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;Ciaran O’Sullivan, Esq. (SBN 198970) SAN MATEO COUNTY
The Law Office of Ciatén O'Sullivan cou
50 California Street, 34% Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111
_ Telephone No.: 415-391-3711 B
Facsimile No.: 415-513-0449 ¥
San Francisco County Sip
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA AUG 03 204
| Attorneys for Respondent Bemard Corry _
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SANMATEO = CLERK OF HE q
pir-20-303793.
Case No.: 19 PRO 01130
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In the Matter of:
, Wa BB
The Deciaration of Trust for Sheila Corry RESPONDENT’S REPLY BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
TRANSFER OF ACTION AND FOR
SANCTIONS IN THE AMOUNT OF
$5,810.00
Date: December 27, 2019
Time: 9:00 a.m.
Dept: 28
eee
INTRODUCTION
Xv Ad STS
In his moving papers Respondent Beard Corry (“Bernard”) identified multiple factors
) in support of changing venue of this matter from San Mateo to. San Francisco. Those factors
included, among others, the fact that two of the three trust parcels of real property were located
in San Francisco,! that the trustee conducts trust banking in San Francisco, that he had notified
all interested parties that he had elected to administer the trust in San Francisco, where he was to
1 As explained below, strictly speaking the Trust owns two parcels of real property, both of which
are in San Francisco, and a 9% interest in a limited partnership that happens to own a parcel of
real property in San Mateo. The moving party had neglected to make this distinction in his
"moving papers. Therefore, the Trust actually owns no real property in San Mateo, which further
supports transfer to San Francisco.
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-be assisted by his attorney, and that the settlor of the Trust had lived and died in San Francisco,
where any probate proceeding would have to be venued. Those factors support a finding that the
principal place of administration of the trust is in San Francisco, and hence, venue is proper
there. (See, Cal. Prob. Code § 17005(a)(2)? [‘In the-case of a testamentary trust, either the ~~
_county where the decedent’s estate is administered or where the principal place of administration
of the trust is located”].)
Petitioner Eamon Corry (“Petitioner”) conveniently ignores those factors. He instead
invokes a red herring by asserting that Bernard is relying entirely on the fact that his attomey’s -
|_ office is itr San Francisco, which he patently is not. Bernard asserted that the location of his
attorney’s office is but one factor in support of the fact that the principal place of administration
is in San Francisco, and that is because many day-to-day activities, such as preparation of an -
accounting, are carried out at that office. Petitioner then focuses solely on the fact that trustee
happens to live in San Mateo. But, as Petitioner's own legal authority demonstrates, that is the
least of the factors that are determinative of the principal place of administration, and is a factor
. that the courts will resort to only when the location of the principal. place of administration...
cannot be determined based on where the trustee or his representative carries out most of his
day-to-day activities. (§17002()(2). ) As evidenced by the declaration of Bernard Corry in
Support of ‘the Motion, and his Reply Declaration submitted herewith, here the principal place of
administration of the trust is easily determined by the fact that the day-to-day activities of the
trust are all Carried out in San Francisco.
“Notably too, Petitioner claims that the Trust’s. largest property is in San Mateo. (See,
Petitioner’s memorandum of points and authorities, at p. 2 [“A primary trust asset is an
approximately forty two (42) unit apartment building .... located in San Mateo County .”)) In
fact, the Trust owns a 9% in a partnership, BLC Wilshire LP, that owns that building. ,
2 Unless otherwise specified, all further statutory references are to the California
Probate Code. aie ee
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Consequently, the Trust in fact owns no real property in San Mateo. (See Reply Declaration of
Bemard Corry in Support of Motion, at { 2.)
Finally, and conclusively, as stated in section 17005(a)(2), for this testamentary trust, .
venue for this proceeding is either the county of the principal place of administration or the
county where the decedent’s estate is administered. Petitioner’s lawsuit is, in effect, an action
arising from decedent Sheila Corry’s alleged breach of her contract to leave Petitioner the San -
Francisco properties. In order to bring such a claim Petitioner must first comply with the Probate
Code creditor’ 's claims procedures, and must first open a probate administration in order to do so.
Venue for administration of Sheila Corry’s estate can only be in San Francisco, where she was
domiciled at death. Even if the Court were to find (which it should not) that the principal place _
of administration is not in San Francisco, it would be a waste of judicial and legal resources to
continue this proceeding in San Mateo while the estate administration proceeds in San Francisco.
Petitioner does not get to choose venue in San Mateo because it is convenient for him.
The Court should order the action transferred to San Francisco, and order Petitioner to pay
sanctions in the amount of the attorneys’ fees incurred in seeking venue, and the court fees
incurred in effectuating the transfer.
DISCUSSION .
A. Bernard Provided Multiple Justifications for Changing Venue Including The
-o + - Location of. Real Estate Holdings, and The Trustee’s Bank Transactions
Petitioner states that Respondent merely relies on the trust attorney’s office address as
justification for his motion to change venue. That is a red herring, and is incorrect, As set out in
the motion papers, there are multiple factors which identify San Francisco as the county where
the day-to-day activities of the trust are carried out, and hence where the principal place of
“administration of this Trust is located. These factors include:
1. The two parcels of real property-held by the trust, including Decedent’s long-term
residence, are located in San Francisco — there could be no doubt that were the settlor
” alive the only proper venue for this action would be San Francisco, and her death: .
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changes nothing because Bernard has elected to employ one of the Settlor’s former
, attorneys as his advisor, to continue banking operations with respect to those
* properties at a San Francisco bank, and to conduct many of his activities in San
Francisco;
2. Bank accounts where income from the San Francisco properties are deposited and
from which mortgage and other expenses are paid are located in a Bank of America
branch in San Francisco;
3, Decedent resided in San Francisco for decades and passed away there; and
4. Decedent’s will is lodged with the San Francisco Superior court and all probate
proceedings would need to be adjudicated there. (See, Declaration of Bernard Corry
in Support of Motion, at fj 2-6.
All of Bernard’s activities concern the two San Francisco properties, One of them,
Settlor’s home on Duncan Street, San Francisco, is currently vacant. (See, Reply Declaration of
Bernard Corry in Support of Motion, at { 4.) A vacant property in San-Francisco represents a
significant liability, and he therefore must monitor the property on an ongoing basis. He visits
the property at least once a week, if not more. The other San Francisco property is a 50%
interest in an eight-unit building on 30% Street, San Francisco (the other 50% of which is owned
by Petitioner), that should be receiving income, but Petitioner has'refused to turn said income
over to the Trust. The Trust does receive rental income from two garages located at that
property. (Id.)
Berard conducts activities of the Trust at the designated principal place of
administration, Maureen McFadden’s office in San Francisco. (Reply Declaration of Bernard
Corry, 5.) He is in the process of preparing an accounting, with which he requires his attomney’s
assistance, and he provides bank statements, receipts and expenditures to her there, and discusses
trust affairs. (Id.)
Those facts are sufficient to establish that the principal place of administration is in San
Francisco, What’s more, it is a fact that many of the functions of a trustee are legal ini nature,
and those-fiunctions are carried out at Bernard’s trust attorney’s. offices in San Francisco. In that
regard Bernard, before this action was ever filed, served notice of that fact in his Notice pursuant
to Section 16061.7 — as such, even if he had a choice as to the location of the principal place of
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RESPONDENT’S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR TRANSFER OF ACTION AND FOR
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t administration of the trust, his choice should be respected since it did not confer any benefit to
him, and was not made for any improper purpose.
2
3 B. Petitioner’s Lawsuit Is Essentially An Action Against Decedent Sheila Corry
itt For Allegedly Breaching Her Contract With Petitioner; The Opening of. A
4 ona.
Probate Administration And Compliance With Creditor’s Claims
5 Procedures Are Conditions Precedent To Such A Suit, And Such A Probate
6 Administration Must Be Venued In San Francisco.
7 ; i. The Gravamen Of The Petition Is A Breach Of Contract Action Against
8 Decedent Sheila Corry
9 Petitioner’s Petition for Removal of Trustee; Accounting; Appointment of Successor-
10 || Trustee; Breach of Trust and Fiduciary Duty (“Petition”), in pertinent part, states:
“On or about February 20, 2008, the Trustor executed and entered into a contract
12 entitled “Mutual, Transfer, Settlement and Release Agreement.” A copy of this
13 agreement is attached hereto as Ex. A. (Ex. A.)” (Petition, 5, at p. 2.)
14 “Amongst other terms and conditions, the express terms of this “Mutual, Transfer,
1 5 Settlement and Release Agreement” agreement required the Trustor Sheila ( ry 7
1% upon her death to.transfer her interest in the properties at 07 29" Street, San,
” Francisco and 838 Duncan Street, San Francisco, Ca. To (sic) Petitioner Eamon
Corry.” (Petition, { 6, at p. 3.).
18
9 “Petitioner is informed and believes, and based on such information and belief
alleges that consistent with the terms of the “Mutual, Transfer, Settlement and
20 Release Agreement”, the Trustor Sheila Corry created and executed on May 7,
21 2008 the Declaration of Trust for Sheila Corry.” (Petition, { 7, at p. 3.)
22 “Petitioner is informed and believes, and based on such information and belief ~
23 __ alleges that the purported Third Amendment to the Trust executed on or about
24 May 12, 2016 and the purported Fourth Amendment to the Trust executed on or
5 about March 20, 2018, were in breach of the “Mutual, Transfer, Settlement and
26 Release Agreement.” (Petition, { 8, at p. 3.)
27 :
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mentioned in this Petition should be stricken and voided ‘and invalidated for the ©
reasons as set forth herein.” (Petition, { 10, at p. 3.)
In other words, although this vaguely-pled Petition can be read to include allegations of
wrongdoing against Bernard, in its essence it claims that decedent Sheila Corry breached a
contract with her son, Petitioner, and he seeks redress for that breach.
2. A Breach Of Contract Claim Against A Decedent Requires Compliance With
“8 Phe Probate Code Créditér’s Claims Procedures, And The Opening OfA
Probate Estate Administration ' .
“For the purposes of the Probate Code creditor claim rules (the notice and claim-
filing requirements), a ‘creditor’ is ‘a person who may have a claim against estate
property’ (Prob. C. § 9000(c)). And ‘claim’ is defined broadly to include a
demand for payment for any of the following, ‘whether due, not due, accrued or
not accrued, or contingent, and whether liquidated or unliquidated” (Prob: C: §
9000(a)):
Decedent’s contract and tort liabilities: Liability of the decedent, whether arising
in contract, tort or otherwise...”
(Bruce S. Ross et al. California Practice Guide, Probate §8:9- 8:10 at p. 8-11 [Rutter
Group 20 1 9].)
Mandatory prerequisites to the filing of such a cause of action are (1) that the creditor
first comply with the applicable creditor claim procedure, and (2) that the claim be rejected in
whole or in part. (Cal. Prob. Code § 9002(b) [“A claim that is not filed as provided in this part is
barred”]; § 9351[“An action may not be commenced against a decedent’s personal representative
on a cause of action against the decedent unless the claim is first filed as provided in this part and
the claim is rejected in whole or in part”].)
Petitioner, as a potential creditor of the decedent, has standing to-open a proceeding to
) administer Decedent’s estate. . (See, 1992 Law Revision Commission Comments to CCP 366.2
[‘“If the creditor is concerned that the decedent's beneficiaries may not have a general personal
representative appointed ... the creditor may petition for appointment .... See.Prob. Code §§
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8000 (pétition), 8461 (creditors have priority for appointment); see, also, Prob: Code §-48-- -
("interested person" defined)”].)
The fact that decedent's property is being administered via a testamentary trust does not
change.the foregoing: As the language of section 19001 — which pertains to claims against a
decedent’s trust estate - makes clear, the trust assets are only “subject to the claims of creditors
of the deceased settlor’s estate,” and only “to the extent that the deceased settlor’s estate is
inadequate to satisfy those claims and expense.” (§ 19001(a).) (emphasis added.). Obviously, the
conditions of section 19001 (a) cannot be satisfied unless a claim is first filed in the probate estate
and it is established that the estate is insufficient to satisfy the claims. (See, e.g., McGovern’s
. Annotated California Probate Code at p. 1138 [West, 2019] (commentary to section 19001(a)
[Under paragraph (a) creditors must first exhaust the probate estate”]; see, also, Arluk Medical
Center Industrial Grp. v. Dobler (2002) 116 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1335 [“
Preview
_ ie N v Soe eB on Se oe ew BNRRRRBRRES SUEDE BH AS wo oe NY DH PTW N aN Sd . : Mo ;Ciaran O’Sullivan, Esq. (SBN 198970) SAN MATEO COUNTY The Law Office of Ciatén O'Sullivan cou 50 California Street, 34% Floor San Francisco, CA 94111 _ Telephone No.: 415-391-3711 B Facsimile No.: 415-513-0449 ¥ San Francisco County Sip IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA AUG 03 204 | Attorneys for Respondent Bemard Corry _ IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SANMATEO = CLERK OF HE q pir-20-303793. Case No.: 19 PRO 01130 — In the Matter of: , Wa BB The Deciaration of Trust for Sheila Corry RESPONDENT’S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR TRANSFER OF ACTION AND FOR SANCTIONS IN THE AMOUNT OF $5,810.00 Date: December 27, 2019 Time: 9:00 a.m. Dept: 28 eee INTRODUCTION Xv Ad STS In his moving papers Respondent Beard Corry (“Bernard”) identified multiple factors ) in support of changing venue of this matter from San Mateo to. San Francisco. Those factors included, among others, the fact that two of the three trust parcels of real property were located in San Francisco,! that the trustee conducts trust banking in San Francisco, that he had notified all interested parties that he had elected to administer the trust in San Francisco, where he was to 1 As explained below, strictly speaking the Trust owns two parcels of real property, both of which are in San Francisco, and a 9% interest in a limited partnership that happens to own a parcel of real property in San Mateo. The moving party had neglected to make this distinction in his "moving papers. Therefore, the Trust actually owns no real property in San Mateo, which further supports transfer to San Francisco. = oe -1- - : _ RESPONDENT’S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR TRANSFER OF ACTION AND FOR . SANCTIONS :wo @o NY A WK WN Ie N BoB oe eee = BNRRPBBR VS Sea REERES -be assisted by his attorney, and that the settlor of the Trust had lived and died in San Francisco, where any probate proceeding would have to be venued. Those factors support a finding that the principal place of administration of the trust is in San Francisco, and hence, venue is proper there. (See, Cal. Prob. Code § 17005(a)(2)? [‘In the-case of a testamentary trust, either the ~~ _county where the decedent’s estate is administered or where the principal place of administration of the trust is located”].) Petitioner Eamon Corry (“Petitioner”) conveniently ignores those factors. He instead invokes a red herring by asserting that Bernard is relying entirely on the fact that his attomey’s - |_ office is itr San Francisco, which he patently is not. Bernard asserted that the location of his attorney’s office is but one factor in support of the fact that the principal place of administration is in San Francisco, and that is because many day-to-day activities, such as preparation of an - accounting, are carried out at that office. Petitioner then focuses solely on the fact that trustee happens to live in San Mateo. But, as Petitioner's own legal authority demonstrates, that is the least of the factors that are determinative of the principal place of administration, and is a factor . that the courts will resort to only when the location of the principal. place of administration... cannot be determined based on where the trustee or his representative carries out most of his day-to-day activities. (§17002()(2). ) As evidenced by the declaration of Bernard Corry in Support of ‘the Motion, and his Reply Declaration submitted herewith, here the principal place of administration of the trust is easily determined by the fact that the day-to-day activities of the trust are all Carried out in San Francisco. “Notably too, Petitioner claims that the Trust’s. largest property is in San Mateo. (See, Petitioner’s memorandum of points and authorities, at p. 2 [“A primary trust asset is an approximately forty two (42) unit apartment building .... located in San Mateo County .”)) In fact, the Trust owns a 9% in a partnership, BLC Wilshire LP, that owns that building. , 2 Unless otherwise specified, all further statutory references are to the California Probate Code. aie ee -2- RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR TRANSFER OF ACTION AND FOR SANCTIONS .eo Om I DH PB YW NS yb N re BRERERRBBRESSERRADE BEES ~ th. Consequently, the Trust in fact owns no real property in San Mateo. (See Reply Declaration of Bemard Corry in Support of Motion, at { 2.) Finally, and conclusively, as stated in section 17005(a)(2), for this testamentary trust, . venue for this proceeding is either the county of the principal place of administration or the county where the decedent’s estate is administered. Petitioner’s lawsuit is, in effect, an action arising from decedent Sheila Corry’s alleged breach of her contract to leave Petitioner the San - Francisco properties. In order to bring such a claim Petitioner must first comply with the Probate Code creditor’ 's claims procedures, and must first open a probate administration in order to do so. Venue for administration of Sheila Corry’s estate can only be in San Francisco, where she was domiciled at death. Even if the Court were to find (which it should not) that the principal place _ of administration is not in San Francisco, it would be a waste of judicial and legal resources to continue this proceeding in San Mateo while the estate administration proceeds in San Francisco. Petitioner does not get to choose venue in San Mateo because it is convenient for him. The Court should order the action transferred to San Francisco, and order Petitioner to pay sanctions in the amount of the attorneys’ fees incurred in seeking venue, and the court fees incurred in effectuating the transfer. DISCUSSION . A. Bernard Provided Multiple Justifications for Changing Venue Including The -o + - Location of. Real Estate Holdings, and The Trustee’s Bank Transactions Petitioner states that Respondent merely relies on the trust attorney’s office address as justification for his motion to change venue. That is a red herring, and is incorrect, As set out in the motion papers, there are multiple factors which identify San Francisco as the county where the day-to-day activities of the trust are carried out, and hence where the principal place of “administration of this Trust is located. These factors include: 1. The two parcels of real property-held by the trust, including Decedent’s long-term residence, are located in San Francisco — there could be no doubt that were the settlor ” alive the only proper venue for this action would be San Francisco, and her death: . -3- RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR TRANSFER OF ACTION AND FOR SANCTIONS 1Co we aA HW Rw Nw v ,N Yb N NEN BY Ra a BREFRRBBIN ES SRA BE BS Fs changes nothing because Bernard has elected to employ one of the Settlor’s former , attorneys as his advisor, to continue banking operations with respect to those * properties at a San Francisco bank, and to conduct many of his activities in San Francisco; 2. Bank accounts where income from the San Francisco properties are deposited and from which mortgage and other expenses are paid are located in a Bank of America branch in San Francisco; 3, Decedent resided in San Francisco for decades and passed away there; and 4. Decedent’s will is lodged with the San Francisco Superior court and all probate proceedings would need to be adjudicated there. (See, Declaration of Bernard Corry in Support of Motion, at fj 2-6. All of Bernard’s activities concern the two San Francisco properties, One of them, Settlor’s home on Duncan Street, San Francisco, is currently vacant. (See, Reply Declaration of Bernard Corry in Support of Motion, at { 4.) A vacant property in San-Francisco represents a significant liability, and he therefore must monitor the property on an ongoing basis. He visits the property at least once a week, if not more. The other San Francisco property is a 50% interest in an eight-unit building on 30% Street, San Francisco (the other 50% of which is owned by Petitioner), that should be receiving income, but Petitioner has'refused to turn said income over to the Trust. The Trust does receive rental income from two garages located at that property. (Id.) Berard conducts activities of the Trust at the designated principal place of administration, Maureen McFadden’s office in San Francisco. (Reply Declaration of Bernard Corry, 5.) He is in the process of preparing an accounting, with which he requires his attomney’s assistance, and he provides bank statements, receipts and expenditures to her there, and discusses trust affairs. (Id.) Those facts are sufficient to establish that the principal place of administration is in San Francisco, What’s more, it is a fact that many of the functions of a trustee are legal ini nature, and those-fiunctions are carried out at Bernard’s trust attorney’s. offices in San Francisco. In that regard Bernard, before this action was ever filed, served notice of that fact in his Notice pursuant to Section 16061.7 — as such, even if he had a choice as to the location of the principal place of -4- RESPONDENT’S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR TRANSFER OF ACTION AND FOR SANCTIONS ‘3 t administration of the trust, his choice should be respected since it did not confer any benefit to him, and was not made for any improper purpose. 2 3 B. Petitioner’s Lawsuit Is Essentially An Action Against Decedent Sheila Corry itt For Allegedly Breaching Her Contract With Petitioner; The Opening of. A 4 ona. Probate Administration And Compliance With Creditor’s Claims 5 Procedures Are Conditions Precedent To Such A Suit, And Such A Probate 6 Administration Must Be Venued In San Francisco. 7 ; i. The Gravamen Of The Petition Is A Breach Of Contract Action Against 8 Decedent Sheila Corry 9 Petitioner’s Petition for Removal of Trustee; Accounting; Appointment of Successor- 10 || Trustee; Breach of Trust and Fiduciary Duty (“Petition”), in pertinent part, states: “On or about February 20, 2008, the Trustor executed and entered into a contract 12 entitled “Mutual, Transfer, Settlement and Release Agreement.” A copy of this 13 agreement is attached hereto as Ex. A. (Ex. A.)” (Petition, 5, at p. 2.) 14 “Amongst other terms and conditions, the express terms of this “Mutual, Transfer, 1 5 Settlement and Release Agreement” agreement required the Trustor Sheila ( ry 7 1% upon her death to.transfer her interest in the properties at 07 29" Street, San, ” Francisco and 838 Duncan Street, San Francisco, Ca. To (sic) Petitioner Eamon Corry.” (Petition, { 6, at p. 3.). 18 9 “Petitioner is informed and believes, and based on such information and belief alleges that consistent with the terms of the “Mutual, Transfer, Settlement and 20 Release Agreement”, the Trustor Sheila Corry created and executed on May 7, 21 2008 the Declaration of Trust for Sheila Corry.” (Petition, { 7, at p. 3.) 22 “Petitioner is informed and believes, and based on such information and belief ~ 23 __ alleges that the purported Third Amendment to the Trust executed on or about 24 May 12, 2016 and the purported Fourth Amendment to the Trust executed on or 5 about March 20, 2018, were in breach of the “Mutual, Transfer, Settlement and 26 Release Agreement.” (Petition, { 8, at p. 3.) 27 : 2g || °° “Belitioner furttier alleges that the ‘Third and Fourth Amendments to the trust as -5- RESPONDENT’S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR TRANSFER OF ACTION AND FOR SANCTIONSN jo oe ND HR wW ll | 12 13 14 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | 24 25 26 27 28 O OO mentioned in this Petition should be stricken and voided ‘and invalidated for the © reasons as set forth herein.” (Petition, { 10, at p. 3.) In other words, although this vaguely-pled Petition can be read to include allegations of wrongdoing against Bernard, in its essence it claims that decedent Sheila Corry breached a contract with her son, Petitioner, and he seeks redress for that breach. 2. A Breach Of Contract Claim Against A Decedent Requires Compliance With “8 Phe Probate Code Créditér’s Claims Procedures, And The Opening OfA Probate Estate Administration ' . “For the purposes of the Probate Code creditor claim rules (the notice and claim- filing requirements), a ‘creditor’ is ‘a person who may have a claim against estate property’ (Prob. C. § 9000(c)). And ‘claim’ is defined broadly to include a demand for payment for any of the following, ‘whether due, not due, accrued or not accrued, or contingent, and whether liquidated or unliquidated” (Prob: C: § 9000(a)): Decedent’s contract and tort liabilities: Liability of the decedent, whether arising in contract, tort or otherwise...” (Bruce S. Ross et al. California Practice Guide, Probate §8:9- 8:10 at p. 8-11 [Rutter Group 20 1 9].) Mandatory prerequisites to the filing of such a cause of action are (1) that the creditor first comply with the applicable creditor claim procedure, and (2) that the claim be rejected in whole or in part. (Cal. Prob. Code § 9002(b) [“A claim that is not filed as provided in this part is barred”]; § 9351[“An action may not be commenced against a decedent’s personal representative on a cause of action against the decedent unless the claim is first filed as provided in this part and the claim is rejected in whole or in part”].) Petitioner, as a potential creditor of the decedent, has standing to-open a proceeding to ) administer Decedent’s estate. . (See, 1992 Law Revision Commission Comments to CCP 366.2 [‘“If the creditor is concerned that the decedent's beneficiaries may not have a general personal representative appointed ... the creditor may petition for appointment .... See.Prob. Code §§ -6- RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR TRANSFER OF ACTION AND FOR mere , SANCTIONS , im NON Boe Boe oe BRRRRPERBRBEBSERWIARAEBEES Ce A AH A wD O . q 8000 (pétition), 8461 (creditors have priority for appointment); see, also, Prob: Code §-48-- - ("interested person" defined)”].) The fact that decedent's property is being administered via a testamentary trust does not change.the foregoing: As the language of section 19001 — which pertains to claims against a decedent’s trust estate - makes clear, the trust assets are only “subject to the claims of creditors of the deceased settlor’s estate,” and only “to the extent that the deceased settlor’s estate is inadequate to satisfy those claims and expense.” (§ 19001(a).) (emphasis added.). Obviously, the conditions of section 19001 (a) cannot be satisfied unless a claim is first filed in the probate estate and it is established that the estate is insufficient to satisfy the claims. (See, e.g., McGovern’s . Annotated California Probate Code at p. 1138 [West, 2019] (commentary to section 19001(a) [Under paragraph (a) creditors must first exhaust the probate estate”]; see, also, Arluk Medical Center Industrial Grp. v. Dobler (2002) 116 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1335 [“