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109 Stevenson Street, 5"
PAUL F. UTRECHT (SBN 118658)
ELIZABETH L. HURWITZ (SBN 278846)
UTRECHT & LENVIN, LLP ELECTRONICALLY
109 Stevenson Street, 5"" Floor FILED
San Francisco, CA 94105 Superior Court of California,
Telephone: (415) 357-0600 a Sole)
Fax: (415) 354-3485 04/09/2018
BY: VANESSA WU
Attomeys for Petitioners PRIYA SANGER. Deputy Clerk
and MICHAEL SANGER
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO - UNLIMITED JURISDICTION
PRIYA SANGER, MICHAEL Case No, CPF-12-511985
SANGER,
REPLY DECLARATION OF ELIZABETH L.
Petitioners, HURWITZ IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
AMEND JUDGMENT
vs.
Date: April 16, 2018
LEAH AHN. Time: 9:30 a.m.
Dept: 302
Re dent.
ee Reservation No. 03130416-14
1, Elizabeth L. Hurwitz, declare:
1 lam an attorney licensed to practice before all courts in the State of California. I
am one of the attorneys representing Petitioners Priya Sanger and Michael Sanger (the “Sangers”’)
in the above-entitled action.
2. I make this reply declaration in support of the Sangers’ Motion to Amend the
Judgment. The following is based on personal knowledge and if called as a witness I could and
would testify as follows:
3. On or about October 16, 2016, Respondent Leah Ahn (“Respondent”) filed a
motion for civil contempt against the Sangers and their attorneys, claiming that their efforts to
enforce this Court’s 2012 judgment was a violation of the bankruptcy discharge injunction. A true
and correct copy of Respondent’s motion is attached as Exhibit A.
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REPLY DECLARATION OF ELIZABETH L. HURWITZ IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENTou
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4. On November 17, 2016, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order denying
Respondent’s motion for civil contempt for the reasons stated by the judge on the record at the
hearing. A true and correct copy of the transcript of this hearing is attached as Exhibit B.
5. Respondent appealed this order to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel. A true and
correct copy of her opening brief is attached as Exhibit C.
6. On November 2, 2017, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the Bankruptcy
Court’s denial of Respondent’s motion for civil contempt. A true and correct copy of this order is
attached as Exhibit D. Respondent has appealed this decision to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals.
7. I was one of the attorneys representing the Sangers in an arbitration with
Respondent in another case between the parties, Leah Ahn v. Priya Sanger and Michael Sanger,
San Francisco Superior Court Case No: CGC-14-541815.
8. On March 20, 2018, the arbitrator, David Meadows, issued an Interim Award in
that arbitration. A true and correct copy of the Interim Award is attached as Exhibit E.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of California that the
foregoing is true and correct.
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Dated: April 9, 2018 Loy
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REPLY DECLARATION OF ELIZABETH L, HURWITZ IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENTExhibit ALeah Ahn (pro se}
851 Lombard St.
San Francisco, CA 94133
abn.leah@yahoo.com
(415) 645-3359
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
In re Case No. 14-30874 HLB7
LEAH AHN,
Chapter 7
‘Debtor.
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS &
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ORDER OF CIVIL
CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATIONS OF
11 U.S.C. § 524; AND FOR DAMAGES,
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS, AND
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Date: November 17, 2016
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Place: Courtroom 19
Hon, HANNAN L, BLUMENSTIEL
ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ORDER OF CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATIONS OF 11 U.S.C, § 524TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.
INTRODUCTION.
JURISDICTION.
A, Prior to Ahn’s Bankruptcy and Discovery of Priya’s Fraud, Priya
Actively Blocked Abn From Assuming Liability on Loan in the First Place.....8
B. Sangers Procure Judgment Using Coyle’s Testimony and Forged and
False EViden0G....c.ccececcceccceeeseseseeceretaetaetsetersorcasssseessateceaenuneee 10
C, Abn is Honest and Has Acted in Good Faith, While Sangers' Pattern of
Dishonesty Has Already Reached this Court Prior to the Instant Motion........ ll
LEGAL DISCUSSION,
I. Sangers, Utrecht, and Finestone All Had Actual Knowledge of Ahn’s
Chapter 7 Bankruptey and Discharge... 2.00. cee cccceeseteccseecesesnsaetevenccsaessressepnad 2
H. Congressional Intent Behind Section 524 is to Prevent Sangers’ and
Their Attorneys’ Abuse of Ahin’s Legal Ignorance............cccseccecceccccscecssveseeseseaee 2
Til. — Sangers and Their Attorneys Knew of Aln’s Discharge and Intended
the Actions that Violated the Injunction. 14
a) Sangers and Their Atorneys Deliberately Amended Judgment in
Violation of Injunction.
b) Sangers and Their Attorneys Deliberately Coerced Payments from Ahn
on Void Judgment in Violation of Injunction
c) Sangers and Their Attorneys Deliberately Continued Prosecuting
Discharged Claims in Violation of Injunction.
TV. Ahn is Entitled to Full Damages with Interest, Costs and Attorney Fees,
Wf Applicable, and Punitive Damages... cc eccecceceeceescetencatescanscessneassccnere AT
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF. wld
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF Toble of Contents
MOTION FOR ORDER OF CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATIONS OF 11.U.S.C, § 524 | page iTABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases page(s)
Baxier v, Summerfield Inv. Group, LLC (In re Baxter}
2015 Bankr. LEXIS 3492
Cheuk Tin Yan v, Lombard Flats, LLC (In re Lombard Flats, LLC}
_ 2014 US. Dist. LEXIS 113127 QLD. Cal. Aug. 13, 2014)...
Connor v, Countrywide Bank, N.A. (In re Connor)
(2007) 366 BR. 133...
Erhart v. Fina (In re Pina)
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163855
Hassanally v. Republic Bank (In re Hassanally)
(9th Cir. BAP 1997) 208 B.R. 46.
Heilman v. Heilman (in re Heilman)
(9th Cir. BAP 2010) 430 BR. 213. Aetaaersaeneneeen
Henry v. Assocs. Home Equity Servs. (In re Henry)
(2001 C.D. Cal) 266 BAR. 457... eee talelndateetohtntde ta
17, 18, 19
Tn Lone Star Sec. & Video, Ine. v. Gurrola (In re Gurrola)
(9th Cir. BAP 2005) 328 B.R. 158. --12-13, 16
In re Armstead
1997 Bankr, LEXIS 2166 wl 6
Inre Arnold
(1997) 206 BUR. S60... cee ects renceeeeeee we 15-16
In re Brantley
(1990) 116 BAR. 443 eee
In re Fuller Cleaning & Dycing Co.
(1941) 118 F.2d 978
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF Table of Contents
MOTION FOR ORDER OF CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATIONS OF 11 U.S.C. § 524 | page ilnoe
Yn re Hopkins
2014 Bankr. LEXIS 1244., lB
In re Lombard Flats, LLC
2013 Bankr, LEXIS 3253.00.00... ccc cescceseceecreueeeeseseneaanecessevneeeessraneecseen wl
In re Venegas
(2001) 257 BAR. AD occ ceceeccecseeessessennsssearsancesesucsecscsssaeneeveuresecsesersneceamaneal T
Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’ y
(2014 U.S. Court of Appeals 9th Cir.) 774 F.3d 935.00. ccc ceccceceescecescee cen eeseeereneee 2
Langlois v. United States
(1993) 155 BUR. 818... cece cce cee rece neespseserseescernerrcesessaeaysauassasesasenases 1s
Mendoza y. McKnight
(9th Cir. 2001) Fed. Appx. 606...
Mooney v. Green Tree Serv., LLC (In re Mooney)
(2006) 340 B.R. 35..
Motley v. Equity Title Co. {In re Motley)
(9th Cir, C.D. Cal. 2001) 268 BAR. 237. ceccnectseteseneessesessereeee 32, 16, 17
Nash v, Ciark County Dist. Atty’s Office (In re Nash)
(9th Cir, BAP 2012) 464 BUR. 874... esc ecceeeeeeeneeeeereeeeetsteerneueeenes deeeeee 134
Nibbelink v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Nibbelink)
(2009) 403 BR. LB Lecce eecccceeeseecevenestsesessseseseesecseseseeeyauceareesacissnssnenesss 18
Reitano v, Yankwich
(1951) 38 Cal.2d 1
Schoenfeld v. Norberg
(1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 755...
Song v, Moon Joo Lee (in re Moon Joo Lee)
(9th Cir. BAP) 2015 Banker. LEXIS 2130.00.00. ececceccsseeseccseevacvancaseeavecauceseey 2
Wesley v. Oh (In re Oh)
(9th Cir, BAP) 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 4722.0... .ccccccessecrersesseceesanes tevenecseen 2,13, 14
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF Table of Contents
MOTION FOR ORDER OF CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATIONS OF 11 U.S.C. § 524 | page fiiStatutes pagets)
TE ULS.C. § LOD cece cece ceereerresnanresetacraciesteseneuieetaneerenssiageseneesassiarss 7
LLU S.C. § 108. cece renter eer eee ener nee reer ees eee en a entbecnbecnscerecemenanareinerss 1
TE US.C. § 362.00 trees Valotcladat dhctaladala tld atdattalodeadehalatehvaaeheral 7
PE ULS.C. § 524 1, passim
VUS.C.§ Tce
2B USC. § 157.
28 U.S.C. § 1334...
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 9920...... Je eletned seas eet etal
wt3, 47
2
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ORDER OF CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATIONS OF 11 U.S.C. § 524 |
Table of Contents
page ivn
INTRODUCTION
This is an especially egregious case of sophisticated judgment creditors who, with their
state and bankruptcy attorneys, actively capitalized for years on a pro se Debtor's ignorance of the
legal effect of her Chapter 7 discharge. With full knowledge of Debtor's bankruptcy and
discharge, creditors and their attorneys willfully violated the discharge injunction by: amending a
pre-pelition state court money judgment to increase Debtor's personal Jiability thereon; aclively
continuing to prosecute pre-petition claims against Debtor in state court; serving Debtor with a
pending arbitration demand on another pre-petition claim; and demanding and wrongfully coercing
payments from Debtor on an ever-increasing “open-ended” pre-petition judgment under the threat
of executing on what Debtor has learned is a void and unenforceable judgment tien’.
These parties’ willful violations of 11 U.S.C. § 524 are shocking given their particular
positions. Creditor Priya Sanger (“Priya”) has been a licensed attorney for 24 years and was the
former President of the Bar Association of San Francisco, Sangers* lead state attorney Paul
Utrecht (“Utrecht”) has been practicing as a licensed California attorney for 31 years, during
which he has argued before the U.S. Supreme Court; and Sangers’ bankruptcy attorney Stephen
¥inestone (“Finestone”) has been practicing exclusively in bankruptcy law for 30 years
spec
Insolvency Committee. All parties were fully informed of Debtor's Chapter 7 bankruptcy and each
‘ing in Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 bankruptcies and sits on the California State Bar
received the Order of Discharge, These pariies then simply proceeded as though no bankruptcy
had occurred at all—after discharge, Finestone in fact joined creditors and Utrecht in a state court
action to continue prosecuting a discharged claim against the unrepresented Debtor.
“The automatic stay and discharge injunction are cornerstones of bankruptcy law. They
are, respectively, a fundamental debtor protection” (internal citations omitted) (Mooney v. Green
‘Yree Serv., LLC (In re Mooney) (2006) 340 B.R. 351 (“Mooney”) at 358]. A party who knowingly
violates the discharge injunction can be held in contempt under It U.S.C. § 105(a) [Nash v. Clark
County Dist, Atty’s Office (In re Nash) (9th Ci, BAP 2012) 464 B.R. 874 (“Nash”) at 880}.
Debtor Leah Ahn (“Ahn”) respectfully brings this Motion for an Order of Civi] Contempt arising
out of creditors’ and their attorneys’ wanton violations of the Order of Discharge by this Court.
' Debtor is also filing a Complaint for Declaratory Relief with respect to this lien.
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ORDER OF CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATIONS OF 11 U.S.C.§ 524 | page 1‘Ahn seeks to enforce the injunction, pesmanently enjoin creditors from attempting to collect
digcharged debts and prosecuting discharged claims; and recover damages, costs, attorney fees if
applicable, and punitive damages, jointly and severally against creditors and their attorneys [see
Song v. Moon Joo Lee (In re Moon Joo Lee) (9th Cir, BAP) 2015 Bankr, LEXIS 2130, affirming
sanctions jointly and severally against creditor and its attorney for prosecuting pre-petition claims
ageinst debtor in state court in violation of the discharge injunction; Wesley v. Oh (In re Oh) (9th
Cir BAP) 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 4722 (“Wesley”), affirming damages jointly and severally against
creditor and its attorney for continuing state court action against debtor in violations of the
automatic stay and discharge injuriction]. “It has long been settled law that 2 person with notice of
an injunction may be held in contempt for aiding and abetting a party in violating it” (intemal
citations omitted) [Inst. of Celacean Research v. Sea Shepherd. Conservation Soc’y (2014 U.S.
Court of Appeals 9th Cir.) 774 F.3d 935 at 949),
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334{b) and 11 U.S.C,
§ 105 because it involves violations of the discharge injunction of 11 U.S.C. § 524, A proceeding
lo enforce the discharge injunction is a core proceeding (28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2(O)}. Federal Rules
of Bankruptcy Procedure 9020 provides that an action for contempt must be initiated by motion.
BACKGROUND’
Ahn first sets forth the immediate facts giving rise to the instant motion and will then
provide a broader history of this outrageous case, This is not a case about an unsympathetic debtor
whose bankruptcy occasioned the loss of a fair debt owed to an innocent creditor. To the contrary,
instant creditors are sophisticated wrongdoers who bullied an honest and unrepresented debtor in
knowing total disregard of Bankruptcy Law-—and worse, to collect on a judgment that, to begin
with, was procured by creditors’ fraud at a one-day private arbitration hearing, and which sought to
cover up creditors” later-discovered half-million dollar mortgage fraud against Debtor and her
home. As will be set forth, enforcement of the injunction here will have the additional just effect
of helping to preclude the furtherance of creditors’ continuing mortgage scheme.
2 All facts stated herein are supported by the Declaration of Leah Abn in Support of the Motion for
Order of Civit Contempt for Violations of 11 U.S.C. § 524 (’Ahn Deci.”),
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ORDER OF CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATIONS OF 11 U.S.C, § 524 | page 2Ahn filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy on June 9, 2014 and was granted discharge on
September 16.2014. The Court permitted Ahn to re-open the case on April 3, 3015 for the
limited purpose of amending her schedules to more accurately describe the litigation assets that she
had discussed with and were ultimately abandoned by ber Trustee Barry Milgrom. Trustee
Milgrom was re-appoinied and the case was re-closed on July 13, 2015 with no other actions taken
other than the schedule amendments.
CREDITORS’ AND THEIR ATTORNEYS’ ACTIONS IN VIOLATION OF INJUNCTION:
}, Priya and her husband Michael Sanger (jointly, “Sangers”) held a state money
judgment against Ahn for $72,870.57 that entered at the San Francisco Superior Court on March
12, 2012 (“Judgment”) {Exhibit A, attached to Ahn Deel.*}. The Judgment wes the confirmation
of a private arbitrator’s award. Of the Judgment, $62,583.79 represented Sangers’ attorney fees
and costs for the one-day arbitration and to confirm the award into judgment. Sangers were and
continue ta be represented by Utrecht and his associates in actions outside of Bankruptcy Court.
2. On May 16, 2012, Sangers recorded an abstract of judgment to purportedly create a
judgment lien for $72,870.57 on Ahn's home {Exhibit B}.
3, On January 13, 2014, Sangers obtained an Order for Sale of Dwelling from the state
court against Ahn’s home. Ahn was unsuccessful in staying the sale on grounds that Sangers
misrepresented the encumbrance on the property, and Utrecht informed Ahn that Sangers would
not stop the sale unless Ahn made full payment on the Judgment. The sheriffs sale was scheduled
for June 10, 2014, but was halted by Aln’s June 9, 2014 bankruptcy filing.
4. On July 22, 2014, Finestone filed with the Bankruptcy Court a Request for Special
Notice in Ahn’s case {Docket #22}. Ahn was granted discharge from the “no asset” case on
September 16, 2014 {Docket #29}. Sangers and Utrecht were each separately scheduled as
creditors. The Order of Discharge was sent to Sangers and their attorneys at three different
addresses: Sangers’ home; Utrecht’s office; and Finestone’s office {Docket #29}.
5. On April 9, 2015, Sangers filed a motion with this Court for an order “Confirming
that the Automatic Stay Has Been Terminated” {Docket #40}, which was initially dismissed for
omitting a Memorandum of Points & Authorities {Docket #46}. Sangers re-filed for the same
3 All Exhibits referenced herein are attached with the Ahn Declaration.
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ORDER OF CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATIONS OF 11 U.S.C. § 524 | page 3order on May 13, 2015 {Docket #52}. The Order “Confirming that the Automatic Stay Hes Been
Terminated” entered at the Bankruptcy Court on June 5, 2015 {Docket #60}. 4 hereafter:
6. On June 16, 2015, Sangers filed a motion at the state court to amend the pre-petition
Jucgment to ingrease Abn’s personal liability thereon (“Amended Judgment”) {Exhibit C}.
Sangers’ motion slates: “[Sangers] will move the Court for an order that Respondent/Judgment
Debtor Leah Ahn pay [Sangers] $25,559.46 pursuant ta the judgment entered in this matter on
March 12, 2012” (emphasis added) {Exhibit C, p.1, lines 24-26}. The Amended Judgment entered
on July 2, 2015 and states: “[Sangers} shall recover the sum of $105,720.93 from Respondent
Leah Ahn” {Exhibit D, p.2, line 19}.
7, Meanwhile, prior to Ahn’s bankruptcy, Sangers had filed three motions at the state
court for judgment enforcement attomey fees in connection with the pre-petition Judgment
(“enforcement fees”). The state court denied the first two motions on the grounds that Sangers had
no legal basis to claim enforcement fees. The tentative denial of the third motion was under
submission at the time that Ahn filed for bankruptcy. After Ahn’s discharge, Sangers filed a
“renewed” fourth motion in state court on June 12, 2015 to claim the same enforcement fees from
Ahn {Exhibit E}. Sangers* motion states: “(the state court] took [the previous] Motion off
calendar due to the Respondent/Judgment Debtor Leah Ahn’s filing of bankruptcy” (emphasis
added) {Exhibit E, p.3, lines 11-12}. Sangers sought to recover from Ahn all of the enforcement
fees that Sangers had sought in their previous three motions that had all been denied prior to
bankruptey, plus additional amounts, This time, Finestone also executed a Declaration in support
of Sangers’ state court motion, seeking attomey fees from Ahn for billing beginning in December
2013—fully six months before Abn even filed for bankruptcy {Exhibit F, p.2, lines 7-8}. On July
2, 2015, the state court again denied Sangers’ motion on the grounds that Sangers had no legal
basis to claim enforcement fees {Exhibit G}.
8, Also prior to the bankruptcy, Sangers had filed a different motion to amend the
Judgment nunc pro anc to add in a provision awarding enforcement fees to Sangers (“nunc pro
tune motion”). The state court's denial of this motion was also under submission at the time of
Ahn’s bankruptcy. After Ahn’s discharge, Sangers also “re-noticed” and re-filed this mine pro
func motion on June 12, 2015, again acknowledging: “[the state court] took this Motion off
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ORDER OF CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATIONS OF 11 U.S.C. § 524 | page 4eatendar due to... Debtor Leah Alin's filing of bankruptcy” (emphasis added) {Exhibit H, p.2, Hines
17-18}. The state court also denied this motion on its merits on July 2, 2015 {Exhibit I}.
9, On July 6, 2015, Sangers filed notice of appeal in the state appellate court on the
orders denying their (1) second motion for enforcement fees, which had been denied prior to Ahn’s
discharge; (2) fourth motion for enforcement fees, which had been filed and denied after discharge;
and (3) mune pro tune motion, which had also been filed and denied after discharge {Exhibit J}.
10. On June 28, 2016, the state appellate court reversed the pre-petition order denying
Sangers’ second motion for enforcement fees and remanded to the state trial court to determine the
amount of Alin’s personal liability thereon, which appellate decision has since become final
{Exhibit K}. The appellate court did not consider the other two orders. On or around October 3,
2016, Sangers filed notice at the state trial court of their intent to act on remand.
il. On or around March 8, 2016, Sangers also served Ahn with an arbitration demand
based on a “Notice of Actionable Violation” pursuant to the parties’ purported contract {Exhibit
L}. As will be explained further, Sangers and Abn are co-owners of a real property. Sangers
allege that Ahn breached the contract by recording 4 lien against only Ahn’s interest reflecting her
mother’s substantial purchase money loan. Trustee Milgrom verified the legitimacy of the lien and
made no motion to attack the lien during Aln’s bankruptcy. Because this lien affects only Ahn's
interest, Sangers do not allege that they suffered harm but complain that Ahn recorded the lien
without Sangers’ permission’. Sangers acknowledged awareness of this lien since 2013 {Exhibit
M, starting at p.1, line 27}, prior to Ahn’s 2014 bankruptcy. After Ahn’s discharge, Sangers
intend to reduce the currently-pending pre-petition claim into a monetary amount against Ahn:
Sangers seek “consequential damages and liquidated damages” {Exhibit L, p.1} and “all expenses,
including all attorneys’ fees" {Exhibit L, p.2}.
12. Ahn had been fearful throughout her bankruptcy that Sangers would reschedule the
sheriff's sale of her home. Trustee Milgrom had informed Ahn that Finestone had repeatedly
* A tenant-in-common may encumber its interest without the consent of and without affecting the
interests of other tenants [Schoenfeld v. Norberg (1970) 11 Cal.App.3¢ 755, 765). Incredibly, as
will be explained, the crux of the disputes between the parties involves Sangers’ fraudulent
encumbrance against Ahn's home.
MEMORANOUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ORDER OF CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATIONS OF 11 U.S.C. § 524 | page 5contacted Trustee Milgrom expressing Sangers' intent to force the sale of Ahn’s home. Ahn’s
fears were heightened when Finestone began filing for the “Order Confirming that the Automatic
Stay Has Been Terminated.” Utrecht’s supporting Declarations state Sangers’ intent to “move
forward” with the sale {Docket #42, #53}. Ahn thus borrowed significant funds from relatives to
pay the lien to save her home. On July 17, 2015, under protest, Ahn delivered a cashier's check
for $131,098.05 to Utrecht’s office with a demand for satisfaction to remave the lien {Exhibit N}.
However, Sangers refused to remove the lien and instead credited Ahn’s paymeat as partial
payment on the Amended Judgment, and alleged more emounts due {Exhibit 0}.
13, Ahn thus made another protested payment of $3,551.19 and made another demand for
satisfaction on September 9, 2015 to remove the lien {Exhibit P}. Sangers again refused to
remove the lien, and again instead credited Ahn’s payment as partial payment on the Amended
Judgment. Sangers represented that they were “preserving their rights” to unspecified future
payments {Exhibit Q}. The lien remains on Akin’s home.
14. Pro se Ahn, unaware of her bankruptey protections, failed to raise the discharge
injunction as a defense to Sangers’ actions. Ahn filed no claims, counterclaims, appeals, or cross-
| appeals in these actions.
15. Priya continues to bill Ahn every month for ongoing payments on what Sangers are
using as an open-ended judgment. Abn, under constant threat of execution, continued borrowing
funds from relatives and friends for over two years after her discharge to make payments under
protest pursuant to Priya's demands, Sangers used the threat of the purported judgment lien to
collect a total of $146,401.74 from Ahn as “partial payment” on the Amended Judgment.
16. In August 2016, while researching grounds to challenge the state appellate decision,
Ahn happened to stumble upon the discharge injunction. Ahn immediately ceased all payments to
Sangers. Priya has since repeatedly emailed Ahn demanding payment “asap” {Exhibit R,
pp.1,2,3,4}. Alun filed a motion to this Court to reopen this case for the purpose of filing this
instant motion and a complaint for Declaratory Relief (Docket #66}, which was granted on
October 5, 2016 {Docket #68}. While Alin could not afford to retain an attorney, Ahn reserves the
right to retain counsel for this matter if she is able.
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ORDER OF CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATIONS OF 11 US.C.§ 524 | page 6HISTORY BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND THE DEBTS,
A history of the parties and the debts at issue is warranted for an understanding of this case
and to weigh the parties’ credibility. Sangers and Ahn are co-owners in undivided interests as
tenants-in-common (TIC) of a real property at 847-849-851 Lombard Street in San Francisco
(“Property”). The third owner, Alisa Baker (“Baker”) is not involved here.
The crux of the disputes between Sangers and Ahn stem from a half-million dollar
mortgage scheme executed by Priya in collusion with notoriously corrupt former broker WB
Coyle (“Coyle”) using Ahn’s home. Beginning in 2013, Coyle’s widespread fraud and theft was
publicly exposed after a year-long investigation by NBC News. During the times relevant here,
Coyle defrauded at least 40 homeowners out of at least 15 million dollars in various real estate-
based schemes and is/was the defendant in at least 20 lawsuits at the San Francisco Superior Court.
In 2013, Coyle was forced into involuntary bankruptcy by judgment creditors and subject to
numerous adversary proceedings based on Coyle's fraud {Case No. 13-32412 HLB 7},
Priya and Coyle fraudulently diverted $478,000 from being paid to the mortgage that is
secured by Ahn’s home, collateralizing Ahn’s home for these misappropriated funds and rendering,
Ahn's home unmarketable. The finds were held in an escrow account at Old Republic Title
Company (“Old Republic”) in connection with Baker's purchase into the Property with -
instructions to pay the $478,000 to lender First Republic Bank. Instead, Priya—who was vice
president and senior counsel for Wells Fargo Bank at the time—secretly arranged for $438,000 to
be wired directly inte Priya's personal bank account without the knowledge or authorization of the
escrow principals, property owners, loan borrowers, or First Republic Bank {Exhibit S}. The
other $40,000 was taken by Coyle and his business partner Robert Mattei. Priya and Coyle
diverted the funds using forged and altered escrow instructions, and five days after the escrow had
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ORDER OF CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATIONS OF 11 U.5.C.§ 524 | page?closed*, In short, Priya fraudulently pocketed $438,000 from the mortgage that is also seoured by
Abn's home. Priya refused to refinance or otherwise remove her encumbrance from Ahn’s home’.
A. Prior to Ahn’s Bankrupftey and Discovery of Priya's Fraud, Priya Actively Blocked
Abn From Assuming Liability on the Loan in the First Place.
17. Sangers originally owned the Property with Robert Kaplan (“Kaplan”) and Trystan
Christ (“Christ”). These parties obtained one indivisible loan from First Republic Bank (also, “the
Bank”) for $1,200,000 to finance the purchase. Under the mortgage terms, each borrower is
individually and severally liable for the entire loan. Borrowers Sangers, Kaplan, and Christ had a
private agreement between themselves as to their respective obligations on the loan. The Bank’s
| mortgage terms prohibit the wansfer of ownership in the Property without the Bank’s approval. If
a borrower transfers ownership without such approval, the debt does not transfer to the new owner
and the borrower(s) remain personally Hable for the loan. The Bank recorded a deed of trust
against the Property which remains its senior encumbrance.
18, Coyle was the Property manager during the relevant times. Coyle’s reputation was
wholly unknown to Alin in 2004 when Coyle represented Ahn in the purchase of her interest for
$709,000 pursuant to a written agreement with Christ. Ahn was a long-distance first-time
homebuyer who was unfamiliar with TIC properties, and relied exclusively on her agent and
Property manager Coyle for atl matters pertaining to the purchase. Ahn’s mother loaned Abn the
substantial down payment on Ahn’s home. Ahn made a cash down payment of $424,000; and
Coyle represented to Ahn that she had obtained a loan from First Republic Bank and that, in tum,
Christ had been released from all liability on his loan with the Bank.
19. Abn made monthly payments to Property manager Coyle in amounts represented by
Coyle as Ahn's obligation on Ahn’s purported loan with the Bank. However, Ahn later
* Incidentally, Old Republic filed an adversary proceeding for fraud and non-dischargeability
against Coyle at this Court during Coyle’s bankruptcy {Adversary Proceeding No. 14-03143}. Old
Republic sought recovery of the $137,500 it paid to the Trustee to release a claim in connection
with the title insurance that Old Republic issued to Coyle in a different fraudulent transaction.
5 Ahn discussed potential legal action against Priya during her bankruptcy with Trustee Milgrom,
who released the claim to Ahn. On February 29, 2016, Ahn served a fraud action against
Sangers and Old Republic that is pending at the San Francisco Superior Court as Case No. CGC-
414541815, Old Republic has aiso filed a lawsuit against Sangers in this matter.
MEMORANDUM CF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ORDER OF CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATIONS OF 11U.5.C. § 524 | pagesno
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inadvertently discovered that Abn had not, in fact, obtained, assumed, or otherwise obligated
herself to any loan. The loan borrowers were Sangers, Kaplan, and Christ, although Kaplan and
Christ had no ownership interest in the Property. Coyle’s representations to Ahn had been false
and the sale to Ahn had been concealed from the Bank. Ahn alerted Priya, whom Ahn trusted and
was friends with at the time. Coyle was terminated as Property manager.
20, Priya, who was then a bank attomey and the Treasurer of the Bar Association of San
Francisco, quoted the Bank’s loan contract to represent to Ahn that only the borrowers were liable
on the loan {Exhibit T, pp.1-2}. Sangers, Kaplan, and Christ had also agreed between themselves
to a written instrument known as the “TIC Agreement.” Priya also quoted to Ahn the terms of the
TIC Agreement, which also prohibit the co-owners from transferring ownership without the
Bank’s approval, and Priya quoted that a transfer in violation thereon is “void” {Exhibit T, pp.2-
3}. The TIC Agreement was drafted by attomey Andy Sirkin, who did not represent any patties in
this action, but later explained to Ahn that this requirement ensures that all co-owners were Hable
on the common loan to protect the equity and rights of each. Priya asked Ahn to cooperate ina
refinance to remove Kaplan and Christ from liability and for Ahn to assume liability on the foan
{Exhibit T, p.3}. Abn agreed, and soon informed Priya that Ahn had obtained private financing so
the parties could separate into individual loans. Pending the refinance, Ahn, in good faith,
continued making uninterrupted payments on the loan on which Aha, in fact, had no liability.
21. The refinance never took place through no fault of Ahn. Ahn discovered that she was
unable to market her home because of the problematic loan. When Sangers ignored Ahn’s request
for a meeting, Ahn began escrowing the good faith loan payments she had been making pending a
refinance, Instead of refinancing pursuant to Priya’s own written demands, Sangers retained
Coyle’s long-time altomey Utrecht to initiate private arbitration against Ahn’.
” Utrecht's long relationship with Coyle is confirmed by Utrecht’s pleadings to this Court, Utrecht
& Lenvin represented Utrecht in seeking an order of protection from this Court after Utrecht was
personally subpoenaed by Coyle's Trustee, who sought to discover if Utrecht had received
frauduient funds from Coyle (Case No. 13-32412, Docket #198}. Utrecht’s motion states his
relationship with Coyle pre-dates the 2012 inception of Utrecht & Lenvin and encompasses “about
§C bankers’ boxes of files for Mr. Coyle; plus many years’ worth of emails and electronic data”
{Case No. 13-32412, Docket #198, p.2, lines 21-26; attested to by the declaration of Utrecht's
attorney and law partner Ronal Shivo (Case No. 13-32412, Docket #199)}.
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ORDER OF CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATIONS OF 11 U.S.C. § 524 | paged22. In July 2011, Christ discovered that he was still liable on the loan and made a written
demand to all parties to refinance {Exhibit U, p.2}. Utrecht wrote back conveying Sangers’
refusal to refinance and refusal to release Christ from liability on the loan {Exhibit U, p.1}.
B. Sangers Procure Judgment Using Covie’s Testimony and Forged and False lividence.
23, The September 2011 arbitration hearing between Sangers and Ahn lasted only one
day plus a few hours and was nota fully litigated trial. Ahn did not know the facts of Priya’s fraud
at the time. Ahn participated at the hearing in goad faith and did not file any claims,
counterclaims, or call witnesses, and simply believed that the result would be a refinance to
remove the non-owners from liability and for Ahn to assume the loan—pursuant to the First
Republic Bank loan terns and the TIC Agreement.
24. Ahn was stunned when Priya falsely claimed that all parties had agreed not to
refinance while Ahn would pay Christ’s loan. There is, in fact, no such agreement between Ahn,
Christ, First Republic Bank, and/or any other party. Before testifying, Priya informed the
arbitrator of Priya’s then-position as the President of the Bar Association of San Francisco.
Sangers introduced into evidence an email to claim that Ahn agreed to the loan arrangement. The
email had three attachments and had been sent to Sangers and Ahn during Baker’s pending
purchase by Coyle. In fact, the true attachments had been switched out with other documents.
One of the purported attachments that Sangers submitted into evidence was a document bearing
only Baker’s purported signature that Baker later verified is a forgery (Exhibit V}.
25, Baker was not at the hearing. Sangers’ sole witness at arbitration to corroborate their
claims and “verify the authenticity” of their forged and falsified evidence was WB Coyle—~
Utrecht’s other client, who had diverted the mortgage funds with Priya.
26. Sangers prevailed at the 2011 arbitration hearing. Ahn released the escrowed loan
payments to Sangers. Sangers obtained an award against Ahn for $64,829.53, of which
$58,369.29 was in attorney fees and costs for the one-day hearing. Sangers confirmed the award ;
into a $72,870.57 judgment, which included additional attorney fees and costs to.confirm the
award. It is by this Judgment that Sangers became creditors against Ahn, and on which Sangers
continue demanding payments from Ahn in violation of the discharge injunction.
27. It is because of Priya’s misrepresentations at this arbitration hearing that Ahn began
investigating and discovered Priya and Coyle’s improbable half-million dollar mortgage scheme.
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ORDER OF CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATIONS OF 11 U.S.C. § 524 | page 10ow D
Priya refused to refinance to avoid disgorging the $438,006 that she fraudulently obtained for her
personal use from this loan, and Priya was unable or unwilling to obtain separate financing for the
money that she toak. Priya continues to use Ahn's home as Priya’s collateral and also demands
that Ahn make payments on this loan purportedly pursuant to the Judgment. Ahn has no access to
joan information, and Priya has never furnished Ahn with any loan statements or 1098 tax forms.
C. Ahn is Honest and Has Acted in Good Faith, While Sangers’ Pattern of Dishonesty
Has Already Reached this Court Prior fo the Instant Motion.
28. For years, Ahn attempted to “do the right thing” by, among other things, seeking
assistance from First Republic Bank to refinance with the actual property owners and remove the
non-owner borrowers from liability, or to separate the financing. Ahn also sent a RESPA
Qualified Written Request to the Bank to learn the extent of the foan on the Property. The Bank
made writen denial of loan information to Ahn because she is not a borrower {Exhibit W, p.2};
“Nor does First Republic have the power to require a refinancing as you request” (Exhibit W,
pp.1,2}; “First Republic is unable to refinance any loan without the agreement of all the owners of
the property, as borrowers” {Exhibit W, pp.1,2}. Priya is the only party who refuses to cooperate.
29. Despite evidenced facts, in particular Utrecht’s email establishing Sangers’ refusal to
refinance or release Christ from liability on the loan, Priya Sanger made the bare representation
under the penalty of perjury fo this Court that Afn prevented a refinance (Docket #54, in
connection with the motion for the order “Confirming that the Automatic Stay Has Been
Terminated”}. Despite Priya’s express written representations that Ahn was not a borrower to the
First Republic Bank loan {Exhibit T}, which was confirmed by the Bank {Exhibit W, p.2}, Priya
has also made the bare representation under the penalty of perjury to the state court that Ahn has a
mortgage with First Republic Bank {Exhibit X, p.2, lines 6-7}. In fact, even prior to Ahn's
bankruptey, the fact that Ahn had no liability to First Republic Bank was the direct result of
Priya’s documented refusal to refinance and refusal to release Christ from Uability on the Joan.
30. Using the Judgment and threat of execution, Priya has been coercing from Ahn
payments to Priya purportedly as Christ’s purported obligation te First Republic Bank, The Bank
has a deed of trust recorded against Ahn’s property securing this loan that Priya defrauded, and the
Bank has taken no action in violation of the injunction. In short, Priya actively blocked a refinance
to protect her near half-million dollar mortgage fraud—which attorney Priya represented in writing
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ORDER OF CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATIONS OF 11. U.S.C.§ 524 | page 11to Ahn necessarily leaves Sangers, and not Abn, individually and severally Hable for the entire
loan in the first place {Exhibit T, pp.1-2}.
LEGAL DISCUSSION.
1. Sangers, Utrecht, and Finestone All Had Actual Knowledge of Ahn’s Chapter 7
Bankruptey and Discharge.
Utrecht’s office filed a Notice of Stay of Proceedings at the state court the day after Ahn's
filing {Exhibit ¥}. Finestone filed with the Bankruptcy Court a Request for Special Notice in
Abhn’s case {Docket #22}. Sangers (with no regard for the automatic stay either) billed Ahn two
weeks after the bankruptey filing while stating: “Ahn... has declared bankruptcy...” {Exhibit R,
p.5}. Sangers, Finestone, and Utrecht were each sent the Order of Discharge {Docket #29}.
“Jn a chapter 7 case for an individual, the automatic stay terminates when a discharge is
geanted or denied. .,.Upon the grant ofa discharge, the automatic stay is replaced with the
discharge injunction provided by § 524(a)” [Motley v. Equity Title Co. (In re Motley) (9th Cir
C.D. Cal, 2001) 268 B.R. 237 (“Motley”) at 242]. In other words, Sangers’ highly-experienced
bankruptcy attorney’s motion to this Court for the June 5, 2015 order “confirming that the
automatic stay has been terminated” is effectively a motion for an order confirming that the
discharge injunction was in place.
Hl. Congressional Intent Behind Section $24 is to Prevent Sangers’ and Their Attorneys’
Abuse of Abn’s Legal Ignorance,
Pro se Ahn’s ignorance in failing to raise the injunction as a defense to Sangers’ various
post-discharge actions is no defense whatsoever for Sangers, To the contrary, In Lone Star Sec. &
Video, Inc. v. Gurrola (In re Gurrola) (9th Cir, BAP 2005) 328 B.R. 158 (“Gurrola”) explains the
Congressional intent behind the 1970 amendment to the Bankruptcy Act was specifically to
preclude exactly what Sangers and their attomeys did-—litigate in state court with the hopes that a
debtor's ignorance or inability to afford counsel would result in debtor's waiver of the discharge
injunction by failing to plead it as a defense [id at 168].
The Gurrola debtor was in a state action with creditor when debtor filed for Chapter 7
bankruptcy. Debtor neglected to schedule creditor who was hence not informed of the bankruptcy.
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ORDER OF CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATIONS OF 11 U.S.C.§ 524 | page 12te
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Creditor obtained a state court judgment. Afier discharge, debtor filed a state court motion to
vacate the judgment. The state court denied the mation and judgment entered—after which debtor
communicated his bankruptcy to creditor. Creditor filed an adversary proceeding to block
enforcement of the discharge on grounds of equity or estoppel. The Ninth Circuit BAP rejected
and declared the judgment void, citing to and emphasizing the relevant part of 11 U.S.C § 524:
“(a) A discharge in a case under this title -
(1) voids any judgment at any time obtained, to the extent that such judgment is a
determination of the personal liability of the debtor with respect to any debt discharged
under section 727, 944, 1141, 1228, or 1328 of this title, whether ar not discharge ofsuch
debt is waived;
(2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the
employment for process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a
personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived...’”
(original emphasis by BAP) [id at 160].
The automatic stay and discharge injunction are “effective against the world to the full
extent of their statutory terms, regardless of notice” {id at 175]. “Not only are the discharge and
discharge injunction ‘good against the world,’ they are good anywhere in the world, i.e.
extraterritorily” [ibid]. Section 524 “is now an absolute, nonwaivable defense” {id at 170} and its
provisions “do not admit of an equitable exception and are self-executing” [id at 160]. Debtors
“do not bear the burden of proving to creditors” the existence of the discharge injunction before
liability for violation can be imposed against creditors [id at 175].
‘The Gurrola creditor’s lack of notice about the bankruptcy had no effect on the injunction
but may be a defense to contempt sanctions [id at 175]. Here, in stark contrast, sophisticated
attorney creditor Priya and her sophisticated attomeys effectively confirmed that the discharge
injunction was in place before flagrantly violating it by continuing state court actions against and
coercing payments from Ahn in reliance that pro se Ahn wouldn't figure it out. “[A] creditor has a
duty to obey the discharge injunction, which duty is a modern corollary of the venerable rule that
‘all persons concerned in executing [void] judgments...are considered in law as trespassers”
(original emphasis and bracketed term by BAP) (internal citations omitted) {id at 174]. This duty
applies with particular force here, where the contemnors are officers of the court (see also
concurring opinion in Wesley. supra, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 4722, holding debtor’s attorney could
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ORDER OF CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATIONS OF 11 U.S.C. § 524 | page 131
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reasonably “assume that the [contemnors], one of whom is a member of the State Bar of
California, would obey an injunction imposed by black letter taw” {id at 35-36).
Ill. Sangers and Their Attoruevs Knew of Akn’s Discharge and Intended the Actions that
Violated the Injunction.
A violation is sanctionable if the ereditor knew the injunction was applicable and intended
the actions which violated the injunction [see Nash, supra. 464 B.R. at 880]. The standard used to
determine whether a discharge injunction violation was willful is the same as that applied to
automatic stay violations: conternnor’s state of mind and good faith are irrelevant; willful conduct
does not refer to intent to violate the court order, but rather to the deliberateness of conduct and
knowledge of the discharge [see Erhart v. Fina (In re Fina) 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163855 at 25}.
“fCreditor’s attorney] knew the specific terms of the discharge injunction; he hada copy of
the discharge order that had been entered in the bankruptcy court" (Wesley, supra, 2008 Banks,
LEXIS 4722 at 28, holding that fact “satisfied this standard” to award damages for contempt (ibid)
and affirming, “banlcuptcy court correctly concluded that an evidentiary hearing was not required
to establish [creditor’s attorney]’s knowledge of the discharge injunction” (id at 20)]. Here, three
attorneys cach received this Court’s Discharge Order, which unambiguously states, among other
things: “The discharge prohibits any attempt to collect from the debtor a debt that has been
discharged. For example, a creditor is not permitted to...continue a lawsuit...or ta take any other
action to collect a discharged debt fram the debtor.”
a) Sangers and Their Attorneys Deliberately Amended Judgment in Violation of
Injunction.
After receiving the Discharge Order, Sangers moved the state court to amend the Judgment
to determine Abn’s personal liability thereon as $105,720.93 plus interest to date of payment. This
Amended Judgment entered on July 2, 2015 after Ahn’s discharge and includes and increases the
entire amount of Sangers’ pre-petition Judgment. Where judgment entered against Chapter 7
debtor a year after discharge on an action initiated prior to bankruptcy: “Entry of judgment against
[debtor] violated the discharge provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. ...'This is true in a ‘no asset’
case...even if the...case was riot listed as a debt in the filed schedules” (internal citations omitied)
Mendoza v. McKnight (9th Cir, 2001) Fed. Appx. 606 at 607, vacating judgment]. See also Judge
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ORDER OF CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATIONS OF 21U.S.C.§ 524 | page 4Dennis Montali’s Memorandum Decision on Motion for Order of Contempt in In re Lombard
Flats, LLC (2013 Bankr. LEXIS 3253} at 10, where the Court held creditor's post-discharge state
court judgment against debtor on pre-petition claim was “void as a matter of law” under §
524(a)(1) and ordered creditors to set aside or otherwise vacate judgment (affirmed by Cheuk Tin
Yan v. Lombard Flats. LLC (in re Lombard Flats. LLC) 2014 1S. Dist. LEXIS 113127 (ND. Cal.
Aug. 13,2014).
b) Sangers and Their Attorneys Deliberately Coerced Payments from Ahn on Void
Judgment in Violation of Injunction.
‘the discharge releases the debtor from liability on debts and enjoins any creditor's effort to
collect a discharged debt as a personal liability of the debtor [Heilman v. Heilman (In re Heilman)
(9th Cir. BAP) 430 BR. 213 af 218, citing to 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) and § 524(a)(1), (2)]. Priya bills
Ahn every month to pay on the Amended Judgment (see Connor v. Countrywide Bank, NA, (In re
Connor) (2007) 366 B.R. 133 at 138. “only purpose for sending the monthly statements was to
induce debtor to make payments on a discharged debt.") When Abn learned of her Bankruptcy
protections and ceased making payments in August 2016, Priya—in clear violation of the
injunction—has since repeatedly emailed Ahn demanding payment “asap.”
Sangers actively preyed upon Ahn's fear of losing her home to improperly coerce payments
after the bankruptcy. In In re Amold (1997) 206 B.R. 560, Chapter 7 debtor paid a discharged loan
to dissuade creditor from garnishing debtor's wife’s wages on creditor’s judgment against wife,
possibly jeopardizing her chances of receiving a nursing school grant. After discharge, debtor
entered a new note with creditor which included the discharged loan amount and the judgment
amount against his wife and began making payments thereon. The bankruptcy court rejected
ereditor’s contention that debtor voluntarily entered into and paid on the note, pointing out that
debtor was distressed by the garnishment threat and creditor “knew that it had the debtor over a
barrel and eagerly took advantaged (sic) of the situation” [id at 567]. Similarly, payments made
under the threat of execution are neither voluntary nor waivers of any rights (sec Reitano y,
Yankwich (1951) 38 Cal.2d 1, 3 and other California Supreme Court cases cited therein), Abn
paid in excess of the ful! amount of the Amended Judgment under protest—~and Sangers
maliciously continue dangling the lien over Ahn’s head to coerce payments from Ahn on what
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT GF
MOTION FOR ORDER OF CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATIONS OF 41U.S.C.§524 | page 15tw
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Sangers are using as an open-ended judgment (see also Langlois v. United States (1993) 155 B.R.
818. creditor IRS violated injunction by applying post-petition payments to discharged debt).
The Arnold creditor “seized the opportunity to recoup the foss caused by debtor's Chapter 7
and to make itself a handsome profit” [206 B.R. at $67] (see also In re Armstead, 1997 Bankr.
LEXIS 2166 at 16, where debtor initiated inquiries to creditor about new loan, Bankruptcy Court
held, “Regardless of who first contacted the other (cite), [creditor] seized the opportunity” te
obtain payment on discharged debt in violation of injunction (internal citations omitted}}. Sangers
seized the opportunity to amend the pre-petition Judgment to include all of the discharged debt
plus give themselves an open-ended profit. The Amold court found that its creditor's identical
exploitation