Defendant Armando D’Avila’s motion to vacate default and default judgment is DENIED.

Defendant Armando D’Avila moves to vacate default judgment upon the equitable grounds of extrinsic fraud or mistake. Defendant concedes that CCP § 473.5 does not apply because the motion is brought over three years after entry of default judgment.

Where a motion to vacate is made more than six months after entry of default, the motion is not directed to the Court's statutory power under Section 473 of the California Code of Civil Procedure to grant relief for mistake or excusable neglect, but rather is directed to the Court's inherent equity power under which it may grant relief from a default judgment where there has been extrinsic fraud or mistake. See Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 981; Aldrich v. San Fernando Valley Lumber Co. (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 725, 735-737.) In order to obtain relief, three elements must be shown to grant such a motion:

The defaulted party must show that it has