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OFFICE OF THE PLACER COUNTY COUNSEL
ae C. Brumfield (SBN 306642)
75 Fulweiler Avenue
Auburn, California 95603 SUPER F Ek ED ows
Telephone: (530) 889-4044 Soe Oe BLAGia
Facsimile: (530) 889-4069
Email: ebrumfield@placer.ca.gov QY 7 P18 2019
\ JAKE CHATTERS
Attorney for Defendant COUNTY OF PLACER CUTIVE OFFICER & CLERK
By: C. Waggoner, Deputy
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PLACER
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KATHLEEN SADAO and LOTHAIN Case No. SCV0042370
11 SADAO,
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
12 Plaintiffs, AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT COUNTY OF PLACER’S
13 V. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS
14 CITY OF ROCKLIN, CITY OF LINCOLN,
CITY OF ROSEVILLE, COUNTY OF
15 PLACER, and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Date: October 24, 2019
Time: 8:30 a.m.
16 Defendants. Dept: 42
17 Complaint Filed: January 10, 2019
First Amended Complaint Filed: August 29, 2019
18
19 L INTRODUCTION
20 Defendant County of Placer (the “County”) moves for judgment on the pleadings as to
21 Plaintiffs’ entire First Amended Complaint because it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a
22 cause of action. (See Code of Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii).) Plaintiffs allege a dangerous
23 condition of property claim against the County and seek loss of consortium damages. However,
24 Plaintiffs do not allege sufficient facts to establish that the County owns or controls the property, an
25 essential element of the claim. (See Gov. Code, §§ 830, 835.) Plaintiffs allege the accident occurred
26 in the City of Rocklin and under the jurisdiction of the South Placer Regional Transportation
27 Authority (“SPRTA”), and judicially noticeable facts indicate the City of Rocklin owns the subject
28 ///
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
roadway and the SPRTA is an independent public entity with liability separate from its members.
Therefore, the County is entitled tojudgment on the pleadings.
Il. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Code of Civil Procedure section 438, a defendant may bring a motion for judgment on
the pleadings if the “complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” “A
motion for judgment on the pleadings is equivalent to a demurrer.” (Templo v. State (2018) 24
Cal.App.Sth 730, 735, review denied Aug. 22, 2018.) The court in Hunt v. County of Shasta set forth
the standard governing a motion forjudgment on the pleadings:
A defendant isentitled to judgment on the pleadings if the plaintiff's complaint does
not state a cause of action. In considering whether a defendant is entitled tojudgment
10 on the pleadings, we look only to the face of the pleading under attack and do not
consider matters raised in the answer. All facts alleged in the complaint are admitted
11 for purposes of the motion, and the court determines whether those facts constitute a
cause of action. The court also may consider matters subject tojudicial notice.
2
((1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 432, 440.)
13
Because California government tort liability is purely statutory, every fact essential to the
14
existence of liability must be pleaded with particularity. (Susman v. C ity of Los Angeles (1969) 269
15
Cal.App.2d 803, 809.) “Accordingly, a claim alleging a dangerous condition may not rely on
16
generalized allegations.” (Brenner v. City of El Cajon (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 434, 439 (affirming a
17
demurrer to a dangerous condition claim).) “[T]he plaintiff must set forth facts in his complaint
18
sufficiently detailed and specific to support an inference that each of the statutory elements of liability
19
is satisfied. General allegations are regarded as inadequate.” (Mittenhuber v. City of Redondo Beach
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(1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 1,5 (affirming a demurrer to a dangerous condition claim).)
21
On a motion for judgment on the pleadings, as with a demurrer, courts “admit[] all material
22
facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law.” (See Blank vy.
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Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) In addition, courts treat the pleading as if it contained “a
24
statement of all matters of which they are required to take judicial notice, even when the pleading
25
contains an express allegation to the contrary.” (Faix, Ltd. v. Cty. of Los Angeles (1976) 54
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Cal.App.3d 992, 998 (quotations omitted).)
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
Leave to amend is properly denied where there is no “reasonable possibility that the defect
can be cured by amendment.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “The burden of proving
such reasonable possibility is squarely on the plaintiff.” (/d.)
lil. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint on January 10, 2019. The court entered an order on
August 16, 2019 allowing Plaintiffs to file their First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) and deeming the
Answer previously filed by the County to be the answer to the FAC. The FAC was filed on August
29, 2019.
Plaintiff Kathleen Sadao (“Ms. Sadao”) alleges she was injured on June 10, 2018, when a 2-3”
10 lip of pavement caused her bicycle to crash on “Sierra College Boulevard, just past Nightwatch Drive
11 in Rocklin, California” (the “Accident Location”). (FAC 4,5.) Ms. Sadao contends the Accident
12 Location “was in a dangerous and defective condition.” (FAC {|6.) Ms. Sadao alleges “Defendants
13 created the danger and were directly responsible for maintenance of the subject
14 road/pavement/construction zone.” (FAC § 7.) Plaintiff Lothain Sadao (“Mr. Sadao”) is married to
15 Ms. Sadao and alleges a loss of consortium claim based on his wife’s injuries. (FAC qf 19-21.)
16 IV. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
17 Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 438 subdivision (d), where the motion isbased
18 on a matter of which the court may take judicial notice, the matter shall be specified in the supporting
i) points and authorities.
20 A court may take judicial notice of a joint powers agreement (“JPA”) and its provisions. (See,
21 e.g., People v. Shepherd (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 334, 337 & fn. 1.) In addition, the court may take
22 judicial notice of the JPA and itsprovisions because they “are not reasonably subject to dispute and
23 are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable
24 accuracy.” (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (h).) The court may also take judicial notice of a JPA
25 because it isa legislative enactment of itspublic-entity members. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (b);
26 Gov. Code, § 6502 (“If authorized by their legislative or other governing bodies, two or more public
27 agencies by agreement may jointly exercise any power common to the contracting parties...”’).)
28 /I/
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
l Therefore, the County requests the court take judicial notice of the SPRTA JPA and that it
2 || creates “a public entity separate from each of the Members” whose debts, liabilities, and obligations
3 || “shall not constitute the debts, liabilities,or obligations of the Members, either jointly or severally.”
4 ||(SPRTA JPA, §§ 3, 12; Declaration of Eric C. Brumfield (hereinafter “Brumfield Decl.”), Ex. A.) In
5 || addition, the court may take judicial notice of these facts because they “are not reasonably subject to
dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably
BD
indisputable accuracy.” (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (h).) As
NY
a public record, the SPRTA JPA is
both easily accessible and not reasonably subject to dispute.
CO
The County also requests the Court take judicial
So
notice of City of Rocklin Resolutions 79-103
10 || and 82-46 as legislative enactments of a public entity. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (b); Brumfield
11 || Decl., Ex. B& C.) The court “shall” take judicial notice of legislative enactment issued by any public
12 || entity of the United States if aparty requests itand gives each adverse party sufficient notice “through
13 |)the pleadings or otherwise” to enable the adverse party to prepare to meet the request. (See Evid.
14 ||Code, §§ 452, 453.)
15 “It is established that in the consideration of a pleading the courts must read the same as if it
16 ||contained a statement of all matters which they are required to take judicial notice, even when the
17 ||pleading contains an express allegation to the contrary. This rule applies to a motion for judgment
18 || on the pleadings.” (Faix, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 992, 998 (citations
19 ||omitted).)
20 || V. ANALYSIS
21 A. The Alleged Facts Are Insufficient to Establish aDangerous Condition Claim
Against the County.
a The facts alleged by Plaintiffs are insufficient to state a dangerous condition claim against the
23 County because they are not “sufficiently detailed and specific to support an inference” that the
= County owned or controlled the Accident Location. (See Mittenhuber v. City of Redondo Beach
= (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 1, 5.) Dangerous condition liability is dependent on “ownership or control”
26 of the public property at issue. (See Gov. Code, § 830, subd. (c).) Ownership or control of the
Zi property at issue is an essential element of a dangerous condition claim. (See Gov. Code, § 835;
ak Judicial Council of California, Civil Jury Instruction (“CACTI”) 1100.) Because liability for a
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
nth i thE SEAT LT TS
1 || dangerous condition is purely statutory, every essential fact must be pleaded with “particularity.”
2 ||(SeeSusman vy.City of Los Angeles (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 803, 809.) “General allegations are
3 || regarded as inadequate.” (Mittenhuber, 142 Cal.App.3d 1, 5.)
4 Plaintiffs allege the Accident Location was “in Rocklin, California” and “under the
5 || jurisdiction of the South Placer Regional Transportation Authority.” (FAC § 5.) Thus, Plaintiffs
allege that two public entities other than the County owned or controlled the Accident Location. The
ND
Complaint includes a blanket allegation that all defendants were agents, partners, joint venturers, or
employees of one another. (FAC § 2.) However, such a relationship isirrelevant, given the narrow
Oo
statutory basis of liability: a public entity’s liability for adangerous condition does not stem from an
Co
10 || agency or partnership relationship—it stems from the entity’s ownership or control over the location
11 || and its awareness of or creation of a dangerous condition. (See Gov. Code, § 835.) Plaintiffs do not
12 ||allege that the County somehow owned or controlled the Accident Location through membership in
13 ||theSPRTA, but even if they did, the judicially noticeable joint powers agreement indicates the
14 ||SPRTA is a separate public entity with separate liability. (See SPRTA JPA, §§ 3, 12.) These
15 || judicially noticeable facts must be read as ifthey were part of the pleading. (See Faix, Ltd. v.Cty. of
16 || Los Angeles (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 992, 998.)
17 Moreover, the City of Rocklin owns the subject roadway. The City of Rocklin annexed the
18 ||subject roadway on April 5, 1982, by passage and adoption of Resolutions 79-103 and 82-46. (See
19 || Brumfield Decl., Ex. B & C.) When a city incorporates or annexes county territory, “all right, title,
20 || and interest of the county, including the underlying fee where owned by the county, in and to any
21 ||county highway within the territory involved...shall vest in the city and shall thereupon constitute a
22 || city street.” (Streets & Highway Code, § 989 (enacted in 1963).) Therefore, ownership of the subject
23 ||roadway vested with the City of Rocklin on April 5, 1982.
With ownership settled, control isthe only avenue for County liability. “Control exists if the
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25 ||public entity has the power to prevent, remedy or guard against the dangerous condition.” (Goddard
Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 350, 364.) Thus, Plaintiffs must allege
26 ||v.
detailed and specific” facts to support an inference that the County could prevent,
27 ||“sufficiently
or guard against a dangerous condition on the subject roadway. (See Mittenhuber (1983)
28 ||remedy,
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR JUDGME NT ON THE PLEADI NGS
lll
1 || 142 Cal.App.3d 1, 5.) Itis not enough that the complaint simply contains allegations of ownership
2 ||orcontrol. Instead, Plaintiffs must set forth facts “sufficiently detailed and specific to support an
3 || inference that each of the statutory elements of liability is satisfied.” (See Mittenhuber v. City of
4 || Redondo Beach (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 1,5.) “General allegations are regarded as inadequate.”
5 || Ud. (emphasis added).)
6 Plaintiffs do not allege any facts that allow the court to infer the County exercised control over
the subject roadway by virtue of the City of Rocklin’s Capital Improvement Plan. That the
—
construction project was part of a city improvement plan supports the opposite inference. In addition,
9 || to the extent Plaintiffs allege the County exercised control through SPRTA, the judicially noticeable
10 || jointpowers agreement reflects that SPRTA is a separate public entity for which the County cannot
11 ||be held liable.
12 In sum, Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action because the Complaint lacks specific factual
13 ||allegations supporting an inference that the County owned or operated the Accident Location.
14 ||Therefore, the County’s motion for judgment on the pleadings should be granted.
15 B. Plaintiffs’ Loss of Consortium Claim Fails Along With the Dangerous Condition
16 Claim.
Plaintiffs cannot assert a stand-alone loss of consortium claim against the County because the
v claim is acommon law tort,whereas public entity liability ispurely statutory. (See Leonard v. John
° Crane, Inc. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1274, 1282-83 (loss of consortium is “a common law cause of
" action” which applies general tort principles); Gov. Code, § 815.) Plaintiffs may seek loss of
* consortium damages, which are considered noneconomic damages under Proposition 51. (See Civ.
| Code, § 1431.2, subd. (b)(2); CACI 3920.) However, where a plaintiff does not state an underlying
cause of action, their spouse cannot claim loss of consortium damages. (Blain v. Doctor ’sCo. (1990)
*
1048, 1067.) Here, Plaintiffs have not stated a dangerous condition claim against the
* 222 Cal.App.3d
“ County, and therefore they cannot seek loss of consortium damages.
° VI. CONCLUSION
fail to state adangerous condition claim against the County because they have not
°° Plaintiffs
facts to support an inference that the County owned or controlled the Accident
: provided sufficient
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MEMORANDUM OFPOINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADI NGS
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Location. In fact, the allegations exonerate the County because Plaintiffs allege that the Accident
Location was within the jurisdiction of two public entities distinct and separate from the County.
Judicially noticeable facts, which must be read as part of the complaint, provide further support for
this conclusion. Because Plaintiffs have not pled facts showing the County is liable for Ms. Sadao’s
injuries, Mr. Sadao is not entitled to damages for loss of consortium. Therefore, the court should
grant Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Dated: September 18, 2019 Respectfully Submitted,
OFFICE OF THE PLACER COUNTY COUNSEL
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we Ce
Eric C.
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Brumfield
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Attorney for Defendant COUNTY OF PLACER
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADING S
nei ge ERE TEL A
DECLARATION OF PROOF OF SERVICE
Sadao v. City of Rocklin, et al.
Placer County Superior Court Case No. SCV0042370
I, JENNA PORTER, declare:
I am a citizen of the United States and am employed in the County of Placer. I am over the
age of eighteen (18) years and not a party to the within-entitled action. My business address is 175
Fulweiler Avenue, Auburn, California. On September 18, 2019, I served the within document(s):
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT
COUNTY OF PLACER’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
><] BY U.S. MAIL: By placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with the postage
fully prepaid and depositing said envelope(s) with the United States Postal Service at Auburn,
California, addressed as set forth below.
[-] BY U.S. MAIL: By placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope and placing it in
a designated area for outgoing mail, addressed as set forth below. I am readily familiar with the
10 practice of this office with respect to collection and processing of documents for mailing. On
the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing at Auburn, California, it
1] is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service in a sealed
envelope with postage fully prepaid.
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[_] BY OVERNIGHT MAIL: By placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed envelope and
13 depositing said envelope(s) with delivery fees paid or provided for, in a box or other facility
maintained by Federal Express, addressed as set forth below.
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William C. Callaham, Esq. Carl L. Fessenden, Esq.
Is Christopher G. Romero, Esq. Sarah Y. Oh, Esq.
16 WILCOXEN CALLAHAM, LLP PORTER SCOTT
2114 K Street 350 University Ave., Suite 200
17 Sacramento, CA 95816 Sacramento, CA 95825
Tel: (916) 442-2777 / Fax: (916) 442-4118 Tel: (916) 929-1481 / Fax: (916) 927-3706
18 Email: weallaham@vwilcoxenlaw.com Email: cfessenden@porterscott.com
cromero@wilcoxenlaw.com Attorneys for Defendant City of
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs Kathleen Sadao and Rocklin
20 Lothain Sadao
21 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is
true and correct. Executed on September 18, 2019, at Auburn, California.
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Anu Wa
24 7 JENNA PORTER
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
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OFFICE OF THE PLACER COUNTY COUNSEL ae C. Brumfield (SBN 306642) 75 Fulweiler Avenue Auburn, California 95603 SUPER F Ek ED ows Telephone: (530) 889-4044 Soe Oe BLAGia Facsimile: (530) 889-4069 Email: ebrumfield@placer.ca.gov QY 7 P18 2019 \ JAKE CHATTERS Attorney for Defendant COUNTY OF PLACER CUTIVE OFFICER & CLERK By: C. Waggoner, Deputy SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PLACER 10 KATHLEEN SADAO and LOTHAIN Case No. SCV0042370 11 SADAO, MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 12 Plaintiffs, AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT COUNTY OF PLACER’S 13 V. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 14 CITY OF ROCKLIN, CITY OF LINCOLN, CITY OF ROSEVILLE, COUNTY OF 15 PLACER, and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Date: October 24, 2019 Time: 8:30 a.m. 16 Defendants. Dept: 42 17 Complaint Filed: January 10, 2019 First Amended Complaint Filed: August 29, 2019 18 19 L INTRODUCTION 20 Defendant County of Placer (the “County”) moves for judgment on the pleadings as to 21 Plaintiffs’ entire First Amended Complaint because it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a 22 cause of action. (See Code of Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii).) Plaintiffs allege a dangerous 23 condition of property claim against the County and seek loss of consortium damages. However, 24 Plaintiffs do not allege sufficient facts to establish that the County owns or controls the property, an 25 essential element of the claim. (See Gov. Code, §§ 830, 835.) Plaintiffs allege the accident occurred 26 in the City of Rocklin and under the jurisdiction of the South Placer Regional Transportation 27 Authority (“SPRTA”), and judicially noticeable facts indicate the City of Rocklin owns the subject 28 /// i MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS roadway and the SPRTA is an independent public entity with liability separate from its members. Therefore, the County is entitled tojudgment on the pleadings. Il. LEGAL STANDARD Under Code of Civil Procedure section 438, a defendant may bring a motion for judgment on the pleadings if the “complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” “A motion for judgment on the pleadings is equivalent to a demurrer.” (Templo v. State (2018) 24 Cal.App.Sth 730, 735, review denied Aug. 22, 2018.) The court in Hunt v. County of Shasta set forth the standard governing a motion forjudgment on the pleadings: A defendant isentitled to judgment on the pleadings if the plaintiff's complaint does not state a cause of action. In considering whether a defendant is entitled tojudgment 10 on the pleadings, we look only to the face of the pleading under attack and do not consider matters raised in the answer. All facts alleged in the complaint are admitted 11 for purposes of the motion, and the court determines whether those facts constitute a cause of action. The court also may consider matters subject tojudicial notice. 2 ((1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 432, 440.) 13 Because California government tort liability is purely statutory, every fact essential to the 14 existence of liability must be pleaded with particularity. (Susman v. C ity of Los Angeles (1969) 269 15 Cal.App.2d 803, 809.) “Accordingly, a claim alleging a dangerous condition may not rely on 16 generalized allegations.” (Brenner v. City of El Cajon (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 434, 439 (affirming a 17 demurrer to a dangerous condition claim).) “[T]he plaintiff must set forth facts in his complaint 18 sufficiently detailed and specific to support an inference that each of the statutory elements of liability 19 is satisfied. General allegations are regarded as inadequate.” (Mittenhuber v. City of Redondo Beach 20 (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 1,5 (affirming a demurrer to a dangerous condition claim).) 21 On a motion for judgment on the pleadings, as with a demurrer, courts “admit[] all material 22 facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law.” (See Blank vy. 23 Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) In addition, courts treat the pleading as if it contained “a 24 statement of all matters of which they are required to take judicial notice, even when the pleading 25 contains an express allegation to the contrary.” (Faix, Ltd. v. Cty. of Los Angeles (1976) 54 26 Cal.App.3d 992, 998 (quotations omitted).) 27 /I/ 28 2 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Leave to amend is properly denied where there is no “reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “The burden of proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on the plaintiff.” (/d.) lil. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint on January 10, 2019. The court entered an order on August 16, 2019 allowing Plaintiffs to file their First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) and deeming the Answer previously filed by the County to be the answer to the FAC. The FAC was filed on August 29, 2019. Plaintiff Kathleen Sadao (“Ms. Sadao”) alleges she was injured on June 10, 2018, when a 2-3” 10 lip of pavement caused her bicycle to crash on “Sierra College Boulevard, just past Nightwatch Drive 11 in Rocklin, California” (the “Accident Location”). (FAC 4,5.) Ms. Sadao contends the Accident 12 Location “was in a dangerous and defective condition.” (FAC {|6.) Ms. Sadao alleges “Defendants 13 created the danger and were directly responsible for maintenance of the subject 14 road/pavement/construction zone.” (FAC § 7.) Plaintiff Lothain Sadao (“Mr. Sadao”) is married to 15 Ms. Sadao and alleges a loss of consortium claim based on his wife’s injuries. (FAC qf 19-21.) 16 IV. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 17 Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 438 subdivision (d), where the motion isbased 18 on a matter of which the court may take judicial notice, the matter shall be specified in the supporting i) points and authorities. 20 A court may take judicial notice of a joint powers agreement (“JPA”) and its provisions. (See, 21 e.g., People v. Shepherd (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 334, 337 & fn. 1.) In addition, the court may take 22 judicial notice of the JPA and itsprovisions because they “are not reasonably subject to dispute and 23 are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable 24 accuracy.” (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (h).) The court may also take judicial notice of a JPA 25 because it isa legislative enactment of itspublic-entity members. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (b); 26 Gov. Code, § 6502 (“If authorized by their legislative or other governing bodies, two or more public 27 agencies by agreement may jointly exercise any power common to the contracting parties...”’).) 28 /I/ 3 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS l Therefore, the County requests the court take judicial notice of the SPRTA JPA and that it 2 || creates “a public entity separate from each of the Members” whose debts, liabilities, and obligations 3 || “shall not constitute the debts, liabilities,or obligations of the Members, either jointly or severally.” 4 ||(SPRTA JPA, §§ 3, 12; Declaration of Eric C. Brumfield (hereinafter “Brumfield Decl.”), Ex. A.) In 5 || addition, the court may take judicial notice of these facts because they “are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably BD indisputable accuracy.” (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (h).) As NY a public record, the SPRTA JPA is both easily accessible and not reasonably subject to dispute. CO The County also requests the Court take judicial So notice of City of Rocklin Resolutions 79-103 10 || and 82-46 as legislative enactments of a public entity. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (b); Brumfield 11 || Decl., Ex. B& C.) The court “shall” take judicial notice of legislative enactment issued by any public 12 || entity of the United States if aparty requests itand gives each adverse party sufficient notice “through 13 |)the pleadings or otherwise” to enable the adverse party to prepare to meet the request. (See Evid. 14 ||Code, §§ 452, 453.) 15 “It is established that in the consideration of a pleading the courts must read the same as if it 16 ||contained a statement of all matters which they are required to take judicial notice, even when the 17 ||pleading contains an express allegation to the contrary. This rule applies to a motion for judgment 18 || on the pleadings.” (Faix, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 992, 998 (citations 19 ||omitted).) 20 || V. ANALYSIS 21 A. The Alleged Facts Are Insufficient to Establish aDangerous Condition Claim Against the County. a The facts alleged by Plaintiffs are insufficient to state a dangerous condition claim against the 23 County because they are not “sufficiently detailed and specific to support an inference” that the = County owned or controlled the Accident Location. (See Mittenhuber v. City of Redondo Beach = (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 1, 5.) Dangerous condition liability is dependent on “ownership or control” 26 of the public property at issue. (See Gov. Code, § 830, subd. (c).) Ownership or control of the Zi property at issue is an essential element of a dangerous condition claim. (See Gov. Code, § 835; ak Judicial Council of California, Civil Jury Instruction (“CACTI”) 1100.) Because liability for a 4 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS nth i thE SEAT LT TS 1 || dangerous condition is purely statutory, every essential fact must be pleaded with “particularity.” 2 ||(SeeSusman vy.City of Los Angeles (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 803, 809.) “General allegations are 3 || regarded as inadequate.” (Mittenhuber, 142 Cal.App.3d 1, 5.) 4 Plaintiffs allege the Accident Location was “in Rocklin, California” and “under the 5 || jurisdiction of the South Placer Regional Transportation Authority.” (FAC § 5.) Thus, Plaintiffs allege that two public entities other than the County owned or controlled the Accident Location. The ND Complaint includes a blanket allegation that all defendants were agents, partners, joint venturers, or employees of one another. (FAC § 2.) However, such a relationship isirrelevant, given the narrow Oo statutory basis of liability: a public entity’s liability for adangerous condition does not stem from an Co 10 || agency or partnership relationship—it stems from the entity’s ownership or control over the location 11 || and its awareness of or creation of a dangerous condition. (See Gov. Code, § 835.) Plaintiffs do not 12 ||allege that the County somehow owned or controlled the Accident Location through membership in 13 ||theSPRTA, but even if they did, the judicially noticeable joint powers agreement indicates the 14 ||SPRTA is a separate public entity with separate liability. (See SPRTA JPA, §§ 3, 12.) These 15 || judicially noticeable facts must be read as ifthey were part of the pleading. (See Faix, Ltd. v.Cty. of 16 || Los Angeles (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 992, 998.) 17 Moreover, the City of Rocklin owns the subject roadway. The City of Rocklin annexed the 18 ||subject roadway on April 5, 1982, by passage and adoption of Resolutions 79-103 and 82-46. (See 19 || Brumfield Decl., Ex. B & C.) When a city incorporates or annexes county territory, “all right, title, 20 || and interest of the county, including the underlying fee where owned by the county, in and to any 21 ||county highway within the territory involved...shall vest in the city and shall thereupon constitute a 22 || city street.” (Streets & Highway Code, § 989 (enacted in 1963).) Therefore, ownership of the subject 23 ||roadway vested with the City of Rocklin on April 5, 1982. With ownership settled, control isthe only avenue for County liability. “Control exists if the 24 25 ||public entity has the power to prevent, remedy or guard against the dangerous condition.” (Goddard Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 350, 364.) Thus, Plaintiffs must allege 26 ||v. detailed and specific” facts to support an inference that the County could prevent, 27 ||“sufficiently or guard against a dangerous condition on the subject roadway. (See Mittenhuber (1983) 28 ||remedy, 3 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGME NT ON THE PLEADI NGS lll 1 || 142 Cal.App.3d 1, 5.) Itis not enough that the complaint simply contains allegations of ownership 2 ||orcontrol. Instead, Plaintiffs must set forth facts “sufficiently detailed and specific to support an 3 || inference that each of the statutory elements of liability is satisfied.” (See Mittenhuber v. City of 4 || Redondo Beach (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 1,5.) “General allegations are regarded as inadequate.” 5 || Ud. (emphasis added).) 6 Plaintiffs do not allege any facts that allow the court to infer the County exercised control over the subject roadway by virtue of the City of Rocklin’s Capital Improvement Plan. That the — construction project was part of a city improvement plan supports the opposite inference. In addition, 9 || to the extent Plaintiffs allege the County exercised control through SPRTA, the judicially noticeable 10 || jointpowers agreement reflects that SPRTA is a separate public entity for which the County cannot 11 ||be held liable. 12 In sum, Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action because the Complaint lacks specific factual 13 ||allegations supporting an inference that the County owned or operated the Accident Location. 14 ||Therefore, the County’s motion for judgment on the pleadings should be granted. 15 B. Plaintiffs’ Loss of Consortium Claim Fails Along With the Dangerous Condition 16 Claim. Plaintiffs cannot assert a stand-alone loss of consortium claim against the County because the v claim is acommon law tort,whereas public entity liability ispurely statutory. (See Leonard v. John ° Crane, Inc. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1274, 1282-83 (loss of consortium is “a common law cause of " action” which applies general tort principles); Gov. Code, § 815.) Plaintiffs may seek loss of * consortium damages, which are considered noneconomic damages under Proposition 51. (See Civ. | Code, § 1431.2, subd. (b)(2); CACI 3920.) However, where a plaintiff does not state an underlying cause of action, their spouse cannot claim loss of consortium damages. (Blain v. Doctor ’sCo. (1990) * 1048, 1067.) Here, Plaintiffs have not stated a dangerous condition claim against the * 222 Cal.App.3d “ County, and therefore they cannot seek loss of consortium damages. ° VI. CONCLUSION fail to state adangerous condition claim against the County because they have not °° Plaintiffs facts to support an inference that the County owned or controlled the Accident : provided sufficient 6 MEMORANDUM OFPOINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADI NGS T Location. In fact, the allegations exonerate the County because Plaintiffs allege that the Accident Location was within the jurisdiction of two public entities distinct and separate from the County. Judicially noticeable facts, which must be read as part of the complaint, provide further support for this conclusion. Because Plaintiffs have not pled facts showing the County is liable for Ms. Sadao’s injuries, Mr. Sadao is not entitled to damages for loss of consortium. Therefore, the court should grant Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. Dated: September 18, 2019 Respectfully Submitted, OFFICE OF THE PLACER COUNTY COUNSEL 10 11 12 we Ce Eric C. © Brumfield Bool \ Attorney for Defendant COUNTY OF PLACER 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 7 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADING S nei ge ERE TEL A DECLARATION OF PROOF OF SERVICE Sadao v. City of Rocklin, et al. Placer County Superior Court Case No. SCV0042370 I, JENNA PORTER, declare: I am a citizen of the United States and am employed in the County of Placer. I am over the age of eighteen (18) years and not a party to the within-entitled action. My business address is 175 Fulweiler Avenue, Auburn, California. On September 18, 2019, I served the within document(s): MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT COUNTY OF PLACER’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS ><] BY U.S. MAIL: By placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with the postage fully prepaid and depositing said envelope(s) with the United States Postal Service at Auburn, California, addressed as set forth below. [-] BY U.S. MAIL: By placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope and placing it in a designated area for outgoing mail, addressed as set forth below. I am readily familiar with the 10 practice of this office with respect to collection and processing of documents for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing at Auburn, California, it 1] is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid. 12 [_] BY OVERNIGHT MAIL: By placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed envelope and 13 depositing said envelope(s) with delivery fees paid or provided for, in a box or other facility maintained by Federal Express, addressed as set forth below. 14 William C. Callaham, Esq. Carl L. Fessenden, Esq. Is Christopher G. Romero, Esq. Sarah Y. Oh, Esq. 16 WILCOXEN CALLAHAM, LLP PORTER SCOTT 2114 K Street 350 University Ave., Suite 200 17 Sacramento, CA 95816 Sacramento, CA 95825 Tel: (916) 442-2777 / Fax: (916) 442-4118 Tel: (916) 929-1481 / Fax: (916) 927-3706 18 Email: weallaham@vwilcoxenlaw.com Email: cfessenden@porterscott.com cromero@wilcoxenlaw.com Attorneys for Defendant City of 19 Attorneys for Plaintiffs Kathleen Sadao and Rocklin 20 Lothain Sadao 21 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on September 18, 2019, at Auburn, California. 22 23 Anu Wa 24 7 JENNA PORTER 25 26 27 28 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS eee