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  • Currey, Hannelore, et al vs Enloe Medical Center, et al(23) Unlimited Other PI/PD/WD document preview
  • Currey, Hannelore, et al vs Enloe Medical Center, et al(23) Unlimited Other PI/PD/WD document preview
  • Currey, Hannelore, et al vs Enloe Medical Center, et al(23) Unlimited Other PI/PD/WD document preview
  • Currey, Hannelore, et al vs Enloe Medical Center, et al(23) Unlimited Other PI/PD/WD document preview
  • Currey, Hannelore, et al vs Enloe Medical Center, et al(23) Unlimited Other PI/PD/WD document preview
  • Currey, Hannelore, et al vs Enloe Medical Center, et al(23) Unlimited Other PI/PD/WD document preview
  • Currey, Hannelore, et al vs Enloe Medical Center, et al(23) Unlimited Other PI/PD/WD document preview
  • Currey, Hannelore, et al vs Enloe Medical Center, et al(23) Unlimited Other PI/PD/WD document preview
						
                                

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1 BARRY VOGEL, STATE BAR NO. 108640 Bvogel@ljdfa.com 2 SCOTT W. FOLEY, STATE BAR NO. 278357 2/10/2021 SFoley@ljdfa.com 3 LA FOLLETTE, JOHNSON, DeHAAS, FESLER & AMES 4 655 University Avenue, Suite 119 Sacramento, California 95825-6746 5 Telephone (916) 563-3100 • Facsimile (916) 565-3704 6 Attorneys for Defendant and Cross-Complainant ENLOE MEDICAL CENTER 7 8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 9 COUNTY OF BUTTE LA FOLLETTE, JOHNSON, DeHAAS, FESLER & AMES 10 11 HANNELORE CURREY; and KEVIN CASE NO.: 17 CV 00919 CURREY, 12 CROSS-COMPLAINANT ENLOE MEDICAL Plaintiffs, CENTER'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 13 AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION vs. FOR LEAVE TO FILE A FIRT AMENDED 14 CROSS-COMPLAINT AGAINST CROSS- ENLOE MEDICAL CENTER; and DOES 1 DEFENDANT RSC ASSOCIATES, INC. 15 through 20, inclusive, DATE: March 24, 2021 16 Defendants. TIME: 9:00 A.M. LOCATION: Dept. 1 17 AND ALL RELATED ACTIONS. TRIAL DATE: 04/05/21 18 ACTION FILED: 03/30/17 19 20 I. INTRODUCTION 21 Plaintiffs Hannelore Currey and Kevin Currey filed a complaint against defendant Enloe Medical 22 Center (“Enloe”) and asserted causes of action for negligence, dangerous condition, and loss of 23 consortium. They alleged that Enloe failed to properly maintain its parking lot and keep it free from any 24 dangerous conditions. As a result of Enloe’s alleged negligence, Ms. Currey tripped on cracked, uneven 25 pavement, fell to the ground, and suffered injuries. 26 At the time of the alleged incident, Enloe had a contract with RSC Associates, Inc. (“RSC”) 27 wherein RSC agreed to manage the parking lot, inspect it, maintain it in an acceptable condition, and 28 make repairs to protect the health and safety of patrons. RSC also agreed to defend and indemnify Enloe s:\665.39331 -1- currey\motions\m CROSS-COMPLAINANT ENLOE’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF ITS tn for leave to file am x- MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A FIRST AMENDED CROSS-COMPLAINT AGAINST RSC ASSOCIATES, INC. compl\ps&as.f.do cx 1 from lawsuits owing by reason of RSC’s breach, violation, or non-performance of a term or provision of 2 the contract. Enloe filed a cross-complaint against RSC for indemnify and defense and RSC filed a cross- 3 complaint against Enloe seeking the same relief. This Court denied Enloe’s motion for summary 4 judgment and granted RSC’s motion for summary judgment in part, finding that Enloe is obligated to 5 defend RSC in this action. Part of the reason for that finding is plaintiffs did not allege breach of contract 6 in their complaint and Enloe did not assert a cause of action for breach of contract. Enloe therefore seeks 7 leave of this Court for permission to file a First Amended Cross-Complaint to assert a cause of action for 8 breach of contract. 9 II. SUMMARY OF FACTS ALLEGED IN PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT LA FOLLETTE, JOHNSON, DeHAAS, FESLER & AMES 10 Enloe owns property located at 251 Cohasset Road in Chico, California. (First Amended 11 Complaint, submitted with this motion as Ex. F, at ¶ 2.) It is commonly known as Fountain Medical 12 Plaza. (Ibid.) On April 1, 2015, Ms. Currey was in the Fountain Medical Plaza parking lot helping her 13 husband get in their vehicle. (Id. at ¶ 6.) After Ms. Currey helped her husband, she walked around her 14 vehicle to the driver’s side. (Ibid.) However, “her foot caught on a piece of uneven, raised and cracked 15 pavement, causing her to slip and fall onto the pavement and become injured.” (Ibid.) 16 III. SUMMARY OF FACTS RELATED TO THE RELEVANT CONTRACT 17 At the time Ms. Currey fell and injured herself at 251 Cohasset Road, RSC was under contract 18 with Enloe to manage the parking lot, inspect it, maintain it in an acceptable condition according to 19 industry standards, and make repairs to protect pedestrians from harm. (Management Agreement, 20 submitted with this motion as Ex. A, at ¶¶ 4.E., 4.G, and 4.J.) RSC agreed to indemnify Enloe from 21 lawsuits resulting from its breach of the contract. (Id. at ¶ 8.) Ms. Currey tripped on cracked and uneven 22 pavement that RSC failed to repair. (Ex. F at ¶ 6.) Failure to repair a tripping hazard in the parking lot 23 cannot be construed as anything other than a breach of the contract under the terms of the contract 24 between Enloe and RSC. 25 IV. SUMMARY OF RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY 26 On July 20, 2017, plaintiffs served Enloe with their First Amended Complaint. (Declaration of 27 Scott Foley (“Foley Decl.”) at ¶ 3.) On July 6, 2018, Enloe filed a cross-complaint against RSC. (Id. at 28 ¶ 7.) On January 2, 2019, plaintiffs added RSC as a defendant. (Id. at ¶ 8.) On or around March 8, 2019, s:\665.39331 -2- currey\motions\m CROSS-COMPLAINANT ENLOE’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF ITS tn for leave to file am x- MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A FIRST AMENDED CROSS-COMPLAINT AGAINST RSC ASSOCIATES, INC. compl\ps&as.f.do cx 1 RSC filed a cross-complaint against Enloe. (Id. at ¶ 9.) On July 30, 2019, Enloe filed a motion for 2 summary judgment on its cross-complaint and argued RSC had an obligation to defend and indemnify 3 Enloe against plaintiffs’ lawsuit because RSC agreed to do so if someone files a lawsuit due to injuries 4 suffered as a result of RSC’s breach of contract. (Id. at ¶ 11.) The Court denied Enloe’s motion for 5 summary judgment. (Ibid.) Depositions of various witnesses were taken on October 3, 2019, October 6 23, 2019, November 8, 2019, and February 5, 2020. (Id. at ¶¶ 12-15.) On or around June 17, 2020, the 7 Court granted in part and denied in part RSC’s motion for summary judgment on its cross-complaint and 8 found Enloe had a duty to defend RSC against plaintiffs’ lawsuit. (Id. at ¶ 16; Tentative Ruling, submitted 9 with this motion as Ex. E, at pp. 1-2.) LA FOLLETTE, JOHNSON, DeHAAS, FESLER & AMES 10 On July 23, 2020, RSC’s attorney contacted Enloe’s attorney to discuss the issue of RSC’s claim 11 for attorney’s fees and costs related to their defense of plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint and Enloe’s 12 Cross-Complaint. (Foley Decl. at ¶ 17.) On November 11, 2020, all plaintiffs, Enloe, and RSC all 13 participated in a mediation and Enloe settled with plaintiffs. (Id. at ¶ 18.) Following the mediation and 14 up until at least January 15, 2021, Enloe and the mediator were in contact with RSC to negotiate RSC 15 contributing to the settlement and/or waiving any claim it has to attorney’s fees. (Ibid.) 16 V. ARGUMENT 17 A. The Law Regarding Motions for Leave to File an Amended Pleading 18 “The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to 19 amend any pleading by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the 20 name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect.” (Code of Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a)(1).) “The court 21 may . . . after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any 22 pleading or proceeding in other particulars.” (Ibid.) The court may allow the amendment of any pleading 23 “at any time before or after commencement of trial.” (Code of Civ. Proc., § 576 [emphasis added].) The 24 general rule with respect to deciding motions for leave to amend a pleading is that they should be liberally 25 granted. (Nestle v. Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 939; Simons v. County of Kern (1965) 234 26 Cal.App.2d 362, 368; see also Berman v. Bromberg (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 936, 945 [“there is a strong 27 policy in favor of liberal allowance of amendments”].) “The policy favoring amendment is so strong that 28 it is a rare case in which denial of leave to amend can be justified.” (Howard v. County of San Diego s:\665.39331 -3- currey\motions\m CROSS-COMPLAINANT ENLOE’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF ITS tn for leave to file am x- MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A FIRST AMENDED CROSS-COMPLAINT AGAINST RSC ASSOCIATES, INC. compl\ps&as.f.do cx 1 (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1428.) “[I]t it is a rare case in which ‘a court will be justified in refusing 2 a party leave to amend his pleadings so that he may properly present his case.’” (Daum v. Superior Court 3 of Sutter County (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 283, 289, quoting Guidery v. Green (1892) 95 Cal. 630, 633.) 4 “If the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the motion will not prejudice the 5 opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend and where the refusal also results in a party being 6 deprived of the right to assert a meritorious cause of action .. . it is not only error but an abuse of 7 discretion.” (Daum, supra, 228 Cal.App.2d at p. 289.) “[I]t is an abuse of discretion to deny leave to 8 amend where the opposing party was not misled or prejudiced by the amendment. [Citations.]” (Atkinson 9 v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 739, 761.) If leave to amend a pleading is sought during trial and LA FOLLETTE, JOHNSON, DeHAAS, FESLER & AMES 10 the party alleges new facts, “‘prejudice may easily result because of the inability of the other party to 11 investigate the validity of the factual allegations while engaged in trial or to call rebuttal witnesses.’” 12 (IIG Wireless, Inc. v. Yi (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 630, 653, quoting City of Stanton v. Cox (1989) 207 13 Cal.Ap.3d, 1557, 1563.) “‘If the same set of facts supports merely a different theory . . . no prejudice 14 can result.’” (Ibid. [ellipses in original].) 15 “[I]t is a well-established rule which is founded on justice and good reason that a court should 16 exercise liberality in permitting the amendment of pleadings to adequately present the necessary issues 17 at any and all stages of the proceeding.” (Redondo Improv. Co. v. Redondo Beach (1934) 3 Cal.App.2d 18 299, 302.) The reason amendments are permitted with such great liberality is so “lawsuits may be 19 determined upon their merits.” (Desny v. Wilder (1956) 46 Cal.2d 715, 751.) “The fact that the new 20 matter may have been known to the applicant at the time of filing his original pleading is not sufficient 21 ground for denying the right to amend.” (Kroplin v. Huston (1947) 79 Cal.App.2d 332, 340.) 22 B. The Court Should Grant Enloe Leave to File a First Amended Cross-Complaint to Add a Meritorious Cause of Action for Breach of Contract Because RSC Has Not 23 Been Misled and Will Not Be Prejudiced. 24 In Atkinson, the plaintiff filed his complaint in 1999 and asserted three causes of action. 25 (Atkinson, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 742.) Later, the trial court scheduled trial to start on May 7, 2001. 26 (Id. at p. 759.) On April 25, 2001 (less than two weeks before trial), the plaintiff filed a motion for leave 27 to file a first amended complaint with four new causes of action and to continue trial. (Ibid.) On May 4, 28 2001, the trial court denied both of the plaintiff’s motions. (Ibid.) The appellate court found that the trial s:\665.39331 -4- currey\motions\m CROSS-COMPLAINANT ENLOE’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF ITS tn for leave to file am x- MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A FIRST AMENDED CROSS-COMPLAINT AGAINST RSC ASSOCIATES, INC. compl\ps&as.f.do cx 1 court had erred in denying the plaintiff’s motions to amend the complaint and to continue trial. (Ibid.) 2 The defendant had not claimed it would be prejudiced by the amendment and “the better course of action 3 would have been to allow [the plaintiff] to amend the complaint and then let the parties test its legal 4 sufficiency in other appropriate proceedings.” (Id. at p. 761.) The appellate court remanded the case 5 with instructions for the trial court to grant the plaintiff leave to amend his complaint. (Ibid.) 6 In Lilley v. Key System Transit Lines (1955) 136 Cal.App.2d 737, the plaintiffs moved to amend 7 their complaint at the time of trial during their rebuttal to add an allegation that the minor plaintiff was 8 a passenger of the defendant. (Id. at p. 739 [emphasis added].) The defendant argued the motion was 9 untimely, pointed out the plaintiffs knew for 11 months that the minor plaintiff may have been a LA FOLLETTE, JOHNSON, DeHAAS, FESLER & AMES 10 passenger, and argued “it was not fair to expect a defendant retroactively to defend a case on the basis 11 that plaintiff was a passenger rather than a member of the ordinary public.” (Ibid.) The Third District 12 found the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the amendment. (Ibid.) 13 In Nestle, supra, 6 Cal.3d 920, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the City of Santa Monica for 14 personal injuries suffered as a result of the city operating an airport. (Id. at p. 924.) The plaintiffs asserted 15 four causes of action, including negligence and zoning violations. (Ibid.) “At trial the parties agreed to 16 a procedure by which the court, immediately prior to the commencement of trial, would rule on the legal 17 sufficiency of” the negligence and zoning causes of action. (Ibid. [emphasis added].) The court ruled 18 that the negligence and zoning causes of action failed to state a cause of action and then denied the 19 plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend them. (Ibid.) On appeal, the California Supreme Court 20 “conclude[d] the trial court improperly denied plaintiffs an opportunity to amend.” (Id. at p. 938.) Had 21 the trial court exercised its discretion appropriately and granted the plaintiffs leave to amend their 22 complaint, the trial would have needed to be continued. 23 In Garcia v. Roberts (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 900, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit on December 16, 24 2004, against the defendants for breach of an oral contract and fraud. (Id. at pp. 902, 907.) During 25 discovery, the plaintiff claimed the agreement was oral and not based on a written contract. (Id. at p. 26 902.) The plaintiff filed a third amended complaint on December 14, 2005, and alleged breach of oral 27 contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and fraud. (Id. at p. 907.) That was 28 the operative pleading at the time of trial in June 2007. (Ibid.) The plaintiff died four months before trial s:\665.39331 -5- currey\motions\m CROSS-COMPLAINANT ENLOE’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF ITS tn for leave to file am x- MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A FIRST AMENDED CROSS-COMPLAINT AGAINST RSC ASSOCIATES, INC. compl\ps&as.f.do cx 1 and his wife was substituted into the case as the plaintiff’s successor in interest and personal 2 representative. (Ibid.) Trial started on June 25, 2007, and, during motions in limine, the plaintiff’s 3 attorney stated his intent to move to amend the third amended complaint to add a new cause of action for 4 breach of a written contract. (Ibid.) The plaintiff’s motion to amend was heard before closing arguments 5 and granted over the defendants’ objections. (Id. at p. 908.) The jury found in the plaintiff’s favor on 6 the cause of action for breach of a written contract. (Ibid.) 7 The defendants appealed and argued the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted the 8 plaintiff to amend its complaint because it was unfairly prejudicial to them. (Garcia, supra, 173 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 910.) The defendants argued on appeal that the “plaintiff not only failed to previously LA FOLLETTE, JOHNSON, DeHAAS, FESLER & AMES 10 allege the existence of any contract other than the oral loan agreement, but affirmatively represented in 11 deposition testimony that the only agreement he had with defendants concerning the property was the 12 oral loan agreement.” (Id. at p. 910.) The defendants claimed “that as a result of plaintiff’s deposition 13 testimony and in reliance thereon, they did not pursue further discovery from plaintiff to defend a 14 potential claim under the lease-option agreement.” (Id. at p. 911.) In addition, there was evidence the 15 plaintiff knew about the written contract but refused to allow his attorney to bring it up in litigation, so 16 allowing the amendment was not in furtherance of justice. (Ibid.) The appellate court was “persuaded 17 that allowing the amendment at trial unfairly prejudiced defendants and therefore constituted an abuse of 18 discretion.” (Id. at p. 912.) This was because the plaintiff’s deposition testimony claiming there was 19 only an oral contract “reasonably limited the focus of defendants’ discovery efforts and the manner in 20 which defendants prepared for trial” and, since the plaintiff had died, the defendants could not question 21 him “further on any issues relevant to the” written contract. (Id. at p. 913.) Permitting the amendment 22 “allowed plaintiff (through his wife as successor in interest) to materially reverse his position.” (Ibid.) 23 In M&F Fishing, Inc. v. Sea-Pac Ins. Managers, Inc. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1509, no abuse of 24 discretion was found when the trial court denied a motion to amend a complaint eight months before trial 25 to add 166 new parties and denied a motion to amend a complaint three months before trial to add between 26 44 and 54 new parties because it would have necessitated dozens of additional depositions and other 27 discovery, would have complicated the trial, and could have extended the trial beyond the five-year cutoff 28 provided in CCP § 583.310. (Id. at pp. 1535, 1536-1537.) s:\665.39331 -6- currey\motions\m CROSS-COMPLAINANT ENLOE’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF ITS tn for leave to file am x- MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A FIRST AMENDED CROSS-COMPLAINT AGAINST RSC ASSOCIATES, INC. compl\ps&as.f.do cx 1 In the case at bar, Enloe is not proposing to add any new parties or to assert any new allegations 2 that would surprise or prejudice RSC. Enloe’s cross-complaint has always been about RSC’s alleged 3 breach of contract by failing to repair cracked and uneven pavement, which led to Ms. Currey tripping, 4 injuring herself, and filing the lawsuit against Enloe and RSC. While Enloe proposes to assert a new 5 cause of action for breach of contract, the original cross-complaint asserted RSC had a duty to defend 6 and indemnify Enloe because RSC breached the contract by failing to repair cracked and uneven 7 pavement in the parking lot where Ms. Currey tripped, fell, and suffered injuries. (Enloe’s Cross- 8 Complaint, submitted with this motion as Ex. B, at p. 2, lines 2-4 and lines 8-11; ¶¶ 11, 12, 15, 17, and 9 19.) LA FOLLETTE, JOHNSON, DeHAAS, FESLER & AMES 10 Enloe is not reversing its position. The case between Enloe and RSC has always been about the 11 indemnity clause in the contract, which says RSC “agrees that it will indemnify and hold [Enloe] whole 12 and harmless of, from and against all . . . claims, demands and actions of every kind and character owing 13 by reason of [RCS’s] gross negligence, willful misconduct or fraud or of any breach, violation or non- 14 performance of any term, provision, covenant, agreement or condition on the part of” RSC. (Ex. A at p. 15 4, ¶ 8 [emphasis added].) The indemnity clause also says Enloe “agrees that it will indemnify and hold 16 and save [RSC] whole and harmless of, from and against all . . . suits . . . claims, demands and actions of 17 every kind and character owing in connection with the operation and management of the Property . . . 18 except for . . . suits, claims, demands and actions resulting from the gross negligence, willful misconduct 19 or fraud of [RSC], or from the breach, violation or non-performance of any term, provision, covenant, 20 agreement or condition on the part of” RSC.” (Ibid. [emphasis added].) RSC will not need to do any 21 additional discovery to meet the new cause of action for breach of contract because the case has always 22 been about whether RSC breached the contract. Discovery has always been about the trip and fall, the 23 condition of the pavement at the time of the trip and fall, how RSC managed and inspected the parking 24 lot before Ms. Currey tripped and fell, and whether RSC’s actions or inactions should be considered a 25 breach of the contract. 26 After resolving competing motions for summary judgment filed by Enloe and RSC on their 27 respective cross-complaints, the Court found Enloe had a duty to defend RSC because neither plaintiffs 28 nor Enloe asserted a breach of contract in their pleadings. (See Ex. E at p. 2.) Enloe is now seeking s:\665.39331 -7- currey\motions\m CROSS-COMPLAINANT ENLOE’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF ITS tn for leave to file am x- MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A FIRST AMENDED CROSS-COMPLAINT AGAINST RSC ASSOCIATES, INC. compl\ps&as.f.do cx 1 permission to amend its cross-complaint to add a cause of action for breach of contract. If Enloe is not 2 permitted to amend, it will not receive the benefit of its bargain. The circumstances of this litigation—a 3 patron tripping in the parking lot and filing a lawsuit against Enloe—was the exact situation contemplated 4 by Enloe and RSC when they signed the contract with the indemnity clause. RSC agreed by contract to 5 defend and indemnify Enloe in cases where a parking lot patron sustains personal injuries as a result of 6 RSC’s breach of the contract. Ms. Currey tripped on cracked and uneven pavement in Enloe’s parking 7 lot. Enloe hired RSC prior to the trip and fall to manage the parking lot and to make repairs to keep 8 patrons safe. Had RSC repaired the cracked and uneven pavement, Ms. Currey could not have tripped 9 on it. RSC’s failure to repair the pavement was a breach of contract. Thus, Ms. Currey’s injuries and LA FOLLETTE, JOHNSON, DeHAAS, FESLER & AMES 10 lawsuit came about as a result of RSC’s breach of contract, so RSC has a duty under the contract to 11 defend and indemnify Enloe against Ms. Currey’s lawsuit. If the Court does not permit Enloe to amend 12 its cross-complaint, RSC will not only not have to abide by the contract by defending and indemnifying 13 Enloe, but it may be entitled to attorney’s fees based on the Court’s ruling on the parties’ motions for 14 summary judgement. Enloe therefore requests that the Court grant its motion for leave to file an amended 15 cross-complaint to assert a cause of action for breach of contract to further the interests of justice and to 16 allow Enloe to enforce the contract and receive the benefit of its bargain. 17 VI. CONCLUSION 18 For the above stated reasons, Enloe Medical Center requests that this Court grant this motion for 19 leave to file a First Amended Cross-Complaint against RSC Associates, Inc. 20 21 Respectfully Submitted, 22 Dated: February 10, 2021 LA FOLLETTE, JOHNSON, DeHAAS, FESLER & AMES 23 /S/ Scott W. Foley 24 By: SCOTT W. FOLEY 25 Attorneys for Defendant and Cross-Complainant Enloe Medical Center 26 27 28 s:\665.39331 -8- currey\motions\m CROSS-COMPLAINANT ENLOE’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF ITS tn for leave to file am x- MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A FIRST AMENDED CROSS-COMPLAINT AGAINST RSC ASSOCIATES, INC. compl\ps&as.f.do cx 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 LA FOLLETTE, JOHNSON, DeHAAS, FESLER & AMES 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 s:\665.39331 -2- currey\motions\m CROSS-COMPLAINANT ENLOE’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF ITS tn for leave to file am x- MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A FIRST AMENDED CROSS-COMPLAINT AGAINST RSC ASSOCIATES, INC. compl\ps&as.f.do cx