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ELECTRONICALLY FILED
superior Court of California,
County of Placer
Allan R. Frumkin (SBN 50543) 10/06/2020
Jon E. Rietveld II (SBN 320086) By: LaurelSanders, Deputy Clerk
Law Offices of Allan R. Frumkin, Inc.
5900 King Road, Loomis, CA 95650
Phone Number: (916) 660-9298
Fax Number: (916) 652-7380
Attorneys for Defendant
Cynthia Chapman
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CALIFORNIA STATE SUPERIOR COURT
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FOR THE COUNTY OF PLACER
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11 Case No.: SCV0045344
DARLENE LEA, an individual,
12 REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Plaintiff,
13 Date: October 29, 2020
Vv. Time: 8:30 am
14 Dept.: 42
CYNTHIA CHAPMAN, an individual; and
15 Does 1-20, inclusive,
16 Defendants.
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TO THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT:
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Defendant Cynthia Chapman, under the provisions of Evidence Code sections 452 and
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453, requests that the Court take Judicial Notice of:
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1. Defendant Cynthia Chapman’s Verified Complaint, Superior Court of the State of
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California, County of Placer, case number SCV0044121 attached hereto as Exhibit A.
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2. Plaintiff Darlene Lea’s Verified Answer, Superior Court of the State of California, County
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of Placer, case number SCV0044121 attached hereto as Exhibit B.
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3. Plaintiff Darlene Lea’s Notice of Errata Regarding Defendants’ Verified Answer to
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Verified Complaint, Superior Court of the State of California, County of Placer, case
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number SCV0044121 attached hereto as Exhibit C.
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REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE ]
4. The letter from Plaintiff Darlene Lea to John Hancock via Morgan Stanley requesting
distribution of Ross’ John Hancock annuity into Defendant Lea’s Morgan Stanley account
dated November 11, 2019 and transmitted to Morgan Stanley on November 12, 2019
attached hereto as Exhibit D.
5. Email chain between Kristen Ulan, Esq. of Morgan Stanley and Defendant’s counsel
Allan R. Frumkin and Patrick Riazi of the Law Offices of Allan R. Frumkin, Inc. wherein
oolUCOUlUlCUCUOUUMN CUD
Morgan Stanley agrees to not distribute the funds from Ross’ John Hancock annuity dated
December 4, 2019 attached hereto as Exhibit E.
6. Email from Dave C. Jone, Esq., of Hackard Law, counsel for Plaintiff, to Allan R.
Frumkin, Esq., counsel for Defendant on January 31, 2020 at 10:30 am attached hereto as
11 Exhibit F.
12 7. Email from Dave C. Jone, Esq., of Hackard Law, counsel for Plaintiff, to Allan R.
13 Frumkin, Esq., counsel for Defendant on January 31, 2020 at 11:41 am attached hereto as
14 Exhibit G.
15 Respectfully submitted.
4 )po )20 A £
16 Dated:
17 an R. Fru 5; Esq.
ttorn: f Defendant Cynthia Chapman
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REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 2
EXHIBIT A
ALLAN R. FRUMKIN, ESQ. (SB#50543)
PATRICK RIAZI, ESQ. (SB#224017) FILED
Superior Court of Califarnia
LAW OFFICES OF ALLAN R. FRUMKIN, INC.
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County of Placer
5900 KING ROAD
LOOMIS, CA 95650 DEC 0 3 2019
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Telephone Number (916) 660-9298 dake Chatters
Facsimile Number (916) 652-7380 Executive Officer & Clerk ge
By: E. Kouvdos, Deputy
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Attorney for Plaintiff
Cynthia Chapman
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
IN.AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PLACER
CYNTHIA CHAPMAN, an individual, Case No.: SOV OUGe1 21
Plaintiff, VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR:
vs. (1) Conversion
(2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional
DARLENE LEA, an individual, DEBORAH Distress .
SIMPSON, an individual; JOHN (3) Declaratory Relief
HANCOCK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY (4) Breach of Fiduciary Duty = .
(U.S.A.), and Does 1-20, inclusive (5) Preliminary/Permanent Injunctive Relief
(6) Financial Elder Abuse
Defendants.
COMES NOW, Plaintiff, CYNTHIA CHAPMAN (hereinafter “Piaintiff’),
individually, by and through her attorneys, The Law Offices of Allan R. Frumkin, Inc.,
hereby alleges, in this Complaint, against the Defendants the following based on her
knowledge, information and belief:
PARTIES
i Plaintiff at all times mentioned herein was, and is, a resident of Nevada County,
State of California.
Chapman v Lea, et al,Complaint
2. Defendant, Darlene Lea (hereinafter “Lea”) is an individual and at all times
mentioned herein was, and is,.a resident of San Joaquin County.
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3. Defendant, Deborah Simpson, (hereinafter “Simpson’) is an individual and at all
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times mentioned herein was, and is, a resident of El Dorado County, State of California.
4. Defendant, John Hancock Life Insurance Company (U.S.A.), (hereinafter
“Hancock’) is a California corporation, corporation number C1959620, and at all times
mentioned herein was authorized and was doing business in Placer County, State of
California.
9 8. Plaintiff is ignorant of the true names and capacities of defendants sued as Does
10 4 to 20, and therefore sue these defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff will
amend this Complaint to allege their true names and capacities when ascertained.
Plaintiff believes and thereupon alleges that each of the Defendants fictitiously named
herein as a DOE is legally responsible, negligently or in some other actionable manner,
for the events and happenings hereinafter referred to, and thereby proximately and
legally caused the injuries and damages to Plaintiff as hereinafter alleged, Plaintiff will
ask leave of court to amend this Complaint to insert the true names and/or capacities of
such fictitiously named Defendants when the same have been ascertained.
6. Upon information and belief, at all times mentioned herein, Defendants and
DOES were the agent,-employee and representative of each other, and in doing things
hereinafter alleged, was acting within the course and scope of such agency, service and
representation, and directed, aided and abetted, authorized or ratified each and every
act and conduct hereinafter alleged.
JURISDICTION
ie. The occurrence of events which are the subject matter of this Complaint occurred
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within the County of Placer, State of California.
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Chapman v Lea, etal. Complaint
STATEMENT OF FACTS
8. Plaintiff isthe daughter of Mary Ross (hereinafter “Ross"), who is believed to
have died on October 19, 2019. However, Plaintiff is unaware of the exact date and
location because of the acts perpetrated by Plaintiffs sister, Defendant Lea and
Plaintiffs aunt, Defendant Simpson.
9. Ross was living with Plaintiff from approximately 2015 to July of 2019. Ross was
suffering from liver failure and required 24-hour care by medical professionals so she
was moved to, and was living at the Roseville Care Center until approximately the
middle of September.
10. ‘Plaintiffwould visit Ross on a regular basis to ensure that she was being well
taken care of and that her needs were met.
11. Onor about the middle of September, Plaintiff went to the Roseville Care Center
to visit her mother only to discover to her surprise and utter shock that her mother was
moved out of the facility.
12. Itis Plaintiffs belief that Lea obtained a Power of Attorney to. take over Ross’
affairs, which is surprising because Ross’ medical condition was such that she recently
came out of a coma:‘so Plaintiff believes that she could not have been capable of
understanding the Power of Attorney that was placed before her to sign.
43. The Power of Attorney obtained by Lea led to a series -of events including the
theft of Plaintiffs possessions from a safe deposit box held in the names of both the
Plaintiff and Ross; the changing of beneficiaries of Ross’ annuity; allowing Ross’
personal possession contained in a storage unit to be auctioned off; preventing Plaintiff
from contacting Ross so that Plaintiff was unaware of where Ross was when she died,
was not notified of the funeral arrangements and does not even know where Ross is
buried.
Chapman v Lea, etal. Complaint
Safe Deposit Box
14. Plaintiff and Ross are co-owners of a safe deposit box at Wells Fargo Bank in
Roseville, California. The safe deposit box contained Plaintiffs personal possessions
including silver certificates, uncut dollar bills,rolled coins, proof sets, jewelry, Plaintiff's
divorce papers, birth certificates for herself and her children and savings bonds.
15. On or about October 1, 2019, Plaintiff discovered that her safe deposit box was
completely empty and all contents had been removed. Plaintiff believes that Lea used
the Power of Attorney to gain access to the safe deposit box and all items were
removed indiscriminately. Plaintiff believes that Lea was aware that the contents of the
safe deposit belonged to Plaintiff but intentionally removed the items.
16. In order to.access the box, because Lea did not have a key, the safe deposit box
had to be drilled. At the time Plaintiff discovered the safe deposit box was empty, it
required that the box be drilled again, in which Plaintiff had to pay the cost.
17. Plaintiff has contacted Lea to discuss the recovery of her personal possessions
but Plaintiff has been ignored each and every time.
Self-Storage Unit
18. Ross had rented a 25x25 foot storage unit at the Highway 20 Self-Storage in
Penn Valley, California. The unit contained Ross’ personal possessions and Plaintiff
had the key. Ross’ personal possessions that were located in her house needed to be
placed in storage so Plaintiff mailed the key to Lea. Plaintiff believes that Lea has not
paid any of the monthly fees to rent that self-storage unit and that the contents of the
unit will be auctioned off. This may have already been done as Plaintiff does not have
access to anything that was owned by Ross.
49. The contents of the storage until was mostly furniture, jewelry and other personal
property that Ross had accumulated over the years. Plaintiff is Ross’ daughter so as a
Chapman v Lea, etal, Complaint
beneficiary, she may have an interest in Ross’ personal property contained in that
storage unit.
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20. The loss of Ross’ family items, heirlooms, mementos, furniture, etc., would be a
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massive loss and a devastating emotional loss for Plaintiff. Plaintiff is shocked and
dismayed at the callous disregard that Lea and Simpson are showing for the potential
loss of memories and personal effects acquired by Ross over the years.
John Hancock Venture Annuity Account
21. Ross owned a John Hancock Venture Annuity account that was opened on
October 18, 2005, contract number 8038133. As of June 28, 2019, the balance on the
account was $137,078.01.
22. ‘Plaintiff believes that Lea and/or Simpson used the Power of Attorney to change
the beneficiaries on the account to remove Plaintiff as a beneficiary. The annuity
benefit has been paid and, again, Plaintiff is unaware of when this change was done but
suspects itwas done in September or October 2019.
23. The financial representative for this annuity account is Joe Simpson, who just
happens to be the spouse of the Defendant, Deborah Simpson.
24. The effect of the change is that Plaintiff did not receive what she was entitled to
receive as a beneficiary of the annuity. Lea and/or Simpson have effectively frozen out
Plaintiff from participating in Ross’ estate.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Conversion)
(Against Defendants Lea and Simpson)
25. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference every allegation contained in
paragraphs 1-24 of this Complaint, as though fully set forth herein.
26. Plaintiff claims that Defendants Lea and Simpson wrongfully exercised
Chapman v Lea, etal. Complaint
LR. ABD
control over her personal property that was contained in the Wells Fargo Bank safe
deposit bank co-owned by Plaintiff.and Ross.
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27. Plaintiff owned the personal property contained in the safe deposit box including,
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silver certificates, uncut dollar bills, rolled coins, proof sets, jewelry, Plaintiffs divorce
{Papers, birth certificates for herself and her chifdren and savings bonds.
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28. Defendants Lea and Simpson intentionally and substantially
interfered with Plaintiffs. property by taking possession of the contents in the safe
deposit box as outlined above. Defendants have also prevented Plaintiff from having
access to the items in the safe deposit box as well as refusing to return the items
contained inthe safe deposit box even after Plaintiff made several demands for their
return.
29. Plaintiff did not consent to the removal of her personal possessions from the safe
deposit box and only discovered the items were missing when making a routine trip to
her bank on or about September or October.
30. Plaintiff was harmed by the loss of the personal possessions because each item
has value and the documents will cost Plaintiff a substantial amount of money to
replace.
31. Defendant Lea and Simpson's conduct was a substantial factor in causing
Plaintiffs harm because they were the only other persons who could access the safe
deposit box using the Power of Attorney obtained from Ross.
32. Asa proximate cause of Defendant Lea and Simpson's acts, Plaintiff has been
damaged in an amount to be proven at trial.
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Chapman v Lea, etal. Complaint
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Intentional infliction of Emotional Distress)
(Against Defendants Lea and Simpson)
33. Plaintiff hereby incorporates all allegations of paragraphs 1 through 32 of this
Complaint, as ifset forth fully herein.
34, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Lea and Simpson's conduct caused her to suffer
severe emotional distress.
35. Defendant's conduct was outrageous and outside the norms of common
decency. Specifically, the theft of Plaintiffs possessions from a safe deposit box held in
the names of both the Plaintiff and Ross; the changing of beneficiaries of Ross' life
insurance policy eliminating Plaintiff as a beneficiary; allowing Ross’ personal
possession contained in a storage unit to be auctioned off; preventing Plaintiff from
||contacting Ross so that Plaintiff was unaware of where Ross was when she died so
Plaintiff could not even visit her mother prior to her passing, was not notified of the
funeral arrangements. and does not even know where Ross is buried.
36. Defendant Lea and Simpson intended to cause Plaintiff emotional distress as all
of these acts required some amount of thought, planning and not a matter of chance or
happenstance. There is no other purpose to commit these acts other than to cause
Plaintiff severe pain and emotional distress.
37. Plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer severe emotional distress.
38. Defendant Lea and Simpson's conduct was a substantial factor in causing
Plaintiffs severe emotional distress as they were the only people that could have done
what they did.
39. As aproximate cause of Defendant Lea and Simpson’s acts, Plaintiff has been
damaged in an amount to be proven at trial.
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Chapman v Lea, etal.
Complaint
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Declaratory Relief)
(Against John Hancock and Does 1-20)
40. Plaintiff hereby incorporates all allegations of paragraphs 1 through 39 of this
Complaint, as if fully set forth herein.
41. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Plaintiff and John
Hancock as to the proper beneficiary designations in the annuity contract. As described
above, Plaintiff contends that the beneficiaries have not been properly designated in the
annuity contract. A judicial determination of these issues and of the respective duties
of Plaintiff and Hancock is necessary and appropriate at this time under the
circumstances.
42. The annuity benefit has been paid but a freeze has been placed on the receiving
account. A judicial determination is necessary to prevent further distributions from
these receiving accounts.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Fiduciary Duty)
(Against Lea Does 1-20)
43. Plaintiff hereby incorporates all allegations of paragraphs 1 through 42 of this
Complaint, as iffully set forth herein.
44.‘ Plaintiff claims that she was harrned by Lea’s breach of the fiduciary duty to use
reasonable care, assuming that the Power of Attorney is valid.
45. Assuming that the Power of Attorney obtained by Lea is considered valid, Lea
then has a fiduciary duty, as the individual controlling the assets of Ross’ estate, to any
and all potential heirs of the estate. Plaintiff, being one of Ross’ children, isan heir to
the estate, therefore, Lea owes a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff.
Chapman v Lea, etal. Complaint
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46. Lea, as a fiduciary to Plaintiff, should be acting on Plaintiffs behalf as itrelates to
the Annuity, Ross’ personal possessions in the storage unit and the overall disposition
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of Ross’ estate.
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47. Lea failed to act as a reasonably careful fiduciary would have acted under the
same or similar circumstances by diverting potential estate assets away from any and
all heirs of the estate for the benefit of Lea.
48. Plaintiff was harmed by not receiving estate assets she may be entitled to as. an
heir to Ross.
49. Lea’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiffs harm because Lea
obtained the Power of Attorney from Ross.
50. Asa proximate cause of Defendant Lea and Simpson's acts, Plaintiff has been
damaged in an amount to be proven at trial.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Preliminary/Permanent Injunctive Relief)
(Against Hancock and Does 1-20)
51. Plaintiff hereby incorporates all allegations of paragraphs 1 through 51 of this
Complaint, as though fully set forth herein.
52. Onor about Septernber or October 2019, Hancock paid the benefits of the
Annuity after the designated beneficiaries were changed, excluding the Plaintiffas a
beneficiary.
53. Upon discovery, Plaintiff sent notice to Hancock and Hancock responded that the
benefits of the Annuity were paid but there were stillfunds in a receiving account that
had not been distributed.
54. The amount of the funds contained in this account are unknown to Plaintiff and
Hancock indicated they would freeze the account. at the close of business on Friday,
December 8, 2019, and not make any distributions, until and unless, they received a
Chapman v Lea, etal. Complaint
court order enjoining them from making this distribution while the question of the proper
designated beneficiaries of the Annuity is determined.
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55. Hancock's conduct, unless and until enjoined and restrained by order of this
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court, will cause great and irreparable injury to Plaintiff in that she would not receive any
of the funds in the receiving account, as a beneficiary, that she would be entitled to.
56. Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law for the injuries currently being suffered in
that, although the amount may be certain, if Hancock is not enjoined from distributing
the monies in the receiving account; that money will go to Lea never to be seen again.
The resources in both time and money required for Plaintiff to track down and try to
recover these monies is near impossible. Even ifa judgment was awarded against Lea,
she may be judgment proof so that Plaintiff would never recover a penny. Despite the
| fact that a dollar amount in this account is certain, the practicality is that Plaintiff would
really have no remedy at law to recover what she is entitled to receive as a beneficiary
of this Annuity account. Plaintiff will be forced to institute a multiplicity of suits to obtain
adequate compensation for her injuries.
57. IfHancock is not enjoined from distributing the remaining funds from the Annuity,
Plaintiff will be further damaged in like manner. The full amount of such damage is not
now known to Plaintiff and Plaintiff will amend this complaint to state such amount when
the same becomes known, or on proof thereof.
SIXTH CAUSE GF ACTION
(Financial Elder Abuse)
(Against Lea and Simpson)
58. Plaintiff hereby incorporates all allegations of paragraphs 1 through 57 of this
Complaint, as though fully set forth herein.
59. Plaintiff claims that Lea and/or Simpson violated the Elder Abuse and Dependent
Adult Civil Protection Act by taking financial advantage of Mary Ross.
Chapman v Lea, eta. Complaint
{SP LD,
60. Lea and/or Simpson appropriated, obtained and retained Mary Ross’ personal
property in the form of Ross’ personal possessions in the safe deposit box, the storage
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unit and the Annuity, with the intent to defraud Plaintiff, through the use of undue
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influence.
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61. Mary Ross was 65 years of age or older at the time of the conduct.
62. That Lea and/or Simpson appropriated, obtained and retained Mary Ross’
personal property with the intent to defraud Plaintiff through the use of undue influence.
Lea and/or Simpson obtained Ross’ signature on a Power of Attorney despite Ross’
diminished mental capacity. Ross had been in a coma as a complication from liver
failure and, upon information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that the Power of Attorney was
signed shortly after Ross woke up from her coma.
63. The Power of Attorney obtained by Lea and/or Simpson led to a series of events
including the theft of Plaintiffs possessions from a safe deposit box held in the names of
both the Plaintiff and Ross; the changing of beneficiaries of Ross’ lifeinsurance policy;
allowing Ross’ personal possession contained in a storage unit to be auctioned off;
preventing Plaintiff from. contacting Ross so that Plaintiff was unaware of where Ross
was when she died, was not notified of the funeral arrangements and does not even
know where Ross is buried.
64. ‘Plaintiffwas harmed by the acts perpetrated by Lea and/or Simpson in obtaining
the Power of Attorney through the loss of Plaintiffs possessions from a safe deposit box
held in the names of both the Plaintiff and Ross; the changing of beneficiaries of Ross’
life insurance policy; allowing Ross’ personal possession contained in a storage unit to
be auctioned off; preventing Plaintiff from contacting Ross so that Plaintiff was unaware
of where Ross was when she died, was not notified of the funeral arrangements and
does not even know where Ross is buried.
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Chapman v Lea, etal, Complaint
PR, OBI
65. Lea and/or Simpson’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff's
harm.
66. As a proximate cause of Defendant Lea and Simpson’s acts, Plaintiff has been
damaged in an amount to be proven at trial.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for the following damages and relief:
1. For general damages in an amount to be determined at trial:
For compensatory damages to be determined according to proof at time of trial:
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For punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial;
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For a declaration concerning the proper beneficiary designations in the Annuity;
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For a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction and permanent
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prohibiting Hancock from any further distributions from the Ross annuity contract;
6. Costs of suit; and
For such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
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LAW OFFICES OF ALLAN R. FRUMKIN
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Dated: 4 ala
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f
ieee ESQ.
Attorney forPiaintiff
Chapman v Lea, et al.Complaint
COR, AR,
VERIFICATION
|,CYNTHIA CHAPMAN, am the Plaintiff in the above entitled action. | have read the
foregoing Complaint and know the contents thereof.
Other than any allegation made on information and belief, |declare under penalty of
perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed in Loomis, Califormia.
Dated: BS ei C (., Saas C\pe PAA} A
CYNTHIA CHAPMANS Plaintiff
Chapman v Lea, et al,Complaint
EXHIBIT B
A
HACKARD LAW, A PLC SUPERIORF Gi th E D
Michael Hackard (SBN 71067) COUNTY OF PLAQEE ORNIA
ave Jones (SBN 237196)
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10630 Mather Blvd. JAN 09 2020
Mather, CA 95655 JAKE CHA
Tel: (916) 313-3030
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EXECUTIVE OFFICER 8 CLERK
Fax: (916) 226-5177 By: C. Vallan-Brown, Deputy
Attorneys for Defendants
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DARLENE LEA and DEBORAH
6 SIMPSON
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
UN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PLACER
UNLIMITED JURISDICTION
CYNTHIA CHAPMAN, and individual, CASE NO.: SCV0044121
Plaintiff, | DEFENDANTS?’ VERIFEID ANSWER TO
y | VERIFIED COMPLAINT
DARLENE LEA, an individual, DEBORAH
SIMPSON, and individual: JOHN HANCOCK
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY (U.S.A.), Date Filed — : December 3, 2019
and DOES 1-20, inclusive,
Defendants.
COMES NOW, Defendants, DARLENE LEA and DEBORAH SIMPSON (hereinafter
“Defendants”) individually and through their attorneys, Hackard Law, a PLC, responds to the
Complaint of Cynthia Chapman (“Plaintiff”) as follows:
PARTIES
FAX
J Answering the allegations of Paragraph |, Defendants lack sufficient personal
information to admit or deny the allegations of Paragraph 1, but are informed and believe they
BY
are true, and on that basis admit the allegations.
2. Answering the allegations of Paragraph 2, Defendants admit the allegations.
Be Answering the allegations of Paragraph 3, Defendants admit the allegations.
4. Answering the allegations of Paragraph 4, Defendants admit the allegations.
35. Answering the allegations of Paragraph 5, Defendants lack sufficient personal
Page 1
DEFENDANTS’ VERIFIED ANSWER TO VERIFIED COMPLAINT
AB. By.
information to admit or deny the allegations of Paragraph 5, but are informed and believe they
are true, and on that basis admit the allegations.
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6. Answering the allegations of Paragraph 6, Defendants lack sufficient personal
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information to admit or deny the allegations of Paragraph 6, but are informed and believe they
are true, and on that basis admit the allegations.
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6 JURISDICTION
Uo Answering the allegations of Paragraph 7, Defendants admit the allegations.
STATE. ENT OF FACTS
8. Answering the allegations of Paragraph 8, Defendants admit that Plaintiff is the
daughter of Mary Ross (“Mary”). Defendants deny that Plaintiffis unaware of the exact date and
location of Mary’s death and deny that any lack of information on Plaintiffs part isdue to acts of
the Defendants, but rather due to the fact that Mary had filed an elder abuse claim against
PLC
Plaintiff, and Plaintiff agreed to refrain from having any contact with Mary in lieu of having a
226-5177
A LAW,
restraining order placed against her.
16)
9. Answering the allegations of Paragraph 9, Defendants deny that Mary lived with
ARD
Plaintiff from approximately 2015 to July of 2019. Defendants admit Mary lived with Plaintiff at
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some points in time, and eventually required temporary 24-hour care, but that she had to live
with Defendant Lea thereafter due to Plaintiff denying Mary access to their shared residence.
Mary also lived for a short time in assisted living.
10. Answering the allegations of Paragraph 10, Defendants deny the allegations that
PAX
Plaintiff regularly visited Mary at the Care Center. Detective Haack of the Nevada County
Sheriff's Department had obtained Plaintiffs agreement to stay away after numerous complaints
BY |
about her from Mary and the facility.
11. Answering the allegations of Paragraph 11, Defendants deny the allegations that
Plaintiff went to the Care Center and that she was unaware of Mary’s planned discharge.
12. Answering the allegations of Paragraph 12, Defendants deny the allegations and
assert that Defendant Lea became Mary’s power of attorney only upon the request of Mary, and
that Mary was of sound mind and completely competent to make her own legal, financial, and