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  • ELIZABETH LARROQUE vs FIRST ADVANTAGE CREDIT CASESComplex Civil Unlimited document preview
  • ELIZABETH LARROQUE vs FIRST ADVANTAGE CREDIT CASESComplex Civil Unlimited document preview
  • ELIZABETH LARROQUE vs FIRST ADVANTAGE CREDIT CASESComplex Civil Unlimited document preview
  • ELIZABETH LARROQUE vs FIRST ADVANTAGE CREDIT CASESComplex Civil Unlimited document preview
  • ELIZABETH LARROQUE vs FIRST ADVANTAGE CREDIT CASESComplex Civil Unlimited document preview
  • ELIZABETH LARROQUE vs FIRST ADVANTAGE CREDIT CASESComplex Civil Unlimited document preview
  • ELIZABETH LARROQUE vs FIRST ADVANTAGE CREDIT CASESComplex Civil Unlimited document preview
  • ELIZABETH LARROQUE vs FIRST ADVANTAGE CREDIT CASESComplex Civil Unlimited document preview
						
                                

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1 PETER R. DION-KINDEM (SBN 95267) THE DION-KINDEM LAW FIRM 2 PETER R. DION-KINDEM, P. C. 3 2945 Townsgate Road, Suite 200 Westlake Village, CA 91361 4 Telephone: (818) 883-4900 Email: peter@dion-kindemlaw.com 5 LONNIE C. BLANCHARD III (SBN 93530) 6 THE BLANCHARD LAW GROUP, APC 9/11/2020 7 5211 East Washington Blvd., # 2262 Commerce, CA 90040 8 Telephone: (213) 599-8255 Fax: (213) 402-3949 9 Email: lonnieblanchard@gmail.com 10 Attorneys for Plaintiff Elizabeth Larroque 11 (Additional Counsel listed on following page) 12 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 13 COUNTY OF SAN MATEO 14 15 FIRST ADVANTAGE CREDIT CASES, Case No. JCCP4961 16 CLASS ACTION Coordination Proceeding (Assigned to the Hon. Marie S. Weiner - Dept. 17 Special Title (CRC Rule. 3.550) 2) 18 Notice of Motion and Unopposed Motion for 19 Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement; Memorandum of Points and 20 Authorities in Support Thereof 21 Date: October 5, 2020 22 Time: 11:00 a.m. Dept.: 2 23 24 25 26 27 28 Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement 1 1 Shaun Setareh (SBN 204514) shaun@setarehlaw.com 2 Thomas Segal (SBN 222791) 3 thomas@setarehlaw.com Farrah Grant (SBN293898) 4 farrah@setarehlaw.com SETAREH LAW GROUP 5 315 S. Beverly Drive, Suite 315 Beverly Hills, California 90212 6 Telephone: (310) 888-7771 7 Facsimile: (310) 888-0109 8 Attorneys for Plaintiffs Marcus Chism and Michelle Blankenship 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement 2 1 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on October 5, 2020 at 11:00 a.m., in Department 2 of the 2 Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Mateo, located at 400 County Center, 3 Redwood City, California 94063, Plaintiffs Elizabeth Larroque, Marcus Chism, and Michelle 4 Blankenship (“Plaintiffs”) will, and hereby do, move this Court for an Order: 5 (1) Granting certification of the Settlement Class for settlement purposes pursuant to 6 California Code of Civil Procedure § 382; 7 (2) Preliminarily approving the Settlement Agreement submitted concurrently herewith; 8 (3) Appointing Plaintiffs as Class Representatives for the Settlement Class; 9 (4) Appointing Lonnie C. Blanchard III of the Blanchard Law Group, APC, Peter R. Dion- 10 Kindem of Peter R. Dion-Kindem, P.C., and Shaun Setareh of the Setareh Law Group as 11 Class Counsel for the Settlement Class; 12 (5) Approving the form and content of the proposed Notice of Settlement, submitted 13 concurrently herewith; 14 (6) Approving the notice procedure set forth in the Settlement Agreement and directing that 15 notice be given to class members consistent therewith; 16 (7) Approving KCC as the Settlement Administrator; and 17 (8) Scheduling a final fairness and approval hearing. 18 This Court should grant this Motion because: 19 (1) The Settlement Class meets all the requirements for class certification for settlement 20 purposes under Code of Civil Procedure § 382; 21 (2) The Settlement Agreement is a fair, adequate, and reasonable compromise of the 22 disputed Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) claim based on Defendant’s allegedly 23 unlawful policies; 24 (3) Plaintiffs and Class Counsel are adequate to represent the Settlement Class; 25 (4) The proposed notice procedure complies with California Rules of Court 3.766(d) and (e) 26 and adequately apprises Class Members of their rights and fully comports with due 27 process; and 28 Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement 3 1 (5) Based on the foregoing, notice should be directed to the Class Members and a final 2 fairness hearing should be scheduled. 3 This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion, the attached Memorandum of Points and 4 Authorities, the Declarations of Peter R. Dion-Kindem, Lonnie C. Blanchard III, Shaun Setareh, 5 Elizabeth Larroque, Marcus Chism and Michelle Blankenship, Scott DiCarlo, and Even Hendricks, and 6 all exhibits thereto, all papers and pleadings on file with the Court in this action, all matters judicially 7 noticeable, and on such oral and documentary evidence as may be presented at the hearing. 8 Dated: September 11, 2020 THE DION-KINDEM LAW FIRM 9 10 11 BY: ____________________________ PETER R. DION-KINDEM, P.C. 12 PETER R. DION-KINDEM 13 Attorney for Plaintiff Elizabeth Larroque 14 THE BLANCHARD LAW GROUP, APC LONNIE C. BLANCHARD III 15 SETAREH LAW GROUP 16 Shaun Setareh 17 Thomas Segal Farrah Grant 18 Attorneys for Plaintiffs Marcus Chism and Michelle Blankenship 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement 4 1 CONTENTS 2 I. Introduction ........................................................................................................................10 3 II. Overview of the Litigation .................................................................................................11 A. Procedural History .................................................................................................11 4 B. Summary of Claims Subject to the Settlement Agreement ...................................13 5 1. First Advantage’s Alleged Failure to Obtain Legally Required 6 Certifications 13 2. Remedies for Violation of the FCRA 13 7 3. Willfulness 14 8 4. First Advantage’s Potential Defenses to Liability and Certification 15 9 III. Mediation and Settlement ..................................................................................................16 10 IV. Overview of the Settlement ...............................................................................................16 11 A. Settlement Class Definition ...................................................................................16 B. Settlement Relief....................................................................................................17 12 1. Settlement Class Members Will Receive Free and Heavily Discounted 13 Background Check Products. 17 14 2. Settlement Class Members will also receive a $15 discount on First Advantage’s Instant Check Criminal product. 18 15 3. Settlement Class Members will also receive a $15 discount on First 16 Advantage’s Resume Check product. 19 4. First Advantage has also agreed to injunctive relief ensuring that the 17 alleged wrongful conduct of issuing background checks without first 18 obtaining a required retrospective certification from the requesting employer has ceased. 20 19 C. Release of Claims ..................................................................................................20 20 D. Notice Procedures ..................................................................................................21 21 V. The Court Should Conditionally Certify the Settlement Class Because it Meets All the Requirements for Class Certification for Settlement Purposes Only Under Code of Civil 22 Procedure Section 382. ......................................................................................................21 23 A. There Is an Objectively Ascertainable and Sufficiently Numerous Class. ............23 B. There Is a Predominance of Common Questions. .................................................23 24 C. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Typical. ..............................................................................24 25 D. Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ Counsel Can Adequately Represent the Settlement Class. 26 ................................................................................................................................25 VI. The Settlement Is a Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable Compromise of Disputed Claims in 27 View of Defendant’s Potential Liability Exposure and the Risks of Continued Litigation. 28 ............................................................................................................................................25 Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement 5 1 A. The Settlement Agreement Was Reached Via Arm’s-Length Negotiations of Experienced Counsel and an Experienced Mediator with Sufficient Information to 2 Intelligently Negotiate a Fair Settlement. ..............................................................26 3 B. First Advantage’s Estimated Liability Exposure. ..................................................27 4 C. Risks in Going Forward with Litigation ................................................................28 D. The Proposed Incentive Awards to Plaintiffs Are Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable. 5 ................................................................................................................................28 6 E. The Proposed Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Are Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable. ............................................................................................................29 7 F. The Proposed Payment to the Settlement Administrator Is Fair, Adequate, and 8 Reasonable. ............................................................................................................30 9 G. The Proposed Settlement Administration Plan Complies with Rule of Court 3.766(e). .................................................................................................................30 10 H. The Proposed Class Notice Complies with Rule 3.766(d) and (e). .......................31 11 VII. Conclusion .........................................................................................................................32 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement 6 1 Table of Authorities 2 Cases 3 7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1135 ..................... 26 4 Air Line Stewards, etc., Local 550 v. Am. Airlines, Inc. (7th Cir. 1972) 455 F.2d 101 .......................... 27 5 Alaniz v. California Processors, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 1976) 73 F.R.D. 269 .................................................. 22 6 Ashby v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Oregon (D. Or. 2008) 592 F.Supp.2d 1307 ............................................. 27 7 B.W.I. Custom Kitchen v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1341 ........................................ 24 8 Beaver v. Tarsadia Hotels (S.D. Cal., Sept. 28, 2017, No. 11-CV-01842-GPC-KSC) 2017 WL 4310707 ............................................................................................................................................................... 30 9 Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 715 .................................................................. 28 10 Bowles v. Superior Court of City and County of San Francisco (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574 ......................... 23 11 Bravo v. Gale Triangle, Inc. (C.D. Cal., Feb. 16, 2017, No. CV1603347BROGJSX) 2017 WL 708766 12 ............................................................................................................................................................... 27 13 Cartt v. Superior Court (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960 ................................................................................ 31 14 Chavez v. Netflix, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43 ................................................................................. 29 15 Clark v. American Residential Services LLC (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 785............................................ 27 16 Classen v. Weller (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27 ......................................................................................... 24 17 Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794 ..................................................................... 22, 26 18 Fireside Bank v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1069....................................................................... 24 19 Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 836........................... 22, 25 20 Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp. (9th Cir. 1992) 976 F.2d 497.................................................................. 24 21 Hebbard v. Colgrove (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 1017 .................................................................................. 23 22 Hicks v. Kaufman and Broad Home Corp. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 908 ................................................. 23 23 In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. (2d Cir. 1992) 960 F.2d 285 ............................................. 22 24 Jaimez v. Daiohs USA, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1286 .............................................................. 22, 23 25 Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116 .............................................................. 27 26 Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat. Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480 ..................................................................... 29 27 Lealao v. Beneficial California, Inc. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 19 ............................................................ 30 28 Lexmark Intern., Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. (2014) 572 U.S. 118..................................... 16 Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement 7 1 Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429 ..................................................................................... 21 2 Mallick v. Superior Court (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434 ............................................................................ 26 3 McGhee v. Bank of America (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442 ........................................................................ 25 4 Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 955, 980 [250 Cal.Rptr.3d 234, 253, 445 P.3d 626, 643] ............................................................................................................................................................... 23 5 Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Com'n of City and County of San Francisco (9th Cir. 1982) 688 6 F.2d 615 ................................................................................................................................................ 28 7 Reyes v. San Diego Cty. Bd. of Supervisors (1979) 196 Cal.App.3d 1263 ............................................. 23 8 Rodriguez v. West Pub. Corp. (C.D. Cal., Sept. 10, 2007, No. CV05-3222 R (MCX)) 2007 WL 2827379................................................................................................................................................. 28 9 Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr (2007) 551 U.S. 47.......................................................................... 15 10 Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319................................................. 21, 23 11 Schwartz v. Harp (C.D. Cal. 1985) 108 F.R.D. 279 ............................................................................... 24 12 Smith v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc. (S.D. Cal., Jan. 14, 2013, No. 10-CV-1116- IEG WMC) 2013 WL 13 163293................................................................................................................................................... 30 14 Stambaugh v. Superior Court (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231 ...................................................................... 25 15 Syed v. M-I LLC (E.D. Cal., Oct. 23, 2014, No. CIV. 1:14-742 WBS) 2014 WL 5426862 ................... 14 16 Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F.Supp. 294 ............................................. 28 17 Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp. (9th Cir. 2002) 290 F.3d 1043 ................................................................... 29 18 Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224 ............................................. 25, 26, 27, 31 19 Statutes 20 12 C.F.R. § 1022.130 .............................................................................................................................. 17 21 15 U.S.C. § 1681b ................................................................................................................................... 13 22 15 U.S.C. § 1681g ................................................................................................................................... 17 23 15 U.S.C. § 1681n ................................................................................................................................... 13 24 15 U.S.C. § 1681o ................................................................................................................................... 13 25 Civil Code § 178l(f) ................................................................................................................................ 25 26 Rules 27 C.R.C. Rule 3.766 ................................................................................................................................... 31 28 Other Authorities Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement 8 1 Fair Credit Reporting Act Disclosures, 84 FR 65280-01 ....................................................................... 17 2 Manual for Complex Litig. (2d ed. 1993) § 30.45 .................................................................................. 22 3 Newberg on Class Actions (3d ed. 1991) § 11.27, pp. 11-40 to 11-56 ................................................... 22 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement 9 1 I. INTRODUCTION 2 The proposed Settlement before the Court provides a fitting and fair resolution to a highly 3 complex class action lawsuit in which Plaintiffs claim that First Advantage failed to obtain proper 4 certifications from employers in violation of Section 1681b(b)(1) of the federal Fair Credit Reporting 5 Act (“FCRA”). Plaintiffs contend that during the class period, First Advantage used client certifications 6 as part of its background check process, but these certifications were unlawful, either because they 7 were blanket certifications contained in First Advantage’s form contracts with its employer clients or 8 because the certifications stated that the employer would comply with its obligations to disclose to 9 consumers that a report may be obtained for employment purposes and to obtain their written 10 authorization to procure the report as opposed to a statement that the client had already complied with 11 such disclosure and authorization obligations. Plaintiffs do not seek to recover actual damages as a 12 result of First Advantage’s alleged violations, but instead seek only statutory damages. However, in 13 order to recover statutory damages, Settlement Class Members must show that First Advantage not 14 only violated the FCRA, but that its violations were willful. Given the enhanced proof necessary to 15 demonstrate willfulness (and the possibility of no recovery whatsoever if said proof were deemed 16 lacking), this Settlement, which will benefit approximately 1.65 million Settlement Class Members, 17 was achieved in the face of considerable risk. 18 Another important consideration is the great uncertainty of First Advantage’s ability to pay a 19 judgment if Plaintiffs were to prevail. If the class did prevail, the minimum statutory award would be 20 $100 per violation and the maximum award would be $1,000 per violation. Thus, First Advantage 21 would be facing a massive judgment between $165 million and $1.65 billion. Despite these obvious 22 financial constraints, the parties have structured the Settlement to provide Settlement Class Members 23 with valuable relief tailored to the alleged conduct underlying Plaintiffs’ claims. To wit, Settlement 24 Class Members will receive several of First Advantage’s background check products at no cost to 25 them, or at a fraction of the regular cost. Moreover, First Advantage has agreed to injunctive relief 26 precluding the recurrence of the alleged FCRA violations giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims. 27 28 Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement 10 1 Plaintiffs are prepared to litigate their case through certification and trial but recognize that 2 there are significant risks in going forward with litigation. As a result, in the opinions of Plaintiffs and 3 Plaintiffs’ counsel, the Settlement represents a fair, adequate, and reasonable compromise in view of 4 those risks. Accordingly, as explained in greater detail below, the Court should grant preliminary 5 approval so that notice can be sent to the Settlement Class Members regarding the Settlement. 6 II. OVERVIEW OF THE LITIGATION 7 A. Procedural History 8 On August 17, 2015, Plaintiff Elizabeth Larroque filed a Complaint in this Court, alleging a 9 single cause of action for violation of the FCRA. Plaintiff Larroque alleged, on behalf of herself and a 10 putative class, that First Advantage furnished consumer reports to potential employers without first 11 obtaining certifications from the potential employers required by the FRCA. (Larroque Compl. ¶¶ 10- 12 11.) Plaintiff Larroque, however, did not allege that she or putative class members suffered harm or 13 actual damages as a result of First Advantage’s alleged conduct. 1 She instead alleged entitlement to 14 statutory damages. (Id. ¶ 13 & Prayer for Relief.) 15 On October 8, 2015, First Advantage answered the Complaint and removed the case to the U.S. 16 District Court for the Northern District of California. On June 21, 2016, the District Court issued an 17 order to show cause regarding subject matter jurisdiction. (Larroque v. First Advantage LNS Screening 18 Sols. (N.D. Cal.), No. 3:15-cv-04684-JSC, ECF No. 32.) On September 2, 2016, the District Court 19 remanded the case to this Court, holding that Plaintiff Larroque “alleged nothing more than a bare 20 procedural violation of the FCRA” and could not satisfy Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement. (Id., 21 ECF No. 18 at 8.) 22 On December 12, 2016, First Advantage filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing 23 that Plaintiff Larroque lacked statutory standing to bring a claim under the FCRA. On January 12, 24 2017, the Honorable Richard DuBois issued an Order denying the motion. 25 26 1 Plaintiff Larroque obtained the position for which she applied. She does not allege that First 27 Advantage’s purported violation of the FCRA impacted her employment prospects, nor her subsequent employment, in any way. 28 Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement 11 1 On February 17, 2017, First Advantage filed a petition for writ of mandamus. The First 2 Appellate District of the Court of Appeal denied the petition on March 23, 2017. On April 3, 2017, 3 First Advantage filed a Petition for Review with the California Supreme Court. On May 10, 2017, the 4 California Supreme Court denied the Petition for Review. 5 On March 21, 2017, the Honorable Susan Etezadi entered an Order deeming the Larroque case 6 complex and assigning it to the Honorable Marie Weiner in Department 2. 7 On September 14, 2017, after deposing Plaintiff Larroque, First Advantage again removed this 8 case. On November 9, 2017, the District Court remanded the case to this Court, again finding that 9 Plaintiff Larroque’s allegations did not support Article III standing. (Larroque v. First Advantage LNS 10 Screening Sols. (N.D. Cal.), No. 3:17-cv-05313-JSC, ECF No. 24 at 3.) 11 On August 2, 2017, Plaintiff Marcus Chism filed a Complaint in the Superior Court for the 12 State of California, County of San Francisco, alleging a cause of action for violation of the FCRA. 13 Plaintiff Chism alleged, on behalf of himself and a putative class, that First Advantage failed to require 14 potential employers to certify compliance with certain provisions of the FCRA before furnishing 15 consumer reports. (Chism Compl. ¶¶ 20-23.) His Complaint alleged entitlement to statutory damages. 2 16 (See Chism Compl., Prayer for Relief.) On October 19, 2017, First Advantage filed a motion to quash 17 for lack of personal jurisdiction, which Plaintiff Chism opposed on November 6, 2017. 18 On December 22, 2017, Chism filed a Petition for Coordination to have Chism and Larroque 19 coordinated. On March 5, 2018, this Court granted the Petition for Coordination. 20 On May 30, 2018, after resolution of the Petition for Coordination, this Court entered an Order 21 denying First Advantage’s motion to quash for lack of personal jurisdiction in Chism. 3 On June 14, 22 2018, First Advantage filed a petition for writ of mandamus. The First Appellate District of the Court 23 of Appeal denied the petition on June 28, 2018. On July 9, 2018, First Advantage filed a Petition for 24 Review with the California Supreme Court. On July 25, 2018, the California Supreme Court denied the 25 2 26 Plaintiff Chism obtained the job for which he applied. (Chism First Amended Compl. ¶ 6.) 3 Plaintiff Chism filed a First Amended Complaint on June 8, 2018, which added Plaintiff Michelle 27 Blankenship as a named Plaintiff. Like Plaintiffs Chism and Larroque, Plaintiff Blankenship received the job for which she applied and did not allege any concrete harm resulting from First Advantage’s 28 alleged violation of the FRCA. (Chism First Amended Compl. ¶¶ 7, 30-31.) Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement 12 1 Petition for Review. On October 23, 2018, First Advantage filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari with 2 the United States Supreme Court. On December 3, 2018, the United States Supreme Court ordered 3 Plaintiff Chism to file a Response to the Petition. Plaintiff Chism filed a Response on February 1, 2019. 4 On March 18, 2019, the Supreme Court denied the Petition. 5 B. Summary of Claims Subject to the Settlement Agreement 6 1. First Advantage’s Alleged Failure to Obtain Legally Required Certifications 7 The FCRA prohibits a consumer reporting agency from furnishing a consumer report for 8 employment purposes unless the employer certifies that it has provided the employee or job applicant a 9 disclosure that it will do so in a document consisting “solely of the disclosure” and obtained the 10 consumer’s written authorization to procure the report. (15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i)-(ii).) 11 Pursuant to the FCRA, a “consumer reporting agency” cannot furnish a consumer report to the 12 employer unless the employer first certifies that it has complied with its disclosure and authorization 13 requirements. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(1)(A)(i) states: 14 (1) CERTIFICATION FROM USER. A consumer reporting agency may furnish a 15 consumer report for employment purposes only if (A) the person who obtains such report from the agency certifies to the agency that (i) the person has complied with paragraph 16 (2) with respect to the consumer report . . . . (emphasis added). 17 Plaintiffs allege that First Advantage violated this requirement by using blanket prospective 18 certifications or contemporaneous, individualized certifications that included prospective language. In 19 other words, Plaintiffs allege that First Advantage did not obtain a consumer-by-consumer certification 20 prior to issuing the background check that the employer had complied with the disclosure and 21 authorization requirements. Instead, in Plaintiffs’ view, First Advantage’s certifications stated only that 22 the employer would comply in the future. 23 2. Remedies for Violation of the FCRA 24 If a consumer reporting agency willfully violates any of these requirements, it is liable for 25 statutory damages of at least $100 and up to $1,000 per violation. (15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a).) If a 26 consumer reporting agency negligently violates the FCRA, it is liable for actual damages. (15 U.S.C. § 27 1681o.) As stated above, however, Plaintiffs are not asserting claims for actual damages. 28 Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement 13 1 3. Willfulness 2 Because Plaintiffs are not seeking actual damages, but only statutory damages, Plaintiffs and 3 Settlement Class Members must not only prove that First Advantage violated the law, but also that its 4 violations were willful in order to prevail at trial. 5 Among other ways, Plaintiffs would attempt to show First Advantage’s conduct cannot be 6 reconciled with the FCRA’s clear language. In Syed v. M-I LLC (E.D. Cal., Oct. 23, 2014, No. CIV. 7 1:14-742 WBS) 2014 WL 5426862, at *4–5, rev'd and remanded (9th Cir. 2017) 846 F.3d 8 1034, opinion amended and superseded on denial of reh'g (9th Cir. 2017) 853 F.3d 492, and rev'd (9th 9 Cir. 2017) 853 F.3d 492, the District Court held that an allegation that a consumer reporting agency 10 relied on “prospective” certification language from its customer supported a claim that it willfully 11 violated its obligations under the FCRA: 12 Unlike the interpretation analyzed in Safeco, however, the court sees no apparent foundation in the text of § 1681b(b)(1) for PreCheck’s belief that it could rely on 13 M–I’s prospective certification of compliance with paragraph (2). See Safeco 551 14 U.S. at 69–70 (“While we disagree with Safeco’s analysis, we recognize that its reading has a foundation in the statutory text and a sufficiently convincing 15 justification to have persuaded the District Court to adopt it and rule in Safeco’s favor.” (internal citations omitted)). Prospective certification actually runs counter 16 to § 1681b(b)(1)’s use of the phrase “has complied,” which clearly appears to refer retrospectively to an action already taken. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(1) (“the person has 17 complied with paragraph (2)” (emphasis added)). It makes no sense for M–I to 18 certify that it “has complied” with the FCRA before having done so; M–I must wait until it actually “has complied” to certify its actions. Even if the statute’s language 19 is not entirely “pellucid,” it is clear enough to foreclose the use of a prospective certification as to compliance with paragraph (2). 20 This understanding is reinforced by the statute’s next clause, which requires 21 certification that “the person will comply with paragraph (3) ...if paragraph (3) becomes applicable”-a sharp contrast of language suggesting that Congress 22 contemplated prospective certification as to paragraph (3), but not paragraph (2). 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(1)(A)(i). Accordingly, whether or not PreCheck received a 23 prospective certification from M–I in 2002, the plain language of § 1681b(b)(1) 24 supports plaintiff’s allegation that PreCheck intentionally or recklessly violated the FCRA by failing to secure a certification that M–I “has complied” with paragraph 25 (2). 26 PreCheck’s actions might be objectively reasonable if it could point to some court decision or “authoritative guidance” from the FTC that it relied upon when deciding 27 to use a prospective, blanket certification. That is, PreCheck must show that it had some “sufficiently convincing justification” for thinking that a prospective 28 Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement 14 1 certification fulfilled its obligation under the FCRA. Safeco 551 U.S. at 69–70. But PreCheck has not provided, and the court cannot find, any court decision addressing 2 the use of prospective certifications under § 1681b (b)(1). 3 Plaintiffs also argue that, as a company specializing in providing background checks, First 4 Advantage should be expected to be fully conversant with all of its legal requirements under the FCRA. 5 4. First Advantage’s Potential Defenses to Liability and Certification 6 Notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ arguments, Plaintiffs recognize that proceeding with litigation 7 would carry significant risks in light of First Advantage’s potential defenses. For instance, First 8 Advantage has relied in part upon the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Safeco Ins. Co. of 9 America v. Burr (2007) 551 U.S. 47 [127 S.Ct. 2201, 167 L.Ed.2d 1045] and has contended that its 10 conduct was not willful under the test for willfulness as set forth in that case. Plaintiffs expect that First 11 Advantage will take the position that Safeco stands for the proposition that conduct is not willful 12 because there is no appellate authority or Federal Trade Commission or Consumer Financial Protection 13 Bureau guidance stating that such conduct was objectively unreasonable. Plaintiffs also anticipate that 14 First Advantage will contend it did not act recklessly because, whatever the language in the 15 certifications at issue, Plaintiffs received disclosures from their potential employers and authorized 16 them to obtain consumer reports from First Advantage prior to ordering and obtaining background 17 reports on them from First Advantage. In addition, First Advantage will likely argue that it vetted 18 employers before taking them on as clients, provided FCRA-related training, and required prospective 19 and contemporaneous certifications from clients. First Advantage will further point to the fact that the 20 U.S. Government also uses “a one-time, blanket certification” that the user “will” comply with Section 21 1681b(b)(2) to demonstrate that First Advantage’s interpretation of this statutory provision is 22 reasonable. First Advantage also will contend that its clients all understood that they were certifying 23 that they had complied with their disclosure and authorization obligations before ordering background 24 reports from First Advantage. In sum, First Advantage will assert that it did not recklessly disregard an 25 unjustifiably high risk of probable harm to Plaintiffs or any other consumers because such potential 26 harm never existed. 27 28 Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement 15 1 Plaintiffs further anticipate that First Advantage would argue, in a post-trial appeal, that