Motion to Compel in Gomez v. CSAA Insurance Exchange| Trellis.Law

On January 01, 1900 a Motion-Secondary was filed involving a dispute between Gomez, Jesus, Gomez, Maria Teresa, and Csaa Insurance Exchange, for civil in the District Court of Fresno County.

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1 Hyon M. Kientzy, Esq. - SBN 209579 E-FILED
Min K. Kang, Esq. - SBN 246904 3/3/2021 11:55 AM
2 CODDINGTON, HICKS & DANFORTH Superior Court of California
A Professional Corporation, Lawyers County of Fresno
3 555 Twin Dolphin Drive, Suite 300
Redwood City, CA 94065-2133 By: C. York, Deputy
4 Tel.: 650.592.5400
Fax: 650.592.5027
5

6 ATTORNEYS FOR Defendant
CSAA Insurance Exchange
7

8 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

9 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRESNO

10
11 JESUS GOMEZ, MARIA TERESA Case No. 19CECG03506
GOMEZ, individuals,
12 OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
Plaintiffs, SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT
13 OF MOTION TO COMPEL
vs.
14 Date: March 16, 2021
CSAA INSURANCE EXCHANGE and Time: 3:30 p.m.
15 DOES 1 through 10, Dept: 403
Judge: Kristi Culver Kapetan
16 Defendants.
Trial: August 30, 2021
17
18
19 Request for Production No. 1:
20 Pursuant to Colonial Lift & Accident Ins. Co. v.Superior Court (1982) 31 Ca1.3d 785,
21 the claims files of all other insureds with homeowners policies, within the state of
22 California, from 2016 to the present, where CSAA retained EA Renfroe to investigate
23 and adjust the claim.
24 Response to Request for Production No. 1:
25 Defendant objects to this request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous,
26 overbroad, and calls for speculation. Defendant further objects to this request to the extent it
27 seeks to invade the attorney-client privilege and/ or the attorney work product doctrine, and
28 seeks the premature disclosure of expert witness documents. Defendant objects to this request
1
Opposition to Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of Motion to Compel
Case No: 19CECG03506 753956
1 on the grounds that it is not limited in scope as to plaintiff's claim that is the subject of this

2 lawsuit. Defendant also objects to this request on .the grounds that it invades the right of

3 privacy of individuals who are not parties to this litigation, seeks information in violation of

4 Insurance Code section 791.13, violates Cal. Code of Civil Procedure §2017.010 to the extent it

5 seeks documents regarding matters that are neither relevant to this case nor reasonably

6 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and is therefore unduly burdensome

7 and oppressive and propounded to vex, annoy and harass defendant.

8 STATEMENT OF REASON COMPELLING FURTHER RESPONSE:
9 Relevancy: It is a black letter law that the information contained in the claim files
10 is relevant and discoverable in insurance bad faith cases subject to certain limitations.
11 (CROSKEY, Insurance Litigation, California Practice Guide, 15:749-15:754). The
12 requested claims files here are relevant on several issues in this case. First, the claims files
13 of other insureds are discoverable to establish a regular business practice. (Colonial Life,
14 31 Cal 3d at 790-793). In Colonial Life, the insured sought the names of other insureds
15 whose claims were assigned to particular adjusters to look for a pattern in the way the
16 claims were handled. Colonial Life objected on grounds of relevance, overbreadth and
17 the privacy rights of other insureds. The court opined that the discovery is relevant to
18 the insurer's intent and California Insurance Code Section 790.03(h), which prohibits
19 insurers from committing or performing "with such frequency as to indicate a general
20 business practice" various unfair claim settlement practices, and such discovery will lead
21 to admissible evidence at trial. (Id at 790-791). The court further stated that defendant's
22 objection as to relevancy of other claims files was "patently meritless." (Id at 790).
23 The evidence obtained through discovery of other claims files may be admissible to
24 show that even if Plaintiffs cannot show that the acts that harmed her were knowingly
25 committed, they may still establish her bad faith claim by showing that the acts were
26 engaged in with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice. Here, the
27 policyholders have filed a complaint publicly alleging that their claim was handled in bad
28
2
Opposition to Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of Motion to Compel
Case No: 19CECG03506 753956
1 faith, that the estimate provided by E.A. Renfroe was highly inadequate, and that it was a
2 pattern and practice for CSAA to engage in such practice to limit its liability.
3 The trier-of-fact will be called upon to determine whether CSAA acted reasonably
4 or unreasonably in investigating and settling the claim. See, CACI No. 2331, Breach of
5 the Implied Obligation of Good Faith and Fair Dealing - Failure or Delay in Payment,
6 and No. 2332, Bad Faith - Failure to Properly Investigate the Claim. Further, under
7 CACI No. 2337 - Factors to Consider in Evaluating Insurer's Conduct, the Court will
8 instruct the jury under subsection (g) that the jury may consider whether CSAA
9 attempted to settle Mr. Gomez's claim for less than the amount to which a reasonable
10 person would have believed he or she was entitled. Here, by CSAA's own admission
11 with its estimate eight months after the loss, it presented the insured with a low-ball
12 estimate from E.A. Renfroe and kept insisting that E.A. Renfroe should continue the
13 adjustment. CSAA can simply attempt to hide behind E.A. Renfroe's back as an allegedly
14 independent adjuster, but the discovery of other claim files may show a quite different
15 picture.
16 History of claims handling is also relevant on the issue of the plaintiff's claim for
17 punitive damages (CROSKY, et. al., Insurance Litigation§ 15:753; see, e.g., Neal v.
18 Farmers Ins. Exchange (1978) 21 Cal.3d 910). In bad faith litigation, similar instances of
19 misconduct are crucial to a reprehensibility analysis. If CSAA used E.A. Renfroe from
20 Alabama to adjust claims in California in order to limit its liability in conducting a full,
21 prompt, and thorough investigation, such fact would be important in the reprehensibility
22 analysis.
23 CSAA has claimed throughout the proceedings that this is a garden variety bad
24 faith claim and plaintiff has not presented evidence of E.A. Renfroe's bias. Yes, it
25 refused to even produce information regarding payments from CSAA to E.A. Renfroe.
26 For example, if CSAA retained E.A. Renfroe based on a low flat fee basis, E.A. Renfroe
27 had no incentive to conduct a thorough investigation of the claim as required by
28
3
Opposition to Plaintiff's Separate Statement in Support of Motion to Compel
Case No: 19CECG03506 753956
1 California law. Again, discovery of other claim files will reveal whether such pattern and
2 practice existed as it pertains to other policyholders.
3 Privacy and confidentiality: Understanding privacy concerns, plaintiff agrees to
4 follow the procedure established by the California Supreme Court to safeguard
5 policyholders' privacy rights under section 719.13. (Colonial Life & Accident Insurance Co.,
6 supra, 31 Cal.3d at pp. 792-793, ftn. 10). This procedure was to limit disclosure to names
7 and addresses of the persons falling within the permissible scope of discovery and then
8 to approve the form and content of a letter to be sent by plaintiffs counsel to all those
9 persons, requesting their consent to release of their claim file information by the
10 insurance company. Ibid Plaintiffs' counsel drafted authorization and consent letters to
11 be sent to the policyholders whose names and addresses will be identified by CSAA
12 pertaining to the Request for Production of Document, Set Two. Draft letters had been
13 previously provided to CSAA's counsel during meet-and-confer process. Plaintiffs will
14 also agree if CSAA sends the letters out to the insureds and then provides a proper
15 declaration as to how many insureds were identified pursuant to the requests and how
16 many letters had been mailed out. The draft letters are attached as Exhibit I to
17 Declaration of Gene Halavanau, if10. This is the exact production method approved by
18 the California Supreme Court in Colonial Lift.
19 As for the confidentiality, the parties had entered into a stipulated protective order
20 limiting dissemination of infonnation produced in this litigation under certain
21 circumstances.
22 Burden: The burden of searching for the claim files is highly exaggerated by
23 CSAA in its meet-and-confer letter. The request is limited geographically to California
24 and to four years. CSAA hinted that it could potentially reveal hundreds of files. The
25 claim appears to be highly exaggerated, but even if CSAA identified hundreds of files,
26 only a percentage of them would technically be produced based on seeking permission
27 from the insureds. CSAA's assertion in the meet-and-confer letter that there are
28 potentially hundreds of claims in California that may have to be identified that are
4
Opposition to Plaintiff's Separate Statement in Support of Motion to Compel
Case No: 19CECG03506 753956
1 adjusted by an Alabama adjuster not licensed in California as a contractor or as an
2 adjuster makes this inquiry even more relevant. Moreover, CSAA failed to offer any way
3 of narrowing the request to ease its burden of production. For example, only the first
4 100 identified claim files pertaining to each request could be identified to obtain the
5 names of the insureds and send them the consent letters.
6
DEFENDANT'S REASONS FURTHER RESPONSE SHOULD NOT BE
7
COMPELLED:
8
9 Plaintiffs Have Failed to Meet the Legal Standard and Threshold Requirement
10 of Good Cause to Compel Production
11 "Although the scope of civil discovery is broad, it is not limitless." Ca/cor Space Facility,
12 Inc. v.Sup. Ct., 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 223 (1997). "[T]he discovery process is subject to frequent

13 abuse and, like a cancerous growth, can destroy a meritorious cause or defense," such that it

14 must be used as "tools to facilitate litigation rather than as weapons to wage litigation."' Id. at

15 p. 221. "Any discovery request, even an initial one, can be misused in an attempt to generate

16 settlement leverage by creating burden, expense, embarrassment, distraction, etc. It is a judge's

17 responsibility to control such abuse." Obregon v. Superior Court, 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431 (1998).

18 To establish good cause, a party seeking to compel discovery must "set forth specific

19 facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought." Code of Civ. Proc.§ 2031.310

20 (b)(l). "The burden rests upon the party seeking the discovery to provide evidence from which

21 the court may determine these conditions are met ... [A] party seeking to compel such

22 production to 'set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the

23 inspection demand .... ' (Italics added.)" Ca/cor Space, supra 53 Cal.App.4th at 223-224.

24 Noticeably absent from plaintiffs' motion is any mention or even any suggestion that

25 they have met the requisite standard of "good cause". Although plaintiffs' moving papers

26 attempt to address the issue of relevancy, they are entirely void of any evidence or any specific

27 facts demonstrating good cause for the onerous discovery demanded.

28 A moving party must provide specific facts, not mere conclusions or suggestions. The
5
Opposition to Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of Motion to Compel
Case No: 19CECG03506 753956
1 most that plaintiffs have offered is their theory that "if CSAA used E.A. Renfroe from Alabama

2 to adjust claims in California in order to limit its liability in conducting a full, prompt, and

3 thorough investigation, such fact would be important in the reprehensibility analysis." (Motion

4 to Compel p. 4:20-23.) See Fund Ins. Co. v.Superior Court, 233 Cal. App. 3rd 1138, 1141 (1991)

5 (where the court held that plaintiffs desire to review documents for "context" is a "patently

6 insufficient ground" for production of sensitive information). Having failed to meet this

7 threshold showing of good cause, plaintiffs motion must necessarily fail.

8 Significantly, plaintiffs filed their instant MTC before attempting to pursue less intrusive

9 discovery methods to demonstrate the existence of some minimal merit to their claims. 1

10 Further, plaintiffs' representation that E.A. Renfroe is licensed in Alabama is inaccurate,

11 incomplete, entirely misleading and immaterial. E.A. Renfroe is an independent third-party

12 vendor that provides claims support services nationwide, and whose corporate headquarters

13 happens to be located in Alabama. (See, https://www.earenfroe.com/company/about-us).

14 There is also no law or other authority which prohibits an insurer from using the services of a

15 specific third party vendor which has its home office in another state in adjusting claims. Nor is

16 it in any way suggestive of wrongdoing, let alone unreasonable, for an insurer to do so. To hold

17 otherwise would imply that every single transaction between two businesses, and every

18 established business relationship necessarily suggests lack of independence and presumed bias.

19 Plaintiffs Have Failed to Establish the Requisite Compelling Need for the
20 Private, Protected Information Sought
21 Private information collected by insurers is protected by law under the Insurance

22 Information and Privacy Protection Act (Ins. Code§ 791.01, et seq.) (the "Act"). The main

23 purposes of the Act include the maintenance of "a balance between the need for information

24 by those conducting the business of insurance and the public's need for fairness in insurance

25
26 1
Since the filing of plaintiffs' instant motion, plaintiffs have sought to take (but have not yet subpoenaed or even
noticed) the deposition of the involved E.A. Renfroe representative. The parties are actively meeting and conferring as
27 to such deposition, because defendant is in the process of seeking leave to file a cross-complaint against another party in
this action based upon recently discovered information. (Declaration of Min K. Kang in Opposition to Plaintiffs'
28 Motion to Compel ("Kang Deel."), ,r2.)

6
Opposition to Plaintiff's Separate Statement in Support of Motion to Compel
Case No: 19CECG03506 753956
1 information practices, including the need to minimize intrusiveness"; and "limit[ing] the

2 disclosure of information collected in connection with insurance transactions." Ins. Code §791.

3 Plaintiffs believe the sound public policy underlying the Act is outweighed by their own

4 self-interests. They feign respect for the Act by offering a form letter to be sent to CSAA's

5 insureds but ignore both the intrusiveness of this request and the unwarranted burden upon

6 CSAA who must first identify and review these files, and then evaluate and redact privileged,

7 protected information therefrom. This, when plaintiffs have not even subpoenaed or noticed

8 the depositions of any E.A Renfroe representatives.

9 Plaintiffs also seek the full claim files of other insureds rather than even attempting to

10 limit their request to those portions related to E.A. Renfroe's involvement. The overly broad

11 and intrusive nature of plaintiff's RPD is underscored by the fact that any potential

12 involvement by E.A. Renfroe would likely comprise only a sliver of the entirety of the claim

13 files sought.
14 Setting aside the fact that plaintiffs have yet to show any hint of support for their

15 claimed right to intrude upon the privacy of others, it is CSAA's obligation to protect the

16 privacy of its insureds. Ins. Code§ 791.01, et seq. Merely suggesting or surmising that an out-

17 of-state company that deploys inspectors throughout the country to prepare estimates is

18 somehow biased, does not support plaintiffs' asserted right to these claim files.

19 Due to the private nature of the information sought, plaintiffs must do more than

20 simply allege that the information is relevant and reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery

21 of admissible evidence. A party seeking discovery of private information must do more than

22 satisfy a broad relevancy standard. Save Open Space Santa Monica Mtns. v. Sup. Ct., 84 Cal. App.

23 4th 235,252 (2000); Lantz v. Sup. Ct., 28 Cal. App. 4th 1839, 1853 (1994). The burden lies upon

24 plaintiffs to demonstrate a sufficient compelling need for the private and protected third party
25 information sought. Ltfe Technologies Corp. v.Sup. Ct., 197 Cal. App. 4th 640, 651-654 (2011)

26 (holding there was no support for the "sweeping disclosure of individual-specific confidential

27 information sought" in response to overbroad discovery requests when the plaintiff failed to

28 sufficiently show a compelling need). Such "compelling need" must be shown to be both
7
Opposition to Plaintiff's Separate Statement in Support of Motion to Compel
Case No: 19CECG03506 753956
1 "directly relevant" and "essential" to determining the truth of the matters in dispute. Alch v.

2 Sup. Ct., 165 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1427 (2008) (an actual class action case involving allegations of

3 industry-wide discrimination), citing Britt, supra.) Here, plaintiff fails on all fronts.

4 Plaintiffs rely upon the inapposite case of Colonial Life, supra, 31 Cal.3d 785 to support

5 their position. But the facts of Colonial Lje are a far cry from those in the case at bar, and the

6 rationale is inapplicable here. In Colonial Life, plaintiff sought only the names and addresses of

7 35 specific insureds whose claims were assigned to a single insurance adjuster and involved a

8 particular settlement practice by that specific adjuster - not entire claims files. Id. at 789, 792

9 and fn. 10. See also, Hofmann Corp. v. Sup. Ct., 172 Cal.App.3d 357,362 (1985) (distinguishing

10 the case from Colonial Lift and holding that production of a company's entire customer list was

11 too broad and expansive).
12 Nor does Colonial Lift otherwise support plaintiffs' claimed entitlement to the overbroad

13 and burdensome discovery sought, unless it is read out of context and in a vacuum. The

14 gravamen of the court's holding was that the specific, limited information at issue in that case

15 was deemed discoverable because at the time of the opinion (1982), there existed a private right

16 of action by individuals for alleged violations of Insurance Code §790.039(h), during the brief

17 window of time when Royal Globe Ins. Co. v.Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880 (1979) was still good

18 law. See, Colonial Life, 31 Cal. 3d at 791. But Royal Globe was directly overturned by the

19 California Supreme Court in 1988 in the seminal holding of Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman 5 Fund Ins.

20 Cos., 46 Cal. 3d 287 (1988).

21 Moradi-Shalal specifically held that no private cause of action could be stated for a

22 violation of Section 790.03 because the Legislature never intended section 790.03 to form the

23 basis for a private cause of action; rather, its provisions were intended only to allow for

24 administrative remedies for violations of the statute. Id. at 304. Thus, the bases upon which the

25 court decided Colonial Lje - that the information was needed to support the claim for violation

26 of section 790.03 -was long ago rendered null by Moradi-Shalal and echoed by its progeny.

27 The public interest in protecting confidential information "generally outweighs a private

28 litigant's interest in obtaining that information." Ufa Technologies Corp. v.Superior Court, 197 Cal.
8
Opposition to Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of Motion to Compel
Case No: 19CECG03506 753956
1 App. 4th 640, 652 (2011). See also, Britt v. Sup. Ct., 20 Cal.3d 844, 858-859 (1978).) In fact,

2 "California's 'courts generally have concluded that the public interest in preserving confidential

3 information outweighs in importance the interest of a private litigant ... "' Board ofTrustees v.

4 Sup. Ct., ofSanta Clara C!J., 119 Cal. App. 3d 516,530 (1981) citing Ciry &County ofS. F. v.Sup.

5 Ct., 38 Cal.2d 156, 163 (1951).

6 Plaintiffs also alleges that they require the sought information to find evidence of

7 pattern and practice (without any indicia of it in their claim) to support their punitive damage

8 claim. At this juncture in the case, 2.5 years after filing suit, there is not a hint of support for

9 plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages. Rather, plaintiffs are now seeking alleged wrongs against

10 others to see if they can profit from it. That is not permitted.

11 "A defendant's dissimilar acts, independent from the acts upon which liability
was premised, may not serve as the basis for punitive damages. A defendant
12 should be punished for the conduct that harmed the plaintiff, not for being an
13 unsavory individual or business. Due process does not permit courts, in the
calculation of punitive damages, to adjudicate the merits of other parties'
14 hypothetical claims against a defendant under the guise of the reprehensibility
analysis ... Punishment on these bases creates the possibility of multiple punitive
15
damages awards for the same conduct; for in the usual case nonparties are not
16 bound by the judgment some other plaintiff obtains ... Although 'our holdings
that a recidivist may be punished more severely than a first offender recognize
17 that repeated misconduct is more reprehensible than an individual instance of
malfeasance,' [citation], in the context of civil actions courts must ensure the
18
conduct in question replicates the prior transgressions. [Citation]... The
19 reprehensibility guidepost does not permit courts to expand the scope of the case
so that a defendant may be punished for any malfeasance."
20
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422-423, 424 (2003) (where the insured
21
had shown no conduct by the insurer similar to that which harmed them, the conduct that
22
harmed them was the only conduct relevant to the reprehensibility analysis).
23
While plaintiffs claim at this stage that they require evidence to make a claim for
24
punitive damages, they have not yet even established that their individual claim is one that
25
merits such claims. The proper "punitive damages analysis" is one "that focuses primarily on
26
what defendant did to the present plaintiff, rather than the defendant's wealth or general
27
incorrigibility." Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 113 Cal. App. 4th 738, 749 (2003). "The United States
28
9
Opposition to Plaintiff's Separate Statement in Support of Motion to Compel
Case No: 19CECG03506 753956
1 Supreme Court recently recognized that even similar conduct cannot be utilized to punish the

2 defendant for harm caused to others. Philip Morris, supra, 127 S. Ct. at p. 1063. While

3 '[e]vidence of actual harm to nonparties can help to show that the conduct that harmed the

4 plaintiff also posed a substantial risk of harm to the general public, and so was particularly

5 reprehensible ... a jury may not go further than this and use a punitive damages verdict to

6 punish a defendant directly on account of harms it is alleged to have visited on nonparties.

7 [f]he Due Process Clause requires States to provide assurance that juries are not asking the

8 wrong question, i.e., seeking, not simply to determine reprehensibility, but also to punish for

9 harm caused strangers." Id, at p. 1064. See also, Holdgrafer v. Unocal Corp., 160 Cal. App. 4th

10 907, 933 (2008) (holding that punitive damages award was improperly based on (dissimilar)

11 conduct regarding spills that occurred on other pipelines).

12 Plaintiffs' application of Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 21 Cal 3d 910 (1978) is misplaced,

13 in that the Neal case involved the existence of substantial evidence from which the jury

14 reasonably concluded that the insurer acted maliciously, with an intent to oppress, and in

15 conscious disregard of the rights of its insured. Id. at 922-923. No such record exists here. The

16 protected, private information of third parties sought by plaintiffs must be relevant to the case

17 at hand and reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Code of Civ.

18 Proc. §2017.010. This case is not a class action lawsuit. It is not even a complex case or a quasi-

19 class action. It is a claim for bad faith alleging misconduct by CSAA as to plaintiffs' one isolated

20 claim and handling thereof. They are not suing in any representative capacity.

21 Plaintiff's Discovery Demands are Overly Burdensome, Costly and Intrusive and
22 Incommensurate with the Result Sought -Particularly When Plaintiffs Have Not
23 Sought the Subject Information By Less Intrusive Means
24 This Court may limit the scope of discovery if the burden, expense or intrusiveness of

25 responding clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the

26 discovery of admissible evidence. Code Civ. Proc. § 2017 .020(a). As outlined above, much of

27 the information sought by plaintiffs' overbroad requests requires review of potentially hundreds
28 of claims files.

Opposition to Plaintiff's Separate Statement in Support of Motion to Compel
Case No: 19CECG03506 753956
1 The ultimate effect of the onerous burden and cost of identifying, reviewing and

2 thereafter redacting potentially hundreds of claim files that could easily comprise up to

3 hundreds of thousands of pages is incommensurate with the result sought in this single

4 claimant lawsuit - which is, plaintiffs' meager attempt to find some evidence to substantiate

5 their speculative claims. Mead Reinsurance Co. v. Sup. Ct., 188 Cal. App. 3d 313 (1986). See also,

6 Nelson v. Sup. Ct., 184 Cal. App. 3d 444, 452-453 (1986) (after plaintiff made no showing of any

7 use for CHP accident investigation reports other than speculation that after examining the

8 reports he might be able to formulate some viable theory of liability against the state, the court

9 concluded that the plaintiffs "purpose in requesting the reports, so far as was shown, was

10 precisely the type of 'fishing expedition' not authorized even when the requesting party is

11 charged with crime on account of a vehicular accident").

12 Notably, prior to filing this MTC, plaintiffs had not even sought to take the deposition

13 of an E.A. Renfroe representative - a much less intrusive manner through which plaintiffs can

14 obtain the information purportedly sought.

15 CSAA should not be charged with the time-consuming and costly process of identifying

16 and sending letters to potentially hundreds of insureds to subsidize plaintiffs' "fishing

17 expedition," especially given plaintiffs' clear lack of any showing of relevance, let alone good

18 cause or a compelling need.

19 Plaintiffs have not met their threshold burden to warrant production of the protected

20 information sought. They have not pointed to a single fact or a document to substantiate their

21 speculations and demands for intrusive and unduly burdensome discovery. They have not yet

22 taken the deposition of an E.A. Renfroe representative or anyone else regarding plaintiffs'

23 allegations of bias on the part of CSAA or its vendors, and have not made any reasonable

24 attempt to show that any of their claims are founded in fact. Substantial justification therefore

25 exists for defendant's withholding of the sought private, protected information.

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11
Opposition to Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of Motion to Compel
Case No: 19CECG03506 753956
Dated: March 3, 2021 CODDINGTON, HICKS & DANFORTH
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16'/711,i,n, K ~
2 By: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __
MinK. Kang
3 Attorneys for Defendant
CSAA Insurance Exchange
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Opposition to Plaintiff's Separate Statement in Support of Motion to Compel
Case No: 19CECG03506 753956
1 PROOF OF SERVICE
California Code of Civil Procedure sections 1011, 1013, 1013a, 2015.5
2 California Rule of Court rule 2.251
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 5(6)
3
4 I, the undersigned, declare that I am employed in the County of San Mateo, State of

5 California. I am over the age of eighteen (18) years and not a party to the within action. My

6 business address is 555 Twin Dolphin Drive, Suite 300, Redwood City, California 94065. My

7 electronic mail address is Eva@chdlawyers.com.

8 I am readily familiar with my employer's business practice for collection and processing

9 of correspondence and documents for mailing with the United States Postal Service, mailing via

1O overnight delivery, transmission by facsimile machine, and delivery by hand.

11 On March 3, 2021, I served a copy of each of the documents listed below by placing

12 them for processing as indicated herein.

13 OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO COMPEL
14
United States Mail: The correspondence or documents were placed in sealed,
15 labeled envelopes with postage thereon fully prepaid on the above date placed for
collection and mailing at my place of business to be deposited with the U.S. Postal
16 Service at Redwood City, California on this same date in the ordinary course of
business.
17
Overnight Delivery: The correspondence or documents were placed in sealed,
18 labeled packaging for overnight de1ivery, with Federal Express, with allcharges to
be paid by my employer on the above date for collection at my place of business to
19 be deposited in a facility regularly maintained by the overnight delivery carrier, or
delivered to a courier or driver authorized by the overnight delivery carrier to receive
20 such packages, on this date in the ordinary course of business.

21 Hand Delivery: The correspondence or documents were placed in sealed, labeled
envelopes and served by personal delivery to the party or attorney indicated herein,
22 or if upon attorney, by leaving the labeled envefopes with a receptionist or other
person having charge of the attorney's office.
23
Facsimile Transmission: The correspondence or documents were placed for
24 transmission from (650) 592-5027 at Redwood City, California, and were transmitted
to a facsimile machine maintained by the party or attorney to be served at the
25 facsimile machine telephone number provided by said party or attorney, on this
same date in the ordinary course of business. The transmission was reported as
26 complete and without error, and a record of the transmission was properly issued by
the transmitting facsimile machine.
27
X Electronic Transmission: The correspondence or documents were transmitted
28 electronically to the electronic address set forth l?elow.
1 State. The recipient has filed and served notice that he or she accepts
electronic service; the recipient has electronically filed a document with the court;
2 and/ or the Court has mandated that the parties serve documents through its Court
approved vendor. The printed form of this document bearing the original signature
3 is on file and available for inspection at the request of the court or any party to the
action or proceeding in which it is filed, in the manner provided in California Rule of
4 Court Rufe 2.257 (a).

5 Federal. The recipient of this electronic service has consented to this
method of service in writing, a copy of which is on fileand available for inspection
6 in my employer's office. I have received no indication the electronic transmission did
not reach the recipient.
7

8 PERSONS OR PARTIES SERVED:

9 Gene V. Halavanau, Esq.
Halavanau Law Office, P.C.
10 150 Post Street, Suite 600
San Francisco, CA 94108
11
Telephone: (415) 692-5301
12 Facsimile: (415) 692-8412
E-mail: gene@halavanau.com
13
Aleksandr A. V olkov, Esq.
14 Volkov Law Office
1200 Mount Diablo Blvd., Ste. 205
15 Walnut Creek, CA 94596

16 Telephone: (415) 987-7000
Facsimile: (415) 276-6376
17 E-mail: alex@volf.com

19 I certify (or declare)

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Motion-Secondary: Gomez v. CSAA Insurance Exchange

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