Motion to Vacate Sister-State Judgment in Texas

What Is a Motion to Vacate Sister-State Judgment?

Background

Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, a state must give the same force and effect to a judgment of a sister state that it would give to its own judgments. (Enviropower v. Bear (2008) 265 S.W.3d 16, 19-20 citing U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 1.) When a judgment creditor files an authenticated copy of a foreign judgment, it satisfies its burden to present a prima facie case for enforcement of the judgment. (Id., citing Reading Bates Constr. Co. v. Baker Energy Resources Corp. (1998) 976 S.W.2d 702, 712.) This is true even if the foreign judgment is taken by default. (Cash Register Sales and Servs. of Houston, Inc. v. Copelco Capital, Inc. (2001) 62 S.W.3d 278, 280-81.) The burden then shifts to the judgment debtor to prove why the sister state's judgment should not be given full faith and credit. (Enviropower v. Bear (2008) 265 S.W.3d 16, 19-20.)

How to Structure the Motion

To overcome this burden, the judgment debtor must collaterally attack the foreign judgment by establishing one of the following recognized exceptions to the mandates of the Full Faith and Credit Clause:

the judgment is interlocutory;
the judgment is subject to modification under the law of the rendering state;
the rendering state lacked jurisdiction;
the judgment was procured by fraud or is penal in nature; or
limitations has expired under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 16.066.

(See Russo v. Dear (2003) 105 S.W.3d 43, 46; Reading Bates Constr., 976 S.W.2d at 712; see also Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. 16.066 (Vernon 1997).)

The judgment debtor may overcome the presumption of the validity of the foreign judgment only with clear and convincing evidence. (Russo, 105 S.W.3d. at 46.) In a collateral attack, no defense that goes to the merits of the original controversy shall be recognized. (Enviropower v. Bear (2008) 265 S.W.3d 16, 20.)

Nature of the Motion

A motion contesting enforcement of a foreign judgment operates as a motion for new trial. (Mindis Metals v. Oilfield Motor (2004) 132 S.W.3d 477, 483 citing Moncrief v. Harvey (1991) 805 S.W.2d 20, 23 [analogizing motion to vacate to motion for new trial with respect to filing deadlines and appellate timetables].) Ordinarily, an order granting a new trial is interlocutory, and not appealable. (Mindis Metals, supra, citing Cummins v. Paisan Constr. Co.(1984) 682 S.W.2d 235, 236.) However, an order that denies enforcement of a foreign judgment is not necessarily interlocutory in the same manner as a traditional order granting a new trial and/or vacating a judgment. A new "trial" is not possible because there was no Texas trial in the first place; the filing of the foreign judgment comprises both an original petition and a final judgment. A Texas court cannot order a new trial to take place in the foreign jurisdiction. (Mindis Metals v. Oilfield Motor (2004) 132 S.W.3d 477, 483.)

The Court’s Decision

A court's ruling on a motion to vacate, like a ruling on a motion for new trial, is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. (Champion Int'l Corp. v. Twelfth Court of Appeals (1988) 762 S.W.2d 898, 899.) Although the determination of whether [movant] establishes an exception to full faith and credit generally involves a factual inquiry, not the resolution of a question of law, the trial court has no discretion in applying the law to the established facts. (See Walker v. Packer (1992) 827 S.W.2d 833, 840; Reading Bates Const. Co. v. Baker Energy Res. Corp.(1998) 976 S.W.2d 702, 713.)

Texas law requires a trial court to give full faith and credit to a foreign judgment of a sister state unless an exception is established. (Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840). Therefore, [the court] will review the record to determine whether the trial court misapplied the law to the established facts in concluding that [movant] had not established an exception to full faith and credit. (Enviropower v. Bear (2008) 265 S.W.3d 16, 19.)