Preview
ROBINS CLOUD LLP
1 Bill Robins III (SBN 296101)
2 Manuel D. Balam (SBN 236699) 5/13/2020
808 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 450
3 Santa Monica, California 90401
(310) 929-4200 Telephone
4 (310) 566-5900 Facsimile
robins@robinscloud.com
5 mbalam@robinscloud.com
6
7 Attorneys for Plaintiff
8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
9 COUNTY OF BUTTE
10
CARYL LYNN WESTON, ) CASE NO: 19CV00855
11 ) Assigned to: Judge Robert A. Glusman
Plaintiff, )
12 vs. ) PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO
) DEFENDANT STATE OF CALIFORNIA
13 )
STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION’S
)
14 OF TRANSPORTATION; MARK ALLEN ) MOTION/AMENDED MOTION TO
LAWSON, an individual; and DOES 1-50, ) COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO
15 REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF
)
16 Defendants. ) DOCUMENTS FROM PLAINTIFF CARYL
) LYNN WESTON
17 )
) Hearing: May 27, 2020
18 ) Time: 9:00 am
) Dept: TBA
19 )
20 ) Complaint: March 18, 2019
)
) Trial: August 3, 2020
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TO THE COURT, ALL PARTIES, AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
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Plaintiff CARYL LYNN WESTON (“Plaintiff”) submits this Opposition to the following
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documents by Defendant State of California Department of Transportation: (1) Notice of Motion and
24 Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production of Documents from Plaintiff Caryl
25 Lynn Weston [filed and served by overnight courier on April 7, 2020] (“April 7 MTC”); and (2)
26 Amended Notice of Motion and Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production of
27 Documents from Plaintiff Caryl Lynn Weston [filed and served by mail on April 15, 2020] (“April 15
28 Amended MTC”). The April 7 MTC’s “notice” and “motion” did not move for sanctions.
1
PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION’S MOTION/AMENDED MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM PLAINTIFF CARYL LYNN WESTON
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT …………………………………..8
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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY……………………………………………………….…………10
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A. Plaintiff’s injury claims. ……………………………………………………………..10
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B. Prior meet and confer efforts. ……………………………………………………….10
5 C. Specific Requests now at issue. ………………………………………………………10
6 D. Plaintiff’s August 23rd initial objections-only responses. …………………………..11
7 E. Plaintiff’s September 16th supplemental factual responses. ………………………11
8 F. Plaintiff produced 1,552 pages of documents, including billing records
9 and other records showing Medicare/Medi-Cal payments. ………………………..11
10 G. Dispute over pending subpoenas indicated no further resolution
could be reached.………………………………………………………………………12
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III. ARGUMENT………………………………………………………………………………….12
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A. DOT’S Requests are too broad and
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not reasonably particularized (“Breadth”). ………………………………………..12
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B. For privacy issues, general relevancy is not the standard, and the
15 requesting/moving party has a heavy burden to overcome the objections. ………13
16 C. Collateral source/insurance information is protected
17 by the collateral source rule and general privacy rights and
18 is not discoverable (“Collateral Source”). ………………………………………….13
19 D. DOT’s reliance on Gov. Code §985 is wrong and misleading. ……………………15
20 E. Each Request invades constitutional and statutory privacy rights (“Privacy”)…17
1. Privacy objections asserted. …………………………………………………17
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2. Medical information is particularly intimate, warranting
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privacy protection, and a personal injury lawsuit
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does not waive the right to privacy. ………………………………………..17
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F. Each Request invades attorney privilege and work product (“Privilege”). ……19
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G. Each Request seeks other irrelevant, privileged information (“Relevancy”). …21
26 H. Plaintiff’s supplemental factual statement of compliance
27 complies with the CCP. …………………………………………………………….21
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PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION’S MOTION/AMENDED MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM PLAINTIFF CARYL LYNN WESTON
I. Plaintiff’s entire automobile insurance file is not discoverable.…………………..21
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IV. REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY SANCTIONS IS UNTIMELY
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AND NOT JUSTIFIED……………………………………………………………………..22
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PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION’S MOTION/AMENDED MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM PLAINTIFF CARYL LYNN WESTON
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
1
2
Cases
3
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Starley (1946) 28 Cal.2d 347 ............................................................................. 14
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Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. Gherardini (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 669 ...................................... 17
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Board of Trustees v. Sup. Court (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 516................................................................... 13
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7 Boler v. Sup. Court (Everett) (1987) 201 Cal.App.3d 467 ....................................................................... 17
8 Britt v. Sup. Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844 .............................................................................................. 9, 17
9 Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal. 3d 844 .......................................................................................... 18
10 Catholic Mut. Relief Soc. v. Sup. Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 358 ................................................................ 15
11 Cho v. Superior Court (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 113 .................................................................................. 14
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City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court In and For City and County of San Francisco (1951)
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37 Cal.2d 227 ........................................................................................................................................ 19
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Coito v. Sup. Court (2013) 54 Cal.4th 480 ............................................................................................... 19
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Coito v. Superior Court (2012) 54 Cal.4th 480 ........................................................................................ 20
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17 Covell v. Superior Court (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 39 ................................................................................ 21
18 Davis v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1008 ................................................................................ 18
19 Dowden v. Sup. Court (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 126 ................................................................................... 19
20 Food 4 Less Supermarkets, Inc. v. Sup. Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 651.............................................. 22
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General Dynamics Corp. v. Sup. Court (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1164 ................................................................ 19
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Gordon v. Sup. Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1546 .................................................................................. 17
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Greyhound v. Sup. Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355 ....................................................................................... 21
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Harris v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 661................................................................................. 13
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Helfend v. Southern Calif. Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1................................................ 13, 14, 16
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27 Helfend v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1 ................................................ 9, 13
28 Hinshaw, Winkler, Draa, Marsh & Still v. Sup. Court (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 233 ................................. 15
4
PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION’S MOTION/AMENDED MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM PLAINTIFF CARYL LYNN WESTON
1 Hoffman Corp v. Superior Court (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 357 ................................................................. 13
2 Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 541 ...................................................... 16
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Hrnjak v. Graymar, Inc. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 725 .......................................................................................... 14
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In re Lifschutz (1970) 2 Cal.3d 415 .......................................................................................................... 17
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John B. v. Superior Court (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1177 ................................................................................... 17
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Lund v. San Joaquin Valley Railroad (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1 ............................................................. 9, 13, 14
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8 Obregon v. Sup. Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424 ............................................................................ 12, 21
9 O'Brien v. Sup. Court (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 388 ................................................................................... 22
10 People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Donovan (1962) 57 Cal.2d 346 ....................................... 19
11 People v. Martinez (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 465 ........................................................................................ 17
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Philippine Export & Foreign Loan Guarantee Corp. v. Chuidian (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1058 ............ 14
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Professional Career Colleges, Magna Institute, Inc. v. Sup. Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 490 ............ 22
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Rico v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 807 .......................................................................... 19
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Roberts v. Sup. Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 330 ............................................................................................... 17
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17 Roberts v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 330 ........................................................................................ 19
18 Schnabel v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 704 .................................................................................... 21
19 Sexton v. Sup. Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403................................................................................ 9, 22
20 Tien v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 528 ................................................................................ 13
21 Valley Bank of Nevada v. Sup. Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652 .................................................................... 14
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Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Sup. Court (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 681 ............................................................ 9, 22
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Webb v. Standard Oil Co. (1957) 49 Cal.2d 509 ................................................................................ 17, 21
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Weese v. Unick (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 100 ............................................................................................. 21
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Williams v. Sup. Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531 ...................................................................................... 13, 15
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27 Williams v. Sup.Ct. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531 ................................................................................................ 18
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5
PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION’S MOTION/AMENDED MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM PLAINTIFF CARYL LYNN WESTON
1 Statutes
2 CCP §§1985.3 ........................................................................................................................................... 17
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CCP §1985.6 ............................................................................................................................................. 17
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CCP §§2017.010 2017.020 ............................................................................................................... 19, 21
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CCP §2017.210 ......................................................................................................................................... 15
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CCP §2018.010-2018.040................................................................................................................... 19, 20
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8 CCP §2030.300 ........................................................................................................................................... 9
9 CCP §2031.030 ........................................................................................................................... 8, 9, 12, 13
10 CCP §2031.220 ................................................................................................................................... 11, 21
11 CCP §2031.310 ..................................................................................................................................... 9, 22
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CRC Rule §1.20(b)(2)(A) ......................................................................................................................... 17
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Evid. Code §§210, 350.............................................................................................................................. 21
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Evid. Code §§950-954 .............................................................................................................................. 19
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Evid. Code §965-967 ................................................................................................................................ 19
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17 Evid. Code §1060...................................................................................................................................... 17
18 Evid. Code §§950-953 .............................................................................................................................. 19
19 Evid. Code §1155...................................................................................................................................... 15
20 Evid. Code §951........................................................................................................................................ 19
21 Evid. Code §952........................................................................................................................................ 19
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Evid. Code §954........................................................................................................................................ 19
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Gov. Code §985 .............................................................................................................................. 9, 15, 16
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Government Code §7460 .......................................................................................................................... 17
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Insurance Code §§791............................................................................................................................... 17
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27 42 U.S.C. §1320d ...................................................................................................................................... 17
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PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION’S MOTION/AMENDED MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM PLAINTIFF CARYL LYNN WESTON
1 Constitutional Provisions
2 California Constitution, Article I, Section 1 ............................................................................................. 17
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United States Constitution ........................................................................................................................ 17
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PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION’S MOTION/AMENDED MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM PLAINTIFF CARYL LYNN WESTON
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
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The document filed in this action as Exhibit 16, attached to Declaration of Darren S.
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Nakashima, an in-house attorney for the STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
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TRANSPORTATION (“DOT”), is a quintessential example of abuse and disregard for Plaintiff’s rights
5 and why Plaintiff opposes the discovery and these discovery motions. Exhibit 16 is a page from
6 Plaintiff’s medical records, which contains personal, private information. DOT’s attorney, an agent of
7 the State, unilaterally made it a public record, without ensuring Plaintiff’s privacy rights were
8 protected. This is an egregious violation of Plaintiff’s rights. Any point that DOT wanted to make
9 about these records could have been made without filing private medical documents. Left uncontrolled
10 and unchecked, this is what some attorneys and defendants will do. Plaintiff seeks to stop this.
In this action, Plaintiff contends she suffered serious injuries to the following areas: 1) a left
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leg/shattered femur; 2) the hip, namely her left side; 3) right wrist/thumb/hand fracture; 4) fractures in
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the back at L2, L4 and resulting pain; 5) general physical pain and suffering, mental suffering, and
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emotional distress; and, 6) recent growths on wrist area of hands, which are being investigated.
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In response to these claims, DOT attempts to invade Plaintiff’s clear, undisputed, and
15 fundamental privacy and collateral source rule rights. Plaintiff contends the MTC and underlying
16 discovery at issue were designed to burden, harass, and oppress Plaintiff. Further, DOT ignores
17 egregious problems in its discovery requests, which triggered and required the objections.
18 Distilling the issues down to their simplest form, although not clearly identified or articulated
19 by the MTC, DOT only challenges Plaintiff’s supplemental responses to DOT’s Requests for
20 Production, Set 1, Nos. 18-21, and to DOT’s Request for Production, Set 2, No. 22. (DOT’s Set 1 and
Set 2 Requests for Production are collectively referred to as “Requests” with each individual request at
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issue referred to as “Request(s) No.”). DOT claims that the 6 objections that Plaintiff almost
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identically asserted to each Request are meritless and that Plaintiff has not made correct “compliance”
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statements. DOT is wrong as to each of its contentions.
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Without limitation, in an overly broad and invasive manner, Requests Nos. 18-21 ask for “any
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and all DOCUMENTS” that “pertain” to collateral source or other insurance benefits as a result of the
26 incident. Request No. 22 similarly asks for “all DOCUMENTS” “relating to” auto insurance.
27 Procedurally, the Requests violate CCP §2031.030 and are oppressive, harassing, and
28 burdensome as a result. There is no limitation on the types, categories, content, purpose, or anything
8
PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION’S MOTION/AMENDED MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM PLAINTIFF CARYL LYNN WESTON
along those lines of the information and documents sought. As a result of this over-breadth, each and
1
every broadly-stated Request using the words “any” and/or “all” generally triggers and requires all
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objections stated, which are summarized in short form as (1) “Breadth,” (2) “Collateral Source,” (3)
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“Privacy,” (5) “Privilege,” and (6) “Relevancy.” The MTC can be denied simply on the grounds of the
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over-breadth and lack of compliance with CCP §2031.030.
5 Substantively, the other major problem with the Requests and the MTC is that they ignore and
6 attempt to violate fundamental privacy and collateral source rights of Plaintiff with respect to Plaintiff’s
7 collateral sources, settlements with insurers, compromised liens, insurance benefits, and similar
8 information and documents in Plaintiff’s insurance files, such as application documents, financial
9 information, and all other documents used to seek and obtain insurance. Privacy rights and the collateral
10 source rule squarely make this information inadmissible and, therefore, not subject to discovery.
Helfend v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1, 6; Lund v. San Joaquin Valley
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Railroad (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1, 10-12; Britt v. Sup. Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 859 862.
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Although DOT attempts to argue that Gov. Code §985 gives DOT a broad, unfettered right to
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engage in this type of invasive, expansive pre-litigation discovery, that argument is wrong and, frankly,
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misleading. DOT has no broader rights to seek this discovery, at this stage of the litigation, than any
15 other defendant would. Indeed, in its moving papers, DOT leaves out the provisions of Gov. Code §985
16 that expressly show the narrow limits of insurance/collateral source “discovery” allowed (a list of
17 collateral sources, at best). It is not the invasive discovery that DOT now argues it is entitled to.
18 As to DOT’s request for attorneys’ fees, Plaintiff asserts a procedural objection (for the record)
19 and, more importantly, a substantive position. First, the April 15 Amended MTC’s “notice” and
20 “motion” seeking sanctions were not timely served; the deadline for any notice and motion for sanctions
was April 7. DOT missed it. Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Sup. Court (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 681, 685; Sexton
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v. Sup. Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1409-1410; CCP §2031.310(c) (45 days for request for
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production); CCP §2030.300(c) (45 days for interrogatories).
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Second, as evidenced by DOT’s egregious violation of Plaintiff’s privacy rights in attaching
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Exhibit 16, Plaintiff “acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition
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of the sanction unjust” in that fundamental, weighty rights are at issue. There is nothing obstructive or
26 meritless in these privacy concerns. Public policy supports these rights. DOT has shown it needs to be
27 checked.
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9
PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION’S MOTION/AMENDED MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM PLAINTIFF CARYL LYNN WESTON
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1
A. Plaintiff’s injury claims.
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Plaintiff contends she suffered serious injuries to the following areas: 1) a left leg/shattered
3
femur; 2) the hip, namely her left side; 3) right wrist/thumb/hand fracture; 4) fractures in the back at
4
L2, L4 and resulting pain; 5) general physical pain and suffering, mental suffering, and emotional
5 distress; and, 6) recent growths on wrist area of hands, which are being investigated. (Declaration of
6 Manuel D. Balam [“Balam Dec.”] ¶2).
7 B. Prior meet and confer efforts.
8 This MTC arises after a lengthy verbal and written meet and confer process in which both sides
9 discussed their positions, tried to resolve them through supplemental work, and ultimately disagreed.
10 Therefore, for purposes of this Opposition, Plaintiff need not and does not waste the Court’s time with a
self-serving recitation or interpretation of the meet and confer procedural history. Plaintiff merely
11
objects to any characterization that Plaintiff did not act in good faith—the letters, communications, and
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the supplemental efforts provided by DOT show otherwise. Additionally, the parties engaged in many
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verbal and written discussions on the issues. (Balam Dec. ¶3, Exhibit A thereto).
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C. Specific Requests now at issue.
15 DOT’s Separate Statement identifies that there are only five Requests now at issue in this MTC,
16 quoted in full below (Balam Dec. ¶4):
17 [From DOT’s Request for Production, Set 1]
18 “REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 18: Any and all DOCUMENTS pertaining to Workers'
19 Compensation, Social Security or other disability benefits for which YOU have applied, and which
20 relate to the INCIDENT.”
“REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 19: Any and all DOCUMENTS which pertain to
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settlements, compromised liens and/or payments to YOU or any health care provider for any damages
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suffered as a result of the INCIDENT.”
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“REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 20: Any and all DOCUMENTS which pertain to any
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COLLATERAL SOURCE PAYMENT made directly to YOU and others on YOUR behalf as a result of
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the INCIDENT.”
26 “REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 21: Any and all DOCUMENTS which reflect the amounts of
27 any COLLATERAL SOURCE PAYMENT paid to and on YOUR behalf as a result of the INCIDENT.”
28 [From Request for Production, Set 2]
10
PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION’S MOTION/AMENDED MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM PLAINTIFF CARYL LYNN WESTON
“REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 22: All DOCUMENTS relating to YOUR automobile
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insurance policy in effect at the time of the INCIDENT including all declarations pages.”
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DOT’s Set 1 and Set 2 Requests for Production are collectively referred to as “Requests” or
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“each Request” with each individual number referred to as “Request(s) No.” In short, these Requests
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ask for Plaintiff’s collateral sources, settlements with insurers, compromised liens, insurance benefits,
5 and similar information and documents in Plaintiff’s insurance files, such as application documents,
6 financial information, and all other documents used to seek and obtain insurance (Balam Dec. ¶4).
7 D. Plaintiff’s August 23rd initial objections-only responses.
8 Given the similar, nearly-identical, and invasive nature of each Request (or, using DOT’s
9 characterization, given the “boilerplate” Requests), and given the parties’ pending disputes, Plaintiff
10 initially responded by serving only objections on August 23, 2019 per the deadline agreed by the
parties. The objections to the at-issue Requests were nearly identical, except that they corresponded to
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particular words used in each Request. DOT’s moving papers contain all responses. (Balam Dec. ¶5).
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E. Plaintiff’s September 16th supplemental factual responses.
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In the interest of good faith meet and confer efforts to resolve the dispute, without waving and
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subject to all previously asserted objections and in accordance with CCP §2031.220, Plaintiff served
15 supplemental responses on September 16, 2019 with much factual detail. (Balam Dec. ¶6).
16 Plaintiff provided the identical supplemental factual response to each Request now at issue and
17 stated as follows: “Without waiving the objections previously asserted, which are restated and
18 incorporated herein, and subject to them, Responding Party responds as follows: Responding Party will
19 comply to a limited extent, will produce some nonprivileged/work product documents or things in the
20 demanded category that exist and are in the possession, custody, or control of Responding Party and to
which no objection is being made, and will provide a privilege log for any potentially relevant and
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withheld documents or categories of documents, if any. However, the request is too broad as stated.”
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Since Medicare and Medi-Cal paid some of Plaintiff’s medical expenses, notwithstanding the
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general defects of each Request that supported standing on the objections, Plaintiff provided a “limited”
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response to help move things along per CCP §2031.220. To the extent DOT sought information and
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documents other than from Medicare and Medi-Cal, the objections stood. (Balam Dec. ¶7).
26 F. Plaintiff produced 1,552 pages of documents, including billing records and other
27 records showing Medicare/Medi-Cal payments.
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PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION’S MOTION/AMENDED MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM PLAINTIFF CARYL LYNN WESTON
As part of the document responses, Plaintiff also produced 1,552 pages of documents in
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response to the document request, including billing records and other records showing Medicare/Medi-
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Cal payments made to the medical providers. (Balam Dec. ¶8).
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G. Dispute over pending subpoenas indicated no further resolution could be reached.
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Concurrently with the disputes over the interrogatories and requests for production, Plaintiff and
5 DOT were disagreeing about medical records and insurance records subpoenas issued by DOT. Based
6 in large part on the same objections now at issue, Plaintiff objected and proposed a “first look”
7 agreement and protective order. DOT categorically refused to consider a “first look” agreement
8 proposed by Plaintiff, and discussions over a protective order were not taken seriously or fell apart. As
9 a result, Plaintiff and DOT were at a stalemate and all resolution efforts fell apart. (Balam Dec. ¶9).
10 III. ARGUMENT
A. DOT’S Requests are too broad and not reasonably particularized (“Breadth”).
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In an overly broad and invasive manner, Requests Nos. 18-21 ask for “any and all
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DOCUMENTS” that “pertain” to collateral source/insurance benefits as a result of the incident. Request
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No. 22 similarly asks for “all DOCUMENTS” “relating to” Plaintiff’s auto insurance.
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CCP §2031.030(c)(1) expressly requires that a request for production “[d]esignate the
15 documents, tangible things, land or other property, or electronically stored information to be inspected,
16 copied, tested, or sampled either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably
17 particularizing each category of item.”
18 Additionally, there is no broad discovery right permitting a broad intrusion without limitations.
19 “Any discovery request, even an initial one, can be misused in an attempt to generate settlement
20 leverage by creating burden, expense, embarrassment, distraction, etc.” Obregon v. Sup. Court (1998)
67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431.
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DOT’s Requests violate the above standards. Procedurally, the Requests violate CCP §2031.030
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and are oppressive, harassing, and burdensome as a result. There is no limitation on the types,
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categories, content, purpose, or anything along those lines of the information and documents sought. As
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a result of this over-breadth, each and every broadly-stated Request using “any” and/or “all” generally
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triggers and requires all stated objections, which are summarized as (1) “Breadth” [addressed in this
26 section and throughout], (2) “Collateral Source,” (3) “Privacy,” (5) “Privilege,” and (6) “Relevancy.”
27 These objections are particularly appropriate, warranted, and necessary in cases like this where the
28 information and documents in insurance files intertwine with medical information and medical records.
12
PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION’S MOTION/AMENDED MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM PLAINTIFF CARYL LYNN WESTON
Although DOT tries to characterize the objections as “boilerplate” simply because they are
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nearly identical, DOT ignores that the common nature of DOT’s Requests (“boilerplate” nature, if one
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uses DOT’s nomenclature) is what prompted the nearly identical objections. The Requests themselves
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are “boilerplate” and redundant and call for the same objections to be repeated. In any event, given the
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broad and similar nature of each Request at issue, all objections are valid and warranted.
5 The MTC can be denied simply on the grounds of this Breadth objection and lack of compliance
6 with CCP 2031.030. Plaintiff requests the Court deny the MTC outright on this basis. Nevertheless,
7 Plaintiff further addresses each of the substantive objections now at issue.
8 B. For privacy issues, general relevancy is not the standard, and the requesting/moving
9 party has a heavy burden to overcome the objections.
10 As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff emphasizes an underlying principle applicable to all objections
involved in this particular dispute. Whenever matters protected by privacy are sought, the burden is on
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the requesting party to demonstrate a particularized or compelling need for the confidential information
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sought for proper balancing of the factors; broad relevancy to the subject matter is not enough. Britt v.
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Sup. Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 859 862; Harris v. Sup. Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 661, 665; Board
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of Trustees v. Sup. Court (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 516, 524–525; Williams v. Sup. Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th
15 531, 558 (disapproving prior case law only to the extent that they assumed, without conducting the
16 proper inquiry, that a compelling interest or compelling need automatically is required). The more
17 sensitive the information, the greater the need for discovery must be shown. Hoffman Corp v. Sup.
18 Court (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 357, 362; Tien v. Sup. Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 528, 540.
19 C. Collateral source/insurance information is protected by the collateral source rule
20 and general privacy rights and is not discoverable (“Collateral Source”).
Since collateral source/insurance information is fundamentally at the heart of this dispute,
21
Plaintiff begins with the Collateral Source Rule (which itself is tethered to general privacy rights).
22
Plaintiff objects on the grounds that each Request improperly seeks the entirety of Plaintiff’s
23
collateral source/insurance information and documents. The entirety of Plaintiff’s collateral
24
source/insurance information and documents are protected by the collateral source rule. Helfend v.
25
Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1, 6; Lund v. San Joaquin Valley Railroad
26 (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1, 10-12. The collateral source rule was restated and reaffirmed in Helfend v.
27 Southern Calif. Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1, 13, as applicable “in tort cases in which the
28 plaintiff has been compensated by an independent collateral source—such as insurance, pension,
13
PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION’S MOTION/AMENDED MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM PLAINTIFF CARYL LYNN WESTON
continued wages, or disability payments—for which he has actually or constructively … paid or in cases
1
in which the collateral source would be recompensed from the tort recovery through subrogation, refund
2
of benefits, or some other arrangement.”
3
Thus, an injured party need not disclose compensation received from a “collateral source” for
4
injuries caused by the defendant, because such evidence is not admissible to mitigate damages. The
5 rationale is that defendant should not benefit from plaintiff's foresight in obtaining insurance or other
6 sources of compensation. See Helfend v. Southern Calif. Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1, 6.
7 A closely related evidentiary rule/principle prohibits the admission of evidence of compensation
8 from a collateral source; “California has adopted the closely related principle that, as a general rule,
9 jurors should not be told that the plaintiff can recover compensation from a collateral source.” Lund v.
10 San Joaquin Valley Railroad (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1, 10; Hrnjak v. Graymar, Inc. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 725,
729, 732-733. “Where a person suffers personal injury or property damage by reason of the wrongful
11
act of another, an action against the wrongdoer for the damages suffered is not precluded nor is the
12
amount of damages reduced by the receipt by him of payment for his loss from a source wholly
13
independent of the wrongdoer.” Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Starley (1946) 28 Cal.2d 347, 349.
14
“The collateral source rule expresses a policy judgment in favor of encourag
Preview
ROBINS CLOUD LLP 1 Bill Robins III (SBN 296101) 2 Manuel D. Balam (SBN 236699) 5/13/2020 808 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 450 3 Santa Monica, California 90401 (310) 929-4200 Telephone 4 (310) 566-5900 Facsimile robins@robinscloud.com 5 mbalam@robinscloud.com 6 7 Attorneys for Plaintiff 8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 9 COUNTY OF BUTTE 10 CARYL LYNN WESTON, ) CASE NO: 19CV00855 11 ) Assigned to: Judge Robert A. Glusman Plaintiff, ) 12 vs. ) PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO ) DEFENDANT STATE OF CALIFORNIA 13 ) STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION’S ) 14 OF TRANSPORTATION; MARK ALLEN ) MOTION/AMENDED MOTION TO LAWSON, an individual; and DOES 1-50, ) COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO 15 REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF ) 16 Defendants. ) DOCUMENTS FROM PLAINTIFF CARYL ) LYNN WESTON 17 ) ) Hearing: May 27, 2020 18 ) Time: 9:00 am ) Dept: TBA 19 ) 20 ) Complaint: March 18, 2019 ) ) Trial: August 3, 2020 21 TO THE COURT, ALL PARTIES, AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: 22 Plaintiff CARYL LYNN WESTON (“Plaintiff”) submits this Opposition to the following 23 documents by Defendant State of California Department of Transportation: (1) Notice of Motion and 24 Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production of Documents from Plaintiff Caryl 25 Lynn Weston [filed and served by overnight courier on April 7, 2020] (“April 7 MTC”); and (2) 26 Amended Notice of Motion and Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production of 27 Documents from Plaintiff Caryl Lynn Weston [filed and served by mail on April 15, 2020] (“April 15 28 Amended MTC”). The April 7 MTC’s “notice” and “motion” did not move for sanctions. 1 PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION’S MOTION/AMENDED MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM PLAINTIFF CARYL LYNN WESTON TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT …………………………………..8 2 II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY……………………………………………………….…………10 3 A. Plaintiff’s injury claims. ……………………………………………………………..10 4 B. Prior meet and confer efforts. ……………………………………………………….10 5 C. Specific Requests now at issue. ………………………………………………………10 6 D. Plaintiff’s August 23rd initial objections-only responses. …………………………..11 7 E. Plaintiff’s September 16th supplemental factual responses. ………………………11 8 F. Plaintiff produced 1,552 pages of documents, including billing records 9 and other records showing Medicare/Medi-Cal payments. ………………………..11 10 G. Dispute over pending subpoenas indicated no further resolution could be reached.………………………………………………………………………12 11 III. ARGUMENT………………………………………………………………………………….12 12 A. DOT’S Requests are too broad and 13 not reasonably particularized (“Breadth”). ………………………………………..12 14 B. For privacy issues, general relevancy is not the standard, and the 15 requesting/moving party has a heavy burden to overcome the objections. ………13 16 C. Collateral source/insurance information is protected 17 by the collateral source rule and general privacy rights and 18 is not discoverable (“Collateral Source”). ………………………………………….13 19 D. DOT’s reliance on Gov. Code §985 is wrong and misleading. ……………………15 20 E. Each Request invades constitutional and statutory privacy rights (“Privacy”)…17 1. Privacy objections asserted. …………………………………………………17 21 2. Medical information is particularly intimate, warranting 22 privacy protection, and a personal injury lawsuit 23 does not waive the right to privacy. ………………………………………..17 24 F. Each Request invades attorney privilege and work product (“Privilege”). ……19 25 G. Each Request seeks other irrelevant, privileged information (“Relevancy”). …21 26 H. Plaintiff’s supplemental factual statement of compliance 27 complies with the CCP. …………………………………………………………….21 28 2 PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION’S MOTION/AMENDED MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM PLAINTIFF CARYL LYNN WESTON I. Plaintiff’s entire automobile insurance file is not discoverable.…………………..21 1 IV. REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY SANCTIONS IS UNTIMELY 2 AND NOT JUSTIFIED……………………………………………………………………..22 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION’S MOTION/AMENDED MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM PLAINTIFF CARYL LYNN WESTON TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 1 2 Cases 3 Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Starley (1946) 28 Cal.2d 347 ............................................................................. 14 4 Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. Gherardini (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 669 ...................................... 17 5 Board of Trustees v. Sup. Court (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 516................................................................... 13 6 7 Boler v. Sup. Court (Everett) (1987) 201 Cal.App.3d 467 ....................................................................... 17 8 Britt v. Sup. Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844 .............................................................................................. 9, 17 9 Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal. 3d 844 .......................................................................................... 18 10 Catholic Mut. Relief Soc. v. Sup. Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 358 ................................................................ 15 11 Cho v. Superior Court (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 113 .................................................................................. 14 12 City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court In and For City and County of San Francisco (1951) 13 37 Cal.2d 227 ........................................................................................................................................ 19 14 Coito v. Sup. Court (2013) 54 Cal.4th 480 ............................................................................................... 19 15 Coito v. Superior Court (2012) 54 Cal.4th 480 ........................................................................................ 20 16 17 Covell v. Superior Court (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 39 ................................................................................ 21 18 Davis v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1008 ................................................................................ 18 19 Dowden v. Sup. Court (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 126 ................................................................................... 19 20 Food 4 Less Supermarkets, Inc. v. Sup. Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 651.............................................. 22 21 General Dynamics Corp. v. Sup. Court (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1164 ................................................................ 19 22 Gordon v. Sup. Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1546 .................................................................................. 17 23 Greyhound v. Sup. Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355 ....................................................................................... 21 24 Harris v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 661................................................................................. 13 25 Helfend v. Southern Calif. Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1................................................ 13, 14, 16 26 27 Helfend v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1 ................................................ 9, 13 28 Hinshaw, Winkler, Draa, Marsh & Still v. Sup. Court (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 233 ................................. 15 4 PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION’S MOTION/AMENDED MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM PLAINTIFF CARYL LYNN WESTON 1 Hoffman Corp v. Superior Court (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 357 ................................................................. 13 2 Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 541 ...................................................... 16 3 Hrnjak v. Graymar, Inc. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 725 .......................................................................................... 14 4 In re Lifschutz (1970) 2 Cal.3d 415 .......................................................................................................... 17 5 John B. v. Superior Court (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1177 ................................................................................... 17 6 Lund v. San Joaquin Valley Railroad (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1 ............................................................. 9, 13, 14 7 8 Obregon v. Sup. Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424 ............................................................................ 12, 21 9 O'Brien v. Sup. Court (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 388 ................................................................................... 22 10 People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Donovan (1962) 57 Cal.2d 346 ....................................... 19 11 People v. Martinez (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 465 ........................................................................................ 17 12 Philippine Export & Foreign Loan Guarantee Corp. v. Chuidian (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1058 ............ 14 13 Professional Career Colleges, Magna Institute, Inc. v. Sup. Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 490 ............ 22 14 Rico v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 807 .......................................................................... 19 15 Roberts v. Sup. Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 330 ............................................................................................... 17 16 17 Roberts v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 330 ........................................................................................ 19 18 Schnabel v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 704 .................................................................................... 21 19 Sexton v. Sup. Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403................................................................................ 9, 22 20 Tien v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 528 ................................................................................ 13 21 Valley Bank of Nevada v. Sup. Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652 .................................................................... 14 22 Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Sup. Court (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 681 ............................................................ 9, 22 23 Webb v. Standard Oil Co. (1957) 49 Cal.2d 509 ................................................................................ 17, 21 24 Weese v. Unick (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 100 ............................................................................................. 21 25 Williams v. Sup. Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531 ...................................................................................... 13, 15 26 27 Williams v. Sup.Ct. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531 ................................................................................................ 18 28 5 PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION’S MOTION/AMENDED MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM PLAINTIFF CARYL LYNN WESTON 1 Statutes 2 CCP §§1985.3 ........................................................................................................................................... 17 3 CCP §1985.6 ............................................................................................................................................. 17 4 CCP §§2017.010 2017.020 ............................................................................................................... 19, 21 5 CCP §2017.210 ......................................................................................................................................... 15 6 CCP §2018.010-2018.040................................................................................................................... 19, 20 7 8 CCP §2030.300 ........................................................................................................................................... 9 9 CCP §2031.030 ........................................................................................................................... 8, 9, 12, 13 10 CCP §2031.220 ................................................................................................................................... 11, 21 11 CCP §2031.310 ..................................................................................................................................... 9, 22 12 CRC Rule §1.20(b)(2)(A) ......................................................................................................................... 17 13 Evid. Code §§210, 350.............................................................................................................................. 21 14 Evid. Code §§950-954 .............................................................................................................................. 19 15 Evid. Code §965-967 ................................................................................................................................ 19 16 17 Evid. Code §1060...................................................................................................................................... 17 18 Evid. Code §§950-953 .............................................................................................................................. 19 19 Evid. Code §1155...................................................................................................................................... 15 20 Evid. Code §951........................................................................................................................................ 19 21 Evid. Code §952........................................................................................................................................ 19 22 Evid. Code §954........................................................................................................................................ 19 23 Gov. Code §985 .............................................................................................................................. 9, 15, 16 24 Government Code §7460 .......................................................................................................................... 17 25 Insurance Code §§791............................................................................................................................... 17 26 27 42 U.S.C. §1320d ...................................................................................................................................... 17 28 6 PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION’S MOTION/AMENDED MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM PLAINTIFF CARYL LYNN WESTON 1 Constitutional Provisions 2 California Constitution, Article I, Section 1 ............................................................................................. 17 3 United States Constitution ........................................................................................................................ 17 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 7 PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION’S MOTION/AMENDED MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM PLAINTIFF CARYL LYNN WESTON MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 1 I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 2 The document filed in this action as Exhibit 16, attached to Declaration of Darren S. 3 Nakashima, an in-house attorney for the STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 4 TRANSPORTATION (“DOT”), is a quintessential example of abuse and disregard for Plaintiff’s rights 5 and why Plaintiff opposes the discovery and these discovery motions. Exhibit 16 is a page from 6 Plaintiff’s medical records, which contains personal, private information. DOT’s attorney, an agent of 7 the State, unilaterally made it a public record, without ensuring Plaintiff’s privacy rights were 8 protected. This is an egregious violation of Plaintiff’s rights. Any point that DOT wanted to make 9 about these records could have been made without filing private medical documents. Left uncontrolled 10 and unchecked, this is what some attorneys and defendants will do. Plaintiff seeks to stop this. In this action, Plaintiff contends she suffered serious injuries to the following areas: 1) a left 11 leg/shattered femur; 2) the hip, namely her left side; 3) right wrist/thumb/hand fracture; 4) fractures in 12 the back at L2, L4 and resulting pain; 5) general physical pain and suffering, mental suffering, and 13 emotional distress; and, 6) recent growths on wrist area of hands, which are being investigated. 14 In response to these claims, DOT attempts to invade Plaintiff’s clear, undisputed, and 15 fundamental privacy and collateral source rule rights. Plaintiff contends the MTC and underlying 16 discovery at issue were designed to burden, harass, and oppress Plaintiff. Further, DOT ignores 17 egregious problems in its discovery requests, which triggered and required the objections. 18 Distilling the issues down to their simplest form, although not clearly identified or articulated 19 by the MTC, DOT only challenges Plaintiff’s supplemental responses to DOT’s Requests for 20 Production, Set 1, Nos. 18-21, and to DOT’s Request for Production, Set 2, No. 22. (DOT’s Set 1 and Set 2 Requests for Production are collectively referred to as “Requests” with each individual request at 21 issue referred to as “Request(s) No.”). DOT claims that the 6 objections that Plaintiff almost 22 identically asserted to each Request are meritless and that Plaintiff has not made correct “compliance” 23 statements. DOT is wrong as to each of its contentions. 24 Without limitation, in an overly broad and invasive manner, Requests Nos. 18-21 ask for “any 25 and all DOCUMENTS” that “pertain” to collateral source or other insurance benefits as a result of the 26 incident. Request No. 22 similarly asks for “all DOCUMENTS” “relating to” auto insurance. 27 Procedurally, the Requests violate CCP §2031.030 and are oppressive, harassing, and 28 burdensome as a result. There is no limitation on the types, categories, content, purpose, or anything 8 PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION’S MOTION/AMENDED MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM PLAINTIFF CARYL LYNN WESTON along those lines of the information and documents sought. As a result of this over-breadth, each and 1 every broadly-stated Request using the words “any” and/or “all” generally triggers and requires all 2 objections stated, which are summarized in short form as (1) “Breadth,” (2) “Collateral Source,” (3) 3 “Privacy,” (5) “Privilege,” and (6) “Relevancy.” The MTC can be denied simply on the grounds of the 4 over-breadth and lack of compliance with CCP §2031.030. 5 Substantively, the other major problem with the Requests and the MTC is that they ignore and 6 attempt to violate fundamental privacy and collateral source rights of Plaintiff with respect to Plaintiff’s 7 collateral sources, settlements with insurers, compromised liens, insurance benefits, and similar 8 information and documents in Plaintiff’s insurance files, such as application documents, financial 9 information, and all other documents used to seek and obtain insurance. Privacy rights and the collateral 10 source rule squarely make this information inadmissible and, therefore, not subject to discovery. Helfend v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1, 6; Lund v. San Joaquin Valley 11 Railroad (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1, 10-12; Britt v. Sup. Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 859 862. 12 Although DOT attempts to argue that Gov. Code §985 gives DOT a broad, unfettered right to 13 engage in this type of invasive, expansive pre-litigation discovery, that argument is wrong and, frankly, 14 misleading. DOT has no broader rights to seek this discovery, at this stage of the litigation, than any 15 other defendant would. Indeed, in its moving papers, DOT leaves out the provisions of Gov. Code §985 16 that expressly show the narrow limits of insurance/collateral source “discovery” allowed (a list of 17 collateral sources, at best). It is not the invasive discovery that DOT now argues it is entitled to. 18 As to DOT’s request for attorneys’ fees, Plaintiff asserts a procedural objection (for the record) 19 and, more importantly, a substantive position. First, the April 15 Amended MTC’s “notice” and 20 “motion” seeking sanctions were not timely served; the deadline for any notice and motion for sanctions was April 7. DOT missed it. Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Sup. Court (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 681, 685; Sexton 21 v. Sup. Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1409-1410; CCP §2031.310(c) (45 days for request for 22 production); CCP §2030.300(c) (45 days for interrogatories). 23 Second, as evidenced by DOT’s egregious violation of Plaintiff’s privacy rights in attaching 24 Exhibit 16, Plaintiff “acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition 25 of the sanction unjust” in that fundamental, weighty rights are at issue. There is nothing obstructive or 26 meritless in these privacy concerns. Public policy supports these rights. DOT has shown it needs to be 27 checked. 28 9 PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION’S MOTION/AMENDED MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM PLAINTIFF CARYL LYNN WESTON II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 1 A. Plaintiff’s injury claims. 2 Plaintiff contends she suffered serious injuries to the following areas: 1) a left leg/shattered 3 femur; 2) the hip, namely her left side; 3) right wrist/thumb/hand fracture; 4) fractures in the back at 4 L2, L4 and resulting pain; 5) general physical pain and suffering, mental suffering, and emotional 5 distress; and, 6) recent growths on wrist area of hands, which are being investigated. (Declaration of 6 Manuel D. Balam [“Balam Dec.”] ¶2). 7 B. Prior meet and confer efforts. 8 This MTC arises after a lengthy verbal and written meet and confer process in which both sides 9 discussed their positions, tried to resolve them through supplemental work, and ultimately disagreed. 10 Therefore, for purposes of this Opposition, Plaintiff need not and does not waste the Court’s time with a self-serving recitation or interpretation of the meet and confer procedural history. Plaintiff merely 11 objects to any characterization that Plaintiff did not act in good faith—the letters, communications, and 12 the supplemental efforts provided by DOT show otherwise. Additionally, the parties engaged in many 13 verbal and written discussions on the issues. (Balam Dec. ¶3, Exhibit A thereto). 14 C. Specific Requests now at issue. 15 DOT’s Separate Statement identifies that there are only five Requests now at issue in this MTC, 16 quoted in full below (Balam Dec. ¶4): 17 [From DOT’s Request for Production, Set 1] 18 “REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 18: Any and all DOCUMENTS pertaining to Workers' 19 Compensation, Social Security or other disability benefits for which YOU have applied, and which 20 relate to the INCIDENT.” “REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 19: Any and all DOCUMENTS which pertain to 21 settlements, compromised liens and/or payments to YOU or any health care provider for any damages 22 suffered as a result of the INCIDENT.” 23 “REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 20: Any and all DOCUMENTS which pertain to any 24 COLLATERAL SOURCE PAYMENT made directly to YOU and others on YOUR behalf as a result of 25 the INCIDENT.” 26 “REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 21: Any and all DOCUMENTS which reflect the amounts of 27 any COLLATERAL SOURCE PAYMENT paid to and on YOUR behalf as a result of the INCIDENT.” 28 [From Request for Production, Set 2] 10 PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION’S MOTION/AMENDED MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM PLAINTIFF CARYL LYNN WESTON “REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 22: All DOCUMENTS relating to YOUR automobile 1 insurance policy in effect at the time of the INCIDENT including all declarations pages.” 2 DOT’s Set 1 and Set 2 Requests for Production are collectively referred to as “Requests” or 3 “each Request” with each individual number referred to as “Request(s) No.” In short, these Requests 4 ask for Plaintiff’s collateral sources, settlements with insurers, compromised liens, insurance benefits, 5 and similar information and documents in Plaintiff’s insurance files, such as application documents, 6 financial information, and all other documents used to seek and obtain insurance (Balam Dec. ¶4). 7 D. Plaintiff’s August 23rd initial objections-only responses. 8 Given the similar, nearly-identical, and invasive nature of each Request (or, using DOT’s 9 characterization, given the “boilerplate” Requests), and given the parties’ pending disputes, Plaintiff 10 initially responded by serving only objections on August 23, 2019 per the deadline agreed by the parties. The objections to the at-issue Requests were nearly identical, except that they corresponded to 11 particular words used in each Request. DOT’s moving papers contain all responses. (Balam Dec. ¶5). 12 E. Plaintiff’s September 16th supplemental factual responses. 13 In the interest of good faith meet and confer efforts to resolve the dispute, without waving and 14 subject to all previously asserted objections and in accordance with CCP §2031.220, Plaintiff served 15 supplemental responses on September 16, 2019 with much factual detail. (Balam Dec. ¶6). 16 Plaintiff provided the identical supplemental factual response to each Request now at issue and 17 stated as follows: “Without waiving the objections previously asserted, which are restated and 18 incorporated herein, and subject to them, Responding Party responds as follows: Responding Party will 19 comply to a limited extent, will produce some nonprivileged/work product documents or things in the 20 demanded category that exist and are in the possession, custody, or control of Responding Party and to which no objection is being made, and will provide a privilege log for any potentially relevant and 21 withheld documents or categories of documents, if any. However, the request is too broad as stated.” 22 Since Medicare and Medi-Cal paid some of Plaintiff’s medical expenses, notwithstanding the 23 general defects of each Request that supported standing on the objections, Plaintiff provided a “limited” 24 response to help move things along per CCP §2031.220. To the extent DOT sought information and 25 documents other than from Medicare and Medi-Cal, the objections stood. (Balam Dec. ¶7). 26 F. Plaintiff produced 1,552 pages of documents, including billing records and other 27 records showing Medicare/Medi-Cal payments. 28 11 PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION’S MOTION/AMENDED MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM PLAINTIFF CARYL LYNN WESTON As part of the document responses, Plaintiff also produced 1,552 pages of documents in 1 response to the document request, including billing records and other records showing Medicare/Medi- 2 Cal payments made to the medical providers. (Balam Dec. ¶8). 3 G. Dispute over pending subpoenas indicated no further resolution could be reached. 4 Concurrently with the disputes over the interrogatories and requests for production, Plaintiff and 5 DOT were disagreeing about medical records and insurance records subpoenas issued by DOT. Based 6 in large part on the same objections now at issue, Plaintiff objected and proposed a “first look” 7 agreement and protective order. DOT categorically refused to consider a “first look” agreement 8 proposed by Plaintiff, and discussions over a protective order were not taken seriously or fell apart. As 9 a result, Plaintiff and DOT were at a stalemate and all resolution efforts fell apart. (Balam Dec. ¶9). 10 III. ARGUMENT A. DOT’S Requests are too broad and not reasonably particularized (“Breadth”). 11 In an overly broad and invasive manner, Requests Nos. 18-21 ask for “any and all 12 DOCUMENTS” that “pertain” to collateral source/insurance benefits as a result of the incident. Request 13 No. 22 similarly asks for “all DOCUMENTS” “relating to” Plaintiff’s auto insurance. 14 CCP §2031.030(c)(1) expressly requires that a request for production “[d]esignate the 15 documents, tangible things, land or other property, or electronically stored information to be inspected, 16 copied, tested, or sampled either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably 17 particularizing each category of item.” 18 Additionally, there is no broad discovery right permitting a broad intrusion without limitations. 19 “Any discovery request, even an initial one, can be misused in an attempt to generate settlement 20 leverage by creating burden, expense, embarrassment, distraction, etc.” Obregon v. Sup. Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431. 21 DOT’s Requests violate the above standards. Procedurally, the Requests violate CCP §2031.030 22 and are oppressive, harassing, and burdensome as a result. There is no limitation on the types, 23 categories, content, purpose, or anything along those lines of the information and documents sought. As 24 a result of this over-breadth, each and every broadly-stated Request using “any” and/or “all” generally 25 triggers and requires all stated objections, which are summarized as (1) “Breadth” [addressed in this 26 section and throughout], (2) “Collateral Source,” (3) “Privacy,” (5) “Privilege,” and (6) “Relevancy.” 27 These objections are particularly appropriate, warranted, and necessary in cases like this where the 28 information and documents in insurance files intertwine with medical information and medical records. 12 PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION’S MOTION/AMENDED MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM PLAINTIFF CARYL LYNN WESTON Although DOT tries to characterize the objections as “boilerplate” simply because they are 1 nearly identical, DOT ignores that the common nature of DOT’s Requests (“boilerplate” nature, if one 2 uses DOT’s nomenclature) is what prompted the nearly identical objections. The Requests themselves 3 are “boilerplate” and redundant and call for the same objections to be repeated. In any event, given the 4 broad and similar nature of each Request at issue, all objections are valid and warranted. 5 The MTC can be denied simply on the grounds of this Breadth objection and lack of compliance 6 with CCP 2031.030. Plaintiff requests the Court deny the MTC outright on this basis. Nevertheless, 7 Plaintiff further addresses each of the substantive objections now at issue. 8 B. For privacy issues, general relevancy is not the standard, and the requesting/moving 9 party has a heavy burden to overcome the objections. 10 As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff emphasizes an underlying principle applicable to all objections involved in this particular dispute. Whenever matters protected by privacy are sought, the burden is on 11 the requesting party to demonstrate a particularized or compelling need for the confidential information 12 sought for proper balancing of the factors; broad relevancy to the subject matter is not enough. Britt v. 13 Sup. Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 859 862; Harris v. Sup. Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 661, 665; Board 14 of Trustees v. Sup. Court (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 516, 524–525; Williams v. Sup. Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 15 531, 558 (disapproving prior case law only to the extent that they assumed, without conducting the 16 proper inquiry, that a compelling interest or compelling need automatically is required). The more 17 sensitive the information, the greater the need for discovery must be shown. Hoffman Corp v. Sup. 18 Court (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 357, 362; Tien v. Sup. Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 528, 540. 19 C. Collateral source/insurance information is protected by the collateral source rule 20 and general privacy rights and is not discoverable (“Collateral Source”). Since collateral source/insurance information is fundamentally at the heart of this dispute, 21 Plaintiff begins with the Collateral Source Rule (which itself is tethered to general privacy rights). 22 Plaintiff objects on the grounds that each Request improperly seeks the entirety of Plaintiff’s 23 collateral source/insurance information and documents. The entirety of Plaintiff’s collateral 24 source/insurance information and documents are protected by the collateral source rule. Helfend v. 25 Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1, 6; Lund v. San Joaquin Valley Railroad 26 (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1, 10-12. The collateral source rule was restated and reaffirmed in Helfend v. 27 Southern Calif. Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1, 13, as applicable “in tort cases in which the 28 plaintiff has been compensated by an independent collateral source—such as insurance, pension, 13 PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION’S MOTION/AMENDED MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM PLAINTIFF CARYL LYNN WESTON continued wages, or disability payments—for which he has actually or constructively … paid or in cases 1 in which the collateral source would be recompensed from the tort recovery through subrogation, refund 2 of benefits, or some other arrangement.” 3 Thus, an injured party need not disclose compensation received from a “collateral source” for 4 injuries caused by the defendant, because such evidence is not admissible to mitigate damages. The 5 rationale is that defendant should not benefit from plaintiff's foresight in obtaining insurance or other 6 sources of compensation. See Helfend v. Southern Calif. Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1, 6. 7 A closely related evidentiary rule/principle prohibits the admission of evidence of compensation 8 from a collateral source; “California has adopted the closely related principle that, as a general rule, 9 jurors should not be told that the plaintiff can recover compensation from a collateral source.” Lund v. 10 San Joaquin Valley Railroad (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1, 10; Hrnjak v. Graymar, Inc. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 725, 729, 732-733. “Where a person suffers personal injury or property damage by reason of the wrongful 11 act of another, an action against the wrongdoer for the damages suffered is not precluded nor is the 12 amount of damages reduced by the receipt by him of payment for his loss from a source wholly 13 independent of the wrongdoer.” Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Starley (1946) 28 Cal.2d 347, 349. 14 “The collateral source rule expresses a policy judgment in favor of encourag