The Court bases the Order After Hearing of this date upon the following Statement of Decision:
9. In a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff must prove the defendant's negligence was a cause-in-fact of injury. (Bromme v. Pavitt (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1502.) “The law is well settled that in a personal injury action causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability based [on] competent expert testimony. Mere possibility alone is insufficient to establish a prima facie case. That there is a distinction between a reasonable medical ‘probability’ and a medical ‘possibility’ needs little discussion. There can be many possible ‘causes,’ indeed, an infinite number of circumstances [that] can produce an injury or disease. A possible cause only becomes ‘probable’ when, in the absence of other reasonable causal explanations, it becomes more likely than not that the injury was a result of its action.” (Jones v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 396, 402–403.) T
Hearing Date
August 01, 2019
Type
Medical Malpractice - Physicians & Surgeons (General Jurisdiction)
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The Court bases the Order After Hearing of this date upon the following Statement of Decision:
9. In a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff must prove the defendant's negligence was a cause-in-fact of injury. (Bromme v. Pavitt (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1502.) “The law is well settled that in a personal injury action causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability based [on] competent expert testimony. Mere possibility alone is insufficient to establish a prima facie case. That there is a distinction between a reasonable medical ‘probability’ and a medical ‘possibility’ needs little discussion. There can be many possible ‘causes,’ indeed, an infinite number of circumstances [that] can produce an injury or disease. A possible cause only becomes ‘probable’ when, in the absence of other reasonable causal explanations, it becomes more likely than not that the injury was a result of its action.” (Jones v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 396, 402–403.) T