Motion-Secondary: TYRONE L. ADAMS VS. CHARLES L. EASLEY et al

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                                F I dL
TYRONE L. ADAMS, IN PRO PER my OF Lucite, D
P.O. BOX 981044
WEST SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95798 AUG 2 0 2020
Telephone: (407) 716 0233. GRERK 61
TYRONE L. ADAMS, Plaintiff, In Pro Per BY

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

TYRONE L. ADAMS, ) Case No.: CGC-11-512168
Plaintiff, ) MEMORANDUM OF LAW In SUPPORT,
OF TYRONE L. ADAMS’ MOTIONS
v. ) REQUESTING ORDERS OF THE
COURT REVERSING THE ORDERS
CHARLES L. EASLEY, et. al. ) THE COURT ISSUED ON AUGUST 48,
Defendants ). 2020 CONTINUING PLAINTIFF'S

_ ° THREE (3) DISPOSITIVE DISCOVERY
) MOTIONS UNTIL SEPTEMBER 17,
2020 and Plaintiff's MOTION SEEKING
) REVERSAL OF THE COURT ORDER
CONTINUING PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS
SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER 4,
) 2020 UNTIL SEPTEMBER 17 2020;
In Support of PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
) REQUESTING AN ORDER OF THE
COURT TO FILE PLAINTIFF'S
‘ ). SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT;
) CCP §576; §475; §631; §473(a)(1);
AND PLAINTIFF’S MOTION SEEKING
) REVERSAL OF THE COURT ORDER
DISMISSING CORPORATE
) DEFENDANT CULLIGAN WATER
SYSTEMS AND SERVICES OF
SACRAMENTO.

Date: SEPTEMBER 16, 2020
Time: 9:30 a.m.
Dept.: 501 FAC Filed: June 26, 2020

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS REQUESTING ORDERS OF

THE COURT REVERSING THE COURT’S ORDERS ISSUED ON AUGUST 11, 2020 AND
REVERSING THE ORDERS OF THE COURT ISSUED ON AUGUST 18, 2020. SAN FRANCISCO
COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT. CASE NUMBER: CGC-11-512166. PAGE |

ORIGIWALMEMORANDUM OF LAW - POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTIONS

IL. INTRODUCTION

CONTRARY TO THE RULING OF THE COURT ON AUGUST 11, 2020 AND AUGUST]
18, 2020, THERE WAS NO SIGNED ON ORDER ON FILE BY THE COURT
SUSTAINING THE DEFENDANT’S DEMURRER TO THE PLAINTIFF’S FIRST
AMENDED COMPLAINT ON RES JUDICATA GROUNDS.

ON AUGUST 11, 2020 and AUGUST 18, 2020 - THERE WAS A VIABLE FIRST
AMENDED COMPLAINT ON THE RECORD. THEREFORE, THE PLAINTIFF’S
THREE DISPOSITIVE DISCOVERY MOTIONS WERE NOT MOOT ON AUGUST 11,
2020 or AUGUST 18, 2020 AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN HEARD.

THIS LEGAL ERROR BY THE COURT CAUSED HARM & PREJUDICE TO MY CASE)
SUCH THAT THE MOTION HEARINGS on AUGUST 11, 2020 and AUGUST 18, 2020
WERE OVERTLY DISCRIMINATORY, BIASED, PREJUDICIAL, UNJUST AND
UNFAIR.

THIS CONSTITUTED IRREPARABLE, BIASED, PREJUDICIAL, REVERSIBLE,
STRUCTURAL ERROR PER SE BY THE COURT CAUSING AN UNJUST RESULT
AND A JUDICIAL MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE. (Cal. State Constitution Article VI,
§13); (California Evidence Code §353; §354; §355; §623; §646; §668; §669) (Cal.
CCP §475: §631).

IL. CONTROLLING CASE LAW

177 Cal.App.4th 1229 - PEOPLE v. MOORE, Court of Appeals of California, Third
District.; ‘\n examining the restitution statute, "[t]he intent of the voters is plain: every

victim who suffers a loss shall have the right to restitution from those convicted of the
crime giving rise to that loss." [Citation.] As a result, "the word ‘loss' must be construed

ee
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’?S MOTIONS REQUESTING ORDERS OF

THE COURT REVERSING THE COURT’S ORDERS ISSUED ON AUGUST 11, 2020 AND
REVERSING THE ORDERS OF THE COURT ISSUED ON AUGUST 18, 2020. SAN FRANCISCO
COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT. CASE NUMBER: CGC-11-512166. PAGE 2broadly and liberally to uphold the voters’ intent." [Citation.] Because the statute uses
the language "including, but not limited to" these enumerated losses, a trial court may
compensate a victim for any economic loss which is proved to be the direct result of the
defendant's criminal behavior, even if not specifically enumerated in the statute.’
[Citation.]" (People v. Crisler (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1503, 1508 [81 Cal.Rptr.3d 887]
(hereafter Crisler).) "The only limitation the Legislature placed on victim restitution is
that the loss must be an “economic, loss incurred as the result of the defendant's
criminal conduct." [Citations.]" (Ibid.) [177 Cal.App.4th 1232]

"[A] wrongdoer in criminal cases as in civil torts takes his victim as he finds him."
(People v. Cameron (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 786, 790 [126 Cal.Rptr. 44].)

197 Cal.App.4th 757 - PEOPLE v. TAYLOR, Court of Appeals of California, Third
District.; As this court recently noted, """A victim's restitution right is to be broadly and
liberally construed." (People v. Moore (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1231 [99
Cal.Rptr.3d 555].) """When there is a factual and rational basis for the amount of
restitution ordered by the trial court, no abuse of discretion will be found by the
reviewing court." [Citations.]" (In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1132 [123
Cal.Rptr.2d 316].) Once the victim makes a prima facie showing of economic losses
incurred as a result of the defendant's criminal acts, the burden shifts to the defendant
to disprove the amount of losses claimed by the victim. (People v. Fulton (2003) 109

Cal.App.4th 876, 886 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 466].) [197 Cal.App.4th 761]

THE PEOPLE v. ANTHONY ARANDA, JR.; Supreme Court of California; 55 Cal.4th
342 (2012); 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 855; 283 P.3d 632; August 27, 2012;

Federal Constitutional Error: Question of whether the error is amenable to harmless
error analysis under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct.
824] (Chapman); Does the error Constitute state law error, such error is reviewed for
prejudice under the standard set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 837

a a A
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS REQUESTING ORDERS OF

THE COURT REVERSING THE COURT’S ORDERS ISSUED ON AUGUST 11, 2020 AND
REVERSING THE ORDERS OF THE COURT ISSUED ON AUGUST 18, 2020. SAN FRANCISCO
COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT. CASE NUMBER: CGC-11-512166. PAGE 3SENSE
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS REQUESTING ORDERS OF

[299 P.2d 243], which inquires whether there is a "reasonable probability" that a result
more favorable to the defendant would have occurred absent the error. (See People v.
Mayo (2006) 140 Cal. App.4th 535, 550-551 [44 Cal.Rptr.3d 497].)

Avery limited class" of federal constitutional errors are "subject to per se reversal"; all
others are "amenable to harmless error analysis." (People v. Aranda (2012) 55 Cal.4th
342, 363 [145 Cal.Rptr.3d 855, 283 P.3d 632]; Chapman v} California (1967) 386 U.S.
18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824] (Chapman); Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. 18,
established that federal constitutional errors are properly subject to review for
harmlessness. In the nearly 50 years since Chapman was decided, the high court
repeatedly has emphasized that most errors implicating a federal constitutional right,
including most instructional errors, are amenable to harmless error analysis and that
only a "very limited class of cases" are subject to per se reversal. (Johnson v. United
States (1997) 520 U.S. 461, 468 [137 L.Ed.2d 718, 117 S.Ct. 1544]; see Hedgpeth v.
Pulido (2008) 555 U.S. 57, 61 [172 L.Ed.2d 388, 129 S.Ct. 530]; Neder v. United
States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 8 [144 L.Ed.2d 35, 119 S.Ct. 1827] (Neder); Rose v.

Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570, 578 [92 L.Ed.2d 460, 106 S.Ct. 3101] [errors requiring
automatic reversal "are the exception and not the rule"].) In Arizona v.

Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279 [113 L.Ed.2d 302, 111 S.Ct. 1246], the high court
categorized constitutional errors into two groups. "Structural defects," on the other
hand, “defy analysis by ‘harmless-error' standards" (id. at p. 309) because they are
not "simply an error in the trial process," but rather an error "affecting the framework
within which the trial proceeds" (id. at p. 310; see Brecht v. Abrahamson (1993) 507 U.S.
619, 630 [123 L.Ed.2d 353, 113 S.Ct. 1710] [structural errors require automatic reversal
because "they infect the entire trial process"]).[55 Cal.4th 364]. THE HIGH COURT
HAS IDENTIFIED AS STRUCTURAL ERROR CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS
SUCH AS TRIAL BEFORE A BIASED JUDGE. (See United States v. Gonzalez-
Lopez (2006) 548 U.S. 140, 149 [165 L.Ed.2d 409, 126 S.Ct. 2557] [listing structural
errors]; Neder, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 8 [same].)

THE COURT REVERSING THE COURT’S ORDERS ISSUED ON AUGUST 11, 2020 AND
REVERSING THE ORDERS OF THE COURT ISSUED ON AUGUST 18, 2020. SAN FRANCISCO
COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT. CASE NUMBER: CGC-11-512166. PAGE 4See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824] [to
find constitutional error harmless, "the court must be able to declare a belief that it was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"].) But to declare an error "structural," it is not
enough to say that the error denied the defendant a "most elementary and fundamental
right." As the high court's decisions make clear, the deprivation of important
constitutional protections can be subject to harmless error analysis. (See Arizona v.
Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at p. 312 [that the erroneous admission of an involuntary
confession "may be devastating" to a defendant "is not a reason for eschewing the
harmless-error test entirely"].) To make that determination, we ask whether the error
rendered the trial "fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or
innocence" (Neder, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 9), or whether the effect of the erroris '
"necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate" (Sullivan, supra, 508 U.S. at p. 282). The
importance of the constitutional right, standing alone, is not dispositive of the question
whether the error is susceptible to harmlessness review. Under Chapman, a federal
constitutional error is harmless when the reviewing court determines "beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."
(Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.) When there is "a reasonable possibility" that the
error might have contributed to the verdict, reversal is required. (/bid.)

THE PEOPLE, v. ADAM JAMES TURRIN; Court of Appeals of California, Third District.
176 Cal.App.4th 1200 (2009); No. C059722; August 20, 2009; A review of various
statutes concerning restitution indicates that the Legislature has consistently used a
“restitution order" to refer to victim restitution, not to a restitution fine.

An unauthorized sentence because of an error in restitution must be vacated and
the proper sentence imposed whenever the matter is brought to the attention of
the trial or reviewing court. (People v. Zito (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 736, 740-742 [10
Cal.Rptr.2d 491] [176 Cal.App.4th 1206]

cr rr ar!
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS REQUESTING ORDERS OF

THE COURT REVERSING THE COURT’S ORDERS ISSUED ON AUGUST 11, 2020 AND
REVERSING THE ORDERS OF THE COURT ISSUED ON AUGUST 18, 2020. SAN FRANCISCO
COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT. CASE NUMBER: CGC-11-512166. PAGE 5Thus, section 1202.4, subdivision (i), states that "[a] restitution order imposed
pursuant to subdivision (f) shall be enforceable as if the order were a civil
judgment." (Italics added.) Section 1202.4, subdivision (f), applies to restitution to the
victim. [176 Cal.App.4th 1208] ‘

ALSO, AN UNAUTHORIZED SENTENCE MAY BE CORRECTED AT ANY TIME.
(People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354-355 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627, 885 P.2d

1040]; People v. Crooks (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 797, 811 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 236].)

THE PEOPLE v. MELISSA NICOLE NICHOLS; Court of Appeals of California, Third
District; 8 Cal.App.5th 330 (2017); No. CO069555; February 9, 2017; Victim restitution is
mandatory under the California Constitution: Article |, section 28, subdivision (b), to the
California Constitution provides in pertinent part: "(A) It is the unequivocal intention of
the People of the State of California that all persons who suffer losses as a result of
criminal activity shall have the right to seek and secure restitution from the persons
convicted of the crimes causing the losses they suffer. [{]] (B) Restitution shall be
ordered from the convicted wrongdoer in every case, regardless of the sentence or
disposition imposed, in which a crime victim suffers a loss." (Cal. Const., art. |, § 28,
subd. (b)(13)(A)-(B).) For the purposes of victim restitution under our Constitution, the
parents of the direct crime victim are separate victims. (Cal. Const., art. |, § 28, subd.
(e); see also Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (k)(3)(A).) These constitutional provisions were
enacted by the voters as part of Proposition 8, the Victims' Bill of Rights of 1982
(Giordano, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 652), and they were subsequently amended by the
electorate in Proposition 9, Victims' Bill of Rights Act of 2008: Marsy's Law (Marsy's
Law) (Prop. 9, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2008) eff. Nov. 5, 2008; Cal.
Const., art. I, § 28). The original constitutional provision in Proposition 8 required the
Legislature to enact a statutory scheme implementing the broad mandate in the
constitution. (Cal. Const., art. !, § 28, former subd. (b); Giordano, at pp. 652, 655-656.)
One such provision is section 1202.4.2 (3) As this court and others have previously

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS REQUESTING ORDERS OF
THE COURT REVERSING THE COURT’S ORDERS ISSUED ON AUGUST 11, 2020 AND
REVERSING THE ORDERS OF THE COURT ISSUED ON AUGUST 18, 2020. SAN FRANCISCO
COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT. CASE NUMBER: CGC-11-512166. PAGE 6noted, """"A victim's restitution right is to be broadly and liberally construed.

Taylor (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 757, 761 [128 Cal.Rptr.3d 399]; see People v.

Moore (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1231 [99 Cal.Rptr.3d 555] (Moore); People v.
Meams (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 493, 500-501 [118 Cal.Rptr.2d 511].) We review

restitution awards for abuse of discretion. (Giordano, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 663.) "[T]he|
court's discretion in setting the amount of restitution is broad, and it may use any

(People v.

rational method of fixing the amount of restitution as long as it is reasonably calculated
to make the victim whole." (People v. Baker (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 463, 470 [23

Cal.Rptr.3d 871].) [8 Cal.App.5th 342]

People v. Turrin, 176 Cal. App. 4th 1200 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); Court of Appeals of
California, Third District; No. C059722; August 20, 2009; An unauthorized sentence
may be corrected at any time. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal. 4th 331, 354-355 [36 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 627, 885 P.2d 1040]; People v. Crooks (1997) 55 Cal. App. 4th 797, 811

[64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 236].) "The unauthorized sentence exception is ‘a narrow exception’ to
the waiver doctrine that normally applies where the sentence “could not lawfully be
imposed under any circumstance in the particular case; The class of nonwaivable
claims includes ‘obvious legal errors at sentencing that are correctable without referring
to factual findings in the record or remanding for further findings." (People v.

Brach (2002) 95 Cal. App. 4th 571, 578 [115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 753].) People v.

Smith (2001) 24 Cal. 4th 849 [102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 14 P.3d 942] explained, "We
deemed appellate intervention appropriate in these cases because the errors presented
“pure questions of law' [citation], and were “"clear and correctable" independent of any
factual issues presented by the record at sentencing." (/d. at p. 852.)

Similarly, section 1202.46 provides that a court retains jurisdiction to impose or modify
victim restitution and further states: "Nothing in this section shall be construed as
prohibiting A VICTIM, the district attorney, or a court on its own motion from requesting
correction, at any time, of a sentence when the sentence is invalid due to the

TY
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS REQUESTING ORDERS OF

THE COURT REVERSING THE COURT’S ORDERS ISSUED ON AUGUST 11, 2020 AND
REVERSING THE ORDERS OF THE COURT ISSUED ON AUGUST 18, 2020. SAN FRANCISCO
COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT. CASE NUMBER: CGC-11-512166. PAGE7omission of a restitution order or fine without a finding of compelling and
extraordinary reasons pursuant to Section 1202.4." (Italics added.)

THE PEOPLE v. JACKIE DELBERT TAYLOR; Court of Appeals of California, Third
District. 197 Cal.App.4th 757 (2011); No. C062413; July 19, 2011; This was amended
by Proposition 9 in 2008, and now reads as follows: "Restitution shall be ordered
from the convicted wrongdoer in every case, regardless of the sentence or
disposition imposed, in which a crime victim suffers a loss." (Cal. Const., art. I, §
28, subd. (b)(13).) As amended, the California Constitution now requires trial
courts to order victim restitution whenever the victim suffers a loss.

From Cal.2d, Reporter Series

57 Cal.2d 450 - AUTO EQUITY SALES, INC. v. SUPERIOR COURT, Supreme Court
of California. In Bank.

THE PEOPLE v. SHERRI_SMALLING; Superior Court of California, Los Angeles
County, Appellate Division; 36 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1 (2019); No. BR 054104; May 30,
2019; "[A] sentence is generally ‘unauthorized’ where it could not lawfully be imposed

under any circumstance in the particular case." (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331,
354 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627, 885 P.2d 1040].) "Mlictim restitution is mandatory and a
sentence without such an award is invalid." (People v. Rowland (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th
1745, 1751 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 351]; see also People v. Bernal (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 155
165 [123 Cal.Rptr:2d 622].) [When the trial court pronounces a sentence which is
unauthorized ... that sentence must be vacated and a proper sentence imposed
whenever the mistake is appropriately brought to the attention of the trial court or the
reviewing court.' This rule also applies to sentences which are unauthorized because of
an error in the matter of restitution. [Citation.]" (People v. Rivera (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS REQUESTING ORDERS OF

THE COURT REVERSING THE COURT’S ORDERS ISSUED ON AUGUST 11, 2020 AND
REVERSING THE ORDERS OF THE COURT ISSUED ON AUGUST 18, 2020. SAN FRANCISCO
COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT. CASE NUMBER: CGC-11-512166. PAGE 81153, 1163-1164 [261 Cal.Rptr. 93], italiés added; accord, People v. Turrin (2009) 176
Cal.App.4th 1200, 1205 [98 Cal.Rptr.3d 471]
Restitution

‘||""The standard of review of a restitution order is abuse of discretion. "A victim's

restitution right is to be broadly and liberally construed." [Citation.]....' [Citation.]
However, a restitution order ‘resting upon a ""demonstrable error of law" constitutes an
abuse of the court's discretion. [Citation.]' [Citation.]"© (People v. Millard (2009) 175
Cal.App.4th 7, 26 [95 Cal.Rptr.3d_751].) "If the trial court misunderstands or misapplies
the applicable legal standard, it has not properly exercised its discretion. [Citations.]"

(Id. at p. 31.) Indeed, "[a]s a practical matter, an appellate court's consideration of a
claim that a trial court abused its discretion in awarding [or denying] restitution because
the lower court applied an incorrect legal standard is tantamount to independent or de
novo review." (People v. Brunette (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 268, 276 [124 Cal.Rptr.3d

521].)
The California Constitution

The California Constitution unambiguously states "[rjestitution shall be ordered from the
convicted wrongdoer in every case, regardless of the sentence or disposition imposed,
in which a crime victim suffers a loss." (Cal. Const., art. |, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(B); see
also People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1122 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 681, 899 P.2d
67].) The constitutional mandate is implemented by section 1202.4, which provides in
relevant part: "It is the intent of the Legislature that a victim of crime who incurs an
economic loss as a result of the commission of a crime shall receive restitution directly
from a defendant convicted of that crime." (§ 1202.4, subd. (a)(1), italics added;

see People v. Mearns (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 493, 498 [118 Cal.Rptr.2d 511].) The
Legislature has expressly categorized infractions as crimes (§§ 17, subd. (a)
[recognizing crimes are felonies, misdemeanors, or infractions], 16, subd. 3 ["Crimes
and public offenses include: [{] ... [{]] 3. Infractions"]), and the "infraction case" as a
“criminal action" (§ 691, subd. (g)). In lockstep with the Legislature, California courts

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS REQUESTING ORDERS OF

THE COURT REVERSING THE COURT’S ORDERS ISSUED ON AUGUST 11, 2020 AND
REVERSING THE ORDERS OF THE COURT ISSUED ON AUGUST 18, 2020. SAN FRANCISCO
COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT. CASE NUMBER: CGC-11-512166. PAGE 9have routinely classified an infraction as a crime. (See, e.g., Tracy v. Municipal

Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 760, 765 [150 Cal.Rptr. 785, 587 P.2d 227] [in 1968, infractions
were added to the statutory definition of crimes]; People v. Cortez (2010) 189
Cal.App.4th 1436, 1442 [117 Cal.Rptr.3d 769] ["all three categories of offensesl, i.e.,
felonies, misdemeanors, and infractions,] are considered ‘crime[s] or public
offenses[s]""]; People v. Simpson (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th Supp. 6, 9 [167 Cal.Rptr.3d
396] ["An infraction is a criminal matter subject generally to the provisions applicable to

misdemeanors, except for the right to a jury trial, the possibility of confinement as a
punishment, and the right to court-appointed counsel if indigent"].)

Because an infraction is a crime, and a crime victim is constitutionally entitled to
restitution in "every case," a restitution hearing was mandatory. (§ 1202.4, subd. (b).)
[36 Cal.App.5th Supp. 9]

THE PEOPLE v. JUSTIN BROOKS; Court of Appeals of California, First District,
Division Two; 23 Cal.App.5th 932 (2018); No. A147410; May 25, 2018;

California's Restitution Law

(1) Under our state's restitution scheme, convicted criminals may be required to pay
three types of restitution: a fine, set at the discretion of the court and commensurate
with the seriousness of the offense, which is paid into a state fund used to compensate
victims; direct restitution, primarily for economic loss sustained by the victims as a result]
of the defendant's conduct; or restitution as a condition of probation. (People v.
Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 651-652 [68 Cal.Rptr.3d 51, 170 P.3d 623
(Giordano).) This appeal concerns direct restitution, the right to which was created in
1982 when California voters passed Proposition 8, also known as the Victims' Bill of
Rights. (Giordano, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 652.) The initiative added article |, section 28,
subdivision (b) to the Constitution (Giordano, at p. 652), which in its current form
establishes specific, enumerated rights "[i]Jn order to preserve and protect a victim's
rights to justice and due process." (Cal. Const., art. |, § 28, subd. (b)). Among those

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS MOTIONS REQUESTING ORDERS OF} .

THE COURT REVERSING THE COURT’S ORDERS ISSUED ON AUGUST 11, 2020 AND
REVERSING THE ORDERS OF THE COURT ISSUED ON AUGUST 18, 2020. SAN FRANCISCO
COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT. CASE NUMBER: CGC-11-512166. PAGE 10rights is direct restitution, which is defined expansively: "(A) It is the unequivocal
intention of the People of the State of California that all persons who suffer losses as a
result of criminal activity shall have the right to seek and secure restitution from the
persons convicted of the crimes causing the losses they suffer. (B) Restitution shall be
ordered from the convicted wrongdoer in every case, regardless of the sentence or
disposition imposed, in which a crime victim suffers a loss." (/d., subd. (b)(13)(A), (B).)
[23 Cal.App.5th 940]

238 Cal.App.4th 1313 - PEOPLE v. GROSS, Court of Appeals of California, Third
District.; The Victims’ Bill of Rights

(1) Article |, section 28 of the California Constitution, as amended by Proposition 9, the
Victims’ Bill of Rights Act of 2008, known as "Marsy's Law," provides for a broad
spectrum of victims' rights, including restitution.

Article 1, section 28, subdivision (b)(13) of the California Constitution, states that: "[iJt is
the unequivocal intention of the People of the State of California that all persons who
suffer losses as a result of criminal activity shall have the right to seek and secure
restitution from the persons convicted of the crimes causing the losses they suffer. [{]] ...
Restitution shall be ordered from the convicted wrongdoer in every case, regardless of
the sentence or disposition imposed, in which a crime victim suffers a loss."

A victim's right to restitution is, therefore, a constitutional one; it cannot be bargained
away or limited, nor can the prosecution waive the victim's right to receive restitution.
(See People v. Valdez (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1202-1203 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 4];
accord, People v. Brown (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1226, [54 Cal.Rptr.3d 887]
['Victim restitution may not be bargained away by the People."].) Moreover, "[a]

sentence without an award of victim restitution is invalid." (Brown, at p. 1225;

see People v. Bernal (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 155, 164-165 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d

622]; People v. Rowland (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1745, 1750-1752 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 351].)
Indeed, ON THE MOTION OF A VICTIM, A COURT MAY AT ANY TIME correct a

| NT
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS REQUESTING ORDERS OF

THE COURT REVERSING THE COURT’S ORDERS ISSUED ON AUGUST 11, 2020 AND
REVERSING THE ORDERS OF THE COURT ISSUED ON AUGUST 18, 2020. SAN FRANCISCO
COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT. CASE NUMBER: CGC-11-512166. PAGE 11sentence that is rendered invalid due to the omission of a restitution order. (§
1202.46.) [238.Cal.App.4th 1318] ‘

A CRIME VICTIM HAS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COMPENSATION THAT
"CANNOT BE BARGAINED AWAY OR LIMITED." (People v. Gross (2015) 238
Cal.App.4th 1313, 1318; see Walker v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2017) 14
Cal.App.5th 651, 656 [""[rjestitution is constitutionally and statutorily mandated in
California™].) Section 1202.4, subdivision (a)(1)(3)(B), states that direct victim restitution
is enforceable “as if the order were a civil judgment," and courts have explained victim
restitution is "intended ‘as a civil remedy rather than a criminal punishment." (Evans,
supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 776; see People v. Harvest (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 641,
647.) "In 1982, California voters passed Proposition 8, also known as The Victims’ Bill of
Rights[, which] added article |, section 28, subdivision (b) to the California
Constitution..." (Giordano, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 652; see People v.

Covington (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1268 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 852] (Covington); People v.

Gross (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1317-1318 [190 Cal.Rptr.3d 472] (Gross).)
As adopted, this provision read: "It is the unequivocal intention of the People of the

State of California that all persons who suffer losses as a result of criminal activity shall
have the right to restitution from the persons convicted of the crimes for losses they
suffer. [{] ... Restitution shall be ordered from the convicted persons in every case,
regardless of the sentence or disposition imposed, in which a crime victim suffers a loss
unless compelling and extraordinary reasons exist to the contrary. The Legislature shall
adopt provisions to implement this section..." (Cal. Const., former art. 1, § 28, subd.
(b).)* "A victim's right to restitution is, therefore, a constitutional one; it cannot be
bargained away or limited, nor can the prosecution waive the victim's right to receive
restitution." (Gross, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 1318.)

As directed by the voters, the Legislature enacted section 1202.4 to implement the
Victims' Bill of Rights Act of 2008: Marsy's Law. (Giordano, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 652-

eR
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS REQUESTING ORDERS OF

THE COURT REVERSING THE COURT’S ORDERS ISSUED ON AUGUST 11, 2020 AND
REVERSING THE ORDERS OF THE COURT ISSUED ON AUGUST 18, 2020. SAN FRANCISCO
COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT. CASE NUMBER: CGC-11-512166. PAGE 12653; Gross, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 1318; People v. Seymour (2015) 239
Cal.App.4th 1418, 1435 [192 Cal.Rptr.3d 113] (Seymour).) This statute manifests "the
intent of the Legislature that a victim of crime who incurs an economic loss as a result off
the commission of a crime ... receive restitution directly from a defendant convicted of
that crime." (§ 1202.4, subd. (a)(1).) Subject to exceptions not applicable here, this
statute provides that "in every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a
result of the defendant's conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make
restitution to the victim or victims in an amount established by court order....
The court shall order full restitution." (§ 1202.4, subd. (f).) The statute further provides
that a "defendant's inability to pay shall not be a consideration in determining the
amount of a restitution order." (§ 1202.4, subd. (g).) A victim restitution order is
“enforceable as if [it] were a civil judgment." (§ 1202.4, subd. (a)(3)(B).)

CONTROLLING CASE LAW

Priscilla EDWARDS v. MARIN PARK, INC., a California Corporation; United States
Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit; 356 F.3d 1058 (2004); No. 02-16820; Filed January 26,
2004; Her amended, pro se complaint claimed (1) that under the federal Fair Housing
Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 ef seq., Marin Park had illegally retaliated against Edwards
for her tenant activism; Rather than adduce a prima facie claim in the complaint itself —
before discovery, often necessary to uncover a trail of evidence regarding the
defendants’ intent in undertaking allegedly discriminatory action, has taken place — a
plaintiff need only "give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests." Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512, 122 S.Ct. 992

(quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47, 78 S.Ct. 99). The prima facie case is "an evidentiary
standard, not a pleading requirement." /d. at 510, 122 S.Ct. 992. [356 F.3d 1062]

The most germane paragraphs of Edwards's amended complaint read:

———>—_——————_—_—__——_————_—_—_——
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS REQUESTING ORDERS OF
THE COURT REVERSING THE COURT’S ORDERS ISSUED ON AUGUST 11, 2020 AND
REVERSING THE ORDERS OF THE COURT ISSUED ON AUGUST 18, 2020. SAN FRANCISCO
COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT. CASE NUMBER: CGC-11-512166. PAGE 13NE
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS REQUESTING ORDERS OF

Defendants ... retaliated against plaintiff for engaging in protected acts ... in order to
ensure fair housing conditions, including a disproportionate number of women
seemingly targeted by Defendants ... who met together to speak about having noticed
the disproportionate figure.... The purpose of Defendants ... was to squelch any such
speech or association and to have a chilling impact on the desire of other tenants
(including a disproportionate number of women complaining of feeling targeted as
women), to speak out ... in protection of their FHA rights. The FHA protects against
discrimination "in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling ...
because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin," 42 U.S.C. §
3604(b), and renders it unlawful "to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any
person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed
or on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or
enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by [§ 3604]," id. § 3617. These latter
requirements are the "protected activities" that form part of a § 3617 case. Walker, 272
F.3d at 1128. [356 F.3d 1063]

Walker v. City of Lakewood, 272 F.3d 1114, 1128 (9th Cir.2001)

The Fair Housing Act makes it "unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with
any person ... on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the
exercise or enjoyment of[ ] any right granted or protected by" the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 3617.
The FHF alleges that the City violated § 3617, as well as the analogous state law, the
FEHA, Cal. Gov't Code § 12955.7, by retaliating against the organization for its
involvement in the Park Tenants’ lawsuit.

In Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 214
(1982), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that "Congress intended standing under [the
FHA] to extend to the full limits of Artficle] 1II' and that courts accordingly lack the
authority to create prudential barriers to standing in suits brought under that [statute]."
(quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 103 n. 9, 109, 99 S.Ct.
1601, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979)). Accordingly, courts do not have the authority to create and

THE COURT REVERSING THE COURT’S ORDERS ISSUED ON AUGUST 11, 2020 AND
REVERSING THE ORDERS OF THE COURT ISSUED ON AUGUST 18, 2020. SAN FRANCISCO
COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT. CASE NUMBER: CGC-11-512166. PAGE 14apply new standing requirements, as the district court did here in imposing a "rule of
reason" barring FHA suits between parties to a contract. "[T]he sole requirement for
standing to sue under [the FHA] is the Art[icle] III minima of injury in fact: that the
plaintiff allege that as a result of the defendant's actions he has suffered ‘a distinct and
palpable injury." Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 372, 102 S.Ct. 1114 (quoting Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)) (emphasis

added). See also Fair Housing Council of Suburban Phila. v. Montgomery
Newspapers, 141 F.3d 71, 75 (3d Cir.1998) (holding that "courts ... may not create
prudential barriers to standing under the Act" when fair housing services providers sue
for retaliation under § 3617).

The Supreme Court has established three requirements for standing under Article

lll. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351
(1992).

First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact — an invasion of a legally
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent...
Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of.... Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.

NN
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS REQUESTING ORDERS OF

THE COURT REVERSING THE COURT’S ORDERS ISSUED ON AUGUST 11, 2020 AND
REVERSING THE ORDERS OF THE COURT ISSUED ON AUGUST 18, 2020. SAN FRANCISCO
COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT. CASE NUMBER: CGC-11-512166. PAGE 15DECLARATION OF TYRONE L. ADAMS
CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §2015.5.

Whenever, under any law of this state or under any rule, regulation, order or
requirement made pursuant to the law of this state, any matter is required or permitted
to be supported, evidenced, established, or proved by the sworn statement, declaration,
verification, certificate, oath, or affidavit, in writing of the person making the same (other
than a deposition, or an oath of office, or an oath required to be taken before a specified
official other than a notary public), such matter may with like force and effect be
supported, evidenced, established or proved by the unsworn statement, declaration,
verification, or certificate, in writing of such person which recites that it is certified or J
declared by him to be true under penalty of perjury, is subscribed by him and (1), if
executed within this state, states the date and place of execution, and that it is so
certified or declared under the laws of the State of California. The certification or
declaration may be in substantially the following form: Executed in West Sacramento,
California

“| certify (or declare) under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California
that the foregoing is true and correct” to the best of my knowledge. As to those
statements made based on information and belief, and diligent computer assisted legal
study, stare decisis, controlling United States Supreme Court; California Supreme
Court; and controlling California Appellate Court decisions, | believe those to be true
also.

Date: AUGUST 18, 2020

Dron Lathan

TYRONE L. ADAMS, IN PRO PER

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS REQUESTING ORDERS OF

THE COURT REVERSING THE COURT’S ORDERS ISSUED ON AUGUST 11, 2020 AND
REVERSING THE ORDERS OF THE COURT ISSUED ON AUGUST 18, 2020. SAN FRANCISCO
COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT. CASE NUMBER: CGC-11-512166. PAGE 16POS-020

ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, State Bar number, and address): FOR COURT USE ONLY
|TYRONE L. ADAMS, IN PRO PER

P.O. BOX 981044
IEST SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95798

TELEPHONE No.: (407) 716 0233 FAX NO, (Optional):

E-MAIL ADDRESS (Optional):

ATTORNEY FOR (Name):

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
street appress: 400 MCALLISTER STREET DEPARTMENT 501
maine aopress: 400 McALLISTER STREET

city AND zip cove: SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94102-4514
prance name: CIVIL DIVISION - UNLIMITED DAMAGES

PETITIONERIPLAINTIFF: TYRONE L. ADAMS, IN PRO PER

RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT-Charles Easley,Andrew Paulson, Pensco Trust Comp. et

CASE NUMBER:
PROOF OF PERSONAL SERVICE—CIVIL CGC-11-512166

(Do not use this Proof of Service to show service of a Summons and Complaint.)
. lam over 18 years of age and nota party to this action.
2. | served the following documents (specify):

MOTIONS REQUESTING ORDERS OF THE COURT REVERSING THE ORDERS

Notice of Motion and Plaintiffs Motion Requesting An Order of the Court Reversing Order Issued On 9/18/2020 Continuing

Plaintiffs Three Dispositive Discovery Motions Until 9/17/2020 and Plaintiffs Motion Seeking Reversal Of Court Order Continuing

Plaintiffs Motions Scheduled For 9/4/2020 Until 9/17/2020; Notice of Motion and Plaintiff's Motion Requesting An Order Of The

POF Tae de dialer are TU TAS AMSA SHE TS Braer Sr Pe sinay Saves OM BScumenks SESH TOTIN POSS.
3. | personally served the following persons at the address, date, and time stated:

a. Name: Attorney Christopher Egan - Porter Scott Law Firm

b. Address: 350 University Avenue - Suite 200 SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95825

c. Date: AUGUST 19, 2020

d. Time: 11:30 a.m. ’
[1 The persons are listed in the Attachment to Proof of Personal Service—Civil (Persons Served) (form POS-020(P)).
4. lam
a not a registered California process server. c. [_] anemployee or independent contractor of a
b. [_] a registered California process server. registered California process server.
d. [__] exempt from registration under Business & Professions
Code section 22350(b).

5. My name, address, telephone number, and, if applicable, county of registration and number are (specify):

WILLIAM T. STOKES _ P.O. BOX 3072 CITRUS HEIGHTS, CALIFORNIA 95610

| declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
7. [J tama California sheriff or marshal and certify that the foregoing is true and correct.

Date; AUGUST 19, 2020
WILLIAM T. STOKES > Adhsvibs

(TYPE OR PRINT NAME OF PERSON WHO SERVED THE PAPERS) (SIGNATURE OF PERSON WHO SERVED THE PAPERS)

Form Approved for Optional Use

‘ga Goural @ Conionia PROOF OF PERSONAL SERVICE—CIVIL Code of Ga Procesir,§ 1084
POS-020 [New January 1, 2005] www. LsPOS-020

ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, Stale Bar number, and address): FOR COURT USE ONLY
TYRONE L. ADAMS, IN PRO PER
P.O, BOX 981044

IEST SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95798

teLepHone no. (407) 716 0233 FAX NO. (Optional):
E-MAIL ADDRESS (Optional):
ATTORNEY FOR (Name):

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
street aopress: 400 McALLISTER STREET DEPARTMENT 501
maine Aopress: 400 MCALLISTER STREET

city AND zip cove: SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94102-4514
pranch Name: CIVIL DIVISION ~ UNLIMITED DAMAGES

PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF: TYRONE L. ADAMS, IN PRO PER

RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT:Charles Easley,Andrew Paulson, Pensco Trust Comp. et

CASE NUMBER:

PROOF OF PERSONAL SERVICE—CIVIL CGC-11-512166

(Do not use this Proof of Service to show service of a Summons and Complaint.)
. lam over 18 years of age and not a party to this action.
2. | served the following documents (specify):

MOTIONS REQUESTING ORDERS OF THE COURT REVERSING THE ORDERS

Notice of Motion and Plaintiffs Motion Requesting An Order of the Court Reversing Order Issued On 9/18/2020 Continuing

Plaintiffs Three Dispositive Discovery Motions Until 9/17/2020 and Plaintiffs Motion Seeking Reversal Of Court Order Continuing

Plaintiffs Motions Scheduled For 9/4/2020 Until 9/17/2020; Notice of Motion and Plaintiff's Motion Requesting An Order Of The

FR} TRE USAUAIRNES ars TAU AT AS AA SCAMRNT 1 Pro OF PURSHAI Sa ies “CM Dodumens Served Cori POSOLTEY).
3. 1 personally served the following persons at the address, date, and time stated:

a. Name: Attorney Daniel Taylor - JACOBSEN & McElroy, PC

b. Address: 2401 AMERICAN RIVER DRIVE - Suite 100 SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95825

c. Date: AUGUST 19, 2020

d. Time: 11:30 a.m.

(4 The persons are listed in the Attachment to Proof of Personal Service—Civil (Persons Served) (form POS-020(P)).

4. lam
a not a registered California process server. c. [_] an employee or independent contractor of a
b. L_] a registered California process server. registered California process server.
d. [__] exempt from registration under Business & Professions
Code section 22350(b).

5. My name, address, telephone number, and, if applicable, county of registration and number are (specify):

WILLIAM T. STOKES _ P.O. BOX 3072 CITRUS HEIGHTS, CALIFORNIA 95610

| declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
7. [1] 1am a California sheriff or marshal and certify that the foregoing is true and correct.

Date; AUGUST 19, 2020
,
WILLIAM T, STOKES > ML... VE

¥

(TYPE OR PRINT NAME OF PERSON WHO SERVED THE PAPERS) (SIGNATURE OF PERSON WHO SERVED THE PAPERS)
Form Approved for Optional Use i 7
‘indealGourel of Canora PROOF OF PERSONAL SERVICE—CIVIL oe Ot es toca ey

POS-020 [New January 1, 2005] wwww.courtinfo.ca.govPOS-030

ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, State Bar number, and address): FOR COURT USE ONLY

TYRONE L. ADAMS, IN PRO PER
P.O. BOX 981044
West Sacramento, California 95798

reLepHone no:(407) 716 0233 FAX NO. (Onion
E-MAIL ADDRESS (Optional):
ATTORNEY FOR (Name):

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
street appress: 400 McALLISTER STREET - Department 501
maiinc aopress: 400 McALLISTER STREET - Department 501
cyano zipcope: San Francisco, California 94102-4514

arancu name: CIVIL DIVISION - UNLIMITED DAMAGES

PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF:-7YRONE L. ADAMS, IN PRO PER

RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT: Charles L. Easley, Andrew Paulson, Pensco Trust Comp, et.
al.

‘CASE NUMBER:

PROOF OF SERVICE BY FIRST-CLASS MAIL—CIVIL CGC-11-512166

(Do not use this Proof of Service to show service of a Summons and Complaint.)

41. lam over 18 years of age and nota party to this action. | am a resident of or employed in the county where the mailing
took place.

2. My residence or business address is:

WILLIAM T. STOKES P.O. BOX 3072 CITRUS HEIGHTS, CALIFORNIA 95610

3. On (date): 8/19/2020 | mailed from (city and state): Sacramento, California 95842

Nee omg cocume! ats RRS tion Requesting Orders Of The Court Reversing The Orders The Court Issued 8/18/2020
Continuing Plaintiffs Three Dispositive Discovery Motions Until 9/17/2020 and Plaintiffs Motion Seeking Reversal Of The Court
Order Continuing Plaintiffs Motions Scheduled for 9/4/2020 Until 9/17/ 2020; Memorandum of Law In Support of Motions Requesting

An Order Of The Court To FILE Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint; Plaintiffs Motion Seeking Reversal Of The Court ORDER

TTT The Coainienks Are lisked in the AHachimerifi6 Prdor oF Service by First-Class Mal—Cial (Bocumeris Sérved)

(form POS-030(D)).
4. | served the documents by enclosing them in an envelope and (check one):

a. depositing the sealed envelope with the United States Postal Service with the postage fully prepaid.

b. [_] placing the envelope for collection and mailing following our ordinary business practices. | am readily familiar with this
business's practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is
placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service in
a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid.

5. The envelope was addressed and mailed as follows:

a. Name of person served:

b. Address of person served:

Attorney WILLIAM D. MORROW - MARK S. DOVE; Morrow & White 1600 Dove Street, Suite 315
Newport Beach, California 92660-2487

The name and address of each person to whom | mailed the documents is listed in the Attachment to Proof of Service
by First-Class Mail—Civil (Persons Served) (POS-030(P)).

I declare under penaity of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
Date: AUGUST 19, 2020

WILLIAM T. STOKES De F [anon Wells

(TYPE OR PRINT NAME OF PERSON COMPLETING THIS FORM) (SIGNATURE OF PERSON COMPLETING THIS FORM)
Suda Gourcl ot Celomia PROOF OF SERVICE BY FIRST-CLASS MAIL—CIVIL Code of Givi Procedure, §§ 1019, 1013a

OS-030 [New January 1, 2005} (Proof of Service) ‘wiwu.courtnfo.ca.govPOS-030(D)

SHORT TITLE: ‘CASE NUMBER:
Tyrone Adams v. Charles Easley, Andrew Paulson, Pensco Trust Comp. et al. | CGC-11-512166
ATTACHMENT TO PROOF OF SERVICE BY FIRST-CLASS MAIL—CIVIL (DOCUMENTS SERVED)
(This Attachment is for use with form POS-030)
The documents that were personally served by first-class mail are as follows (describe each document specifically):

Notice of Motions and MOTIONS REQUESTING ORDERS OF THE COURT REVERSING THE ORDERS THE COURT ISSUED
ON AUGUST 18, 2020 CONTINUING PLAINTIFF THREE (3) DISPOSITIVE DISCOVERY MOTIONS UNTIL SEPTEMBER 17, 2020

Notice of Motion and Plaintiffs MOTION SEEKING REVERSAL OF THE COURT ORDER CONTINUING PLAINTIFF ’ S MOTIONS
SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER 4, 2020 UNTIL SEPTEMBER 17 2020

Notice of Motion and PLAINTIFF's MOTION REQUESTING AN ORDER OF THE COURT TO FILE PLAINTIFF's
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT; CCP §576; §475; §631; §473(a)(1)

Notice of Motion and PLAINTIFF's MOTION SEEKING REVERSAL OF THE COURT ORDER DISMISSING CORPORATE
DEFENDANT CULLIGAN WATER SYSTEMS AND SERVICES OF SACRAMENTO,

Memorandum of Law In Support of MOTIONS REQUESTING ORDERS OF THE COURT REVERSING THE ORDERS THE
COURT ISSUED ON AUGUST 18, 2020 CONTINUING PLAINTIFF THREE DISPOSITIVE DISCOVERY MOTIONS Until 9/17/202

Declaration MOTIONS REQUESTING ORDERS OF THE COURT REVERSING THE ORDERS THE COURT ISSUED ON
AUGUST 18, 2020 CONTINUING PLAINTIFF THREE (3) DISPOSITIVE DISCOVERY MOTIONS UNTIL SEPTEMBER 17, 2020

Memorandum of Law In Support Plaintiffs MOTION SEEKING REVERSAL OF THE COURT ORDER CONTINUING PLAINTIFF ' S
MOTIONS SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER 4, 2020 UNTIL SEPTEMBER 17 202

Declaration In Support of Plaintiffs MOTION SEEKING REVERSAL OF THE COURT ORDER CONTINUING PLAINTIFF ' S
MOTIONS SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER 4, 2020 UNTIL SEPTEMBER 17 2020

Memorandum of Law In Support of PLAINTIFF's MOTION SEEKING REVERSAL OF THE COURT ORDER DISMISSING
CORPORATE DEFENDANT CULLIGAN WATER SYSTEMS AND SERVICES OF SACRAMENTO.

Declaration In Support of PLAINTIFF's MOTION SEEKING REVERSAL OF THE COURT ORDER DISMISSING CORPORATE,
DEFENDANT CULLIGAN WATER SYSTEMS AND SERVICES OF SACRAMENTO.

Form Approved for Opsonal Use ATTACHMENT TO PROOF OF SERVICE BY
POS-030(0) [New January 1, 2005] FIRST-CLASS MAIL—CIVIL (DOCUMENTS SERVED) Page__of

(Proof of Service)
For your protection and privacy, please press the Clear

This Form button after you have printed the form. [ Print this form | | Save this form |% : Nad

Tyrone Adams v. Charles Easley, et al.

San Francisco County Superior Court Case No.: CGC-11-512166

PROOF OF SERVICE LIST

JUD WAGGOMAN, ESQ.

IN PRO PER

1215 PLUMAS STREET, SUITE 1800
YUBA CITY, CA 95991

JONATHAN W. HECK

BOORNAZIAN, JENSEN & GARTHE, APG
555 12 th STREET, SUITE 1800
OAKLAND, CA 94607

WILLIAM D. MORROW

MARK S. DOVE

MORROW & WHITE

1600 DOVE STREET, SUITE 315
NEWPORT BEACH, CA 92660-2487

THOMAS E.BORBELY _

BORBELY & ASSOCIATES

1255 TREAT BOULEVARD, SUITE 300
WALNUT CREEK, CA 94597

DANIEL C. TAYLOR

JACOBSEN & MCELROY PC

2401 AMERICAN RIVER DRIVE SUITE 100
SACRAMENTO, CA 95825