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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
HENRY BOYCE and ANGELIQUE )
BOYCE, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. )
)
BLENHEIM AT BAY POINTE, )
LLC., BLENHEIM HOMES, INC., )
BLENHEIM HOMES, L.P., SUDLER ) C.A. No. N14C-06-239
CONSTRUCTION LTD., THE )
LESSARD ARCHITECTURAL )
GROUP INC., JOHN F. MCLAURIN, )
JAMES A REEVES INC., )
CUSTOM SIDING OF DELAWARE )
LLC, DELMARVA ROOFING AND )
COATING INC., CARFARO INC., and )
BLENHEIM BROWN LLC, )
)
Defendants. )
OPINION
Date Submitted: October 29, 2014
Date Decided: December 30, 2014
Upon Defendants Blenheim at Bay Pointe, LLC, Blenheim Hones, Inc., and
Blenheim Homes, L.P.’s, Motion to Dismiss: DENIED.
Blake A. Bennett, Esquire, and Christopher H. Lee, Esquire, Cooch & Taylor P.A.,
1000 West Street, 10th Floor, Wilmington, DE 19801, Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
Jeffrey M. Weiner, Esquire, 1332 King Street, Wilmington, DE 19801, Attorney
for Defendants Blenheim at Bay Pointe, LCC., Blenheim Homes Inc., and
Blenheim Homes, L.P.
Joel H. Fredricks, Esquire, Casarino Christman Shalk Ransom & Doss P.A., 405
North King Street, Suite 300, Wilmington, DE 19899, Attorney for Defendant
Suder Construction Ltd.
Paul Cottrell, Esquire, Tighe & Cottrell, P.A., 704 North King Street, Suite 500,
Wilmington, DE 19801, Attorney for Defendants The Lessard Architectural
Group, Inc., and John F. McLaurin.
Charles Gruver, III, Esquire, Charles Gruver III, P.A., 724 Yorklyn Road, Suite
315, Hockessin, DE 19707, Attorney for Defendant Custom Siding of Delaware
LCC.
Joseph Scott Shannon, Esquire, and Art C. Aranilla, Esquire, Marshall Dennehey
Warner Coleman & Goggin, 1220 North Market Street, 5th Floor, Wilmington, DE
19801, Attorneys for Defendant Carfaro Inc.
Jurden, J.
2
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Defendants’ Blenheim at Bay Point LCC., Blenheim
Homes Inc., and Blenheim Homes L.P.’s (collectively “Blenheim”) Motion to
Dismiss. This case involves negligence claims by the owners of a single family
home in the Bay Pointe residential community against the builders and designers
of that home. After experiencing reoccurring water leaks and severe damage in
their home, Plaintiffs filed suit against Blenheim, Sudler Construction Ltd
(“Sudler”), The Lessard Architectural Group Inc. (“Lessard”), John F. McLaurin
(“McLaurin”), James A Reeves Inc. (“Reeves”), Custom Siding of Delaware LLC
(“Custom Siding”), Delmarva Roofing and Coating Inc. (Delmarva Roofing”),
Carfaro Inc. (“Carfaro”), and Blenheim Brown LLC (“Blenheim Brown”)
(“collectively Defendants”), alleging negligent construction and negligent design.
Blenheim filed this Motion to Dismiss arguing that the Plaintiffs’ Complaint
is time-barred and fails to state a claim against Defendants Blenheim Homes, Inc.
and Blenheim Homes L.P.
Defendants Sudler, Lessard, McLaurin, Custom Siding, and Carfaro, have
joined Blenheim’s Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons explained below,
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
3
II. FACTS
On August 31, 2011, Henry and Angelique Boyce (“Plaintiffs”) purchased a
single family home from its original owners.1 The original owners purchased the
property directly from Blenheim in 2005.2
In 2013, Plaintiffs began to experience isolated water leaks in their garage
ceiling and walls.3 In June 2014, when the leaks worsened, Plaintiffs hired a home
inspection expert who specializes in water infiltration. 4 The expert found evidence
of extensive water infiltration and concluded that the windows, doors, balcony, and
stone veneer were not properly installed and needed repair. 5
Plaintiffs filed their initial Complaint on June 25, 2014.6 Plaintiffs assert
claims of negligent construction (Count I) against Blenheim, Blenheim Brown,
Sudler, Reeves, Custom Siding, Delmarva Roofing, and Carfaro; and negligent
design (Count II) against Lessard and McLaurin.7
According to Plaintiffs, Defendants’ negligent construction and design of
their home resulted “in severe water and moisture penetration, deterioration,
1
Second Amended Complaint at ¶14 (“SAC”) (Trans. ID. 55898357) (Aug. 15, 2014); Plaintiffs’
Opposition to Blenheim Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at ¶1 (“Pls.’ Opp. Mot. Dismiss”)
(Trans. ID. 56034201).
2
Pls.’ Opp. Mot. Dismiss at ¶1.
3
Id. at ¶3.
4
Id. at ¶¶3–4.
5
Id. at ¶4.
6
Trans. ID. 55644065. Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on July 10, 2014 (Trans. ID.
55713479) and a SAC on August 15, 2014 (Trans. ID. 55898357). For purposes of this motion,
Complaint refers to Plaintiffs’ SAC.
7
SAC (Trans. ID. 55898357).
4
unattractiveness, loss in marketability and market value, structural and physical
instability, and other dangerous conditions.” 8
III. PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
Blenheim argues that the Complaint must be dismissed under Superior Court
Civil Rule 12(b)(6) because it is time-barred.9 According to Blenheim, Plaintiffs
had constructive notice of the alleged defects in their home because more than
three years prior to the Complaint other Bay Pointe homeowners filed similar
lawsuits alleging negligent design and negligent construction.10 Blenheim asserts
that Plaintiffs should have known of the defects in their home because “the public
record is replete with allegations of defects and deficient construction in
connection with 5 houses constructed in Bay Pointe more than 3 years old prior to .
. . filing their complaint on June 25, 2014.” 11
Plaintiffs argue that they “were neither aware nor should they have been
aware of any construction defects in other homes in the Bay Pointe neighborhood
or any litigation regarding those homes when they purchased the property.” 12
8
SAC at ¶15.
9
Blenheim Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint at ¶12 (“Mot. Dismiss”)
(Trans. ID. 55834033).
10
Id. at ¶¶11–12. Blenheim attached to its Motion to Dismiss two complaints filed by other Bay
Pointe homeowners against Blenheim in 2009 and 2010. Id. at ¶¶7–8. Blenheim also attached a
complaint filed by Blenheim in 2009 against Sudler for improper and deficient construction,
workmanship, and materials in connection with installation of the siding of several homes in Bay
Pointe. Id. at ¶6.
11
Id. at ¶12.
12
Pls.’ Opp. Mot. Dismiss at ¶2.
5
Plaintiffs assert that their claims are tolled by the Time of Discovery rule and
therefore timely because the Complaint was filed within one month of Plaintiffs
learning of the construction defects from their home inspection expert.13 Plaintiffs
contend that “[g]iven their lack of expertise and the limited and isolated nature of
the leaks at issue, the statute of limitations did not even begin to run until June
2014.” 14
Blenheim also argues that the Complaint fails to allege any specific facts
supporting a claim against Defendants Blenheim Homes, Inc. and Blenheim
Homes L.P. because Plaintiffs’ deed explicitly states that the land premises were
conveyed to the original owners from Blenheim Brown, LLC and Blenheim at Bay
Point, LCC.15
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court will dismiss a complaint only if it appears “with reasonable
certainty that, under any set of facts that could be proven to support the claims
asserted, the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief.” 16 The Court only considers
“the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint.” 17 “[A] motion to dismiss shall be
13
Id. at ¶¶4–5, 7.
14
Id. at ¶12.
15
Mot. Dismiss at ¶13. Because Blenheim has submitted matters outside the pleading the Court
is treating Blenheim’s motion as one for summary judgment and the Court will allow discovery
on this matter.
16
Clinton v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co., 977 A.2d 892, 895 (Del. 2009).
17
Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 458 (Del. 2005).
6
treated as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 if matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the Court.” 18
Through its Motion to Dismiss, Blenhiem has submitted documents not
relied upon by the Plaintiffs in their Complaint.19 Blenhiem asks the Court to
consider three “judicial proceedings” that contain “allegations of defects and
deficient construction in connection with five houses constructed in Bay Pointe.”20
Because the Court has considered these proceedings, it is treating Blenhiem’s
motion as one for summary judgment.
On a motion for summary judgment, the Court views all facts in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party, and determines whether a genuine issue of
material fact exists.21 The Court will grant summary judgment only if no genuine
issue of material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.22 If the record reveals that material facts are in dispute, or if the
factual record has not been developed thoroughly enough to allow the Court to
apply the law to the facts of the case, then summary judgment must be denied. 23
18
Bochniak v. Blenheim at Bay Pointe, LLC, 2011 WL 2184180, at *4 (Del. Super. May 31,
2011) (internal quotations omitted); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 12.
19
See supra note 10; Mot. Dismiss at ¶¶6–8.
20
Mot. Dismiss at ¶12.
21
Storm v. NSL Rockland Place LLC, 898 A.2d 874, 879 (Del. Super. 2005).
22
J.L. v. Barnes, 33 A.3d 902, 911 (Del. Super. 2011); Storm, 898 A.2d at 879.
23
Barnes, 33 A.3d at 911–12 (citing Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 470 (Del.1962)).
7
V. DISCUSSION
Generally, negligence claims are governed by 10 Del. C. §8106, which
requires that a plaintiff bring an action to recover damages within three years of the
“accruing of the cause of action.” 24 The statute of limitations may be tolled,
however, under the Time of Discovery rule.25 “The Time of Discovery rule
provides that, in certain cases, a cause of action does not accrue until a party has
reason to know that he or she has a cause of action.” 26
Under this rule, for the limitations period to be tolled, the cause of action
must be inherently unknowable and the plaintiff must be blamelessly ignorant of
the cause of action.27 The statute of limitations “will begin to run only upon the
discovery of facts constituting the basis of the cause of action or the existence of
facts sufficient to put a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence on inquiry
which, if pursued, would lead to the discovery of such facts.”28 Thus, a plaintiff
may not rely on the Time of Discovery rule to toll a limitations period “if objective
24
S&R Associates, L.P. v. Shell Oil Co., 725 A.2d 431, 439 (Del. Super. 1998); 10 Del. C.
§8106.
25
See S&R Associates, 725 A.2d at 439; Lee v. Linmere Homes, Inc., 2008 WL 4444552, at *3
(Del. Super. Oct. 1, 2008).
26
S&R Associates, 725 A.2d at 439.
27
Morton v. Sky Nails, 884 A.2d 480, 481–82 (Del. 2005) (citing Layton v. Allen, 246 A.2d 794
(Del. 1968)).
28
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 860 A.2d 312, 319 (Del. 2004) (internal citations
omitted).
8
or observable factors exist to put the plaintiff on constructive notice that a wrong
has been committed.”29
Here, the parties disagree as to when the statute of limitations began to
accrue. Blenheim points to lawsuits filed by other Bay Pointe homeowners alleging
negligent design and negligent construction and maintains that because these suits
are a matter of public record, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that their cause of
action “was inherently unknowable and that they were blamelessly ignorant.” 30
Relying on In re Petition of Delaware Department of Transportation,31
Blenheim argues that “[a] person is charged with constructive notice of
information that could have been acquired by examining public records, including
judicial proceedings.” 32 However, as explained below, the constructive notice at
issue in Petition of Delaware Department of Transportation is distinguishable
from the constructive notice in this case.
In Petition of Delaware Department of Transportation, the Delaware Court
of Chancery denied a petition to vacate a portion of a road, in part, because the
Court of Chancery had previously held that the road was a “public road and
29
Envo, Inc. v. Walters, 2012 WL 2926522, at *8 (Del. Ch. July 18, 2012) aff'd, 2013 WL
1283533 (Del. 2013).
30
Mot. Dismiss at ¶¶11–12.
31
Petition of Delaware Dep't of Transp., 1997 WL 391780 (Del. Super. May 6, 1997).
32
Mot. Dismiss at ¶11.
9
common highway.” 33 The Court noted that because the road was a public road, the
landowners had constructive notice of it when they bought their property.34
Although the constructive notice in Petition of Delaware Department of
Transportation related to a previous judicial proceeding, the Court of Chancery did
not hold that the prior judicial proceeding alone constituted constructive notice of
a road. And the present case is further distinguishable because the “judicial
proceedings” Blenheim relies upon relate to other Bay Pointe homes, not
Plaintiffs’ home.
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, a genuine issue of
material fact exists as to when the statute of limitations began to accrue, and if the
statute of limitations is tolled by the Time of Discovery rule.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Jan R. Jurden, Judge
33
Petition of Delaware Dep't of Transp., 1997 WL 391780, at *4. See Scureman v. Judge, 626
A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1992) aff'd sub nom. Wilmington Trust Co. v. Judge, 628 A.2d 85 (Del. 1993).
34
Petition of Delaware Dep't of Transp., 1997 WL 391780, at *4.
10
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY HENRY BOYCE and ANGELIQUE ) BOYCE, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) ) BLENHEIM AT BAY POINTE, ) LLC., BLENHEIM HOMES, INC., ) BLENHEIM HOMES, L.P., SUDLER ) C.A. No. N14C-06-239 CONSTRUCTION LTD., THE ) LESSARD ARCHITECTURAL ) GROUP INC., JOHN F. MCLAURIN, ) JAMES A REEVES INC., ) CUSTOM SIDING OF DELAWARE ) LLC, DELMARVA ROOFING AND ) COATING INC., CARFARO INC., and ) BLENHEIM BROWN LLC, ) ) Defendants. ) OPINION Date Submitted: October 29, 2014 Date Decided: December 30, 2014 Upon Defendants Blenheim at Bay Pointe, LLC, Blenheim Hones, Inc., and Blenheim Homes, L.P.’s, Motion to Dismiss: DENIED. Blake A. Bennett, Esquire, and Christopher H. Lee, Esquire, Cooch & Taylor P.A., 1000 West Street, 10th Floor, Wilmington, DE 19801, Attorneys for Plaintiffs. Jeffrey M. Weiner, Esquire, 1332 King Street, Wilmington, DE 19801, Attorney for Defendants Blenheim at Bay Pointe, LCC., Blenheim Homes Inc., and Blenheim Homes, L.P. Joel H. Fredricks, Esquire, Casarino Christman Shalk Ransom & Doss P.A., 405 North King Street, Suite 300, Wilmington, DE 19899, Attorney for Defendant Suder Construction Ltd. Paul Cottrell, Esquire, Tighe & Cottrell, P.A., 704 North King Street, Suite 500, Wilmington, DE 19801, Attorney for Defendants The Lessard Architectural Group, Inc., and John F. McLaurin. Charles Gruver, III, Esquire, Charles Gruver III, P.A., 724 Yorklyn Road, Suite 315, Hockessin, DE 19707, Attorney for Defendant Custom Siding of Delaware LCC. Joseph Scott Shannon, Esquire, and Art C. Aranilla, Esquire, Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, 1220 North Market Street, 5th Floor, Wilmington, DE 19801, Attorneys for Defendant Carfaro Inc. Jurden, J. 2 I. INTRODUCTION Before the Court is Defendants’ Blenheim at Bay Point LCC., Blenheim Homes Inc., and Blenheim Homes L.P.’s (collectively “Blenheim”) Motion to Dismiss. This case involves negligence claims by the owners of a single family home in the Bay Pointe residential community against the builders and designers of that home. After experiencing reoccurring water leaks and severe damage in their home, Plaintiffs filed suit against Blenheim, Sudler Construction Ltd (“Sudler”), The Lessard Architectural Group Inc. (“Lessard”), John F. McLaurin (“McLaurin”), James A Reeves Inc. (“Reeves”), Custom Siding of Delaware LLC (“Custom Siding”), Delmarva Roofing and Coating Inc. (Delmarva Roofing”), Carfaro Inc. (“Carfaro”), and Blenheim Brown LLC (“Blenheim Brown”) (“collectively Defendants”), alleging negligent construction and negligent design. Blenheim filed this Motion to Dismiss arguing that the Plaintiffs’ Complaint is time-barred and fails to state a claim against Defendants Blenheim Homes, Inc. and Blenheim Homes L.P. Defendants Sudler, Lessard, McLaurin, Custom Siding, and Carfaro, have joined Blenheim’s Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons explained below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. 3 II. FACTS On August 31, 2011, Henry and Angelique Boyce (“Plaintiffs”) purchased a single family home from its original owners.1 The original owners purchased the property directly from Blenheim in 2005.2 In 2013, Plaintiffs began to experience isolated water leaks in their garage ceiling and walls.3 In June 2014, when the leaks worsened, Plaintiffs hired a home inspection expert who specializes in water infiltration. 4 The expert found evidence of extensive water infiltration and concluded that the windows, doors, balcony, and stone veneer were not properly installed and needed repair. 5 Plaintiffs filed their initial Complaint on June 25, 2014.6 Plaintiffs assert claims of negligent construction (Count I) against Blenheim, Blenheim Brown, Sudler, Reeves, Custom Siding, Delmarva Roofing, and Carfaro; and negligent design (Count II) against Lessard and McLaurin.7 According to Plaintiffs, Defendants’ negligent construction and design of their home resulted “in severe water and moisture penetration, deterioration, 1 Second Amended Complaint at ¶14 (“SAC”) (Trans. ID. 55898357) (Aug. 15, 2014); Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Blenheim Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at ¶1 (“Pls.’ Opp. Mot. Dismiss”) (Trans. ID. 56034201). 2 Pls.’ Opp. Mot. Dismiss at ¶1. 3 Id. at ¶3. 4 Id. at ¶¶3–4. 5 Id. at ¶4. 6 Trans. ID. 55644065. Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on July 10, 2014 (Trans. ID. 55713479) and a SAC on August 15, 2014 (Trans. ID. 55898357). For purposes of this motion, Complaint refers to Plaintiffs’ SAC. 7 SAC (Trans. ID. 55898357). 4 unattractiveness, loss in marketability and market value, structural and physical instability, and other dangerous conditions.” 8 III. PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS Blenheim argues that the Complaint must be dismissed under Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6) because it is time-barred.9 According to Blenheim, Plaintiffs had constructive notice of the alleged defects in their home because more than three years prior to the Complaint other Bay Pointe homeowners filed similar lawsuits alleging negligent design and negligent construction.10 Blenheim asserts that Plaintiffs should have known of the defects in their home because “the public record is replete with allegations of defects and deficient construction in connection with 5 houses constructed in Bay Pointe more than 3 years old prior to . . . filing their complaint on June 25, 2014.” 11 Plaintiffs argue that they “were neither aware nor should they have been aware of any construction defects in other homes in the Bay Pointe neighborhood or any litigation regarding those homes when they purchased the property.” 12 8 SAC at ¶15. 9 Blenheim Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint at ¶12 (“Mot. Dismiss”) (Trans. ID. 55834033). 10 Id. at ¶¶11–12. Blenheim attached to its Motion to Dismiss two complaints filed by other Bay Pointe homeowners against Blenheim in 2009 and 2010. Id. at ¶¶7–8. Blenheim also attached a complaint filed by Blenheim in 2009 against Sudler for improper and deficient construction, workmanship, and materials in connection with installation of the siding of several homes in Bay Pointe. Id. at ¶6. 11 Id. at ¶12. 12 Pls.’ Opp. Mot. Dismiss at ¶2. 5 Plaintiffs assert that their claims are tolled by the Time of Discovery rule and therefore timely because the Complaint was filed within one month of Plaintiffs learning of the construction defects from their home inspection expert.13 Plaintiffs contend that “[g]iven their lack of expertise and the limited and isolated nature of the leaks at issue, the statute of limitations did not even begin to run until June 2014.” 14 Blenheim also argues that the Complaint fails to allege any specific facts supporting a claim against Defendants Blenheim Homes, Inc. and Blenheim Homes L.P. because Plaintiffs’ deed explicitly states that the land premises were conveyed to the original owners from Blenheim Brown, LLC and Blenheim at Bay Point, LCC.15 IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court will dismiss a complaint only if it appears “with reasonable certainty that, under any set of facts that could be proven to support the claims asserted, the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief.” 16 The Court only considers “the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint.” 17 “[A] motion to dismiss shall be 13 Id. at ¶¶4–5, 7. 14 Id. at ¶12. 15 Mot. Dismiss at ¶13. Because Blenheim has submitted matters outside the pleading the Court is treating Blenheim’s motion as one for summary judgment and the Court will allow discovery on this matter. 16 Clinton v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co., 977 A.2d 892, 895 (Del. 2009). 17 Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 458 (Del. 2005). 6 treated as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 if matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the Court.” 18 Through its Motion to Dismiss, Blenhiem has submitted documents not relied upon by the Plaintiffs in their Complaint.19 Blenhiem asks the Court to consider three “judicial proceedings” that contain “allegations of defects and deficient construction in connection with five houses constructed in Bay Pointe.”20 Because the Court has considered these proceedings, it is treating Blenhiem’s motion as one for summary judgment. On a motion for summary judgment, the Court views all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, and determines whether a genuine issue of material fact exists.21 The Court will grant summary judgment only if no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.22 If the record reveals that material facts are in dispute, or if the factual record has not been developed thoroughly enough to allow the Court to apply the law to the facts of the case, then summary judgment must be denied. 23 18 Bochniak v. Blenheim at Bay Pointe, LLC, 2011 WL 2184180, at *4 (Del. Super. May 31, 2011) (internal quotations omitted); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 12. 19 See supra note 10; Mot. Dismiss at ¶¶6–8. 20 Mot. Dismiss at ¶12. 21 Storm v. NSL Rockland Place LLC, 898 A.2d 874, 879 (Del. Super. 2005). 22 J.L. v. Barnes, 33 A.3d 902, 911 (Del. Super. 2011); Storm, 898 A.2d at 879. 23 Barnes, 33 A.3d at 911–12 (citing Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 470 (Del.1962)). 7 V. DISCUSSION Generally, negligence claims are governed by 10 Del. C. §8106, which requires that a plaintiff bring an action to recover damages within three years of the “accruing of the cause of action.” 24 The statute of limitations may be tolled, however, under the Time of Discovery rule.25 “The Time of Discovery rule provides that, in certain cases, a cause of action does not accrue until a party has reason to know that he or she has a cause of action.” 26 Under this rule, for the limitations period to be tolled, the cause of action must be inherently unknowable and the plaintiff must be blamelessly ignorant of the cause of action.27 The statute of limitations “will begin to run only upon the discovery of facts constituting the basis of the cause of action or the existence of facts sufficient to put a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence on inquiry which, if pursued, would lead to the discovery of such facts.”28 Thus, a plaintiff may not rely on the Time of Discovery rule to toll a limitations period “if objective 24 S&R Associates, L.P. v. Shell Oil Co., 725 A.2d 431, 439 (Del. Super. 1998); 10 Del. C. §8106. 25 See S&R Associates, 725 A.2d at 439; Lee v. Linmere Homes, Inc., 2008 WL 4444552, at *3 (Del. Super. Oct. 1, 2008). 26 S&R Associates, 725 A.2d at 439. 27 Morton v. Sky Nails, 884 A.2d 480, 481–82 (Del. 2005) (citing Layton v. Allen, 246 A.2d 794 (Del. 1968)). 28 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 860 A.2d 312, 319 (Del. 2004) (internal citations omitted). 8 or observable factors exist to put the plaintiff on constructive notice that a wrong has been committed.”29 Here, the parties disagree as to when the statute of limitations began to accrue. Blenheim points to lawsuits filed by other Bay Pointe homeowners alleging negligent design and negligent construction and maintains that because these suits are a matter of public record, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that their cause of action “was inherently unknowable and that they were blamelessly ignorant.” 30 Relying on In re Petition of Delaware Department of Transportation,31 Blenheim argues that “[a] person is charged with constructive notice of information that could have been acquired by examining public records, including judicial proceedings.” 32 However, as explained below, the constructive notice at issue in Petition of Delaware Department of Transportation is distinguishable from the constructive notice in this case. In Petition of Delaware Department of Transportation, the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a petition to vacate a portion of a road, in part, because the Court of Chancery had previously held that the road was a “public road and 29 Envo, Inc. v. Walters, 2012 WL 2926522, at *8 (Del. Ch. July 18, 2012) aff'd, 2013 WL 1283533 (Del. 2013). 30 Mot. Dismiss at ¶¶11–12. 31 Petition of Delaware Dep't of Transp., 1997 WL 391780 (Del. Super. May 6, 1997). 32 Mot. Dismiss at ¶11. 9 common highway.” 33 The Court noted that because the road was a public road, the landowners had constructive notice of it when they bought their property.34 Although the constructive notice in Petition of Delaware Department of Transportation related to a previous judicial proceeding, the Court of Chancery did not hold that the prior judicial proceeding alone constituted constructive notice of a road. And the present case is further distinguishable because the “judicial proceedings” Blenheim relies upon relate to other Bay Pointe homes, not Plaintiffs’ home. Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to when the statute of limitations began to accrue, and if the statute of limitations is tolled by the Time of Discovery rule. VI. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED. Jan R. Jurden, Judge 33 Petition of Delaware Dep't of Transp., 1997 WL 391780, at *4. See Scureman v. Judge, 626 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1992) aff'd sub nom. Wilmington Trust Co. v. Judge, 628 A.2d 85 (Del. 1993). 34 Petition of Delaware Dep't of Transp., 1997 WL 391780, at *4. 10