Motion for Summary Judgment/Partial Summary Judgment in Michigan

Background

“The procedure for granting partial summary judgments is found in GCR 1963, 117. This rule has been interpreted by the Michigan Supreme Court as the counterpart of the Federal summary judgment practice.” (Standard Bldg. v. Woodland Bldg. (1965) 1 Mich. App. 434, 436 citing Durant v. Stahlin [Appeal in re King, Bashara, Merrell, and Waldron] (1964), 374 Mich. 82.)

“A motion for summary judgment under GCR 1963, 117.2(1) tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings with all well-pleaded facts accepted as true. Summary judgment is warranted only if a claim is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could justify a right to recovery.” (Stewart v. Isbell (1986) 155 Mich. App. 65, 74.)

General Information for Complaints and Motions

“In contrast, a motion for summary judgment under GCR 1963, 117.2(3) tests the factual support for a claim or a defense. (Stewart v. Isbell (1986) 155 Mich. App. 65, 74 citing Crowther v Ross Chemical Manufacturing Co (1972) 42 Mich. App. 426.) Its limited purpose is to determine whether a genuine issue of any material fact exists. (Durant v. Stahlin (1965) 375 Mich. 628.)

“When deciding a motion for summary judgment on this ground, the court must consider the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence filed in the action or submitted by the parties.” (Stewart v. Isbell (1986) 155 Mich. App. 65, 74 citing Rizzo v. Kretschmer (1973) 389 Mich. 363.)

“The court must be satisfied that it is impossible for the claim or the defense to be supported at trial because of some deficiency which cannot be overcome.” (Rizzo, supra.) “A motion based upon GCR 1963, 117.2(3) must be supported by affidavits.” (Id., citing GCR 1963, 117.3.)

Standard of Review and Burdens of Proof

“In reviewing a grant of summary judgment under GCR 1963, 117.2(1) [the] Court assumes that the factual allegations in the plaintiff's complaint are true and determines whether the claim, on the pleadings, is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development can permit recovery.” (Guilloz v. Aetna Casualty Co. (1985) 146 Mich. App. 830, 833 citing Hill v. Houghton Twp. (1981) 109 Mich. App. 614, 616 [finding that “[i]n this case, plaintiff's complaint did sufficiently allege a legal claim upon which relief can be granted.”].)

“If summary judgment is granted under the wrong subsection, [the] Court may review the order of summary judgment as though it were granted under the proper subsection when the record permits meaningful review.” (Stewart v. Isbell (1986) 155 Mich. App. 65, 74 citing Lawrence v. Dep't of Treasury (1985) 140 Mich. App. 490, 494.)

The Court’s Decision

In Grebner v. Runyon, the court held that “[t]here was a genuine issue as to whether MegaMedia, in fact, entertained serious doubts concerning the truth of the statements published and whether the failure to make a phone call verifying the report amounted to reckless disregard as to the truthfulness of the report. We find that this matter should have been left to the trier of fact. Where the credibility of a witness or deponent is crucial, summary judgment should not be granted. Plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment.” (Reighard v. ESPN, Inc., No. 355053, at *10-11 [Mich. Ct. App. May 12, 2022] citing Grebner v. Runyon (1984) 132 Mich.App. 327, 337.)

Issues of credibility and intent are generally left to the trier of fact. (Swain v. Morse (2020) 332 Mich. App. 510, 527 citing Pemberton v. Dharmani (1994) 207 Mich. App. 522, 529 n. 1 [“summary disposition is inappropriate where questions of motive, intention, or other conditions of mind are material issues.”]; Goldsmith v. Moskowitz (1977) 74 Mich. App. 506, 518 [“In cases involving state of mind, such as the scienter requirement in fraud, summary judgment will be appropriate in relatively few instances because it will be difficult to foreclose a genuine dispute over this factual question.”])