

What Is a Motion to Bifurcate or Sever Trial?

Purpose and Significance of a Motion to Bifurcate or Sever Trial

The purpose of section 2-614(b) is to allow claims to be severed when disparate issues would make a joint trial overly complicated. (Cook v. General Electric Co. (1992) 146 Ill. 2d 548, 555 citing Mount v. Dusing (1953) 414 Ill. 361, 367 [“A motion to sever ... [requires] an appraisal of administrative convenience and the possibility of prejudice to substantial rights of the litigants in the light of the particular problems which will arise in the course of the trial.”])

Factors Considered by the Court in Granting or Denying a Motion to Bifurcate or Sever Trial

“The Illinois Code of Civil Procedure provides that an action may be severed, and actions may be consolidated, as an aid to convenience, whenever it can be done without prejudice to a substantial right.” (Pickering v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas (1994) 265 Ill. App. 3d 806, 811 citing 735 ILCS 5/2-1006 (West 1992).)

“A motion to sever is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, to be exercised in each case by an appraisal of administrative convenience and the possibility of prejudice to substantial rights of the litigants in the light of the particular problems which will arise in the course of the trial.” (Pickering v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas (1994) 265 Ill. App. 3d 806, 811 citing Mount v. Dusing (1953) 414 Ill. 361, 367.)

Burdens of Proof for a Motion to Bifurcate or Sever Trial

“A motion to sever is addressed to the circuit court's discretion, and the court's decision will be reversed only for abuse of that discretion.” (Atwood v. Chicago Transit Authority (1993) 253 Ill. App. 3d 1, 8-9 citing Argueta v. Baltimore Ohio Chicago Terminal R.R. Co. (1991) 224 Ill. App.3d 11, 28 [not abuse of discretion to sever closing arguments and verdict on third party contribution claim], appeal denied (1992) 144 Ill.2d 631.)

Recent Cases and Precedents Influencing Motion to Bifurcate or Sever Trial Decisions

Bifurcation in Marriage Dissolution Cases

“In In re Marriage of Cohn (93 Ill. 2d 190, 199 [1982]) [the Illinois] supreme court held that while a circuit court does not have unfettered discretion to bifurcate a dissolution judgment, bifurcation is justified in certain circumstances.” (In re Marriage of Wade (2011) 408 Ill. App. 3d 775, 778 citing id.)

“The court set forth a nonexhaustive list of appropriate circumstances for entering a bifurcated dissolution judgment, which included:

‘[w]here the court does not have in personam jurisdiction over the respondent;
where a party is unable to pay child support or maintenance if so ordered;
where the court has set aside an adequate fund for child support pursuant to section 503(d) of the [Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage] Act; or
where the parties' child or children do not reside with either parent.’”

(In re Marriage of Wade (2011) 408 Ill. App. 3d 775, 778 citing id.)

“Bifurcation is justified where the circumstances listed in Cohn are present or where the circumstances are of the same caliber as those enumerated in Cohn.” (In re Marriage of Wade (2011) 408 Ill. App. 3d 775, 778 citing id.; In re Marriage of Bogan (1986) 116 Ill. 2d 72, 80.) A reviewing court will not disturb the circuit court's decision to enter a bifurcated judgment of dissolution of marriage absent an abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Wade (2011) 408 Ill. App. 3d 775, 778 citing id.; Copeland v. McLean (2002) 327 Ill. App. 3d 855, 865.)