Motion for Forum Non Conveniens in SHIPMAN ASSOCIATES, LLC, S/B/A THEBLAM v. WHITE & CASE, LLP| Trellis.Law

On March 13, 2020 a Motion-Secondary was filed involving a dispute between Shipman Associates, Llc, S B A Theblam, and White & Case, Llp, for T29 - Torts - Malpractice - Legal in the District Court of Fairfield County.

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DOCKET NO.: FST-CV20-6046192-S SUPERIOR COURT
J.D. STAMFORD/NORWALK
SHIPMAN ASSOCIATES, LLC D/B/A AT STAMFORD
THEBALM,

Plaintiff,
v.

WHITE & CASE LLP,

Defendant. AUGUST 24, 2020
----------------------------------------------------

WHITE & CASE LLP’s REPLY IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF ITS
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FORUM NON CONVENIENS
In its Opposition, Plaintiff Shipman Associates LLC d/b/a theBalm (“theBalm”) openly

admits that it brought this lawsuit in Connecticut to avoid Justice Nancy Bannon, the New York

trial court judge who has, for two years, been presiding over litigation between the same Parties.

Plaintiff likewise admits that this case and the New York litigation arise from the same facts and

circumstances. Plaintiff simply argues – as if naked form shopping were an ordinary and proper

tactic in litigation – that it does not like Justice Bannon’s rulings, and would prefer to proceed in

this Court instead.

In fact, theBalm is so open about its plans, that it says in its papers that it will keep on

forum shopping if this Court grants the Motion to Dismiss. See Dkt. No. 123.00 at *16 (“Opp.”)

(stating that, if this case is dismissed, it “could file in Federal Court” as opposed to New York

state court). It is almost too basic to say, but a litigant’s dislike for a presiding judge’s rulings is

not a basis for ignoring the ongoing case, and selecting a new jurisdiction as if that were

perfectly permissible. This Court should not allow theBalm’s gamesmanship to so blatantly

disrespect Justice Bannon.

Ultimately, absolutely nothing in theBalm’s Opposition changes the fact that this suit

arises out of legal work done by New York lawyers, retained in New York and the alleged actions

of New York lawyers in the course litigating a pending action in New York before Justice

Bannon, a New York judge (the “Fee Action”). There could be no more proper decision-maker,

and no more convenient forum, than Justice Bannon and her courtroom.

To end run these indisputable facts, theBalm’s papers make false statement after false

statement with an almost comic disregard for the truth. For example, theBalm claims to be a

long-standing “Connecticut” entity, with its principal office in Greenwich. But it did not even

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Robert Shipman’s private house at Fox Lane has always been theBalm’s Connecticut

“headquarters” is insulting to the Court. See Pt. I, below. Exhibit A is a photo of the home, and

Exhibit B is the title information, showing that it is zoned for residential use only, and not for

commercial use as headquarters for a multimillion-dollar company.

At the end of the day, even if the purported “facts” in the Balm’s Objection were true –

and they are not – they would be utterly irrelevant to what theBalm is asking this Court to do:

(1) decide the propriety of actions taken by lawyers before Justice Bannon, when Justice Bannon

herself is clearly best suited to perform that task; (2) hear claims that Justice Bannon has already

dismissed in reliance on the prior pending action doctrine; and (3) entertain claims that it

previously threatened to bring in New York but ultimately chose not to– although, even today, it

could still seek leave to do so.

Despite theBalm’s protestations to the contrary, the doctrine of forum non conveniens

vests this Court with ample discretion to extend to Justice Bannon the comity she deserves.

I. TheBalm’s Opposition Is Rife With Factual Misstatement And Misdirection

TheBalm manufactures a tenuous Connecticut connection by grossly distorting its

activities (and White & Case’s) within the state.

A. TheBalm Is Not A Connecticut Company

TheBalm’s claims regarding its Connecticut “office” are either patently false, or they

prove only how far theBalm is willing to go to flout state law. First, theBalm did not register to

do business in Connecticut until March 19, 2020, days after the instant suit was filed—an

exceedingly odd thing for a purported “Connecticut” company with $100,000,000 in sales in

Connecticut, Opp. at *3, to have overlooked by accident. Indeed, having previously registered a

related entity, the Balm Bedford Inc., in Connecticut in 2016, theBalm cannot reasonably claim

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ignorance of the obligation to register businesses in our State. Opp., M. Shipman Aff., Ex. C,

Cert. of Incorporation for The Balm Bedford (Jun. 8, 2016).

Moreover, the location of what theBalm claims to be its “main office” – 49 Fox Run

Lane, Greenwich, Connecticut – is indisputably zoned as “residential,” Ex. B, and its alleged

business activities blatantly violate zoning regulations:

theBalm Claim Greenwich Zoning Regulation Governing
Home Offices (§ 6-95(b)(2))
(attached as Ex. C)
“For many years we had 4 full time “No non-resident person shall be employed or
employees and an intern working in otherwise associated with the business in the
Greenwich” Opp. at *3. home office.” § 6-95(b)(2)(A)

“Importantly, displays and samples are “There shall be no stock of merchandise for
available and maintained in Greenwich, as the sale or equipment that is customarily
Connecticut office is the principal office to employed in sales on the premises.” § 6-
meet our customers. . . . We have 95(b)(2)(G)
conducted over $100,000,000 in sales from
the Greenwich office” Opp. at *3.

“[T]he entire third floor is dedicated to “Any use that becomes more intensive than
theBalm and it houses fully functioning sales, permitted by standards established for
marketing, and administrative offices.” Opp. residential zones shall be permitted only in
at *2. the appropriate business zone.” § 6-95(b)(1)

“The third floor is probably 1,800-2,500 in “No home office shall occupy more than 700
size.” square feet or 25% of the gross floor area in
the premises, whichever is smaller.” § 6-
95(b)(2)(I)

A title search on the property revealed no variances, special permits, or any other exception that

would allow theBalm to so brazenly violate the zoning restrictions. Ex. B.

Equally egregious, theBalm intentionally misleads this Court with regard to the location

of its documents. It claims, for example, that it maintains its corporate records in Connecticut.

Opp. at *3. However, the documents relevant to this dispute are White & Case’s, not theBalm’s,

and they are not in Connecticut. The location of theBalm’s irrelevant “sales contracts” does not

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matter. Opp. at *2.

Even if they were somehow relevant, theBalm’s statements regarding the location of its

own documents are also inconsistent with the testimony in sworn proceedings by its

representatives. In support of its Opposition, theBalm submitted an affidavit from Robert

Shipman swearing under oath that theBalm’s “corporate records are maintained in Connecticut

for the most part.” Opp. at *2. But that is inconsistent with his prior, November 2018 sworn trial

testimony:

Q. For a long time, you were responsible for keeping the company’s
corporate records.
A. I guess, yes.
Q. You didn’t keep the company’s records in one place, did you?
A. There weren’t very many records. I lived in different places, and whatever
records or papers we had went with me, I guess. And I guess that’s what
happened.
Q. The papers were scattered between your homes in Connecticut and Florida
and the company’s offices in California?
A. I would say yes.

Ex. D, Kotler v. Shipman Associates, No. 2017-0457-JRS, Trial Transcript – Volume II at

470:12-24 (Del. Ch. Ct. Nov. 28, 2018); see also Mot. To Dismiss Ex. 2, Dep. R. Shipman at

103:22-26 (he lives in Connecticut for only “a short period of time of the year”).

B. White & Case Did Not Perform Legal Work for theBalm In Connecticut

TheBalm also mischaracterizes the relationship between White & Case and Connecticut

as it pertains to theBalm. Nowhere is this more apparent than its claim that “Defendant regularly

conducts business in Connecticut by appearing in cases here” while citing two cases, one from

2006 and one from 1988. Opp. at *5. Given theBalm’s generous definition of “regularly,” it is

unsurprising that it also describes the sporadic visits made by White & Case to Greenwich in

relation to theBalm as “regular.” Opp. at *4. Notably, while theBalm cites “at least 6 meetings

at the Connecticut office,” that number is only achieved by including a visit prompted by a hunt

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for lost files and purely social visits.

Similarly, theBalm makes much of the de minimis work performed by certain White &

Case attorneys pertaining to The Balm Bedford Inc. in Connecticut. Opp. at *7. In total this

work was approximately 20 out of 5,000 total hours—less than half of 1%—between February

2016 and May 2017. See Opp., Hayes Aff. at Ex. D, SHIP 004370-72. Most importantly, this

work has nothing to do with the claims at issue here; it was part of a totally separate and distinct

assignment given to White & Case by theBalm – but of course, the Balm does not candidly

acknowledge that to the Court. See generally Compl. (no mention of theBalm Bedford).

C. TheBalm Also Misrepresents The Parties’ Communications

Based entirely on misrepresentations, theBalm argues that the Court should deny the

Motion to Dismiss because White & Case purportedly refused to provide information in response

to discovery. Opp. at *5. That is demonstrably false. See generally Dkt. No. 116.00, 125.00.

On June 9, 2020, despite having already deposed Attorney Oliver Brahmst for a full day

in the Fee Action, theBalm sought a re-do here by noticing his deposition for June 30, 2020 (a

date unilaterally chosen by theBalm), and included broad discovery requests seeking information

that was entirely irrelevant to forum non conveniens and far beyond what theBalm itself had

represented was necessary to respond to the Motion to Dismiss. Ex. E. Therefore, on June 14,

2020, White & Case tried to confer with theBalm by proposing stipulations in lieu of the

discovery as served. Ex. F. On June 15, 2020, theBalm asked about the discovery it had

requested without even acknowledging the stipulations proposed by White & Case. Ex. G. In

response, White & Case specifically asked for theBalm’s views on the stipulations. Ex. G. On

June 25, 2020, theBalm ignored the inquiry altogether and asked solely about the deposition,

again without reference to the stipulations. Ex. H. White & Case responded that same day to

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theBalm’s inquiry, explaining that, absent a response to the proposed stipulations, it would be

filing a Motion for Protective Order with regard to the discovery requested by theBalm. Ex. I. It

then filed the Motion on June 29, 2020, the day before the scheduled deposition, and only after it

became clear that theBalm would not confer in good faith about the dispute. See generally Dkt.

No. 116.00, 125.00.

Also, on Friday, June 26, theBalm asked for the personal addresses of White & Case

attorneys without disclosing why it wanted that information. Concerned with providing personal

addresses, White & Case responded that the individuals could be contacted through counsel. On

Monday, June 29, theBalm clarified that it wanted the information to calculate “travel time to the

Courthouse.” On July 2, 2020, White & Case provided the mileages. TheBalm followed up by

asking for mileage calculations to the New York courthouse as well, and White & Case

responded with the requested information the same day. White & Case never “flatly refused to

provide” the mileage, Opp. at *6, and in fact promptly responded to every inquiry (in stark

contrast to theBalm’s utter refusal to acknowledge or discuss the stipulations).

II. The Fee Action Is Central To This Case, and Plaintiffs Should Not Be Permitted to
Circumvent the Rulings in that Action

TheBalm disregards the existence of the “Fee Action,” which has been pending for years

before Justice Bannon, as a “red herring.” Opp. at *8. The Fee Action is not an irrelevant side

dispute; the third count of the Complaint arises directly from White & Case’s actions in the Fee

Action, and it seeks relief under a particular New York statute governing New York attorneys.

See Compl. ¶ 64. The underlying allegations of count three and the Fee Action are inextricably

intertwined,1 as Justice Bannon implicitly recognized when she dismissed similar allegations in

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Counsel for theBalm speculates that White & Case did not move to dismiss on grounds of prior pending action
because it “knows (a) there is no counterclaim for malpractice in the Fee Action . . . and that at this late stage in that
case, no amendment will be allowed.” Opp. at *8. This is inaccurate.A motion to dismiss is not the appropriate

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the Injunction Action on the basis of the prior pending action doctrine. Mem. of Law, Dkt. No.

118.00 at *6 (“Mem.”).

TheBalm complains that neither White & Case nor Justice Bannon are willing to permit it

carte blanche to add new counterclaims on the eve of trial, Opp. at 9-10, while ignoring that

theBalm had every opportunity to raise defenses in that action and chose (and, today, continues

to choose) not to seek leave to file new counterclaims there. The consequences of theBalm’s

own strategic decisions cannot possibly render New York an inadequate forum.

III. The Cases Cited By TheBalm Are Inapposite

A. The Cases Cited By theBalm Involve At Least One Connecticut Resident

Plaintiffs cannot point to a single precedent that supports their blatant attempts at forum

shopping. Instead, theBalm cites cases for the unremarkable, but inapplicable, proposition that a

Connecticut forum may be appropriate where at least one of the parties is a Connecticut resident.

See, e.g., Picketts v. Int’l Playtex, Inc., 215 Conn. 490, 491-92 (1990).2 Neither party to this

action is a Connecticut resident.

The only case cited by theBalm that does not involve a Connecticut party is Everett v.

Everett, No. FSTCV106004013S, 2010 WL 5573731 (Conn. Super. Dec. 16, 2010). However,

mechanism to raise the prior pending action doctrine where the prior suit is in another jurisdiction.
See Purcaro v.
Herlands, No. CV176013297S, 2019 WL 2303915, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 28, 2019).
2
Sabino v. Ruffolo, 19 Conn. App. 402, 410 (1989) (“Both the plaintiff and the defendant were Connecticut
residents when the suit was filed.”); Katz v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. CV116020487, 2012 WL 3003456, at **1-2
(Conn. Super. Ct. Jun. 21, 2012) (Connecticut plaintiff); Rocky Hill Eye Assocs., P.C. v. Data Care Pro, LLC,
CV196087591S, 2019 WL 7811348, at * 1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 24, 2019) (same); IDV North Am., Inc. v.
Saronno, 1999 WL 773961, (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 9, 1999) (same); Biro v. Hill, No. CV87 0091594, 1990 WL
265142, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 4, 1990) (same); Anderson v. Anderson, FA186077828S, 2019 WL 1569788,
at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 8, 2019) (same); Santa Buckley Energy v. Blue Sky Holdings, Inc., No.
CV095021606S, 2009 WL 1707867, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 27, 2009) (same); Boston Prop. Ex. Trans. Co.,
Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. X04HHDCV116026660S, 2012 WL 5476911, at *6 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Oct. 16, 2012) (both parties were Connecticut residents); see also Phravixay v. Prakuson, No. CV92 04
07 09S, 1992 WL 361799, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 30, 1992) (plaintiffs and defendant all Connecticut
residents); Sea Greens Holdings, LLC v. Angera, CV185041470S, 2018 WL 5115613, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct.
1, 2018) (plaintiff and several of the defendants are Connecticut residents).

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that case arose from “the alleged tortious actions committed by the defendant in Connecticut

[based on] his actions before the Connecticut Probate Court.” Id. at *14. Here, in stark contrast,

the alleged tortious actions were committed by New York attorneys before Justice Bannon in the

New York Supreme Court. There is no alleged tort in Connecticut.

B. The Cases Cited By theBalm Involve Situations Where The Defendant Did Not
Present Any Evidence in Support Of Dismissal

Unable to demonstrate why the private and public interest factors weigh in its favor,

theBalm cites wholly inapposite cases in which the defendants failed to introduce any evidence

whatsoever.3 White & Case has provided ample relevant evidence regarding the history of

interactions between the Parties and the litigation in New York, along with the likely witnesses

and subjects of their testimony. Mem. at *9. That evidence demonstrates that the factors weigh

heavily in favor of dismissal, as discussed further below.

C. The Private And Public Interest Factors Weigh in Favor of Dismissal

Entirely absent from theBalm’s Opposition, peppered as it is with distinguishable cases

and factual inconsistencies, is any consideration due Justice Bannon, who has overseen years of

overlapping litigation between these same Parties, under the principle of comity. See Hamilton

Partners, L.P. v. England, 11 A.3d 1180, 1212 (Del. Ch. Ct. 2010) (“The doctrine of forum non

conveniens provides the primary vehicle through which courts apply the doctrine of comity.”)

1. The Balm’s Arguments Regarding Ease of Access to Evidence Are Wrong

TheBalm’s arguments regarding ease of access to proof are predicated on false assertions

and cases standing for the opposite proposition. TheBalm argues that it maintains physical

3
See, e.g., Temlock v. Temlock, 95 Conn. App. 505, 516 (2006); Katz v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. CV116020487,
2012 WL 3003456, at *1-2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jun. 21, 2012); Everett, 2010 WL 5573731 at *12; Rocky Hill Eye
Assocs., P.C. v. Data Care Pro, LLC, CV196087591S, 2019 WL 7811348, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 24, 2019);
Mathis v. Marriott Intern., Inc., No. NNHCV146044292S, 2014 WL 5138023, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 12,
2014).

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copies of sales contracts and corporate records “in Connecticut for the most part.” Opp. at *17.

This position is directly contradicted by Mr. Shipman’s prior sworn trial testimony. Ex. D, at

470:12-24. Additionally, theBalm has failed to identify any document or documents stored in

Connecticut that are relevant to this case. This is unsurprising, as the majority of the relevant

documents will be in White & Case’s possession. Mem. at *9. TheBalm pivots and tries to argue

that, because White & Case’s information is electronically stored it is equally available in

Connecticut. The information electronically stored on White & Case’s internal document system

is available at any White & Case office, including the office in New York. White & Case does

not have a Connecticut office.

2. It Is Not Unfair To Hold theBalm Responsible For Its Failed Litigation Strategy

TheBalm repeatedly complains that it cannot have a fair trial in New York because

Justice Bannon understandably seemed hesitant to allow new claims on the eve of trial. Opp. at

22, 26. There is nothing “unfair” about being told that delaying until the last second, after the

close of discovery, to introduce wholly new claims is likely to be unsuccessful. Rather, the real

unfairness comes from theBalm’s brazen efforts to avoid the consequences of its dilatory

behavior by dragging White & Case into a whole new suit in Connecticut, asking this Court

effectively to second guess Justice Bannon’s years-long management of the litigation.

3. Judiciary Law § 487 Is A Uniquely New York Law Being Invoked By theBalm To
Address Alleged Actions That Took Place Before Justice Bannon In New York

TheBalm argues that the Court can easily apply New York law because “the standards are

virtually the same” as in Connecticut. Not so. Although this Court can certainly apply New

York law as a general matter, the specific New York statute on which it relies, N.Y. Judiciary

Law § 487, is wholly unlike any similar law in Connecticut. As the case they cite acknowledges,

this is not a simple malpractice claim. See Bill Birds v. Stein Law Firm, P.C., 82 N.Y.S.3d 91

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(App. Div. 2d Dept., 2018) (a section 487 claim is “not duplicative” of a legal malpractice

claim). And because the alleged attorney misconduct at issue under this unique statute occurred

in the Fee Action pending before Justice Bannon, there is no one better to apply it than Justice

Bannon. See Lipin v. Hunt, No. 14-cv-1081, 2015 WL 1344406, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2015)

(regarding section 487 claim, “[p]laintiff should have raised these misconduct allegations before

the courts in which the allegedly improper conduct occurred”).

4. Litigation Across Two Forums Is Inherently Burdensome

Finally, theBalm suggests that the burden of litigating related actions in two forums is

minimal because the Parties can reach “a simple stipulation” that the discovery in New York can

be used in Connecticut. Opp. at *25. This argument is as ironic as it is demonstrably false given

theBalm’s failure to so much as acknowledge the stipulations proposed by White & Case,

precipitating a motion for a protective order.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, as well as those previously stated in White & Case’s

opening papers, the Court should grant the Motion to Dismiss.

Defendant,
WHITE & CASE LLP

/s/ Kevin M. Smith
Kevin M. Smith
Robyn E. Gallagher
WIGGIN AND DANA LLP
Juris No. 067700
One Century Tower
265 Church Street, P.O. Box 1832
New Haven, CT 06508-1832
Tel: (203) 498-4400
Fax: (203) 782-2889
ksmith@wiggin.com
rgallagher@wiggin.com

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CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that, on August 24, 2020, a copy of the foregoing was delivered via

electronic mail to all counsel of record as follows:

Eric D. Grayson, Esq.
Grayson & Associates, P.C.
175 West Putnam Avenue, Second Floor
Greenwich, Connecticut 06830
ericgrayson@graysonlaw.com

Andrew Hayes, Esq.
43 West 43rd St., Suite 195
New York, NY 10017
ahayes@andrewhayes.net

/s/ Kevin M. Smith
Kevin M. Smith

27804\2\4842-8575-5335.v7

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EXHIBIT A
8/22/2020 49 Fox Run Ln - Google Maps

49 Fox Run Ln

Greenwich, Connecticut

Google

Street View

https://www.google.com/maps/place/49+Fox+Run+Ln,+Greenwich,+CT+06831/@41.0502041,-73.6498891,3a,75y,58.78h,90t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1st… 1/1
EXHIBIT B
EXHIBIT C
TOWN OF GREENWICH
BUILDING ZONE REGULATIONS

August 2019
Adopted February 1, 1926
Revisions through August 14, 2019
§6-95 GREENWICH MUNICIPAL CODE §6-95

Sec. 6-95. PERMITTED ACCESSORY USES.

(a) Customary uses incidental to the principal uses in Sections 6-93 shall be permitted in RA-4, RA-
2, RA-1, R-20 and R-12 zones and R-7 zone (by the cross reference in Section 6-97 (b) (1) to
RA-4 zones permitted uses) and R-6 zone (by the cross reference in Section 6-98 (b) (1) to R-
7 zones permitted uses). They shall include: (2/8/94) (10/17/18)
(1) The office of a resident professional person (other than a resident medical professional)
or the studio of an artist in which not more than two (2) persons not residents of the
premises are employed in connection therewith.
(2) (A) Private garages, barns, sheds, shelters, silos and other structures customarily
accessory to residential estates, farms, or resident uses provided no accessory building
shall exceed the gross floor area established below, unless authorized by the Board of
Appeals as a special exception or the Planning and Zoning Commission as a special
permit ifsaid accessory structures results in a structure or group of structures which
individually or together total in excess of 40,000 cubic feet in volume above established
grade in the underlying zones of the mapped Central Greenwich Impact Overlay Zone, the
mapped Post Road Impact Overlay Zone, the Waterfront Business (WB) Zone, the Local
Business (LB) Zone, or the Local Business Retail (LBR) Zones, or in excess of 150,000
cubic feet in volume above established grade in all other zones:

RA-4 and RA-2 zones: 1,200 square feet
RA-1 and R-20 zones: 800 square feet
R-12, R-7, R-6 and RMF zones: 600 square feet

In granting a Special Exception, in addition to considering allthe standards of Sec. 6-
20(c), the Board of Appeals shall find in residential zones that the accessory structure by
virtue of its scale, design, size or location on the site is compatible with its zone and
individually or in combination with other accessory structures, maintains the appearance
of being subordinate to the principal structure. (1/1/87) (10/17/18)

(B) In the case of buildings which meet the standards of Sec. 6-109, 1(3)(a) of the
Building Zone Regulations, as recommended by the Historic District Commission,
the Board of Appeals may waive the provisions of Sec. 6-147 (b) and 6-95(a)(2)(A)
above. (1/1/87)
(3) Roadside stands for the display and sale of natural products grown on the premises under
conditional requirements of location, design, parking and length of operation and any other
conditions the Planning and Zoning Commission may deem necessary to carry out the
purpose of this Article as expressed in Section 6-1. (10/17/18)
(4) The keeping of not more than two (2) roomers or boarders by a resident family only in a
detached single family dwelling, exclusive of employees on the premises.
(5) The rental and use for residential purposes of dwelling units in accessory buildings,
provided the same dwelling units were in lawful existence prior to September 30, 1947.
(6) Retail sale of alcoholic liquor to be consumed on the premises by a club not open to the
general public and not operated for commercial profit under a club permit issued by the
Liquor Control Commission in accordance with the provision of the Liquor Control Act and
the regulation adopted thereunder.
(7) The keeping of not more than six (6) horses (not including their young under the age of
six (6) months) provided there shall be at least twenty thousand (20,000) sq. ft. of gross
lot area for each horse age six (6) months or older.

9-5
§6-95 GREENWICH MUNICIPAL CODE §6-96

(8) Indoor athletic uses occupying more than 1,200 square feet of floor area when authorized
by the Planning and Zoning Commission as a special permit. (10/17/18)
(9) Family Day Care as defined in Sec. 6-5(a)(21.1). (7/31/80)
(b) HOME OFFICE (2/8/94)
(1) The purpose of this regulation is to take into account the changing nature and location of
the workplace because of technological advancements, including the development of new
computer-based home businesses and increased use of telecommuting, resulting in
a growing number of people doing office work in their homes. This regulation allows for
the changing character and type of work performed in the home provided there is no
impact on the residential character of the community by prohibiting change in the character
and appearance of the dwelling, minimizing traffic and parking on residential streets,
avoiding noise normally associated with business operations, and maintaining public
health, safety and welfare and the value of property. Any use that becomes more intensive
than permitted by standards established for residential zones shall be permitted only in
the appropriate business zone.
(2) A home office shall be permitted as an accessory use incident to the principal uses in
Section 6-93 in RA-4, RA-2, RA-1, R-20 and R-12 zones and R-7 zone (by the cross
reference in Section 6-97(b)(1) to RA-4 zones permitted uses) and R-6 zone (by the cross
reference in Section 6-98(b)(1) to R-7 zone permitted uses), provided all of the following
requirements are met at all times:
(A) No non-resident person shall be employed or otherwise associated with the business
in the home office;
(B) The business shall be primarily conducted by telecommunications, mail or courier
deliveries;
(C) There shall be no more than three business visitors daily to the home office,
provided, however, that there shall be adequate off-street parking as provided in
Section 6-158 for both business visitors and residential use;
(D) There shall be no sign on the premises advertising the home office, notwithstanding
Section 6-163;
(E) There shall be no change in the exterior of the dwelling or addition of parking space
in the front yard, no outdoor display or storage of materials, supplies, equipment or
waste, and no exterior visible evidence of such use;
(F) There shall be no noise, odor or electrical interference caused by such home office
use;
(G) There shall be no stock of merchandise for sale or equipment that is customarily
employed in sales on the premises;
(H) There shall be only one home office in the dwelling and no other accessory use on
the premises that might otherwise be permitted under any section of these
Regulations;
(I) No home office shall occupy more than 700 square feet or 25% of the gross floor
area in the premises, whichever is smaller.

Sec. 6-96. PROHIBITED ACCESSORY USES.

The following accessory uses shall be prohibited in RA-4, RA-2, RA-1, R-20 and R-12 zones:

(1) Separate servants’ quarters having housekeeping facilities or accessory dwelling units within or
attached to private dwellings except for Elderly Conversions. (See Sec. 6-99)
(2) Any business or industrial uses other than those permitted in Section 6-95. (2/8/94)

9-6
EXHIBIT D
EXHIBIT E
D.N. FST-CV-20-6046192S
_____________________________________x
SHIPMAN ASSOCIATES LLC, d/b/a SUPERIOR COURT
theBalm J.D. STAMFORD/NORWALK
AT STAMFORD
v.
June 9, 2020
WHITE & CASE, LLP
______________________________________x

NOTICE OF DEPOSITION AND DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff Shipman Associates, LLC will take the deposition

of Defendant White & Case, LLP, through Attorney Oliver Brahmst, pursuant to Prac. Book Sec.

13-26 et seq. before a Court Reporter, Notary Public or any other a person authorized to conduct an

examination either virtually, e.g., through video conference technology, or at the offices of Grayson

& Associates, P.C., 175 West Putnam Avenue, Second Floor, Greenwich, Connecticut 06830, on

June 30, 2020. The deponent(s) will be examined under oath concerning, without limitation, all

matters raised in Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and in his undated Affidavit submitted in

connection therewith. The deposition(s) will commence at 9:30 a.m. and will continue day to day

until completed. The deponent is required to bring to the deposition all of the documents and things

set out in Schedule A hereto. You are invited to attend and cross-examine.
s/ Eric D. Grayson
____________________
Eric D. Grayson, Esq.
Grayson & Associates, P.C.
175 West Putnam Avenue, Second Floor
Greenwich, Connecticut 06830
(203) 622-8100
Firm J.N. 418385
Attorneys for Plaintiff

and

Andrew Hayes, Esq.
43 West 43rd St., Suite 195
New York, NY 10017
(203) 625-4520
Pro Hac Vice Application to Be Filed

2
Certificate

On June 9, 2020, a copy of the attached was served on all counsel who have appeared and
any self-represented parties by email by agreement and/or by First Class Mail, if applicable as set
out below:

s/ Eric D. Grayson
__________________________
Eric D. Grayson

Service on:

Kevin M. Smith, Esq.
Wiggin & Dana LLP
P.B. Box 1832
New Haven, CT 06508
Counsel for Defendant

3
Schedule A

The Deponent is required to bring with him/her and produce at the Deposition the following
documents and things:

1. All billing records of White & Case, LLP related to services purportedly rendered to and
disbursements purportedly incurred for Shipman Associates, LLC.

2. All White & Case, LLP time records for any attorney or paralegal who rendered any services
for Shipman Associates, LLC.

3. All White & Case, LLP disbursement records or requests for reimbursement for expenses
related to Shipman Associates, LLC.

4. For any White & Case, LLP representative, any and all expense reports, with back up
documentation, such as for example only, credit card receipts, air or train tickets, EZ Pass
receipts, related to any in-person meetings between or among with any representatives of
White & Case, LLP and any representatives of Shipman Associates, LLC.

5. For any White & Case, LLP representative, any and all documentation related to any expense
incurred for or at any in-person meetings between or among with any representatives of
White & Case, LLP and any representatives of Shipman Associates, LLC that were not
claimed for reimbursement. For example only, a restaurant receipt where such reprsentative
paid for a meal with with any representatives of Shipman Associates, LLC, but did not claim
same as a

Case Info

Judge

Sheila A. Ozalis Track Judge’s New Case

Case No.

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Document Filed Date

August 24, 2020

Case Filing Date

March 13, 2020

County

Parties

CUMMINGS & LOCKWOOD LLC Attorney
GRAYSON & ASSOCIATES PC Attorney for the Plaintiff
JOSEPH CHRISTOPHER AKALSKI Attorney
KEVIN KOTLER Witness
LATHAM& WATKINS LLP (NON -PARTY) Witness
PHV BERMAN JOSHUA 5/12/17 Attorney for the Defendant
PHV GIBLIN THOMAS J 1/3/23 Attorney
PHV GURLAND CAROLYN PELLING 4/17/23 Attorney for the Defendant
SHIPMAN ASSOCIATES, LLC, S/B/A THEBLAM Plaintiff
STACY KOTLER Witness
WHITE & CASE, LLP Defendant
WIGGIN & DANA LLP Attorney for the Defendant
Kevin Shay Attorneys for Defendants

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Motion-Secondary: SHIPMAN ASSOCIATES, LLC, S/B/A THEBLAM v. WHITE & CASE, LLP

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Case Info

Parties