Preview
1
MARK M. HATHAWAY.
(CA 151332; DC 437335; IL 6327924: NY 2431682)
2
JENNA E. PARKER (CA 303560)
3
WERKSMAN JACKSON
HATHAWAY & QUINN LLP
4 888 West Sixth Street, Fourth Floor Fl LE D
Los Angeles. California 9001 7
5 Telephone: (213) 688-0460 SEP 1 9 2018
Facsimile: (213) 624-1942
6 E—Mail: mhathawav/iflwerksmaniackson.com
7 DAN ROTH (CA 270569)
“wmamwdmcfi
LAW OFFICE OF DAN ROTH
8 803 Hearst Avenue R. AR
Berkeley. CA 94710
‘
9 Telephone: (510) 849-1389
1
FaCSImile: (510) 295-2680
10 E-mail: dan@drothlaw.com
11 Attorneys for Petitioner
12
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
13
FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA
14
15
JOHN DOE, an individual, ) Case No.: 18CV332751
)
16
Petitioner. )
17 ) EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY
v. ) OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION
1
18 ) PENDING COURT REVIEW OF
CATHERINE GLAZE, an individual in her ) PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS;
19
official capacity as Title IX Coordinator at ) DECLARATION; EXHIBITS;
Stanford University; STANFORD ) PROPOSED ORDER
20
UNIVERSITY. a California corporation: and )
DOES 1 to 20 inclusive, ) Date: September 19. 2018
21 ) Time: 8:15 a.m.
Respondents. ) Dept: 6
22 )
)
)
23
24 TO THE COURT AND RESPONDENTS AND THEIR ATTORNEYS:
25 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that 0n September 19, 2018 at 8:15 a.m. in Department 6 ofthe
26 above-titled Court, located at 191 North First Street, San Jose, CA 951 13 Petitioner will, and hereby
27 does, apply ex parte for an order t0 stay the operation of Stanford University‘s administrative decision t0
23 proceed with disciplinary action against Petitioner.
EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY
1
THERE IS URGENCY BECAUSE STANFORD UNIVERSITY HAS SCHEDULED A
DISCIPLINARY HEARING FOR SEPTEMBER 25, 2018, BEFORE THE PETITION CAN BE
HEARD ON ITS MERIT OR A MOTION FOR STAY MAY BE HEARD ON NOTICE.
As shown in the verified Petition filed herein. the attached memorandum, the declaration of
Petitioner. the declaration of Mark Hathaway and exhibits filed herewith. this court should stay the
\DOONQKIIAWN—
operation of the administrative decision under Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5 subd. (g) because: (1) Petitioner
presents a colorable claim for writ relief; (2) the requested stay is not contrary to public interest, (3) and
the stay causes Respondents no prej udice while preventing irreparable harm to Petitioner’s academic
success, reputation, and standing in the academic community.
Petitioner’s motion is based on the Petition for Writ 0f Mandate; this Notice of Application and
Application; the supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities; the Declaration of Petitioner; the
Declaration of Mark M. Hathaway; the pleadings, files, and records in this action; and any such
argument as may be received by this Court at the hearing on the motion.
WERKSMAN JACKSON
HATHAWAY & QUINN LLP
September 18, 2018
NNNNNNNNNflu—A—p—t———tr—tu—d—t
Dated: By:
k M. Hathaway”
Jenna E. Parker
OONOMAWN~o~ooouomhwm—o
Attorneys for Petitioner John Doe
EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY
,7
4.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 5
..................................................................................................................
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 7
........................................................................
I. INTRODUCTION 7
......................................................................................................................
ll.
©00NONM§WN~
LEGAL AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND 7
....................................................................
A. Federal Title IX ...............................................................................................................
7
B. California Law Requirements 8
For Student Discipline ....................................................
C. Respondents’ Final Decision to Proceed With Administrative Charges isSubject to
Immediate Writ Review. 10
...............................................................................................
D. Petitioner’s Sole Remedy is Writ Relief. 11
......................................................................
E. Stanford’s Title IX Coordinator IsNot An Improper Party To The Writ Action ......... 12
Ill. STANDARD OF REVIEW 13
......................................................................................................
A. “Fair Hearing” IsReviewed De Nova ...........................................................................
13
B. Independent Judgment, a Trial De Nova, Required Where Administrative Process
Affects a Vested Fundamental Right. 13
...........................................................................
C. Internal and External Pressure on Colleges and Universities. 15
......................................
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1V. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 15
..............................................................
°°\IO\UI4>WN~o\ooo\IO\L/14>ww~o
A. Stanford’s Title IX Policies. 15
.........................................................................................
B. Summary 0f Relevant Events ........................................................................................
16
l. Stanford Initiates Title [X Charges Against 16
Petitioner .....................................
2. Stanford ’s Second Attempt (0 Initiate TitleIX Charges .................................... I7
V. ARGUMENT 18
............................................................................................................................
A. Court Should Grant the Stay in Order t0 Preserve the Status Quo. 18
..............................
B. Petitioner Has A Colorable Claim. 18
...............................................................................
C. Issuance 0f Stay Not Contrary to Public 18
Interest ..........................................................
EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY
3
1. Petitioner 's
Appellate Vindication Cannot Undo Irreparable
Damage t0 His Academic Success and Reputation Without the
I9
Stay....................................................................................................................
D. Doctrine of Judicial Non-Intervention 20
Does Not Apply ...............................................
E. Petitioner Has Complied With Ex Parte Rules for Stay . 20
.............................................
\OOONQLII-bbJNt—
1. ProofofService ofStay Request. 20
......................................................................
2. N0 Bond Required For Stay. .............................................................................
21
VI. CONCLUSION 21
.........................................................................................................................
DECLARATION OF MARK M. HATHAWAY 22
.................................................................................
PROPOSED ORDER 24
............................................................................................................................
WNO\M$WN—‘OOWNO\M$WN#O
NNNNNNNNNH-HflH-——
EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY
4
7 ¥
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Applebaum v. Board ofDirs. Q/‘Barton Mem. Hosp. (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 648 9
................................
Association of'Orange County Deputy Sheriffs v.County OfOrange (2013) 21 7
Ca1.App.4th 29 ...................................................................................................................................
18
\OOONONKIIAUJNH
Banks v. Dominican College (Cal. App. lst Dist. 1995) 35 Cal. App. 4th 1545 .................................. 20
Berlinghieri v. Department ofMotor Vehicles (1983) 33 Ca1.3d 392 14
..................................................
Berman v. Regents Q/‘University ofCalifbrnia (2014) 229 Ca1.App.4th 1265 ................................. 9,
11
Betts v.Board QfEducation (7th Cir. 1972) 466 F.2d 629 15
....................................................................
Bixby v.Pierno (1971) 4 Ca1.3d 130 .................................................................................................
9, 13
Board ofCurators Q/‘University ofMissouri v.Horowitz (1978) 435 U.S. 78 9, 15
................................
Br703v1£n
v.Superior Court ofCalifbrnia in andfor Los Angeles County (1925) 70 Cal.App.
l3
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1984) 467 U.S. 837 8
......................
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown (1979) 441 U.S. 281 8
.......................................................................................
City offlollister v. Monterey Ins. C0. (2008) 165 Ca1.App.4th 455 .....................................................
18
Clark v. City ofHermosa Beach (1996) 48 Ca1.App.4th 1152 .............................................................
13
Doe v. Baum, et al.,N0. 17-2213 (6th Cir. Sept. 7, 9
2018) ......................................................................
NNNNNNNNNHH—H-H_~—t
WN0M#WN~OOWVO\M#WNHO
Doe v. Brandeis Univ. (D. Mass. 2016) 2016 WL 7428557 .................................................................
15
Doe v. Brandeis University (D. Mass. 2016) 177 F.Supp.3d 561 15
........................................................
Doe v. Claremont McKenna College (201 8) 25 Cal.App.5th 1055 ........................................................ 9
Doe v. Regents 0f University ofCalg'fornia (201 6) 5 Cal.App.5th 1055 ................................................. 9
Doe v. University ofSouthem California (2016) 246 Ca1.App.4th 221 8, 9, 10,
................................. 13
Fahlen v. Sutter Central Valley Hospitals (2014) 58 Ca1.4th 655 13
........................................................
Friends 0fthe ()ld Trees v. Department a_f'Forestry & Fire Protection (1997) 52
Ca1.App.4th 1383 ...............................................................................................................................
11
Garfield v. Board ofMedical Examiners (1950) 99 Ca1.App.2d 219 ...................................................
13
Goss v. Lopez (1975) 419 U.S. 565 passim
...............................................................................................
EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY
5
Greenhill v. Bailey (8th Cir. 1975) 519 F.2d 5 13
.....................................................................................
Interstate Brands v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1980) 26 Cal.3d 770 14
.......................................
JKH Enters. Inc. v. Dep 't
oflndus. Rels. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1046 .............................................
14
John A. v.San Bernardino City Unified School Dist. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 301 13
........................................
OOONQLIIAUJNv—
Kuhn v. Department ofGeneral Services (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1627 9
.................................................
Meyer v. Nebraska (1923) 262 U.S. 390 14
..............................................................................................
Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center (1980) 27 Ca1.3d 614 ................................................................
13
Moran v. State Bd. ofMedicaI Examiners ofDept. QfProfessional and Vocational
Standards ofCal. (1948) 32 Cal.2d 301 12
............................................................................................
Paulsen v. Golden Gate University (1979) 25 Cal. 3d 803 20
..................................................................
Peck v.Board ofLos Angeles County Sup'rs (1891) 90 Cal. 384 .........................................................
l3
Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Society 0f0rth0d0ntists (1974) 12 Ca1.3d 541 12
.............................................
Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center v.Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 93 13
......................
Shuffer v. Board ofTrustees (1977) 67 Ca1.App.3d 208 12, 13
................................................................
Venice Canals Resident Home Owners Assn. v. Superior Court, (1977) 72 Cal. App. 3d
675 21
.....................................................................................................................................................
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Statutes
20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 7
.........................................................................................................................
wuomthflocmflam-bwwflo
Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5 passim
...............................................................................................................
Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. 12
(d) ......................................................................................................
EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY
6
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
l. INTRODUCTION
Petitioner JOHN DOE. a rising sophomore student at Stanford University (“Stanford”), is being
improperly subjected t0 an unfair Title IX sexual misconduct disciplinary process in the absence of
reasonable grounds to proceed. Respondents have failed t0 comply with Stanford University’s internal
policies
OOOOVGMAWNfl
and regulations and have failed t0 proceed in the manner required by law.
Petitioner was falsely accused by another student of engaging in sexual activity while the other
student was incapacitated by alcohol. Stanford University’s internal Title IX investigation confirmed
that the allegation was unsupported by the evidence — and that n0 reasonable panel of reviewers could
find otherwise — yet Respondents insist 0n proceeding with administrative disciplinary action against
Petitioner that could result in his expulsion from the University.
Petitioner requests a stay of the operation 0f Respondents’ administrative decision to proceed
pending court review of his Petition on two independent grounds under Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5: (1)
unfair hearing. in that Respondents' decision fails to comply with Stanford University policy; and, (2)
prejudicial abuse of discretion. in that Respondents are proceeding with a Title IX disciplinary action
contrary to the weight of the evidence that no conduct violation has occurred.
ll. LEGAL AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND'
A. Federal Title IX.
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The issue of sexual misconduct on university campuses is primarily addressed at the federal level
WNOU‘bWN—OOWNQM-kWNfl
by Title IX.2 A university violates Title IX regarding student-on—student sexual violence if: (1) the
alleged conduct is sufficiently serious t0 limit or deny a student's ability to participate in or benefit from
the school's educational programs;3 and (2) the school, upon notice, fails to take prompt and effective
'
A more complete statement of the regulatory and procedural background is setforth in the Petition
for Writ of Mandamus ("Writ Petition") at pp. 9-1 8. (Exhibit 7.)
2
Title IX ofthe Education Amendments of 1972. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688.
3
The Dept. of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) requires that conduct be evaluated from the
perspective 0f a reasonable person in the alleged victim's position, considering all the circumstances.
OCR, Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment 0f Students by School Employees. Other
Students, or Third Parties — Title IX (2001) at p.18 ("2001 Guidance”) notice of publication at 66 Fed.
Reg. 5512 Qanuary 19, 2001) http://www.ed.gov/ocr/docs/shguidehtm1. (Exhibit 1.)
EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY
7
steps reasonably calcfilated t0 end the sexual violence, eliminate the hostile environment, prevent its
recurrence, and, as appropriate, remedy itseffectsfl The Dept. 0f Education‘s Office for Civil Rights
(“OCR”). has expanded on Title IX enforcement through (a) regulations promulgated through notice-
and—comment rulemaking5 that “have the force and effect 0f law”;6 and (b) “significant guidance
documents” such as the September 201 7 “Dear Colleague
OOOONONLIIAwat—t
Letter" and the September 201 7 “Questions
and Answers 0n Title IX and Sexual Violence." (Exhibits 3 and 4.) A school’s procedures must, at a
minimum. (1) “ensure the Title IX rights 0f the complainant,” but “accord due process t0 both parties
involved”; (2) provide an “adequate, reliable, and impartial investigation”; (3) provide the complainant
and the accused student “an equal opportunity to present relevant witnesses and other evidence”); (4)
ensure that the “factfinder and decision maker . ..have adequate training 0r knowledge regarding sexual
violence”10; and (5) require proceedings t0 be documented and include written findings of fact and
summarize ”
reports that all evidence, both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence.
B. California Law Requirements For Student Discipline.
Califomia‘s procedural and substantive standards for student disciplinary proceedings begin with
Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5 subdivisions (b) and (c). which require that (1) there be “a fair trial.”which
“means that there must have been ‘a fair administrative hearing”"2; (2) the proceeding be conducted “in
the manner required by law”; (3) the decision be “supported by the findings”; and (4) the findings be
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“supported by the weight 0f the evidence," or where an administrative action does not affect vested
OONQM$WN~OCWN¢MAUJN~
4
OCR, “Questions and Answers 0n Title IX and Sexual Violence" (April 2014), (“2014 Questions
and Answers”) (Exhibit 4.)
5
2001 Guidance at p. 36 n.98. (Exhibit 1.)
6
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown (1979) 441 U.S. 281, 295, 301-02 (regulations promulgated pursuant t0
notice-and—comment rulemaking that affect individual rights and obligations “have the force and effect
of law”). The 2001 Guidance isentitled to deference under the doctrine articulated in Chevron, USA,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1984) 467 U.S. 837. 842-43.
7
2001 Guidance at p. 22. (Exhibit 1.) Students facing suspension or expulsion have interests
qualifying for protection 0fthe Due Process Clause. (Goss v. Lopez (1975) 41 9 U.S. 565. 577.)
8
2001 Guidance at p. 20. (Exhibit 1.)
9
ld.;2017 Dear Colleague Letter at p. 3. (Exhibit 3.)
'0
ld.;2001 Guidance at p. 21. (Exhibit 1.)
"
2017 Dear Colleague Letter at p. 5. (Exhibit 3.)
‘2
Doe v. University 0/‘Southern Caly’orm'a (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 221 ,
239 (citations omitted).
EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY
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fundamental rights. the findings must be “supported by substantial evidence in the light 0f the whole
record?“ In addition, a reviewing court does not "blindly seize any evidence in support of the
respondent in order t0 affirm the judgment. . .. Itmust be reasonable, .. .credible. and 0f solid value.”
(Kuhn v. Department ofGeneral Services (1 994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1627. 1633.)
Students facing suspension or expulsion have
\OOONQKII-bbJNb—
interests qualifying for protection 0f the Due
Process Clause. (Goss v. Lopez (1975) 419 U.S. 565, 577 (for suspensions of less than ten days from
high school. students are not entitled “t0 confront and cross-examine witnesses”).) The “[s]pecific
requirements for procedural due process vary depending upon the situation under consideration and the
interests involved?“ The severity 0f the deprivation isone of several factors that must be weighed in
deciding the exact due process owed the student. (Board (ngurators (3f University ofMissouri v.
Horowitz (1978) 435 U.S. 78, 86.) In this case, the deprivation 0f a lengthy suspension 0r expulsion
could not be more severe, resulting in the loss 0f an “an interest of almost incalculable value, especially
to those students who have already enrolled in the institution and begun the pursuit of their college
training.” (Goldberg v. Regents of University ofCal. (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 867, 876.)
While California law does not require any specific form 0f disciplinary hearing, a university is
bound by its own policies and procedures. (Berman v.Regents 0f University ofCalifornia (2014) 229
Cal.App.4th 1265, 1271-72.)
In California, schools must provide for the questioning of the complainant, either directly or
NNNNNNNNN—H—de—H—an—t
indirectly. by the accused
OOVOUl-bWN—‘OOOOVONMAUJN—‘O
student. (Doe v. Claremont McKenna College (201 8) 25 Ca1.App.5th 1055;
Doe v. Regents of University Qf(.'alif0rnia (2016) 5 Ca1.App.5th 1055. 1084; see also Doe v. Baum, et
al., No. 17-2213 (6th Cir. Sept. 7, 201 8) (where credibility is an issue, “the university must give the
accused student 0r his agent an opportunity t0 cross-examine the accuser and adverse witnesses in the
presence of a neutral fact-finder.”) In addition, students are to have “ample opportunity t0 hear and
observe the witnesses against them.” (Doe v. University ofSouthern California (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th
221, 246, citing Goldberg v. Regents ofUniversity Q/‘(Ialifbrnia (1967) 248 Ca1.App.2d 867, 882.)
'3
California has undertaken to protect vested fundamental rights "from untoward intrusions by the
massive apparatus of government.” (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130 142-143.)
'4
Id. at244 [quoting Applebaum v. Board ofDirs. ofBarton Mem. Hosp. (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 648,
657.
EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY
9
H A fairprocess also requires the university to present the evidence to the accused student so that
respond to the accusation: “.
the student has a reasonable opportunity to prepare a defense and to ..
requiring John to request access to the evidence against him does not comply with the requirements of a
fair hearing. [citing Goss v.Lopez (1975) 419 U.S. 565. 582.]” (Doe v. University ofSauthern
California, supra. 246 Cal.App.4th at 245-246.)
OOOONONUIAUJN
“The right t0 a fair procedure includes the right to impartial adj udicators. (Applebaum v.Board
ofDireclors. supra, 104 Ca1.App.3d 648, 658.) Moreover, "[f]aimess requires a practical method of
testing impartiality." (Hackethal v.Califbrnia Medical Assn, supra, 138 Ca1.App.3d 435, 444.)”
(Rosenblit v. Superior Court (1991) 231 Ca1.App.3d 1434, 1448.)
C. Respondents’ Final Decision t0 Proceed With Administrative Charges is Subject to
Immediate Writ Review.
The Stanford Title 1X Coordinator‘s final charge decision on May 31, 201 8 qualifies as “any
final administrative order 0r decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is
required to be given, evidence is required t0 be taken. and discretion in the determination 0f facts is
vested in the inferior tribunal, corporation, board. 0r officer.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5, subd. (a).)
Here, allthe elements for
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mandamus relief are met.
First, discretion in the determination 0f facts in order to proceed with administrative charges is
vested in Stanford‘s Title 1X Coordinator. 1n fact. Stanford appointed Title 1X Coordinator Catherine
Glaze, and
UI-bwmv—oooouamhwm—
now JillM. Thomas, in order t0 comply with federal regulations” and the Title IX
Coordinator isresponsible for monitoring Stanford‘s overall compliance with Title IX, ensuring
appropriate training and education, and overseeing the university’s investigation, response, and
resolution of reports made under the university‘s Title 1X policy.
Second. Title 1X"’ requires Stanford University to accord accused students due process in sexual
M
‘5
Stanford is a recipient of federal education funds and is bound by Title IX and its implementing
regulations. Under the Title IX regulations, a recipient designate at least one employee t0 serve as
26
its Title IX coordinator. Q 65 Fed
designated to handle Title IX complaints.
Reg. 52867 at §
The w
135(a).
recipient
Ideally, this person may
notify all
be the employee
its students and employees, 0f the
name, office, address, and telephone number of the employee(s) designated to serve as the Title IX
Coordinator. Stanford’s Policy complies with this federal requirement. (Exhibit 2, p. 4.)
'6
"The rights established under Title 1X must be interpreted consistent with any federally guaranteed
EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY
IO
misconduct disciplinary matters and California law. as shown above. requires Stanford University to
provide a fair process. Due process and a fair process each include the requirement that the university
must present the evidence t0 the accused student so that the student has a reasonable opportunity to
prepare a defense and t0 respond t0 the accusation. (Doe v. University ofSouthern California (2016) 246
\O®\IO\£II-hU)Nt—‘
Cal.App.4th 221. 245-246. citing Goss v. Lopez (1975) 419 U.S. 565, 579—580.) It is this opportunity t0
review the evidence and present a defense that helps to satisfy the hearing requirement for writ relief
under Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5.
Third, under Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5 some process in the nature of a hearing” is required and
even a “purely documentary" hearing. as isrequired at Stanford, satisfies Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5,
subd. (a). (Friends 0fthe ()ld Trees v. Department ofForestry & Fire Protection (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th
1383, 1391 .) While due process and California law do not require any specific form of hearing,
Stanford University is bound by its own policies and procedures. (Berman v. Regents ofUniversity 0f
California (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1265, 1271-72.)
Here, after the Notice of Concern was issued on April 13. 201 8 Stanford’s policy requires that:
(1) information is to be gathered from the Complainant and the Responding Student; and, (2) the Title
IX Coordinator reviews the information and evidence to decide whether the preponderance of the
evidence reasonably
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supports that the alleged Prohibited Conduct occurred. (m 2, pp. 10. 11.)
Stanford’s policy requirement of gatherin
Preview
1 MARK M. HATHAWAY. (CA 151332; DC 437335; IL 6327924: NY 2431682) 2 JENNA E. PARKER (CA 303560) 3 WERKSMAN JACKSON HATHAWAY & QUINN LLP 4 888 West Sixth Street, Fourth Floor Fl LE D Los Angeles. California 9001 7 5 Telephone: (213) 688-0460 SEP 1 9 2018 Facsimile: (213) 624-1942 6 E—Mail: mhathawav/iflwerksmaniackson.com 7 DAN ROTH (CA 270569) “wmamwdmcfi LAW OFFICE OF DAN ROTH 8 803 Hearst Avenue R. AR Berkeley. CA 94710 ‘ 9 Telephone: (510) 849-1389 1 FaCSImile: (510) 295-2680 10 E-mail: dan@drothlaw.com 11 Attorneys for Petitioner 12 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 13 FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA 14 15 JOHN DOE, an individual, ) Case No.: 18CV332751 ) 16 Petitioner. ) 17 ) EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY v. ) OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION 1 18 ) PENDING COURT REVIEW OF CATHERINE GLAZE, an individual in her ) PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS; 19 official capacity as Title IX Coordinator at ) DECLARATION; EXHIBITS; Stanford University; STANFORD ) PROPOSED ORDER 20 UNIVERSITY. a California corporation: and ) DOES 1 to 20 inclusive, ) Date: September 19. 2018 21 ) Time: 8:15 a.m. Respondents. ) Dept: 6 22 ) ) ) 23 24 TO THE COURT AND RESPONDENTS AND THEIR ATTORNEYS: 25 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that 0n September 19, 2018 at 8:15 a.m. in Department 6 ofthe 26 above-titled Court, located at 191 North First Street, San Jose, CA 951 13 Petitioner will, and hereby 27 does, apply ex parte for an order t0 stay the operation of Stanford University‘s administrative decision t0 23 proceed with disciplinary action against Petitioner. EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY 1 THERE IS URGENCY BECAUSE STANFORD UNIVERSITY HAS SCHEDULED A DISCIPLINARY HEARING FOR SEPTEMBER 25, 2018, BEFORE THE PETITION CAN BE HEARD ON ITS MERIT OR A MOTION FOR STAY MAY BE HEARD ON NOTICE. As shown in the verified Petition filed herein. the attached memorandum, the declaration of Petitioner. the declaration of Mark Hathaway and exhibits filed herewith. this court should stay the \DOONQKIIAWN— operation of the administrative decision under Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5 subd. (g) because: (1) Petitioner presents a colorable claim for writ relief; (2) the requested stay is not contrary to public interest, (3) and the stay causes Respondents no prej udice while preventing irreparable harm to Petitioner’s academic success, reputation, and standing in the academic community. Petitioner’s motion is based on the Petition for Writ 0f Mandate; this Notice of Application and Application; the supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities; the Declaration of Petitioner; the Declaration of Mark M. Hathaway; the pleadings, files, and records in this action; and any such argument as may be received by this Court at the hearing on the motion. WERKSMAN JACKSON HATHAWAY & QUINN LLP September 18, 2018 NNNNNNNNNflu—A—p—t———tr—tu—d—t Dated: By: k M. Hathaway” Jenna E. Parker OONOMAWN~o~ooouomhwm—o Attorneys for Petitioner John Doe EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY ,7 4. TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 5 .................................................................................................................. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 7 ........................................................................ I. INTRODUCTION 7 ...................................................................................................................... ll. ©00NONM§WN~ LEGAL AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND 7 .................................................................... A. Federal Title IX ............................................................................................................... 7 B. California Law Requirements 8 For Student Discipline .................................................... C. Respondents’ Final Decision to Proceed With Administrative Charges isSubject to Immediate Writ Review. 10 ............................................................................................... D. Petitioner’s Sole Remedy is Writ Relief. 11 ...................................................................... E. Stanford’s Title IX Coordinator IsNot An Improper Party To The Writ Action ......... 12 Ill. STANDARD OF REVIEW 13 ...................................................................................................... A. “Fair Hearing” IsReviewed De Nova ........................................................................... 13 B. Independent Judgment, a Trial De Nova, Required Where Administrative Process Affects a Vested Fundamental Right. 13 ........................................................................... C. Internal and External Pressure on Colleges and Universities. 15 ...................................... NNNNNNNNNn—n_p—tu—nu—nu—t—.—d_— 1V. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 15 .............................................................. °°\IO\UI4>WN~o\ooo\IO\L/14>ww~o A. Stanford’s Title IX Policies. 15 ......................................................................................... B. Summary 0f Relevant Events ........................................................................................ 16 l. Stanford Initiates Title [X Charges Against 16 Petitioner ..................................... 2. Stanford ’s Second Attempt (0 Initiate TitleIX Charges .................................... I7 V. ARGUMENT 18 ............................................................................................................................ A. Court Should Grant the Stay in Order t0 Preserve the Status Quo. 18 .............................. B. Petitioner Has A Colorable Claim. 18 ............................................................................... C. Issuance 0f Stay Not Contrary to Public 18 Interest .......................................................... EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY 3 1. Petitioner 's Appellate Vindication Cannot Undo Irreparable Damage t0 His Academic Success and Reputation Without the I9 Stay.................................................................................................................... D. Doctrine of Judicial Non-Intervention 20 Does Not Apply ............................................... E. Petitioner Has Complied With Ex Parte Rules for Stay . 20 ............................................. \OOONQLII-bbJNt— 1. ProofofService ofStay Request. 20 ...................................................................... 2. N0 Bond Required For Stay. ............................................................................. 21 VI. CONCLUSION 21 ......................................................................................................................... DECLARATION OF MARK M. HATHAWAY 22 ................................................................................. PROPOSED ORDER 24 ............................................................................................................................ WNO\M$WN—‘OOWNO\M$WN#O NNNNNNNNNH-HflH-—— EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY 4 7 ¥ TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Applebaum v. Board ofDirs. Q/‘Barton Mem. Hosp. (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 648 9 ................................ Association of'Orange County Deputy Sheriffs v.County OfOrange (2013) 21 7 Ca1.App.4th 29 ................................................................................................................................... 18 \OOONONKIIAUJNH Banks v. Dominican College (Cal. App. lst Dist. 1995) 35 Cal. App. 4th 1545 .................................. 20 Berlinghieri v. Department ofMotor Vehicles (1983) 33 Ca1.3d 392 14 .................................................. Berman v. Regents Q/‘University ofCalifbrnia (2014) 229 Ca1.App.4th 1265 ................................. 9, 11 Betts v.Board QfEducation (7th Cir. 1972) 466 F.2d 629 15 .................................................................... Bixby v.Pierno (1971) 4 Ca1.3d 130 ................................................................................................. 9, 13 Board ofCurators Q/‘University ofMissouri v.Horowitz (1978) 435 U.S. 78 9, 15 ................................ Br703v1£n v.Superior Court ofCalifbrnia in andfor Los Angeles County (1925) 70 Cal.App. l3 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1984) 467 U.S. 837 8 ...................... Chrysler Corp. v. Brown (1979) 441 U.S. 281 8 ....................................................................................... City offlollister v. Monterey Ins. C0. (2008) 165 Ca1.App.4th 455 ..................................................... 18 Clark v. City ofHermosa Beach (1996) 48 Ca1.App.4th 1152 ............................................................. 13 Doe v. Baum, et al.,N0. 17-2213 (6th Cir. Sept. 7, 9 2018) ...................................................................... NNNNNNNNNHH—H-H_~—t WN0M#WN~OOWVO\M#WNHO Doe v. Brandeis Univ. (D. Mass. 2016) 2016 WL 7428557 ................................................................. 15 Doe v. Brandeis University (D. Mass. 2016) 177 F.Supp.3d 561 15 ........................................................ Doe v. Claremont McKenna College (201 8) 25 Cal.App.5th 1055 ........................................................ 9 Doe v. Regents 0f University ofCalg'fornia (201 6) 5 Cal.App.5th 1055 ................................................. 9 Doe v. University ofSouthem California (2016) 246 Ca1.App.4th 221 8, 9, 10, ................................. 13 Fahlen v. Sutter Central Valley Hospitals (2014) 58 Ca1.4th 655 13 ........................................................ Friends 0fthe ()ld Trees v. Department a_f'Forestry & Fire Protection (1997) 52 Ca1.App.4th 1383 ............................................................................................................................... 11 Garfield v. Board ofMedical Examiners (1950) 99 Ca1.App.2d 219 ................................................... 13 Goss v. Lopez (1975) 419 U.S. 565 passim ............................................................................................... EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY 5 Greenhill v. Bailey (8th Cir. 1975) 519 F.2d 5 13 ..................................................................................... Interstate Brands v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1980) 26 Cal.3d 770 14 ....................................... JKH Enters. Inc. v. Dep 't oflndus. Rels. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1046 ............................................. 14 John A. v.San Bernardino City Unified School Dist. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 301 13 ........................................ OOONQLIIAUJNv— Kuhn v. Department ofGeneral Services (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1627 9 ................................................. Meyer v. Nebraska (1923) 262 U.S. 390 14 .............................................................................................. Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center (1980) 27 Ca1.3d 614 ................................................................ 13 Moran v. State Bd. ofMedicaI Examiners ofDept. QfProfessional and Vocational Standards ofCal. (1948) 32 Cal.2d 301 12 ............................................................................................ Paulsen v. Golden Gate University (1979) 25 Cal. 3d 803 20 .................................................................. Peck v.Board ofLos Angeles County Sup'rs (1891) 90 Cal. 384 ......................................................... l3 Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Society 0f0rth0d0ntists (1974) 12 Ca1.3d 541 12 ............................................. Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center v.Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 93 13 ...................... Shuffer v. Board ofTrustees (1977) 67 Ca1.App.3d 208 12, 13 ................................................................ Venice Canals Resident Home Owners Assn. v. Superior Court, (1977) 72 Cal. App. 3d 675 21 ..................................................................................................................................................... NNNNNNNNN—n—udflflu—nu—tp—nr—tu—a Statutes 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 7 ......................................................................................................................... wuomthflocmflam-bwwflo Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5 passim ............................................................................................................... Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. 12 (d) ...................................................................................................... EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY 6 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES l. INTRODUCTION Petitioner JOHN DOE. a rising sophomore student at Stanford University (“Stanford”), is being improperly subjected t0 an unfair Title IX sexual misconduct disciplinary process in the absence of reasonable grounds to proceed. Respondents have failed t0 comply with Stanford University’s internal policies OOOOVGMAWNfl and regulations and have failed t0 proceed in the manner required by law. Petitioner was falsely accused by another student of engaging in sexual activity while the other student was incapacitated by alcohol. Stanford University’s internal Title IX investigation confirmed that the allegation was unsupported by the evidence — and that n0 reasonable panel of reviewers could find otherwise — yet Respondents insist 0n proceeding with administrative disciplinary action against Petitioner that could result in his expulsion from the University. Petitioner requests a stay of the operation 0f Respondents’ administrative decision to proceed pending court review of his Petition on two independent grounds under Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5: (1) unfair hearing. in that Respondents' decision fails to comply with Stanford University policy; and, (2) prejudicial abuse of discretion. in that Respondents are proceeding with a Title IX disciplinary action contrary to the weight of the evidence that no conduct violation has occurred. ll. LEGAL AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND' A. Federal Title IX. NNNNNNNNNu—tHH—flu—tH—dp—n— The issue of sexual misconduct on university campuses is primarily addressed at the federal level WNOU‘bWN—OOWNQM-kWNfl by Title IX.2 A university violates Title IX regarding student-on—student sexual violence if: (1) the alleged conduct is sufficiently serious t0 limit or deny a student's ability to participate in or benefit from the school's educational programs;3 and (2) the school, upon notice, fails to take prompt and effective ' A more complete statement of the regulatory and procedural background is setforth in the Petition for Writ of Mandamus ("Writ Petition") at pp. 9-1 8. (Exhibit 7.) 2 Title IX ofthe Education Amendments of 1972. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688. 3 The Dept. of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) requires that conduct be evaluated from the perspective 0f a reasonable person in the alleged victim's position, considering all the circumstances. OCR, Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment 0f Students by School Employees. Other Students, or Third Parties — Title IX (2001) at p.18 ("2001 Guidance”) notice of publication at 66 Fed. Reg. 5512 Qanuary 19, 2001) http://www.ed.gov/ocr/docs/shguidehtm1. (Exhibit 1.) EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY 7 steps reasonably calcfilated t0 end the sexual violence, eliminate the hostile environment, prevent its recurrence, and, as appropriate, remedy itseffectsfl The Dept. 0f Education‘s Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”). has expanded on Title IX enforcement through (a) regulations promulgated through notice- and—comment rulemaking5 that “have the force and effect 0f law”;6 and (b) “significant guidance documents” such as the September 201 7 “Dear Colleague OOOONONLIIAwat—t Letter" and the September 201 7 “Questions and Answers 0n Title IX and Sexual Violence." (Exhibits 3 and 4.) A school’s procedures must, at a minimum. (1) “ensure the Title IX rights 0f the complainant,” but “accord due process t0 both parties involved”; (2) provide an “adequate, reliable, and impartial investigation”; (3) provide the complainant and the accused student “an equal opportunity to present relevant witnesses and other evidence”); (4) ensure that the “factfinder and decision maker . ..have adequate training 0r knowledge regarding sexual violence”10; and (5) require proceedings t0 be documented and include written findings of fact and summarize ” reports that all evidence, both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. B. California Law Requirements For Student Discipline. Califomia‘s procedural and substantive standards for student disciplinary proceedings begin with Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5 subdivisions (b) and (c). which require that (1) there be “a fair trial.”which “means that there must have been ‘a fair administrative hearing”"2; (2) the proceeding be conducted “in the manner required by law”; (3) the decision be “supported by the findings”; and (4) the findings be NNNNNNNNNHu——n—Au—np—tn—t—~—a “supported by the weight 0f the evidence," or where an administrative action does not affect vested OONQM$WN~OCWN¢MAUJN~ 4 OCR, “Questions and Answers 0n Title IX and Sexual Violence" (April 2014), (“2014 Questions and Answers”) (Exhibit 4.) 5 2001 Guidance at p. 36 n.98. (Exhibit 1.) 6 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown (1979) 441 U.S. 281, 295, 301-02 (regulations promulgated pursuant t0 notice-and—comment rulemaking that affect individual rights and obligations “have the force and effect of law”). The 2001 Guidance isentitled to deference under the doctrine articulated in Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1984) 467 U.S. 837. 842-43. 7 2001 Guidance at p. 22. (Exhibit 1.) Students facing suspension or expulsion have interests qualifying for protection 0fthe Due Process Clause. (Goss v. Lopez (1975) 41 9 U.S. 565. 577.) 8 2001 Guidance at p. 20. (Exhibit 1.) 9 ld.;2017 Dear Colleague Letter at p. 3. (Exhibit 3.) '0 ld.;2001 Guidance at p. 21. (Exhibit 1.) " 2017 Dear Colleague Letter at p. 5. (Exhibit 3.) ‘2 Doe v. University 0/‘Southern Caly’orm'a (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 221 , 239 (citations omitted). EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY 8 fundamental rights. the findings must be “supported by substantial evidence in the light 0f the whole record?“ In addition, a reviewing court does not "blindly seize any evidence in support of the respondent in order t0 affirm the judgment. . .. Itmust be reasonable, .. .credible. and 0f solid value.” (Kuhn v. Department ofGeneral Services (1 994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1627. 1633.) Students facing suspension or expulsion have \OOONQKII-bbJNb— interests qualifying for protection 0f the Due Process Clause. (Goss v. Lopez (1975) 419 U.S. 565, 577 (for suspensions of less than ten days from high school. students are not entitled “t0 confront and cross-examine witnesses”).) The “[s]pecific requirements for procedural due process vary depending upon the situation under consideration and the interests involved?“ The severity 0f the deprivation isone of several factors that must be weighed in deciding the exact due process owed the student. (Board (ngurators (3f University ofMissouri v. Horowitz (1978) 435 U.S. 78, 86.) In this case, the deprivation 0f a lengthy suspension 0r expulsion could not be more severe, resulting in the loss 0f an “an interest of almost incalculable value, especially to those students who have already enrolled in the institution and begun the pursuit of their college training.” (Goldberg v. Regents of University ofCal. (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 867, 876.) While California law does not require any specific form 0f disciplinary hearing, a university is bound by its own policies and procedures. (Berman v.Regents 0f University ofCalifornia (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1265, 1271-72.) In California, schools must provide for the questioning of the complainant, either directly or NNNNNNNNN—H—de—H—an—t indirectly. by the accused OOVOUl-bWN—‘OOOOVONMAUJN—‘O student. (Doe v. Claremont McKenna College (201 8) 25 Ca1.App.5th 1055; Doe v. Regents of University Qf(.'alif0rnia (2016) 5 Ca1.App.5th 1055. 1084; see also Doe v. Baum, et al., No. 17-2213 (6th Cir. Sept. 7, 201 8) (where credibility is an issue, “the university must give the accused student 0r his agent an opportunity t0 cross-examine the accuser and adverse witnesses in the presence of a neutral fact-finder.”) In addition, students are to have “ample opportunity t0 hear and observe the witnesses against them.” (Doe v. University ofSouthern California (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 221, 246, citing Goldberg v. Regents ofUniversity Q/‘(Ialifbrnia (1967) 248 Ca1.App.2d 867, 882.) '3 California has undertaken to protect vested fundamental rights "from untoward intrusions by the massive apparatus of government.” (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130 142-143.) '4 Id. at244 [quoting Applebaum v. Board ofDirs. ofBarton Mem. Hosp. (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 648, 657. EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY 9 H A fairprocess also requires the university to present the evidence to the accused student so that respond to the accusation: “. the student has a reasonable opportunity to prepare a defense and to .. requiring John to request access to the evidence against him does not comply with the requirements of a fair hearing. [citing Goss v.Lopez (1975) 419 U.S. 565. 582.]” (Doe v. University ofSauthern California, supra. 246 Cal.App.4th at 245-246.) OOOONONUIAUJN “The right t0 a fair procedure includes the right to impartial adj udicators. (Applebaum v.Board ofDireclors. supra, 104 Ca1.App.3d 648, 658.) Moreover, "[f]aimess requires a practical method of testing impartiality." (Hackethal v.Califbrnia Medical Assn, supra, 138 Ca1.App.3d 435, 444.)” (Rosenblit v. Superior Court (1991) 231 Ca1.App.3d 1434, 1448.) C. Respondents’ Final Decision t0 Proceed With Administrative Charges is Subject to Immediate Writ Review. The Stanford Title 1X Coordinator‘s final charge decision on May 31, 201 8 qualifies as “any final administrative order 0r decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required t0 be taken. and discretion in the determination 0f facts is vested in the inferior tribunal, corporation, board. 0r officer.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5, subd. (a).) Here, allthe elements for NNNNNN—dflpdu—fl—‘n—du—A—u—d mandamus relief are met. First, discretion in the determination 0f facts in order to proceed with administrative charges is vested in Stanford‘s Title 1X Coordinator. 1n fact. Stanford appointed Title 1X Coordinator Catherine Glaze, and UI-bwmv—oooouamhwm— now JillM. Thomas, in order t0 comply with federal regulations” and the Title IX Coordinator isresponsible for monitoring Stanford‘s overall compliance with Title IX, ensuring appropriate training and education, and overseeing the university’s investigation, response, and resolution of reports made under the university‘s Title 1X policy. Second. Title 1X"’ requires Stanford University to accord accused students due process in sexual M ‘5 Stanford is a recipient of federal education funds and is bound by Title IX and its implementing regulations. Under the Title IX regulations, a recipient designate at least one employee t0 serve as 26 its Title IX coordinator. Q 65 Fed designated to handle Title IX complaints. Reg. 52867 at § The w 135(a). recipient Ideally, this person may notify all be the employee its students and employees, 0f the name, office, address, and telephone number of the employee(s) designated to serve as the Title IX Coordinator. Stanford’s Policy complies with this federal requirement. (Exhibit 2, p. 4.) '6 "The rights established under Title 1X must be interpreted consistent with any federally guaranteed EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY IO misconduct disciplinary matters and California law. as shown above. requires Stanford University to provide a fair process. Due process and a fair process each include the requirement that the university must present the evidence t0 the accused student so that the student has a reasonable opportunity to prepare a defense and t0 respond t0 the accusation. (Doe v. University ofSouthern California (2016) 246 \O®\IO\£II-hU)Nt—‘ Cal.App.4th 221. 245-246. citing Goss v. Lopez (1975) 419 U.S. 565, 579—580.) It is this opportunity t0 review the evidence and present a defense that helps to satisfy the hearing requirement for writ relief under Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5. Third, under Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5 some process in the nature of a hearing” is required and even a “purely documentary" hearing. as isrequired at Stanford, satisfies Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5, subd. (a). (Friends 0fthe ()ld Trees v. Department ofForestry & Fire Protection (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1391 .) While due process and California law do not require any specific form of hearing, Stanford University is bound by its own policies and procedures. (Berman v. Regents ofUniversity 0f California (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1265, 1271-72.) Here, after the Notice of Concern was issued on April 13. 201 8 Stanford’s policy requires that: (1) information is to be gathered from the Complainant and the Responding Student; and, (2) the Title IX Coordinator reviews the information and evidence to decide whether the preponderance of the evidence reasonably NNNNNNNNN—Iu—u—I—u—n—du—tu—t—n— supports that the alleged Prohibited Conduct occurred. (m 2, pp. 10. 11.) Stanford’s policy requirement of gatherin