Tentative ruling in department 8 on Feb. 09, 2023 in Los Angeles County, CA - Case no: xxxxx559

Case Number: 24SMCV00965 Hearing Date: July 17, 2025 Dept: 207 TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT 207 HEARING DATE July 17, 2025 CASE NUMBER 24SMCV00965 MOTION Service on Secretary of State MOVING PARTY Plaintiff Shahin Safae OPPOSING PARTY none MOTION Plaintiff Shahin Safae (Plaintiff) moves for an order permitting them to serve the summons and complaint on Defendant KB White Construction Inc. (Defendant) via the Secretary of State. The motion is unopposed. ANALYSIS If an agent for the purpose of service of process has resigned and has not been replaced or if the agent designated cannot with reasonable diligence be found at the address designated for personally delivering the process, or if no agent has been designated, and it is shown by affidavit to the satisfaction of the court that process against a domestic corporation cannot be served with reasonable diligence upon the designated agent by hand in the manner provided in Section 415.10, subdivision (a) of Section 415.20 or subdivision (a) of Section 415.30 of the Code of Civil Procedure [service by mail with notice of acknowledgment and receipt] or upon the corporation in the manner provided in subdivision (a), (b), or (c) of Section 416.10 or subdivision (a) of Section 416.20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court may make an order that the service be made upon the corporation by delivering by hand to the Secretary of State, or to any person employed in the Secretary of State's office in the capacity of assistant or deputy, one copy of the process for each defendant to be served, together with a copy of the order authorizing such service. Service in this manner is deemed complete on the 10th day after delivery of the process to the Secretary of State. (Corp. Code, § 1702, subd. (a), emphasis added; see also Corp. Code, § 17701.16, subd. (c) [same provisions concerning limited liability companies].) Plaintiffs counsel has provided a declaration and a non-service report indicating that attempts were made to personally serve Defendant at an address on Wilshire Boulevard, which was reported to be an invalid address, as the suite number did not exist at that address, as well as numerous attempts to personally serve Defendant at the address listed on the Secretary of States website. (Boyadzhyan Decl. ¶¶ 3-5, 7-8 and Ex. B.) Specifically, attempts were made on January 31, 2025 at 3:17 p.m.; on February 3 at 2:35 p.m.; on February 4 at 11:07 a.m.; on February 5 at 4:32 p.m.; on February 6 at 9:11 a.m.; and on February 7 at 10:50 a.m. and again at 3:19 p.m. (Ex. B to Boyadzhyan Decl.) On March 24, 2025, the Court denied Plaintiffs motion without prejudice for failure to attempt to serve the agent for service of process at the agents mailing address, as registered, under Code of Civil Procedure section 415.30, and because Plaintiff had not provided any information to the Court that the agent for service of process has not requested that the United States Postal Service forward mail from the agents mailing address, as registered. (Cf. Watts v. Crawford (1995) 10 Cal.4th 743, 748-749, fn. 5 [If a defendants address is ascertainable, a method of service superior to publication must be employed, because constitutional principles of due process of law, as well as the authorizing statute, require that service by publication be utilized only as a last resort].) Plaintiff now declares that on March 31, 2025, they served a Notice of Acknowledgment along with the summons, complaint, and case initiating documents via mail to Defendants address of record. Plaintiff also submitted a request with the United States Postal Service, which responded to the request identifying no change of address on file. (Boyadzhyan Decl. ¶¶ 9-10) Plaintiffs motion is slightly premature, as a recipient of a notice of acknowledgment has twenty (20) days within which to sign and return the notice of acknowledgment, yet Plaintiff filed the motion only seventeen days later, on June 17, 2025. Notwithstanding, if Plaintiffs counsel is able to represent at the hearing as an officer of the Court that no response to the notice and acknowledgement has been received as of the date of the hearing, the Court is inclined to grant Plaintiffs request. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Therefore, if Plaintiffs counsel represents at the hearing that no response to the notice and acknowledgment has been received as of the date of the hearing, the Court will grant Plaintiffs motion to serve KB White Construction, Inc. via the Secretary of State. The Clerk of the Court shall provide notice of the Courts ruling unless Plaintiff waives notice. DATED: July 17, 2025 ___________________________ Michael E. Whitaker Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 25STCV10250 Hearing Date: July 15, 2025 Dept: 37 HEARING DATE: Tuesday, July 15, 2025 CASE NUMBER: 25STCV10250 CASE NAME: Dana Huges vs. Dave & Busters Entertainment Inc. TRIAL DATE: Not set. PROOF OF SERVICE: OK MOVING PARTY: Defendant Dave & Busters Entertainment Inc. OPPOSING PARTY: Plaintiff Dana Hughes PROCEEDING: Demurrer to Complaint OPPOSITION: 01 July 2025 REPLY: 08 July 2025 TENTATIVE: Defendants demurrer is sustained. At the hearing the court will determine if leave to amend should be granted. Background On April 7, 2025, Dana Hughes (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Dave & Busters Entertainment, Inc. (Defendant) and Does 1 through 25. The Complaint alleges a single cause of action violation of the California Invasion of Privacy Acts (CIPA) Trap and Trace Law (Pen. Code, § 638.51). On May 19, 2025, Defendant filed a demurrer to the Complaint. Plaintiff opposes both Motions. The matter is now before the court. request for JUDICIAL notice The court may take judicial notice of official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States, [r]ecords of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States, and [f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy. (Evid. Code § 452, subds. (c), (d), and (h).) Taking judicial notice of a document is not the same as accepting the truth of its contents or accepting a particular interpretation of its meaning. ( Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins. Brokerage (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 369, 374.) Defendant requests judicial notice of the following: Exhibit A : A true and correct copy of the California State Assembly Committee on Public Safetys April 7, 2015, analysis of Assembly Bill 929. Exhibit B : A true and correct copy of the California State Assembly Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protections April 21, 2015, analysis of Assembly Bill 929. Exhibit C : A true and correct copy of the California State Assembly Committee on Appropriations April 29, 2015, analysis of Assembly Bill 1924. Exhibit D : A true and correct copy of the California State Assembly Committee on Public Safetys March 29, 2016, analysis of Assembly Bill 1924. Exhibit E : A true and correct copy of the California State Assembly Committee on Appropriations May 4, 2016, analysis of Assembly Bill 1924 Exhibit F : A true and correct copy of the California State Senate Committee on Public Safetys June 28, 2016, analysis of Assembly Bill 1924. Exhibit G : A true and correct copy of the screenshot from May 16, 2025, of the website https://www.daveandbusters.com/us/en/home, showing Defendants cookie banner. Exhibit H : A true and correct copy of the January 27, 2025 Order on Demurrer in Sanchez v. Cars.com , Case No. 24STCV13201, filed in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles. Exhibit I : A true and correct copy of the March 13, 2024 Order on Demurrer in Licea v. Hickory Farms, LLC , Case No. 23STCV26148, filed in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles Exhibit J : A true and correct copy of the July 9, 2024 Order on Demurrer in Rodriguez v. Fountain9, Inc ., Case No. 24STCV04504, filed in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles. Exhibit K : A true and correct copy of the April 23, 2024 Order on Demurrer in Casillas v. Transitions Optical, Inc ., Case No. 23STCV30742, filed in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles. Defendants request for judicial notice of Exhibits A through F is granted. Defendants request for judicial notice of Exhibit G is denied as Defendant fails to show that Exhibit G is a proper subject for judicial notice. Judicial notice is the recognition and acceptance by the court, for use by the trier of fact or by the court, of the existence of a matter of law or fact that is relevant to an issue in the action without requiring formal proof of the matter. ( Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 882.) Similarly, Defendants request for judicial notice of Exhibit H through K is denied as these are trial court rulings from different departments. Trial court rulings in other cases are not relevant to the facts of this case, cannot be cited as precedent as they have no precedential value, and are submitted by the Defendant not as evidence but as precedent. This is beyond the scope of judicial notice and is legally improper. (See Bolanos v. Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 744, 761; Budrow v. Dave & Buster's of California, Inc . (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 875, 884885.) Demurrer [1] I. Legal Standard Where pleadings are defective, a party may raise the defect by way of a demurrer. ( Coyne v. Krempels (1950) 36 Cal.2d 257, 262.) A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a pleading, and the grounds for a demurrer must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters.¿ (CCP, § 430.30(a); Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) In evaluating a demurrer, the court accepts the complainants properly pled facts as true and ignores contentions, deductions, and conclusory statements. ( Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1976) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713; Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) Moreover, the court does not consider whether a plaintiff will be able to prove the allegations or the possible difficulty in making such proof. ( Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 604.) Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. ( Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.)¿ The burden is on the complainant to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. ( Ibid .) II. Discussion A. Summary of Allegations in Complaint The Complaint alleges Defendants website, www.daveandbusters.com (the Website), installed TikTok Software that is designed to capture the phone number, email, routing, addressing and other signaling information of website visitors. (Compl., ¶¶ 11, 13, 32.) The TikTok software is trap and trace device under Pen. Code section 638.50(c) that gathers device and browser information, geographic information, referral tracking, and URL tracking by running code or scripts on the Website to send user details to TikTok. ( Id . ¶¶ 16, 30, 32.) Using TikToks AutoAdvanced Matching technology, when the website asks for information, such as name, date of birth, and address, the information is sent simultaneously to TikTok, so that TikTok can isolate with certainty the individual to be targeted. ( Id . ¶ 18.) Plaintiff visited Defendants Website on August 2, 2024, and even though the Website has a cookie banner the information has already been sent to TikTok regarding the users visit. (Compl., ¶¶ 14, 17.) The TikTok Software transmits instructions to users web browsers, including Plaintiffs so that Plaintiffs and users personal information is sent to TikToks servers and is used to identify website visitors and facilitate the collection and analysis of user data for mutual financial gain of both Defendant and TikTok. ( Id . ¶¶ 13, 17.) This level of data transmission is not necessary for basic website functionality. ( Id . ¶ 17.) Consequently, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant violated CIPA (Pen. Code § 638.51) by using TikToks trap and trace technology to identify users and Plaintiff is thus entitled to statutory penalties, damages, and injunctive relief under Pen. Code §§ 638.51 and 637.2. (Compl., ¶¶ 33-35.) Defendant now demurs to the Complaint. B. Pen. Code § 638.51 Applies Only to Wire or Electronic Communications As Defined by Pen Code § 629.51 Defendant demurs to the Complaint on the basis that Section 638.51 applies only to telephone communications, not to website technologies. For example, Pen. Code § 638.52(d)(1) regarding the application and authorization to use a pen register or trap and trace device requires the order issued by the magistrate to the peace officer state [t[he identity, if known, of the person to whom is leased or in whose name is listed the telephone line to which the pen register or trap and trace device is to be attached and [t]he number and, if known, physical location of the telephone line to which the pen register or trap and trace device is to be attached and, in the case of a trap and trace device, the geographic limits of the trap and trace order. (Pen. Code, § 638.52(d)(1)-(3).) Defendant also points out that in 2016, the California Legislature enacted a new provision of CIPA, section 632.01 [2] , which prohibits the disclosure of certain confidential communications in any forum, including . . . Internet Web sites. (Pen. Code, § 632.01(a)(1).) The Legislatures choice to apply section 632.01 to the internet, but omit similar language from sections 638.50-638.53, demonstrates that the Legislature intended section 638.51 to apply only to telephones. (Demurrer, at p. 10:5-7.) In construing a statute, the courts fundamental task is to ascertain legislative intent to effectuate the purpose of the statute, and by giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning. ( Day v. City of Fontana (2001) 25 Cal.4th 268, 272.) If statutory terms are ambiguous, the court may examine extrinsic sources and choose sources that comport most closely with the Legislatures apparent intent to promote the general purpose and avoid construction that would lead to absurd consequences. ( Id. at p. 272.) The Penal Code commands construction of its provisions according to the fair import of their terms, with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice, but at the same time, penal statutes include only those offenses coming clearly within import of the language, and will not be given application beyond their plain intent. (See DeMille v. Am. Fed'n of Radio Artists (1947) 31 Cal.2d 139, 156; Pen. Code § 4.) Furthermore, with construction of a criminal statute, the defendant must be given the benefit of every reasonable doubt as to whether the statute applies to him. ( In re Zerbe (1964) 60 Cal.2d 666, 668.) The legislative history of the CIPA suggests that pen register and track and trace devices refers to devices or processes that are used to record or decode dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information from telephone numbers, not internet communications such as websites. Pen. Code § 638.51 and its legislative history suggest that section 638.51 applies only to telephone-tracking technology, not IP address-collecting software used by a website to improve its user functionality and the effectiveness of its marketing. The California Legislature enacted Assembly Bill 929, the genesis of CIPA § 638.51, in 2015 to create a comprehensive framework governing how California law enforcement officials could obtain and use a pen register or trap and trace device, just like its federal counterpart. In enacting Assembly Bill 929, the California Legislature adopted the same authorization provision in CIPA section 638.52 that courts have relied on under the federal Pen Register Act to find that the Act applied only to mechanical, telephone number-tracing technology, not technology used to collect the IP address from a desktop computer. Thus, the legislative history of the CIPA suggests that pen register and track and trace devices refer to devices or processes that are used to record or decode dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information from telephone numbers, and not internet communications such as websites. The court acknowledges there is a split in authority in federal district courts as to whether CIPA applies only to telephonic communications or if it extends to electronic communications, including websites and software. (See Greenley v. Kochava, Inc. (S.D. Cal. 2023) 684 F.Supp.3d 1024, Moody v. C2 Educational Systems Inc. (C.D. Cal. 2024) 742 F.Supp.3d 1072, 1076 [Plaintiff's allegations that the TikTok Software is embedded in the Website and collects information from visitors plausibly fall within the scope of §§ 638.50 and 638.51.]; ANNE HEITING, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated Plaintiff, v. FKA DISTRIBUTING CO., DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, Defendants. (C.D. Cal., Feb. 3, 2025, No. 2:24-CV-07314-HDV-AGR) 2025 WL 736594, at *3 [The court concluded the challenged software does fall within the ambit of section 638.50(c)]; Shah v. Fandom, Inc. (N.D. Cal., Oct. 21, 2024, No. 24-CV-01062-RFL) 2024 WL 4539577, at *4.) No California appellate case has found that violations of Civ. Code § 638.51 are limited to only telephonic communications. However, the court is guided by the plain meaning of the words of the statute. ( Perez v. Oakdale Irrigation District (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 793, 797.) Pen. Code § 638.50 states that that the definition of Wire communication and electronic communication have the meanings set forth in Pen. Code § 629.51 and are incorporated into the definition of Pen Register and Trap and trace device by reference: For purposes of this chapter, the following terms have the following meanings: (a) Wire communication and electronic communication have the meanings set forth in subdivision (a) of Section 629.51. (b)¿Pen register means a device or process that records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted, but not the contents of a communication. Pen register does not include a device or process used by a provider or customer of a wire or electronic communication service for billing, or recording as an incident to billing, for communications services provided by such provider, or a device or process used by a provider or customer of a wire communication service for cost accounting or other similar purposes in the ordinary course of its business. (c)¿Trap and trace device means a device or process that captures the incoming electronic or other impulses that identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication , but not the contents of a communication. (Pen. Code, § 538.50(b)-(c) [bold added].) In reading the statutory definitions of wire communication and electronic communication, the court is persuaded that the collection and taking information transmitted over the internet does not fit the definition of a pen register or a trap and trace device. Pen. Code § 629.51(a)(1) defines a Wire communication as: [Any] aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception (including the use of a like connection in a switching station), furnished or operated by any person engaged in providing or operating these facilities for the transmission of communications. ( Id . [bold added].) Pen. Code § 629.51(a)(4) defines Aural transfer as ¿a transfer containing the human voice at any point between and including the point of origin and the point of reception. Accordingly, for the Website or IP address to be a wire communication, it needs to contain a human voice. Because the Website and IP address do not contain a human voice, they are not a wire communication under CIPA. Pen. Code § 629.51(a)(1) defines Electronic communication¿as: [A]ny transfer of signs, signals, writings, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectric, or photo-optical system, but does not include any of the following: (A) Any wire communication defined in paragraph (1). (B) Any communication made through a tone-only paging device. (C) Any communication from a tracking device. As there is no aural transfer, the TikTok software cannot be a wire communication. (Pen. Code, §§ 629.51(a)(1).) Consequently, for Section 638.51 to apply, the TikTok software must meet the definition of Electronic communication, meaning it transfers signs, signals, writings, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature in whole or in part by a wire . . . (Pen. Code, § 629.51(a)(1). Plaintiffs opposition fails to explain how internet communications fit the definition of Electronic Communication under Pen. Code § 629.51(a)(1). Plaintiff also fails to cite any case law extending the definition of electronic communication under Section 629.51(a)(1), or the federal Pen Register Act, to internet communications. Accordingly, Plaintiff does not provide any basis for the court to find that internet communications in whole or in part involve communications via by a wire such that Section 638.51 applies to this action. As the court is not persuaded that Pen. Code § 629.51(a)(1) applies to internet communications; the court sustains the demurrer and does not reach the other points raised by Defendants demurrer. The demurrer is sustained. At the hearing, the court will determine if leave to amend should be granted. Conclusion Defendants demurrer is sustained. At the hearing the court will determine if leave to amend should be granted. [1] Pursuant to CCP § 430.41, the meet and confer requirement has been met. (Chilleen Decl., ¶¶ 3, 4.) [2] Pen. Code, § 632.01 (a)(1) states in relevant part: A person who violates subdivision (a) of Section 632 shall be punished pursuant to subdivision (b) if the person intentionally discloses or distributes, in any manner, in any forum, including, but not limited to, Internet Web sites and social media, or for any purpose, the contents of a confidential communication with a health care provider that is obtained by that person in violation of subdivision (a) of Section 632.

Case Number: 25STCV16375 Hearing Date: July 14, 2025 Dept: 58 Judge Rolf M. Treu Department 58 . . . Hearing Date: July 14, 2025 Case Name: Mirna v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. Case No.: 22STCV16375 Matter: (1.) Motion for Attorneys Fees (2.) Motion to Tax Costs Moving Party: (1.) Plaintiff Mirna Serrano (2.) Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. Responding Party: (1.) Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2.) Plaintiff Mirna Serrano Tentative Ruling: The Motion for Attorneys Fees is granted in part for a total of $ 41,904.50 in attorney fees. The Motion to Tax Costs is granted in the amount of $387.64. The parties have settled this Song-Beverly matter pursuant to a Code of Civil Procedure section 998 Offer to Compromise in the amount of $47,000. The parties were, however, unable to reach an agreement as to the amount of reasonable attorney fees or costs thereby necessitating a motion for attorney fees and a motion to tax costs. On March 24, 2025, Plaintiff Mirna Serrano (Plaintiff) moved for an order awarding attorneys fees under the lodestar method in the amount of $ 50,418.50. They also requested an enhancement of .5, in the amount of $25,209.25. Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (Defendant Honda) opposes the motion, arguing the amounts requested in fees is excessive and unreasonable. Also, on March 24, 2025 , Plaintiff filed a memorandum of costs seeking costs in the amount of $7,070.10. Thus, the total requested in attorney fees and costs is $82,697.85. On April 10, 2025, Defendant Honda moved to strike or tax Plaintiffs memorandum of costs. Plaintiff opposed the motion. The motion for attorney fees is granted in a reduced amount. The motion to tax costs is granted in part. I. Motion for Attorney Fees Legal Standard A prevailing buyer in an action under Song-Beverly shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorneys fees based on actual time expended, determined by the Court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.¿¿(Civ. Code, § 1794,¿subd. (d).) The prevailing party has the burden of showing that the requested attorney fees were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount. ( Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California Inc. ¿(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 817.) The party seeking attorney fees is not necessarily entitled to compensation for the value of attorney services according to [his] own notion or to the full extent claimed by [him]. ( Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc .¿(1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807, 816.)¿¿Therefore, if the time expended or the monetary charge being made for the time expended are not reasonable under all the circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount. ( Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America¿ (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.)¿¿ ¿¿ A court may reduce a fee award based on its reasonable determination that a routine, noncomplex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted.¿¿( Morris v. Hyundai Motor America¿ (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.)¿¿It is also appropriate to reduce an award based on inefficient or duplicative efforts. ( Id. ¿at p. 38.) However, the analysis must be reasonably specific and cannot rely on general notions of fairness. ( Kerkeles¿v. City of San Jose¿ (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 88,¿102.)¿¿Moreover, in conducting the analysis, courts are not permitted to tie any reductions in the fee award to some proportion of the buyers damages recovery. ( Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc.¿ (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.) Discussion Plaintiffs seek $ 50,418.50 in attorneys fees for Knight Law Group, LLP (Knight Law), plus a .5 multiplier enhancement. Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not entitled attorney fees and costs after its first 998 offer April 4, 2023 (First 998 Offer); Defendant also argues that the hours incurred to litigate this routine, non-complex case that settled before trial is unreasonable. Thus, Defendant argues that fees should be reduced to a total of $28,219, which represents a reasonable number of hours incurred based on the purported experience level of Plaintiffs attorneys and the nature of the litigation. A calculation of attorneys fees for a Song-Beverly action¿begins with the lodestar approach, under which the Court fixes the lodestar¿at¿the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.¿( Margolin v. Regional Planning Com. ¿(1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004-1005.) California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys fee award. ( Ibid. )¿ The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work. ( Id.¿ at p. 1004.) The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services¿provided.¿( Serrano v. Priest¿ (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49;¿ PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler ¿(2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) [T]rial courts need not, and indeed should not, become green-eyeshade accountants. The essential goal in shifting fees (to either party) is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection. So trial courts may take into account their overall sense of a suit, and may use estimates in calculating and allocating an attorney's time. ( Fox v. Vice (2011) 563 U.S. 826, 838.) First 998 Offer: Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff is the prevailing parties under the settlement agreement. Instead, Defendant first argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to attorney fees and costs that post-date Defendants first 998 Offer. On April 4, 2023, Defendant served a 998 Offer. The offer provided for $47,000 or itemization of damages according to proof. (Kirnos Decl., ¶ 17 Ex. BB.) Plaintiff objected to this offer as vague, uncertain, and incapable of valuation. (Kirnos Decl., ¶ 17.) On December 2, 2024, Plaintiff attended the Mandatory Settlement Conference. That same date, Defendant served Plaintiff with a 998 Offer for $47,000.00 in exchange for surrender of the subject vehicle, plus a motion for attorneys fees, costs and expenses wherein Plaintiff would be considered the prevailing party. (Kirnos Decl., ¶ 24, Ex. D.) The Settlement included full restitution of payments made on Plaintiffs defective vehicle. (Kirnos Decl., ¶ 24.) Plaintiff accepted the offer on December 2, 2024. (Kirnos Decl., ¶ 24.) The First 998 Offer was invalid. As a general rule, the prevailing party in a civil lawsuit is entitled to recover its costs. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032.) However, u nder Code of Civil Procedure section 998, if the plaintiffs reject a defendant's offer to compromise and then fail to win a more favorable judgment, the plaintiffs cannot recover their postoffer costs and must pay the costs the defendant incurred after the offer. ( Chen v. Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 117, 121.) To be considered a valid offer under Code of Civil Procedure section 998, however, the offer must be unconditional, although it may include nonmonetary terms and conditions. ( Barella v. Exchange Bank (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 793, 799.) The offer must be sufficiently specific to allow the recipient to meaningfully evaluate it and make a reasoned decision whether to accept it. ( Taing v. Johnson Scaffolding Co. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 579, 585.) Finally, the offeree must be able to clearly evaluate the worth of the offer, which is determined at the time the offeree receives it. ( Duff v. Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 491, 500; Barella, supra , 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 801.) The burden is on the offering party to demonstrate that the offer is valid under section 998. ( Barella, supra , 84 Cal.App.4th at 799.) An ambiguity in the offer is in interpreted against its proponent. ( Ignacio v. Caracciolo (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 81, 86 .) In challenging this First 998 Offer, Plaintiff relies heavily on the holding in Duff v. Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 491. In Duff , the manufacturer, Jaguar, issued a 998 offer to the plaintiff, Duff, that Jaguar would repurchase the vehicle for $28,430.80 or greater than that amount if Duff provide[d] documentation to show the amount is more than $28,430.80. ( Duff v. Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 491, 496.) The 998 Offer also obligated Jaguar to pay Duff's costs, expenses, and attorney fees under section 1794, subdivision (d) as determined by agreement or noticed motion; in accepting the offer, Duff would have to dismiss the complaint against Jaguar with prejudice. ( Id .) Duff did not accept, and then was awarded nominal damages of $1 after a bench trial. ( Id .) The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial courts finding that that the 998 was not sufficiently specific because the 998 offer provided that Jaguar would repurchase the vehicle for $28,430.80 or greater than that amount if Duff provide[d] documentation to show the amount is more than $28,430.80. ( Duff, supra , 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 496.) The Court of Appeal explained that the offer presents somewhat of a moving target, and it did not allow for a clear determination of what would constitute a greater recovery at trial. ( Id . at p. 500.) The Court of Appeal rejected Jaguars argument that at the very least, its offer provided a floor to which the court could compare what Duff received at trial. ( Duff, supra , 74 Cal.App.5th 500.) Here, Plaintiff argues that that Defendants First 998 Offer suffers from the same lack of specificity as the offer in Duff . Specifically, the 998 Offer contained the following relevant terms: 2. As an alternative to the amount in paragraph 1 above, pursuant to Civil Code Section 1793.2(d)(1) and subject to proof, AHM will pay Plaintiff the past amounts which Plaintiff has paid for the Subject Vehicle . . . 3. . . . Plaintiff is invited to submit an itemization of the amounts paid for the Subject Vehicle at the time this offer is accepted together with proof of same. 4. If there is a dispute as to the legal entitlement and/or the amounts recoverable in paragraphs 2 and 3 above [stating categories of damages without any dollar amounts attributed] after submission of the itemization and proof of the same&AHM will allow the Court to determine, either by motion, bench trial, jury trial, expedited jury trial under Rule 3.1545 of the Rules of Court&with Plaintiff bearing the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. (Kirnos Decl., Ex. BB.) Here, the First 998 Offer language is inadequate because it is not sufficiently specific to allow Plaintiff to evaluate the worth of the offer. The language in the offer that Plaintiff highlights creates an alternative offer. Like Duff, Defendant here offers a choice of $47,000, or greater than that amount. Defendant Honda proposes, as the court in Duff found, a moving target. ( Duff, supra, 74 Cal.App.5 th at p. 500.) As such, the First 998 Offer cannot limit Plaintiffs entitlement to attorney fees post April 4, 2023. Attorney Fee Amounts Hourly Rate: Defendant first argues that Plaintiffs attorneys hourly rates are unreasonable. In assessing the reasonableness of hourly billing rates,¿the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees [citation], the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied [citations], and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases.¿( 569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. ¿(2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 437; see¿ Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A. ¿(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 272 [ a reasonable hourly rate is the product of a multiplicity of factors&[including] the level of skill necessary, time limitations, the amount to be obtained in the litigation, the attorneys reputation, and the undesirability of the case ].)¿ Here, Defendant argues the rates sought are excessive for this standard lemon law case. Specifically, Defendant argues Plaintiff provides no competent evidence to show a client paying a market rate for the hourly services of those attorneys for prosecuting an action of this nature. As a preliminary matter, a determination of reasonable rates does not require a showing that a client actually paid the attorney fees at the rates. ( Chacon v. Litke (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1260 [ The reasonable market value of the attorney's services is the measure of a reasonable hourly rate. [Citations.] This standard applies regardless of whether the attorneys claiming fees charge nothing for their services, charge at below-market or discounted rates, represent the client on a straight contingent fee basis, or are in-house counsel. [Citations.] ].) Moreover, the hourly rates are reasonable. A review of the Kirnos Declaration in support of the motion for attorneys fees which contains the descriptions of each attorneys education and experience supports finding Plaintiffs attorneys hourly rates ranging from $350 to $550 are reasonable; the rates are supported by substantial evidence under the present circumstances. (Kirnos Decl., ¶¶ 30-49.) Based on the Court's familiarity with the current local market, and Plaintiffs evidence of the experience and skills of the various attorneys Plaintiffs requested rates per hour are reasonable. Number of Hours Incurred: Defendant also challenges the hours incurred, arguing that the amounts are excessive, duplicative, and/or otherwise unreasonable. Defendants opposition challenges Plaintiffs specific billing entries. (Hancox Decl., ¶ 17, Ex. A.) The Opposition argues generally that the billing records are replete with block billing, overinflated billing, and excessive billing. (Opp., 7:26-9:14.) The Court will address these challenges by general categories. ( Karton v. Ari Design & Construction, Inc. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 734, 744 [A trial court is not required to state each charge it finds reasonable or unreasonable. A reduced award might be fully justified by a general observation that an attorney overlitigated a case.].) Discovery Related Tasks : Plaintiffs counsel expended numerous hours preparing and responding to discovery. However, the nature of these discovery tasks did not warrant the time incurred based on the skill of the legal professionals performing these tasks. That is, while the Court did not reduce the hourly rate of the attorneys above, these higher hourly rates impose a greater expectation of the skill and experience by which these attorneys perform tasks such that number of hours incurred should be reduced. As such, many of these discovery related entries are excessive. ( See e.g., Kirnos Decl., Ex. A [See 10/28/22, 11/28/22, 7/25/25, 7/26/24, 8/26/24, 11/6/ 24.) In reviewing the time expended for discovery related tasks the Court will reduce the number of hours incurred by 8.3 hours. Applying a blended attorney rate of $430, [1] this reduction amounts to $3,569. Trial Preparation and Motions in Limine : By the Courts review, an excessive number of hours were incurred preparing this case for trial. ( See e.g., Kirnos Decl., Ex. A [11/18/24, 11/22/24, 11/27/24, 12/2/24].) Given the counsels experience in litigation of this nature, these amounts are excessive. The Court will reduce these hours by 2.6 ($1,118). Inter-office communications : Defendant identifies numerous inter-office communications. Generally, such attorney fees are recoverable and reasonably necessary to the litigation. Here, however, the numerous interoffice communications are reflective of the inherent inefficiencies of staffing sixteen (18) different billers on this matter. (See Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 38 [In evaluating whether the attorney fee request is reasonable, the trial court should consider whether the case was overstaffed, how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expended.]; Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 272 [finding that simultaneous representation by multiple law firms posed substantial risks of task padding, over-conferencing, attorney stacking (multiple attendance by attorneys at the same court functions), and excessive research].) Therefore, f ees incurred for duplicative/inefficient work will be reduced by 2.7 hours ($1,161.) Attorney Fee Motion : Plaintiff seeks approximately 13.9 hours for this attorney fee motion. Although the number of hours incurred by attorneys, of course, vary in each case, Plaintiffs legal arguments and the opposition argument are not unique and are substantially similar to the issues raised in any other lemon law attorney fee motion Plaintiffs counsel would have filed. Thus, the amounts incurred here are excessive. The Court will reduce these hours by 6.2 hours ($2,666.) The Court will reduce the fees requested by Plaintiff as follows: Reductions Total Original Lodestar Amount $50,418.50 Discovery-Related Entries $ 3,569 Trial Preparation $1,118 Inter-office communications $1,161 Attorney Fee Motion $2,666 Reduced Lodestar Amount $8,514 $ 41,904.50 Multiplier adjustment Finally, Plaintiff seeks a .5 lodestar multiplier based on the risk of taking on the case on contingency, and the delay in payment of attorney fees. Relevant factors to determine whether an enhancement is appropriate include (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. ( Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.) Admittedly, this matter was taken on contingency (Kirnos Decl., ¶ 9) a factor that supports the application of a multiplier. However, this was a garden variety Song-Beverly case; there were no novel or difficult questions presented. ( Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 834.) Further, the¿contingent risks, skill, and difficulty¿Plaintiffs attorneys¿assert are absorbed by¿their¿already high (albeit reasonable) hourly rates. (See¿ Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California. Inc. ¿(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 822.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs request for a lodestar multiplier is denied. II. Motion to Tax Costs Legal Standard The prevailing party is entitled to recover costs for suit in any action or proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (b); Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 606.) Prevailing party includes the party with a net monetary recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4).) Recoverable costs shall be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(2).) If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. ( Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn . (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 774.) Verification of the memorandum of costs by the prevailing partys attorney establishes a prima facie showing that the claimed costs are proper.¿(See Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1267 [There is no requirement that copies of bills, invoices, statements, or any other such documents be attached to the memorandum.].) Mere conclusory assertions are insufficient to rebut a prima facie showing by the prevailing party. ( Rappenecker v. Sea-Land Service, Inc. (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 256, 266.) On the other hand, if the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs. [Citations.] Whether a cost item was reasonably necessary to the litigation presents a question of fact for the trial court and its decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion. ( Ladas , supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 774.) Discussion Defendant moves for an order that Plaintiffs Memorandum of Costs in the amount of $7,070.10 be taxed in the sum of $2,953.25. Item No. 5 Service of Process: Defendant seeks to tax Plaintiffs costs of $583.25 for service on the Custodians of Records of Moss Brothers Honda and DCH Gardena Honda on the grounds there is no proof of any actual service. In opposition, Plaintiff submits invoices showing these costs were actually incurred as to NRC Legal Support, LLC. (Cutler Decl., Ex. A.) Moreover, Plaintiffs evidence also indicate that this cost was reasonably necessary to the litigation, as well. (Culter Decl., ¶ 5.) The motion to tax this costs is denied. Item No. 11 Models, Blowups, and Photocopies of Exhibits: Plaintiff asserts $ 383.64 in costs for Exhibit Binders. Defendant challenges this amount on the grounds that Plaintiff submits this amount without specifying any costs for any particular items, without separating costs for specific binders, and without attaching any invoice or receipt. (Mot., 5:4-7.) In opposition, Plaintiff merely asserts that Department 58 requires trial binders, but submits no receipts. (Culter Decl., ¶ 6.) In light of Defendants assertion that binders are routinely recycled between cases and the absence of any receipts, the motion to tax this costs is granted. Item No. 12 Court Reporter Fees: Plaintiffs claim $993.00 in court reporters fees as costs for hearings on 9/28/22 ($618) and on 12/3/24 ($375). Defendant asserts that based on these dates the court reporters were to be present at a hearing on a motion for leave to amend and a Final Status Conference. Although the Court did not order court reporters present at these hearings, Section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(11) includes court reporter fees as established by statute among the items allowable as costs. Thus, these costs are generally allowable. Defendant further challenges these costs noting that the 12/3/24 cost for $375 was incurred for a late cancellation. However, it appears that the late cancellation court reporter fee was incurred because Plaintiff accepted Defendants 998 offer the day before; as such, the cost remains reasonably necessary to the litigation where there was upcoming hearing which was cancelled because of settlement. Thus, the motion to tax these costs is denied. Item No. 13 Other Costs: Plaintiffs seek $759.61 for Attorney Services and Messengers for Court Filings and Service. Costs for courier or messenger fees, although not specifically enumerated as allowable costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5(a), may still be recoverable in the trial court's discretion if reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation. ( FoothillDe Anza Community College Dist. v. Emerich (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 11, 30.) Here, Plaintiff substantiates the $759.61 for incurred courier fees. (Culter Decl., ¶ 8, Ex. A.) Further, Plaintiff represents that they paid companies commonly used by law firms to perform certain tasks for the purpose of filing court documents. ( Culter Decl., ¶ 8, Ex. A.) Plaintiffs use of a messenger delivery services to serve court records constitutes a reasonable and necessary cost of conducting litigation. The motion to tax these costs is denied. Plaintiff also seeks $260 for Court Appearance Professionals. Defendant argues it should not bear the cost of this convenience to Plaintiffs attorneys. However, these costs are significantly lower than Plaintiffs counsels attorney fees; t hus, these costs were reasonable and necessary and ultimately to Defendants benefit. (Culter Decl., ¶ 8.) The motion to tax these costs is denied. Finally, Plaintiff claims $4 for Minute Orders costs. Plaintiffs opposition does not address this cost. Thus, the motion to strike is granted as to these costs in the amount of $ 4 . Conclusion The motion for attorneys fees and costs is granted in part. In sum, the Court grants Plaintiffs request for attorneys fees in the reduced total amount of $ 41,904.50, which is a reduction of the lodestar amount by $ 8,514 . The motion to strike is granted in the total amount of $387.64. Plaintiffs counsel also requests attorney fees in the amount of $2,750.00 for opposing this motion. (Culter Decl., ¶¶ 10-12.) The request for these opposition fees is granted in the reduced amount of $1,350. Defendants American Honda Motor Co., Inc. is ordered to pay to Plaintiffs counsel the sum of $49,940.96 ($43,254.50 + $6,686.46) for attorneys fees and costs. This amount shall be paid on or before August 14, 2025. [1] The Court reached this blended rate by multiplying the hourly rate of each attorney involved in a case by the hours they worked, then added up those totals and divided by the total hours incurred for the entire case, essentially giving the Court a single rate representing the combined cost of all attorneys working on the matter based on their workload. The math was as follows: 48,088/111.7=430.5.

Case Number: 24CHCV02231 Hearing Date: July 15, 2025 Dept: F47 Dept. F47 Date: 7/15/25 Case #24CHCV02231 MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES (Requests for Admission, Set 1) Motion filed on 4/18/25. MOVING PARTY: Defendant Vineyards at Porter Ranch RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Marlene Barrie Naumann NOTICE: ok RELIEF REQUESTED : An order compelling Plaintiff Marlene Barrie Naumann to serve supplemental responses to Defendant Vineyards at Porter Ranch Requests for Admission Nos. 6-9 and Form Interrogatory No. 17.1 in relation to each of these requests. RULING : The motion is denied. SUMMARY OF ACTION & PROCEDURAL HISTORY This action arises out of a trip and fall incident that occurred on 4/12/24 when Plaintiff Marlene Barrie Naumann (Plaintiff) was entering Guss BBQ restaurant which is located on Defendant Vineyards at Porter Ranchs (Defendant/Doe 1) property. ( See Complaint). Plaintiff alleges that her shoe got stuck in a crack in the floor causing her to trip and fall resulting in severe injuries. Id . Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to warn her of the dangerous condition or take any action to protect its paying guests such as Plaintiff despite having actual and/or constructive notice of the dangerous condition due to the length of time of its presence on the property. Id . On 6/18/24, Plaintiff filed this action alleging causes of action for: (1) Premises Liability (Negligence, Willful Failure to Warn) and (2) General Negligence. Plaintiffs spouse, William George Naumann also makes a claim for loss of consortium. On 12/5/25, Defendant propounded Requests for Admission, Set 1, on Plaintiff. (Victor Decl., Ex.A). On 1/27/25, Plaintiff served responses to the discovery. ( Id ., Ex.B). In response to Requests for Admissions Nos. 6-9 which asked Plaintiff to admit that Defendant did not willfully or maliciously fail to warn or guard against a dangerous condition, Plaintiff stated that she was Unable to Admit or Deny at this time. Discovery continues. Id . On 2/12/25, Defendant sent a meet and confer letter to Plaintiff stating the responses were insufficient because Plaintiff needed to state the reason she is unable to Admit or Deny. ( Id ., Ex.C). On 3/19/25, Plaintiff served further responses to the Requests for Admissions which stated that after a reasonable inquiry, Plaintiff did not have sufficient information to admit or deny the requests. (Victor Decl., Ex.D). On 3/26/25, Defendant sent another meet and confer letter which contended that the responses to Requests 6-9 were still deficient. ( Id ., Ex.E). After additional meet and confer efforts, Plaintiff refused to further supplement her responses to Requests 6-9. ( Id ., Ex.F-H). Therefore, on 4/18/25, Defendant filed and served the instant motion which seeks an order compelling Plaintiff to serve supplemental responses to Defendants Requests for Admission Nos. 6-9 and Form Interrogatory No. 17.1 in relation to each of these requests. Plaintiff has opposed the motion and Defendant has filed a reply to the opposition. ANALYSIS CCP 2033.220 provides: (a) Each answer in a response to requests for admission shall be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits. (b) Each answer shall: (1) Admit so much of the matter involved in the request as is true, either as expressed in the request itself or as reasonably and clearly qualified by the responding party. (2) Deny so much of the matter involved in the request as is untrue. (3) Specify so much of the matter involved in the request as to the truth of which the responding party lacks sufficient information or knowledge. (c) If a responding party gives lack of information or knowledge as a reason for a failure to admit all or part of a request for admission, that party shall state in the answer that a reasonable inquiry concerning the matter in the particular request has been made, and that the information known or readily obtainable is insufficient to enable that party to admit the matter. The subject requests ask Plaintiff to: Admit VINEYARDS did not willfully fail to guard against an alleged dangerous condition present on April 12, 2024 at 20179 Rinaldi St., Suite 150, Porter Ranch, CA 91326. (RFA 6) Admit VINEYARDS did not willfully fail to warn YOU of an alleged dangerous condition present on April 12, 2024 at 20179 Rinaldi St., Suite 150, Porter Ranch, CA 91326. (RFA 7) Admit VINEYARDS did not maliciously fail to guard against an alleged dangerous condition present on April 12, 2024 at 20179 Rinaldi St., Suite 150, Porter Ranch, CA 91326. (RFA 8) Admit VINEYARDS did not maliciously fail to warn YOU of an alleged dangerous condition present on April 12, 2024 at 20179 Rinaldi St., Suite 150, Porter Ranch, CA 91326. (RFA 9) Plaintiff ultimately responded to each of the foregoing requests that [a] reasonable inquiry has been made, and the information known or readily obtainable is insufficient to enable Plaintiff to admit or deny the matter. Defendants contention that the responses are insufficient because they fail to specify so much of the matter involved in the requests as to the truth of which Plaintiff lacks sufficient information or knowledge is without merit. Contrary to Defendants assertion, the Court does not find that CCP 2033.220(b)(3) requires Plaintiff to identify whether Plaintiff has insufficient information to admit or deny even the existence of a dangerous condition, especially in light of the fact that Plaintiff denied other requests for admission in the set that asked her to admit that there was no dangerous condition, that Defendant did not fail to guard against a dangerous condition and Defendant did not fail to warn Plaintiff of a dangerous condition. ( See Victor Decl., Ex.B responses to RFAs Nos. 3, 4, 5; Reply, p.2:13-15). To the extent Defendant contends that a further response is warranted because Plaintiffs claim that she made a reasonable inquiry is not credible based on Plaintiffs responses to other discovery is also without merit. ( See Reply, p.3:11-p.4:17). The subject requests essentially request that Plaintiff admit or deny Defendants (or its employees/agents) state of mind (i.e., that they acted willfully or maliciously). If Plaintiff claims to not have sufficient information to admit or deny the requests after making a reasonable inquiry, the Court cannot force Plaintiff to change her response to the subject requests. Additionally, the fact that Plaintiff contends that Defendant had actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition and that it existed for a protracted period of time does not necessarily mean that Defendant acted willfully or maliciously in failing to warn of same or remedy the alleged defect. Rather, such a determination seems to be a question of fact based on all of the facts and circumstances available. If Defendant believes that Plaintiff has given inconsistent discovery responses, Defendant can use such evidence in defense of Plaintiffs claims. The motion is also procedurally defective in that it improperly combines a motion to compel further responses to the above-mentioned requests for admissions with a motion to compel further responses to Form Interrogatory 17.1 in relation to those requests. ( See Notice of Motion, p.2:6-9). Defendant fails to address Plaintiffs responses to Form Interrogatory 17.1 in relation to these requests in the memorandum of points and authorities or the accompanying separate statement. Form Interrogatory 17.1 provides: Is your response to each request for admission served with these interrogatories an unqualified admission? If not, for each response that is not an unqualified admission: (a) state the number of the request; (b) state all facts upon which you base your response; (c) state the names, ADDRESSES, and telephone numbers of all PERSONS who have knowledge of those facts; and (d) identify all DOCUMENTS and other tangible things that support your response and state the name, ADDRESS, and telephone number of the PERSON who has each DOCUMENT or thing. Since Plaintiffs responses to the subject requests were not unqualified admissions, Plaintiff was required to respond to Form Interrogatory 17.1 in relation thereto. Defendant has given no indication as to what Plaintiffs responses to Form Interrogatory 17.1 were in relation to Requests for Admissions 6, 7, 8 and/or 9. As such, the Court cannot determine whether a further response to Form Interrogatory 17.1 in relation to the requests is warranted. CONCLUSION The motion is denied.

Case Number: 23STCV16700 Hearing Date: July 16, 2025 Dept: 45 CODY RICH v. BARNEY'S BEANERY PASADENA, et al. plaintiffs motion to quash defendants subpoenas to dog hause biergarten, dog hause worldwide llc and kings row gastro pub Date of Hearing: July 16, 2025 Trial Date: March 23, 2026 Department: 45 Case No.: 23STCV16700 Moving Party: Plaintiffs Cody Rich Responding Party: Defendant Barneys Pasadena Ltd. BACKGROUND This action involves employment discrimination and wrongful termination. Plaintiff Cody Rich filed a complaint against Defendants Barneys Beanery Pasadena, Barneys Worldwide Inc., Barneys Pasadena Ltd, A.J. Sacher, Vivian Ramirez, Josh Awuma and Kiana Fanning for several violations under the Fair Employment and Housing Act, California Labor Code, California Business & Professions Code, and California Civil Code. On April 15, 2024, Plaintiff dismissed Kiana Fanning as to the second, third and fifth causes of action. [Tentative] Ruling Plaintiffs Motion to Quash Defendants Subpoenas to Dog Hause Biergarten, Dog Hause Worldwide LLC and Kings Row Gastro Pub is DENIED discussion Plaintiff moves this court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1 for an order quashing three deposition subpoenas issued by Defendant Barneys Pasadena Ltd. Demanding records of Plaintiffs personal financial transactions from Dog Haus Biergarten, Dog Hause Worldwide LLC and Kings Row Gastro Pub, all dated May 27, 2025. Plaintiff seeks to quash the subpoenas on the ground the subpoenas improperly seek video surveillance, photos and transaction records concerning Plaintiffs personal financial affairs and activity concerning his patronage of these establishments. Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1 states that [i]f a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the courts own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. (CCP § 1987.1(a).) In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person. ( Id. ) Subdivision (b) provides that a party may make a motion pursuant to subdivision (a). ( Id. , § 1987.1(b).) The subpoenas demand records and video footage for the periods April 1, 2022, through June 12, 2022, April 30, 2022, and June 4, 2022. Plaintiff argues this window exceeds the time frame the court previously authorized as discoverable in an attempt to get around the courts prior orders as to Plaintiffs personal financial affairs and activities. Plaintiff contends by issuing three identical subpoenas directly to merchants Plaintiff patronized, Defendants are seeking the very same personal financial and location-based information in videos, photos and transaction records through alternate and more invasive means. Plaintiff acknowledges the issue of their slander claim but contends records from Plaintiffs banks, credit and debit cards on June 3, 2022 have already been produced per the courts order and do not show any June 3, 2022 transaction from any of the subpoenaed merchants. Moreover, Plaintiff argues he has a privacy interest in his financial affairs and activities related to the records of transactions with merchants that he patronizes. The court notes Plaintiffs contention that these subpoenas were also meant to harass Plaintiff as they contain an Americas Most Wanted-style photo array including photos of him. In opposition, Defendants argue the subpoenas do not seek any documents that are protected by any right of privacy or are otherwise confidential. Specifically, there are no privacy issues in records maintained by the restaurant open to the public and frequented by Plaintiff on the days he worked for Barney's. Even considering Plaintiffs privacy argument, Defendants argue there are clearly legitimate and important interests in disclosure of Plaintiffs consumption of alcohol. By alleging he was wrongfully terminated from his employment, Plaintiff has in effect tendered the issue of whether that termination was legitimate (i.e., that Plaintiff was fired because he had been drinking on the job) or that it was pretextual or retaliatory. Defendants also argue that the weeks before/after June 2, 2022 are still relevant because it could provide further justification for, and at least a partial defense of, his termination which Plaintiff claims was wrongful. Lastly, Defendants allege Plaintiff failed to include a separate statement and did not sufficiently meet and confer. Defendants note they are willing to limit Subpoenas Request No. 4 to the specific dates worked by Plaintiff at Barney's and his termination date between April 1, 2022-June 12, 2022 as follows: 4/1/22, 4/2/22, 4/3/22, 4/4/22, 4/8/22, 4/9/22, 4/10/22, 4/15/22, 4/16/22, 4/22/22, 4/23/22, 4/24/22, 4/29/22, 4/30/22, 5/1/22, 5/6/22, 5/7 /22, 5/8/22, 5/13/22/ 5/14/22, 5/15/22, 5/21 /22, 5/22/22, 5/27 /22, 5/28/22/5/29/22, 6/3/22, 6/4/22, 6/5/22, 6/10/22. First, the court notes no separate statement was required under the California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1345. As noted by Plaintiff, Rule 3.1345(a)(5) is for production of documents or tangible things at a deposition. Moreover, regardless of whether the meet and confer was sufficient, the court believes the parties have reached an impasse regarding the issue. Regardless, the court denies the motion to quash. The court believes there is still a substantial privacy right; however, because truth is an affirmative defense, the burden is on the employer in a common law defamation action to prove the allegedly defamatory matter is true. (See Ringler Assocs. Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1165, 1180.) As such, there is a compelling interest in the documents and video surveillance sought. Additionally, the court notes the previous rulings do not limit the discovery sought in this instance. The court agrees the subpoenas should be limited to specific dates worked by Plaintiff at Barney's and his termination date. Accordingly, Sanctions Plaintiff seeks $4,387.50 against Barneys Beanery and/or its attorneys Rod Lewin and Allyson Wittner of the Law Offices of Rodney T. Lewin for having to bring this motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2. The court DENIES the request.

Case Number: 25STCV09343 Hearing Date: July 16, 2025 Dept: 54 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Soon Bok Choi, Plaintiff, Case No.: 25STCV09343 vs. Tentative Ruling Hae Sook Kim, Defendant. Hearing Date: July 16, 2025 Department 54, Judge Maurice Leiter Demurrer to Complaint Moving Party : Defendant Hae Sook Kim Responding Party : Plaintiff Soon Bok Choi T/R : DEFENDANT'S DEMURRER IS SUSTAINED. PLAINTIFF TO FILE AND SERVE A FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHIN 30 DAYS OF NOTICE OF RULING. DEFENDANT TO FILE AND SERVE A RESPONSE WITHIN 30 DAYS THEREAFTER. DEFENDANT TO NOTICE If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing. The Court considers the moving papers, opposition, and reply. BACKGROUND On April 1, 2025, Plaintiff Soon Bok Choi filed a complaint against Defendant Hae Sook Kim for defamation. Plaintiff alleges Defendant falsely accused Plaintiff of embezzlement in the "Sudo Girls' High School Southern California Alumni Association" group chat on the KakaoTalk platform. ANALYSIS A demurrer to a complaint may be taken to the whole complaint or to any of the causes of action in it. (CCP § 430.50(a).) A demurrer challenges only the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not the truth of its factual allegations or the plaintiff's ability to prove those allegations. ( Picton v. Anderson Union High Sch. Dist. (1996) 50 Cal. App. 4th 726, 732.) The court must treat as true the complaint's material factual allegations, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. ( Id. at 732-33.) The complaint is to be construed liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated. ( Id. at 733.) Defendant demurs to the complaint on the grounds that it fails to statute sufficient facts and is uncertain. The Court agrees. Plaintiff alleges Defendant defamed her by posting seven cases of manipulation and defamation through Jeong-soon Park (college number 28) in the group Kakao Talk chat room. Despite the $540 related to the commemorative embossment being proven to be false, the defendant continued to accuse the plaintiff of embezzlement. In addition, the defendant further damaged the plaintiff's reputation by making derogatory and mocking remarks against the plaintiff who is still serving as the chairman of the general association and has not been relieved of his position. Plaintiff also attaches screenshots of the alleged defamatory statements, but they are written in Korean. Plaintiff has not identified the alleged defamatory statements in the complaint, instead only generally alleging that Defendant made accusations of embezzlement and derogatory and mocking remarks. This is insufficient to support Plaintiffs claims for defamation. ( Comstock v. Aber (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 931, 948 [To plead a cause of action for slander, the plaintiff must set forth either the specific words or the substance of the allegedly defamatory statements.]) Defendants demurrer is SUSTAINED. Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Soon Bok Choi, Plaintiff, Case No.: 25STCV09343 vs. Tentative Ruling Hae Sook Kim, Defendant. Hearing Date: July 16, 2025 Department 54, Judge Maurice Leiter Anti-SLAPP Motion Moving Party : Defendant Hae Sook Kim Responding Party : Plaintiff Soon Bok Choi T/R : DEFENDANT'S ANTI-SLAPP MOTION IS DENIED. DEFENDANT TO NOTICE If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing. The Court considers the moving papers, opposition, and reply. BACKGROUND On April 1, 2025, Plaintiff Soon Bok Choi filed a complaint against Defendant Hae Sook Kim for defamation. Plaintiff alleges Defendant falsely accused Plaintiff of embezzlement in the "Sudo Girls' High School Southern California Alumni Association" group chat on the KakaoTalk platform. ANALYSIS In ruling on a special motion to strike pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, or anti-SLAPP motion, the court applies a two-prong test. First, the court determines whether the moving defendant has met his or her burden to establish that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity. ( Equilon Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 66.) The moving defendant meets this burden by demonstrating that the act or acts of which the plaintiff complains were taken in furtherance of the [defendant]'s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue, as defined in the statute. ( Id .) The court then moves to the second prong, in which the burden shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits of the complaint. ( Id .) To establish such a probability, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited. ( Matson v. Dvorak (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 539, 548.) Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statutei.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal meritis a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute. ( Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89.) A. Protected Activity Defendant asserts that the complaint arises from Defendants protected speech activity. A claim is subject to the antiSLAPP statute under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(3) if it is an act in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue as including: (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest . (Italics added.) To come within section 425.16, a statement must not only be made in a place open to the public or a public forum, it must also be made in connection with an issue of public interest. ( Nygard, Inc. v. UusiKerttula (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1039.) Courts have held that comments relating to an elected officials fitness to serve involve matters of public interest. (See e.g. Cabrera v. Alam (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1077.) Here, the alleged defamatory statements relate to Plaintiffs fitness to serve as President of the Alumni Association and were made in the "Sudo Girls' High School Southern California Alumni Association" group chat on the KakaoTalk platform. In opposition to the motion, Plaintiff represents that 250 alumni are members of the group chat. The Court finds that the alleged defamatory statements concern matters of public interest made in a public forum. Defendant has met the burden to establish the complaint arises from protected activity. The burden shifts to Plaintiff to establish a probability of success on the merits. B. Probability of Success on the Merits To establish such a probability, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited. ( Matson, supra 40 Cal.App.4th at 548.) Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statutei.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal meritis a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute. ( Navellier, supra 29 Cal.4th at 89.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish a probability of success on the merits because Plaintiff cannot identify a false statement of fact for defamation and because any of the alleged communications are protected by the common interest privilege. Plaintiff alleges Defendant defamed her by posting seven cases of manipulation and defamation through Jeong-soon Park (college number 28) in the group Kakao Talk chat room. Despite the $540 related to the commemorative embossment being proven to be false, the defendant continued to accuse the plaintiff of embezzlement. In addition, the defendant further damaged the plaintiff's reputation by making derogatory and mocking remarks against the plaintiff who is still serving as the chairman of the general association and has not been relieved of his position. Plaintiff also attaches screenshots of the alleged defamatory statements, but they are written in Korean. In opposition, Plaintiff asserts that the defamatory statements were made in a document titled Evaluation of President Yoon that was posted in the group chat and included accusations that Plaintiff embezzled $10,000.00 in membership dues, $1,000.00 in commemorative blankets and $540.00 in plaques. These are statements of fact that, if false, are defamatory. Civil Code section 47, subdivision (c)(1) provides in relevant part: A privileged publication or broadcast is one made: [¶] ... [¶] (c) In a communication, without malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by one who is also interested.... Under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (c), defendant generally bears the initial burden of establishing that the statement in question was made on a privileged occasion, and thereafter the burden shifts to plaintiff to establish that the statement was made with malice. ( Bikkina v. Mahadevan (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 70, 90.) The statements at issue here were made by an interested party to other interested parties. Though Plaintiff does not specifically argue that the statements were made with malice, Plaintiff represents that Defendant made false statements accusing her of illegal acts, called her a thief, urged others to avoid communicating with her and ultimately installed herself as President after falsely removing Plaintiff has president. This is sufficient at this stage to show malice. Defendants anti-SLAPP is DENIED.

Case Number: 25SMCV01662 Hearing Date: July 17, 2025 Dept: 207 TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT 207 HEARING DATE July 17, 2025 CASE NUMBER 25SMCV01662 MOTIONS Demurrer to Amended Complaint MOVING PARTY Defendant The Galileo Foundation US Inc. OPPOSING PARTY Plaintiff Gina Otto MOTION This case arises from allegations that Plaintiff Gina Otto (Plaintiff) was inadequately compensated for her work for Defendant The Galileo Foundation US Inc. (Defendant). The operative First Amended Complaint (FAC) alleges three causes of action for (1) breach of oral or implied-in-fact contract; (2) quantum meruit; and (3) quasi-contract restitution/unjust enrichment. Defendant now demurs to all three causes of action on the grounds that they fail to state facts sufficient to constitute causeS of action and uncertainty pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivisions (e) and (f), respectively. Plaintiff opposes the demurrer and Defendant replies. ANALYSIS 1. DEMURRER It is black letter law that a demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint. ( Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) In testing the sufficiency of a cause of action, a court accepts [a]s true all material facts properly pled and matters which may be judicially noticed but disregard contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [A court also gives] the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. ( 290 Division (EAT), LLC v. City & County of San Francisco (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 439, 450 [cleaned up]; Hacker v. Homeward Residential, Inc . (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 270, 280 [in considering the merits of a demurrer, however, the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be].) Further, in ruling on a demurrer, a court must liberally construe the allegations of the complaint with a view to substantial justice between the parties. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) This rule of liberal construction means that the reviewing court draws inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the defendant. ( Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.) In summary, [d]etermining whether the complaint is sufficient as against the demurrer on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the rule is that if on consideration of all the facts stated it appears the plaintiff is entitled to any relief at the hands of the court against the defendants the complaint will be held good although the facts may not be clearly stated, or may be intermingled with a statement of other facts irrelevant to the cause of action shown, or although the plaintiff may demand relief to which he is not entitled under the facts alleged. ( Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 639.) A. UNCERTAINTY [D]emurrers for uncertainty are disfavored. ( Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.) A demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the pleading is so bad that the responding party cannot reasonably respond - i.e., he or she cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what claims are directed against him or her. ( Khoury v. Malys of California (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Where a demurrer is made upon the ground of uncertainty, the demurrer must distinctly specify exactly how or why the pleading is uncertain, and where such uncertainty appears by reference to page and line numbers. (See Fenton v. Groveland Comm. Services Dist. (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 797, 809.) Defendant argues that the Complaint is uncertain, because at best, it alleges an agreement to agree, which is not actionable. But the proper legal interpretation of the allegations is a separate matter from whether the allegations are so deficient that Defendant cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied or what claims are directed against it. Therefore, because Defendant does not demonstrate that any portions of the Complaint are so flawed that Defendant cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied or what claims are directed against it, the Court declines to sustain Defendants demurrer on uncertainty. B. FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION i. Statute of Limitations Defendant demurs to all causes of action on the grounds that the statute of limitations for oral contracts and for quasi-contractual claims is two years. Defendant contends that the claims accrued by October of 2022, when the October Summit Plaintiff worked on was hosted at the Vatican. Yet, Plaintiff did not file the instant lawsuit until April 1, 2025. Plaintiff counters that the claims did not accrue until June 2023, when it became clear that Defendant would not pay Plaintiff in response to the original invoice she submitted to Defendant in mid-April 2023 and the updated invoice Plaintiff submitted to Defendant on May 24, 2023. Here, Plaintiff alleges: 55. When Ms. Otto communicated her dismay about Mr. McCaffreywho had still not held up his end of the bargain to pay herand emphasized the work she performed for the May Event and October Summit, Ms. Doughty recalled a recent conversation with Mr. McCaffrey where she told him, Listen, just pay her up. Pay her. And thats it and end this thing. Just pay her! Mr. McCaffrey purportedly responded to Ms. Doughty, telling her that Ms. Otto needed to first sign the contract he sent over. He then acknowledged that he knew that he, and Defendant, had to pay Ms. Otto for her work. 56. In late October 2022, Ms. Doughty again agreed that Ms. Otto should be paid for the work Ms. Otto performed, writing that she was waiting for [Ms. Otto] and [her] payment in response to a message from Ms. Otto that reiterated that Mr. McCaffrey needed to pay her. McCaffrey himself expressed this, writing to Ms. Otto that the foundation is grateful you [sic] for your help and assistance and we wish to honor that in an appropriate way. [&] 60. On November 8, 2022, while Ms. Otto reviewed the independent contractor agreement with a member of her legal team, she received a $40,000 wire in her bank account from Defendant Galileo Foundation US Inc. for her work towards the May Event despite not signing the independent contractor agreement. 61. Over the next several months, Ms. Otto continued her attempts to receive proper compensation for her work for the October Summit from Defendant. 62. Ms. Doughty, on behalf of Defendant, requested directly that Ms. Otto prepare an invoice for the Galileo Foundation that detailed the work she performed for the October Summit, along with the fair market value of that work. This request for an invoice followed the parties prior course of dealing, i.e., when Mr. McCaffrey, on behalf of Defendant on September 30, 2022, made the exact same request for an invoice that detailed the work Ms. Otto performed for the May Event. Moreover, it is industry standard for individuals, like Ms. Otto, to provide invoices for her work before receiving payment. 63. While preparing the invoice for the October Summit, Ms. Otto kept in constant communication with Ms. Doughty. Ms. Doughty assured Ms. Otto that she would present the invoice to the Board and support Ms. Ottos effort to receive appropriate compensation for her work. 64. Ms. Otto also learned through Ms. Doughty and the senior project manager at the Galileo Foundation that Mr. McCaffreys actions were par for the course and that Mr. McCaffrey had a track record of not upholding his end of agreements and threatening those who challenged him. 65. On February 20, 2023, after Ms. Otto stated that the invoice needed to be vetted by American and European industry experts to ensure that the amount of money she would request would be accurate and reflect the fair market value of her work, Ms. Doughty responded, Ok hurry cause Im waiting on you. 66. On April 16, 2023, Ms. Otto informed Ms. Doughty that the invoice was nearing completion and that she planned on sending it to Ms. Doughty no later than Tuesday, April 18, 2023. Ms. Doughty responded, Ok. 67. On April 17, 2023, Ms. Otto texted Ms. Doughty that she should receive the invoice the following day. Per their conversation, Ms. Otto prepared two versions of the invoice: one for Ms. Doughty and another for the Board. The one prepared for Ms. Doughty included a higher total of compensation. Ms. Doughty was to inform the Board that Ms. Otto had asked for a higher amount, but that Ms. Doughty convinced her to come to a lesser amount. When told this information, Ms. Doughty replied, Ok super. 68. Ms. Doughty confirmed receipt of the invoices. The two then agreed to send a copy of an invoice to Mr. McCaffrey himself upon Ms. Doughtys suggestion. On April 23, 2023, Ms. Otto asked Ms. Doughty for Mr. McCaffreys address so that she, personally, could send him the invoice. She told Ms. Doughty, I delivered. I want to be paid. & I will send him the invoice. Send me the address. 69. Ms. Doughty responded to Ms. Ottos message with a voice memo, distancing herself from the situation. She told Ms. Otto that Mr. McCaffrey liaised with Ms. Otto, and that she had not. She stated that Ms. Otto, therefore, had to confront Mr. McCaffrey with her invoice. 70. Ms. Otto again asked Ms. Doughty for Mr. McCaffreys address on April 24, May 17, and May 18, 2023. Ms. Doughty never provided the address. 71. On May 24, 2023, Ms. Otto informed Ms. Doughty that she would send the invoice that day to her and Mr. McCaffrey via email. Ms. Doughty then provided her home address to Ms. Otto so that Ms. Doughty could forward the invoice to Mr. McCaffrey. After Ms. Otto sent them the invoice via email, Ms. Doughty asked for Ms. Otto to send a copy to the Galileo Foundations London office and that she would forward a hard copy to Mr. McCaffrey. 72. On June 1 and 3, 2023, Ms. Otto followed up with Ms. Doughty. Ms. Doughty replied that Mr. McCaffrey had received the invoice and that she would speak with Ms. Otto the next day. That call did not occur. 73. On July 14, 2023, Ms. Otto asked Ms. Doughty if the Board would be willing to settle with her directly. Ms. Doughty did not respond. (FAC ¶¶ 55-56, 60-73.) Thus, the allegations demonstrate that Ms. Doughty, on behalf of Defendant, indicated as late as June 3, 2023 that they were in receipt of Plaintiffs invoice and would respond to it the following day, which response never occurred. As such, the allegations demonstrate that the breach did not definitively occur until June 3, 2023. Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot simply delay sending the invoice indefinitely to delay the accrual of her cause of action. While the Court generally agrees, in light of the fact that Defendant allegedly did not ask Plaintiff for an invoice for the May event until September, and did not pay Plaintiff for the May event until November, six months after the May event, and after some quibbling about whether Plaintiff would be paid at all until she signed the contract, the fact that Plaintiff allegedly initially sent the invoice for the October event six months later in April, and was not aware that Defendant definitively refused to pay it until June is within a reasonable time, given Defendants prior history and ongoing communications with Plaintiff. Therefore, the Court declines to sustain the demurrer based on the statute of limitations. ii. Meeting of the Minds To prevail on a cause of action for breach of contract, the plaintiff must prove (1) the contract, (2) the plaintiff's performance of the contract or excuse for nonperformance, (3) the defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damage to the plaintiff. ( Richman v. Hartley (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1186.) Defendant next demurs on the grounds that there was no meeting of the minds as to the amount of Plaintiffs compensation when the parties purportedly agreed, as evidenced by the allegations that Plaintiff was compensated $40,000 for the May event, yet seeks $1,300,000 for the October event. (FAC ¶¶ 4, 36, 60; Prayer ¶ 1.) The FAC alleges that following a meeting over Zoom on April 26, 2021, John McCaffrey, a member of Defendants board, actively solicited Plaintiffs services, offering her quantum meruit compensation for her services. (FAC ¶¶ 18, 20.) On September 15, 2022, Plaintiff requested 7.5-20% commission on the $350,000 in contributions Defendant secured at the May event. (FAC ¶ 31.) McCaffrey responded that someone in Plaintiffs position typically receives half of his own 10% commission. (FAC ¶ 33.) Plaintiff later discovered that McCaffrey actually typically earns 15% in commissions, not 10%, and there was no basis for his statement that Plaintiff could only receive a portion of his commissions. (FAC ¶ 34.) On September 30, 2022, Plaintiff texted McCaffrey that she was declining his offer to become a trustee and that she would send an invoice for 5% of the $350,000. (FAC ¶ 35.) In the meantime, McCaffrey had emailed Plaintiff an offer of $40,000 for the May event, constituting 80 days at $500 per day. (FAC ¶ 36.) Later, on September 30, 2022, Plaintiff sent an invoice for $40,000, (FAC ¶ 38), which Defendant ultimately paid (FAC ¶ 60). Notwithstanding, the FAC alleges Defendant agreed to pay Plaintiff quantum meruit compensation for her services. (FAC ¶¶ 18, 20.) Further, Civil Code section 1611 contemplates the existence of contracts that do not specify the exact amount of consideration or the method by which such consideration shall be ascertained, and deems the consideration what the object of the contract is reasonably worth. Therefore, the fact that the parties did not agree on the exact amount of the reasonable value for Plaintiffs services or even how that value would be ascertained, does not negate the existence of the alleged contract. Therefore, the Court declines to sustain the demurrer to the first cause of action. iii. Quasi-Contract Restitution/Unjust Enrichment Defendant next demurs to the third cause of action on the grounds that there is no cause of action in California for unjust enrichment. The Court agrees. [T]here is no cause of action in California for unjust enrichment. The phrase Unjust Enrichment does not describe a theory of recovery, but an effect: the result of a failure to make restitution under circumstances where it is equitable to do so. Unjust enrichment is a general principle, underlying various legal doctrines and remedies, rather than a remedy itself. It is synonymous with restitution. ( Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc . (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 779, 793 [cleaned up]; accord Jogani v. Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 901, 911 [unjust enrichment is not a cause of action].) Therefore, the Court sustains Defendants demurrer to the third cause of action. 2. LEAVE TO AMEND A plaintiff has the burden of showing in what manner the complaint could be amended and how the amendment would change the legal effect of the complaint, i.e., state a cause of action. (See The Inland Oversight Committee v. City of San Bernardino (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 771, 779; PGA West Residential Assn., Inc. v. Hulven Int'l, Inc . (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 156, 189.) A plaintiff must not only state the legal basis for the amendment, but also the factual allegations sufficient to state a cause of action or claim. (See PGA West Residential Assn., Inc. v. Hulven Int'l, Inc . , supra , 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 189.) Moreover, a plaintiff does not meet his or her burden by merely stating in the opposition to a demurrer or motion to strike that if the Court finds the operative complaint deficient, plaintiff respectfully requests leave to amend. (See Major Clients Agency v Diemer (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1133; Graham v. Bank of America (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 594, 618 [asserting an abstract right to amend does not satisfy the burden].) Here, although Plaintiff requests leave to amend, Plaintiff does not articulate any facts that could be added to the Complaint to revive a cause of action that does not exist under California law. Therefore, Plaintiffs request for leave to amend is denied. CONCLUSION AND ORDER For the reasons stated, the Court overrules Defendants Demurrer to the First and Second causes of action and sustains without leave to amend Defendants Demurrer to the Third cause of action. Further, the Court orders Defendant to file and serve an answer to the FAC on or before August 1, 2025. Further, on the Courts own motion, the Court continues the Case Management Conference from July 31, 2025 to September 11, 2025 at 8:30 A.M. in Department 207. All parties shall comply with California Rules of Court, rules 3.722, et seq., regarding Initial and Further Case Management Conferences. In particular, all parties shall adhere to the duty to meet and confer (Rule 3.724) and to the requirement to prepare and file Case Management Statements (Rule 3.725). Defendant shall provide notice of the Courts ruling and file the notice with a proof of service forthwith. DATED: July 17, 2025 ___________________________ Michael E. Whitaker Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 22STCV11632 Hearing Date: July 15, 2025 Dept: T Peter Douglas Bowling vs City of Los Angeles, et al. Motion to be Relieved as Counsel Moving Party: Plaintiff Peter Douglas Bowlings Counsel Responding Party: None Tentative Ruling: Grant BACKGROUND Plaintiff Peter Douglas Bowlings (Plaintiff) counsel of record, Elina Shakhbazyan (Counsel), moves to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiff. No opposition has been filed. MOVING PARTY POSITION Counsel seeks to be relieved based on a breakdown of attorney client communication. OPPOSITION No opposition was filed. REPLY No reply was filed. ANALYSIS Counsel has filed forms MC-051 and MC-052 and has lodged with the Court a copy of the proposed order on form MC-053 as required.¿ (Cal Rules of Court, rule 3.1362.)¿ Counsel states the instant motion is filed for the following reason: [t]here has been an irremediable breakdown in communication between counsel and client, rendering continued representation impossible. (MC-052.) The Court finds this is a valid reason to withdraw as counsel. (See Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 1.16(b)(4).)¿¿¿ Therefore, the motion to be relieved is granted. RULING Plaintiffs counsels motion to be relieved as counsel is GRANTED. This ruling will be effective 5 days after counsel files a proof of service of the order.