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APP-022
[ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY ‘STATE BAR NUMBER:
NAME:
FIRM NAME:
/STREET ADDRESS:
lorry: STATE: ZIP CODE:
TELEPHONE NO.: FAXNO:
E-MAIL ADDRESS:
JATTORNEY FOR (name):
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
‘STREET ADDRESS: 400 McALLISTER STREET, DEPT. 306
MAILING ADDRESS: 400 McALLISTER STREET, ROOM 103
CITY AND ZIP CODE: SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94102
BRANCH NAME: CIVIC CENTER COURTHOUSE
PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER: FRANCISCO GUACAMAYA GARCIA,
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: CHAMPION STEAM CLEANING, INC., et al.
OTHER PARENT/PARTY:
FOR COURT USE ONLY
D
San Francisco County Superior Court
JUN 0 5'2020
cee OF al COURT
leputy Clerk
ORDER ON APPELLANT'S PROPOSED SETTLED STATEMENT
‘SUPERIOR COURT CASE NUMBER:
CGC-14-540994
(UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE) ‘COURT OF APPEAL CASE NUMBER (if known):
cm Amended (If applicable, specify 1st, 2nd, 3rd, etc. amended form.) | A157124
1, The court has received and reviewed the following:
a. Appellant's Proposed Settled Statement (Unlimited Civil Case) (form APP-014) [—] Amended
filed by the appellant on (date):
b. Response to Appellant's Proposed Settled Statement (Unlimited Civil Case) (form APP-020) [__] Amended
filed by the respondent on (date):
c. [__] Other (specify):
2. The court makes the following order:
a. [__] Certification. The court certifies that the statement proposed by the appellant in item 1a is an accurate summary of the
testimony and other evidence that is relevant to the appellant's reasons for the appeal. The court settles the statement
and certifies that it is ready to be sent to the Court of Appeal.
b. [__] Court reporter transcript required. The trial court proceedings in this case were reported by a court reporter. Instead of
correcting the settled statement, the court orders under rule 8.137(f)(2) of the California Rules of Court that a transcript be
prepared as the record of these proceedings. (Check the court’s local rules to make sure the court has a rule providing
that this option is available.)
c, [[X] Corrections required. Corrections are needed for the settled statement proposed by the appellant to be an accurate
summary of the evidence and testimony for the issues the court addressed in the order or judgment being appealed.
A modified settled statement is attached to this order. See 2.f., below.
(2) [_] The appellant is ordered to prepare a settled statement incorporating the modifications listed below and to serve and
file the modified statement.
(a)
(b)
Page 1of2
Fem Approved for Onional Use ORDER ON APPELLANT'S PROPOSED SETTLED STATEMENT Gat. Rules of Court ue 8.197
‘APP.022 [New January 1, 2019] (UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE)
wwnw.courts.ca.govAPP-022
PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER: FRANCISCO GUACAMAYA GARCIA cac14.540994
DEFENDANTIRESPONDENT: CHAMPION STEAM CLEANING, INC,, et al SFG EL RSE
OTHER PARENT/PARTY: A157124
2. c. (2) Court orders (continued):
© ¢
(d)
(e)
(3) [) Additional corrections required. More corrections than could be listed above were needed in order for the settled
statement proposed by the appellant to be an accurate summary of the testimony and other evidence that is relevant
to the issues the appellant indicated are the reasons for this appeal. A list of required modifications is attached. The
appellant is ordered to prepare a statement incorporating these modifications and serve and file the modified
statement. .
d. [_] Material required for the proposed settled statement to comply with rule 8.137.
(1) [__] The proposed settled statement does not contain the following material required by rule 8.137.
(2) [) The appellant is ordered to prepare a new proposed settled statement that includes this material.
e. [__] The new or modified proposed settled statement must be served and filed by (date):
f. [2¢] Other orders are specified below:
The court finds that the Appellant's proposed settled statement is inaccurate. The court further finds that the Statement of
Decision filed January 28, 2019 and the Order Denying Motion for New Trial filed April 2, 2019, both attached hereto,
report what actually transpired at trial and adopts the same as the Modified Settled Statement.
Date: 6 spo
t
Richard B. Ulmer Jr. PAL BUY,
(TYPE OR PRINT NAME) ‘SIGNATURE OF TRIAL COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER
‘APP.022 [New January 1, 2019] ORDER ON APPELLANT'S PROPOSED SETTLED STATEMENT Page 2 of
(UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE)ATTACHMENT A© 3
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN FRANCIS D
LE.)
JAN
282018
CLERK OF iE on
BY.
FRANCISCO GUACAMAYA GARCIA, Case No. CGC-14-540994
Plaintiff,
vs STATEMENT OF DECISION
CHAMPION STEAM CLEANING, INC., et
3
Defendants,
In this wage and hour case, I find for defendant Shenbao Huang, because he was covered
by a settlement agreement.
In 2014, Francisco Guacamaya Garcia filed 10 wage and hour claims against Chuan
Tang; Tang’s wife, Lijia Chang, and three corporations. Garcia had been employed to steam.
clean restaurant kitchens.
In 2016, Garcia named Shenbao Huang as a Doe defendant, asserting that Huang “was a
manager of Tang’s Power Wash, Inc.” The trial testimony was that Huang gave Garcia steam-
cleaning job assignments while Huang worked at a gas station.
.. Tang and Chang made bankruptcy filings. In January 2018, they settled bankruptcy
litigation with Garcia, as well as our case (No. CGC-14-540994) and a similar state court case by
another ex-employee, Nekis Oliver De Leon-Garcia. The settlement agreement provided that the© °
“litigation” involving Tang, Chang, Garcia and De Leon-Garcia was all settled; the agreement
listed the two bankruptcy litigations and the two state court cases. (Ex. E.) The agreement
provided that by February 2, 2018 “Garcia shall file” in our case “a Notice of Settlement
consistent with California law.” Garcia never filed a notice of settlement.
The settlement agreement provided for Garcia and De Leon-Garcia to receive $15,000
from Chang. Huang’s post-trial brief asserted — and Garcia’s reply did not dispute — that the two
plaintiffs were also to receive “at least 50%” of sales proceeds — “or $150,000” — from a Vallejo
property Tang and Chang transferred to the bankruptcy trustee.
c] f La
A threshold issue to all of Garcia’s claims against Huang is whether the January 2018
settlement agreement released those claims. Because I find that it did, Huang cannot be liable
and no other issue need be reached.
The first and foremost step in construing a settlement agreement — as any contract — is to
consider its plain language. (Civ. Code §§1635, 1638.) The January 2018 agreement stated that
it settled the “litigation,” including our litigation (Case No. CGC-14-540994). The agreement
does not say that only parts of the litigation were settled — ¢.g., just certain claims, cases or
parties. Rather, the 2018 settlement was of the entire case, including claims against Huang, who
was named a defendant back in 2016.
This view of the settlement agreement is confirmed by the agreement’s requirement that
“Mr. De Leon-Garcia and Mr. Garcia shall file and serve in their respective State Court Actions a
Notice of Settlement consistent with California law.” In California law, the term “notice of
settlement” appears only in Rule of Court 3.1385, where it means a notice of settlement of “an
entire case.” (Id.; Form CM-200 (“Notice of Settlement of Entire Case”).) That this is the© 3
“Notice of Settlement” the agreement meant is further confirmed by the fact thatthe notice was
required to be filed “[o]n or before February 2, 2018” (two weeks after the settlement was
signed), consistent with the court rule’s “immediately file” requirement. (CRC 3.1385.) That
Garcia did not in fact file the required “Notice of Settlement” ~ immediately, or ever — adds yet a
third layer of confirmation. Garcia’s counsel no doubt knew the case could not proceed against
Huang if Garcia met his contractual obligation to file the notice of settlement of the entire case.
In short, as Huang asserts, he was a third-party beneficiary of an agreement that settled
this entire case.
Warring with the settlement agreement’s plain language, Garcia’s post-trial briefs make
several arguments, all bereft of authority and all unavailing.
First, Garcia says “Huang failed to present a shred of evidence” that the settlement
agreement “applied to any other entities” besides Tang and Chang. Not so. Beyond the
settlement agreement’s plain language itself (Ex. E), Tang testified at trial that the agreement
applied to the other defendants in our case, e.g., Huang.
Second, Garcia notes that the corporations were not named parties in the bankruptcy
litigation. However, the settlement agreement covered not just the bankruptcy cases, but our
case as well.
Third, Garcia says that if “the parties intended to have a global settlement they would
have stated so.” They did. The settlement agreement expressly covered all “litigation” involving
Tang, Chang, Garcia and De Leon-Garcia without excepting any part of the litigation.
Moreover, the agreement required Garcia to file a “Notice of Settlement” of this “entire case.”
(Ex. E; CRC 3.1385; Form CM-200 (“Notice of Settlement of Entire Case”).)ee we!
Cc °o
Fourth, Garcia finds it telling that Huang filed no summary judgment motion. I do not.
Parties have many reasons for not filing such motions, not the least expense.
Fifth, Garcia says the settlement agreement did not cover the period when Tang’s Power
Wash was in operation, because Tang testified he was not its owner. However, the settlement
agreement states no time restriction. Moreover, Garcia sued Tang’s Power Wash, Inc., alleging
that Tang and it were each other’s agents. In settling the “litigation”/“entire case,” Tang had
every incentive to benefit Tang’s Power Wash (and thus himself).
After the evidence closed at trial, the parties stipulated to a post-trial procedure: each
would submit two briefs on an agreed schedule and I would issue a proposed statement of
decision, on which the parties could then set a hearing.
After the proposed statement of decision issued, Garcia submitted still more briefing and
additional putative evidence. Both are improper.
Garcia’s counsel also demanded that the statement of decision address a long list of
issues she deems material. However, material issues are only those “essential to the judgment
and closely and directly related to the trial court’s determination of the ultimate issues in the
case.” (Kuffel v. Seaside Oil Co. (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 555, 565.) Here, the ultimate issue is
whether Huang was covered by the settlement agreement. I rule that he is, which disposes of all
other issues. /
As to Garcia’s “specific objections and request for clarification,” I rule as follows.
Objection 1. “Page 2, line 17 of the decision ‘Rather ‘settlement was of the entire case,
including claims against Huang.”
Ruling. The proposed statement of decision addressed this point fully.© 9
Objection 2. “Page 3, line 4 and 5. ‘Garcia did not file the Notice of Settlement’ to
breach his contractual obligation. Nekis Garcia filed the Notice of the Settlement of the Entire
case because his case did settle entirely.”
Ruling. Garcia does not dispute that he never filed a notice of settlement as the
settlement agreement required him to; this is confirmed by our court’s register of actions. On the
other hand, “Nekis Garcia” (Mr. De Leon-Garcia) did file a notice of settlement in his state court
action. This reinforces the point that Garcia too was required to file a notice of settlement in his
action, as the settlement agreement treated De Leon-Garcia and Garcia the same. (Ex. E: “Mr.
De Leon-Garcia and Mr. Garcia shall file and serve in their respective State Court Actions a
Notice of Settlement consistent with California law.”).)
Objection 3. “Page 3, line 16. ‘the settlement agreement covers not just the bankruptcy
cases but our case as well.”
Ruling. Garcia argues that “no evidence exists to support this statement,” but, as shown
above, the settlement agreement (Ex. E) expressly covered our case. Moreover, as also shown
above, the testimony at trial established that Huang was covered by the settlement.
EERE
Judgment is for defendant Shenbao Huang on all the claims by Francisco Guacamaya
Garcia in this action. Jurisdiction is reserved for any post-trial motions.
Dated: January 26, 2019
SG
Richard B. Ulmer Jr.
Judge of the Superior CourtGarcia v. Champion Steam Cleaning, et al. Case No: CGC-14-540994
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL (C.C.P. §1013)
The undersigned certifies, under penalty of perjury, that: | am employed in the city and
County of San Francisco, California, am over the age of 18 years, and am not a party to
the within action. I served the attached Statement of Decision by enclosing a true copy
thereof in an envelope(s) addressed as shown below and placing the envelope(s) for
collection and mailing on January 28, 2019 in San Francisco, California following the
Court's ordinary practices. | am readily familiar with the Court's practice for collecting
and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is
placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with
the United States Postal Service in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid.
Svetiana M. Shirinova, Esq. Jeffrey A. Needeiman, Esq.
Law Offices of Svetlana M. Shirinova Attorney at Law
870 Market Street, Suite 948 P.O. Box 471146 |
San Francisco, CA 94102 San Francisco, CA 94147-1146
Dated: January 28, 2019 By: fh :
R. Michael
Deputy Court ClerkATTACHMENT BS/
© : °
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFO!
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO FILED
APROZ200
Ci OF THE COURT
By: -
FRANCISCO GUACAMAYA GARCIA, Case No. CGC-14-540994
Plaintift’
vs.
CHAMPION STEAM CLEANING, INC., et
Mp
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL
Defendants.
Plaintiff Francisco Guacamaya Garcia moves for a new trial. His arguments are
unavailing, so the motion is denied:
First, Garcia contends that his objections to the proposed statement of decision were not
accounted for. (MNT 1:19-23.) Not so. The statement of decision sets out and addresses each
objection filed. (SoD; at 4-5 (“Rulings on Objections to Proposed Statement of Decision”).)
Second, Garcia notes that the settlement agreement ~ Exhibit Eon the trial exhibit list —
was not formally entered into evidence, though it was repeatedly identified, addressed and
treated as evidence at trial. (MNT 1:24-28.) This was an oversight, but it is of no moment.
(Bank of Costa Mesa v. Losack (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 287, 292.) The settlement agreement was
testified to on multiple days at trial, putting the agreement’s terms into evidence.
Third, Garcia notes that a blank California Judicial Form CM-200 was not “admitted into
evidence.” (MNT 1:28, It would have been improper fo admit this adjunct to California Rule of
Court 3.1385 “into evidence:” Rather, judicial notice of such official forms is mandatory,
1NZ So
“{e]ven without a party’s request.” (Evid. Code §451(c); 2 Jefferson’s California Evidence
Benchbook (4th ed. 2009) §49.15.)!
Fourth, Garcia contends that no extrinsic evidence regarding the settlement agreement
was introduced at trial. (MNT 4:1.) Again, this is not true, Garcia and Isaac Tang both testified
to their understandings of the settlement agreement at trial.
Fifth, Garcia asserts that defendant Shenbao Huang did not raise “the third-party
beneficiary theory.” (MNT 4:2-6.) Actually, Huang raised the theory repeatedly —e.g,, in his
pre-trial brief, in opening statement, during testimony and argument at trial, and in post-trial
briefing. Moreover, Garcia addressed the theory in his own briefing.
Sixth, Garcia “reasserts” several arguments already addressed and rejected in the
statement of decision. (MNT 5:10-7:4.) Rather than repeat its findings and rulings, Iincorporate
the statement of decision here by reference.
Seventh, Garcia argues in @ reply brief that opposing counsel “breached the
“confidentiality clause” of the settlement agreement (Ex. E). By statute, this reply brief and its
accompanying docutnents cannot be considered, as they were served more than a month late.
(CCP §659a.)’ Even were it possible tp consider them, the belated arguments would have to be.
rejected for several reasons: (a) Isaac Tang’s trial testimony about the settlement agreement was
expressly authorized by the agreement, as he was a party “served with process” (Ex. E p. 2), (b)
Garcia waived any confidentiality argument by himself testifying about the settlement agreement
+ Garcia also complains that the defense did not cite to the Judicial Council form, but courts are not limited to
authorities cited by counsel.
* CCP. §659a provides that thé moving party on a new trial motion “shall” file his reply brief and any accompanying
documents within five days after the opposition brief is served. Here, the opposition states that it was served by
U.S. Mail and e-mail on February 18, 2019. Garcia's reply brief is dated March 27, 2019. Erikson v. Weiner (1996)
48 Cal.App.4th 1663, 1672-73 holds that §659’s deadlines are “mandatory” —i.e., “jurisdictional.”
24
© oO
at trial? (c) Garcia could ave moved to seal parts of the record he believed confidential, but did
not do so (see: cRC 2.550).and (d) the authoritiés Garcia cites go to “communications exchanged
as part of” a mediation process, not to a settlement agreement resulting from that process.*
Dated: April 2, 2019
Mth b Lf
Richard B, Ulmer Jt.
- Judge of the Superior Court
3 another topic of Garcia's belated reply papers is opposing counsel's attachment of the settlement agreement to a
motion in imine. | did not rely on that attachment in thestatement of decision.and-do not rely.on it in this order.
* Minutes beforé the hearing on the new ‘trial motion, Garcia’s counsel presented'an unfiled “ex parte application
for disqualification of defense counsel.” ‘Garcia may file a regular noticed motion‘on that’ ‘topic If he wishes,
.3Garcia v. Champion Steam Cleaning, et al. Case No: CGC-14-540994
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL (C.C.P. §1013)
The undersigned certifies, under penalty of perjury, that: | am employed in the city and
County of San Francisco, California, am-over the age of 18 years, and am not a party to
the within action. | served the attached Order on Appellant’s Proposed Settled
Statement by enclosing a true copy thereof in an envelope(s) addressed as shown
below and placing the envelope(s) for collection and mailing on June 5, 2020 in San
Francisco, California following the Court's ordinary practices. | am readily familiar with
the Court's practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the
same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the
ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service in a sealed envelope
with postage fully prepaid.
Svetlana M. Shirinova, Esq. Jeffrey A. Needelman, Esq.
Law Offices of Svetlana M. Shirinova Attorney at Law
870 Market Street, Suite 948 P.O. Box 471146
San Francisco, CA 94102 San Francisco, CA 94147-1146
Dated: June 5, 2020 : By: eh, L! » Q
R. Michael Dilés
Deputy Court Clerk
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APP-022 [ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY ‘STATE BAR NUMBER: NAME: FIRM NAME: /STREET ADDRESS: lorry: STATE: ZIP CODE: TELEPHONE NO.: FAXNO: E-MAIL ADDRESS: JATTORNEY FOR (name): SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO ‘STREET ADDRESS: 400 McALLISTER STREET, DEPT. 306 MAILING ADDRESS: 400 McALLISTER STREET, ROOM 103 CITY AND ZIP CODE: SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94102 BRANCH NAME: CIVIC CENTER COURTHOUSE PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER: FRANCISCO GUACAMAYA GARCIA, DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: CHAMPION STEAM CLEANING, INC., et al. OTHER PARENT/PARTY: FOR COURT USE ONLY D San Francisco County Superior Court JUN 0 5'2020 cee OF al COURT leputy Clerk ORDER ON APPELLANT'S PROPOSED SETTLED STATEMENT ‘SUPERIOR COURT CASE NUMBER: CGC-14-540994 (UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE) ‘COURT OF APPEAL CASE NUMBER (if known): cm Amended (If applicable, specify 1st, 2nd, 3rd, etc. amended form.) | A157124 1, The court has received and reviewed the following: a. Appellant's Proposed Settled Statement (Unlimited Civil Case) (form APP-014) [—] Amended filed by the appellant on (date): b. Response to Appellant's Proposed Settled Statement (Unlimited Civil Case) (form APP-020) [__] Amended filed by the respondent on (date): c. [__] Other (specify): 2. The court makes the following order: a. [__] Certification. The court certifies that the statement proposed by the appellant in item 1a is an accurate summary of the testimony and other evidence that is relevant to the appellant's reasons for the appeal. The court settles the statement and certifies that it is ready to be sent to the Court of Appeal. b. [__] Court reporter transcript required. The trial court proceedings in this case were reported by a court reporter. Instead of correcting the settled statement, the court orders under rule 8.137(f)(2) of the California Rules of Court that a transcript be prepared as the record of these proceedings. (Check the court’s local rules to make sure the court has a rule providing that this option is available.) c, [[X] Corrections required. Corrections are needed for the settled statement proposed by the appellant to be an accurate summary of the evidence and testimony for the issues the court addressed in the order or judgment being appealed. A modified settled statement is attached to this order. See 2.f., below. (2) [_] The appellant is ordered to prepare a settled statement incorporating the modifications listed below and to serve and file the modified statement. (a) (b) Page 1of2 Fem Approved for Onional Use ORDER ON APPELLANT'S PROPOSED SETTLED STATEMENT Gat. Rules of Court ue 8.197 ‘APP.022 [New January 1, 2019] (UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE) wwnw.courts.ca.govAPP-022 PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER: FRANCISCO GUACAMAYA GARCIA cac14.540994 DEFENDANTIRESPONDENT: CHAMPION STEAM CLEANING, INC,, et al SFG EL RSE OTHER PARENT/PARTY: A157124 2. c. (2) Court orders (continued): © ¢ (d) (e) (3) [) Additional corrections required. More corrections than could be listed above were needed in order for the settled statement proposed by the appellant to be an accurate summary of the testimony and other evidence that is relevant to the issues the appellant indicated are the reasons for this appeal. A list of required modifications is attached. The appellant is ordered to prepare a statement incorporating these modifications and serve and file the modified statement. . d. [_] Material required for the proposed settled statement to comply with rule 8.137. (1) [__] The proposed settled statement does not contain the following material required by rule 8.137. (2) [) The appellant is ordered to prepare a new proposed settled statement that includes this material. e. [__] The new or modified proposed settled statement must be served and filed by (date): f. [2¢] Other orders are specified below: The court finds that the Appellant's proposed settled statement is inaccurate. The court further finds that the Statement of Decision filed January 28, 2019 and the Order Denying Motion for New Trial filed April 2, 2019, both attached hereto, report what actually transpired at trial and adopts the same as the Modified Settled Statement. Date: 6 spo t Richard B. Ulmer Jr. PAL BUY, (TYPE OR PRINT NAME) ‘SIGNATURE OF TRIAL COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER ‘APP.022 [New January 1, 2019] ORDER ON APPELLANT'S PROPOSED SETTLED STATEMENT Page 2 of (UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE)ATTACHMENT A© 3 THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN FRANCIS D LE.) JAN 282018 CLERK OF iE on BY. FRANCISCO GUACAMAYA GARCIA, Case No. CGC-14-540994 Plaintiff, vs STATEMENT OF DECISION CHAMPION STEAM CLEANING, INC., et 3 Defendants, In this wage and hour case, I find for defendant Shenbao Huang, because he was covered by a settlement agreement. In 2014, Francisco Guacamaya Garcia filed 10 wage and hour claims against Chuan Tang; Tang’s wife, Lijia Chang, and three corporations. Garcia had been employed to steam. clean restaurant kitchens. In 2016, Garcia named Shenbao Huang as a Doe defendant, asserting that Huang “was a manager of Tang’s Power Wash, Inc.” The trial testimony was that Huang gave Garcia steam- cleaning job assignments while Huang worked at a gas station. .. Tang and Chang made bankruptcy filings. In January 2018, they settled bankruptcy litigation with Garcia, as well as our case (No. CGC-14-540994) and a similar state court case by another ex-employee, Nekis Oliver De Leon-Garcia. The settlement agreement provided that the© ° “litigation” involving Tang, Chang, Garcia and De Leon-Garcia was all settled; the agreement listed the two bankruptcy litigations and the two state court cases. (Ex. E.) The agreement provided that by February 2, 2018 “Garcia shall file” in our case “a Notice of Settlement consistent with California law.” Garcia never filed a notice of settlement. The settlement agreement provided for Garcia and De Leon-Garcia to receive $15,000 from Chang. Huang’s post-trial brief asserted — and Garcia’s reply did not dispute — that the two plaintiffs were also to receive “at least 50%” of sales proceeds — “or $150,000” — from a Vallejo property Tang and Chang transferred to the bankruptcy trustee. c] f La A threshold issue to all of Garcia’s claims against Huang is whether the January 2018 settlement agreement released those claims. Because I find that it did, Huang cannot be liable and no other issue need be reached. The first and foremost step in construing a settlement agreement — as any contract — is to consider its plain language. (Civ. Code §§1635, 1638.) The January 2018 agreement stated that it settled the “litigation,” including our litigation (Case No. CGC-14-540994). The agreement does not say that only parts of the litigation were settled — ¢.g., just certain claims, cases or parties. Rather, the 2018 settlement was of the entire case, including claims against Huang, who was named a defendant back in 2016. This view of the settlement agreement is confirmed by the agreement’s requirement that “Mr. De Leon-Garcia and Mr. Garcia shall file and serve in their respective State Court Actions a Notice of Settlement consistent with California law.” In California law, the term “notice of settlement” appears only in Rule of Court 3.1385, where it means a notice of settlement of “an entire case.” (Id.; Form CM-200 (“Notice of Settlement of Entire Case”).) That this is the© 3 “Notice of Settlement” the agreement meant is further confirmed by the fact thatthe notice was required to be filed “[o]n or before February 2, 2018” (two weeks after the settlement was signed), consistent with the court rule’s “immediately file” requirement. (CRC 3.1385.) That Garcia did not in fact file the required “Notice of Settlement” ~ immediately, or ever — adds yet a third layer of confirmation. Garcia’s counsel no doubt knew the case could not proceed against Huang if Garcia met his contractual obligation to file the notice of settlement of the entire case. In short, as Huang asserts, he was a third-party beneficiary of an agreement that settled this entire case. Warring with the settlement agreement’s plain language, Garcia’s post-trial briefs make several arguments, all bereft of authority and all unavailing. First, Garcia says “Huang failed to present a shred of evidence” that the settlement agreement “applied to any other entities” besides Tang and Chang. Not so. Beyond the settlement agreement’s plain language itself (Ex. E), Tang testified at trial that the agreement applied to the other defendants in our case, e.g., Huang. Second, Garcia notes that the corporations were not named parties in the bankruptcy litigation. However, the settlement agreement covered not just the bankruptcy cases, but our case as well. Third, Garcia says that if “the parties intended to have a global settlement they would have stated so.” They did. The settlement agreement expressly covered all “litigation” involving Tang, Chang, Garcia and De Leon-Garcia without excepting any part of the litigation. Moreover, the agreement required Garcia to file a “Notice of Settlement” of this “entire case.” (Ex. E; CRC 3.1385; Form CM-200 (“Notice of Settlement of Entire Case”).)ee we! Cc °o Fourth, Garcia finds it telling that Huang filed no summary judgment motion. I do not. Parties have many reasons for not filing such motions, not the least expense. Fifth, Garcia says the settlement agreement did not cover the period when Tang’s Power Wash was in operation, because Tang testified he was not its owner. However, the settlement agreement states no time restriction. Moreover, Garcia sued Tang’s Power Wash, Inc., alleging that Tang and it were each other’s agents. In settling the “litigation”/“entire case,” Tang had every incentive to benefit Tang’s Power Wash (and thus himself). After the evidence closed at trial, the parties stipulated to a post-trial procedure: each would submit two briefs on an agreed schedule and I would issue a proposed statement of decision, on which the parties could then set a hearing. After the proposed statement of decision issued, Garcia submitted still more briefing and additional putative evidence. Both are improper. Garcia’s counsel also demanded that the statement of decision address a long list of issues she deems material. However, material issues are only those “essential to the judgment and closely and directly related to the trial court’s determination of the ultimate issues in the case.” (Kuffel v. Seaside Oil Co. (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 555, 565.) Here, the ultimate issue is whether Huang was covered by the settlement agreement. I rule that he is, which disposes of all other issues. / As to Garcia’s “specific objections and request for clarification,” I rule as follows. Objection 1. “Page 2, line 17 of the decision ‘Rather ‘settlement was of the entire case, including claims against Huang.” Ruling. The proposed statement of decision addressed this point fully.© 9 Objection 2. “Page 3, line 4 and 5. ‘Garcia did not file the Notice of Settlement’ to breach his contractual obligation. Nekis Garcia filed the Notice of the Settlement of the Entire case because his case did settle entirely.” Ruling. Garcia does not dispute that he never filed a notice of settlement as the settlement agreement required him to; this is confirmed by our court’s register of actions. On the other hand, “Nekis Garcia” (Mr. De Leon-Garcia) did file a notice of settlement in his state court action. This reinforces the point that Garcia too was required to file a notice of settlement in his action, as the settlement agreement treated De Leon-Garcia and Garcia the same. (Ex. E: “Mr. De Leon-Garcia and Mr. Garcia shall file and serve in their respective State Court Actions a Notice of Settlement consistent with California law.”).) Objection 3. “Page 3, line 16. ‘the settlement agreement covers not just the bankruptcy cases but our case as well.” Ruling. Garcia argues that “no evidence exists to support this statement,” but, as shown above, the settlement agreement (Ex. E) expressly covered our case. Moreover, as also shown above, the testimony at trial established that Huang was covered by the settlement. EERE Judgment is for defendant Shenbao Huang on all the claims by Francisco Guacamaya Garcia in this action. Jurisdiction is reserved for any post-trial motions. Dated: January 26, 2019 SG Richard B. Ulmer Jr. Judge of the Superior CourtGarcia v. Champion Steam Cleaning, et al. Case No: CGC-14-540994 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL (C.C.P. §1013) The undersigned certifies, under penalty of perjury, that: | am employed in the city and County of San Francisco, California, am over the age of 18 years, and am not a party to the within action. I served the attached Statement of Decision by enclosing a true copy thereof in an envelope(s) addressed as shown below and placing the envelope(s) for collection and mailing on January 28, 2019 in San Francisco, California following the Court's ordinary practices. | am readily familiar with the Court's practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid. Svetiana M. Shirinova, Esq. Jeffrey A. Needeiman, Esq. Law Offices of Svetlana M. Shirinova Attorney at Law 870 Market Street, Suite 948 P.O. Box 471146 | San Francisco, CA 94102 San Francisco, CA 94147-1146 Dated: January 28, 2019 By: fh : R. Michael Deputy Court ClerkATTACHMENT BS/ © : ° SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFO! COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO FILED APROZ200 Ci OF THE COURT By: - FRANCISCO GUACAMAYA GARCIA, Case No. CGC-14-540994 Plaintift’ vs. CHAMPION STEAM CLEANING, INC., et Mp ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL Defendants. Plaintiff Francisco Guacamaya Garcia moves for a new trial. His arguments are unavailing, so the motion is denied: First, Garcia contends that his objections to the proposed statement of decision were not accounted for. (MNT 1:19-23.) Not so. The statement of decision sets out and addresses each objection filed. (SoD; at 4-5 (“Rulings on Objections to Proposed Statement of Decision”).) Second, Garcia notes that the settlement agreement ~ Exhibit Eon the trial exhibit list — was not formally entered into evidence, though it was repeatedly identified, addressed and treated as evidence at trial. (MNT 1:24-28.) This was an oversight, but it is of no moment. (Bank of Costa Mesa v. Losack (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 287, 292.) The settlement agreement was testified to on multiple days at trial, putting the agreement’s terms into evidence. Third, Garcia notes that a blank California Judicial Form CM-200 was not “admitted into evidence.” (MNT 1:28, It would have been improper fo admit this adjunct to California Rule of Court 3.1385 “into evidence:” Rather, judicial notice of such official forms is mandatory, 1NZ So “{e]ven without a party’s request.” (Evid. Code §451(c); 2 Jefferson’s California Evidence Benchbook (4th ed. 2009) §49.15.)! Fourth, Garcia contends that no extrinsic evidence regarding the settlement agreement was introduced at trial. (MNT 4:1.) Again, this is not true, Garcia and Isaac Tang both testified to their understandings of the settlement agreement at trial. Fifth, Garcia asserts that defendant Shenbao Huang did not raise “the third-party beneficiary theory.” (MNT 4:2-6.) Actually, Huang raised the theory repeatedly —e.g,, in his pre-trial brief, in opening statement, during testimony and argument at trial, and in post-trial briefing. Moreover, Garcia addressed the theory in his own briefing. Sixth, Garcia “reasserts” several arguments already addressed and rejected in the statement of decision. (MNT 5:10-7:4.) Rather than repeat its findings and rulings, Iincorporate the statement of decision here by reference. Seventh, Garcia argues in @ reply brief that opposing counsel “breached the “confidentiality clause” of the settlement agreement (Ex. E). By statute, this reply brief and its accompanying docutnents cannot be considered, as they were served more than a month late. (CCP §659a.)’ Even were it possible tp consider them, the belated arguments would have to be. rejected for several reasons: (a) Isaac Tang’s trial testimony about the settlement agreement was expressly authorized by the agreement, as he was a party “served with process” (Ex. E p. 2), (b) Garcia waived any confidentiality argument by himself testifying about the settlement agreement + Garcia also complains that the defense did not cite to the Judicial Council form, but courts are not limited to authorities cited by counsel. * CCP. §659a provides that thé moving party on a new trial motion “shall” file his reply brief and any accompanying documents within five days after the opposition brief is served. Here, the opposition states that it was served by U.S. Mail and e-mail on February 18, 2019. Garcia's reply brief is dated March 27, 2019. Erikson v. Weiner (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1663, 1672-73 holds that §659’s deadlines are “mandatory” —i.e., “jurisdictional.” 24 © oO at trial? (c) Garcia could ave moved to seal parts of the record he believed confidential, but did not do so (see: cRC 2.550).and (d) the authoritiés Garcia cites go to “communications exchanged as part of” a mediation process, not to a settlement agreement resulting from that process.* Dated: April 2, 2019 Mth b Lf Richard B, Ulmer Jt. - Judge of the Superior Court 3 another topic of Garcia's belated reply papers is opposing counsel's attachment of the settlement agreement to a motion in imine. | did not rely on that attachment in thestatement of decision.and-do not rely.on it in this order. * Minutes beforé the hearing on the new ‘trial motion, Garcia’s counsel presented'an unfiled “ex parte application for disqualification of defense counsel.” ‘Garcia may file a regular noticed motion‘on that’ ‘topic If he wishes, .3Garcia v. Champion Steam Cleaning, et al. Case No: CGC-14-540994 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL (C.C.P. §1013) The undersigned certifies, under penalty of perjury, that: | am employed in the city and County of San Francisco, California, am-over the age of 18 years, and am not a party to the within action. | served the attached Order on Appellant’s Proposed Settled Statement by enclosing a true copy thereof in an envelope(s) addressed as shown below and placing the envelope(s) for collection and mailing on June 5, 2020 in San Francisco, California following the Court's ordinary practices. | am readily familiar with the Court's practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid. Svetlana M. Shirinova, Esq. Jeffrey A. Needelman, Esq. Law Offices of Svetlana M. Shirinova Attorney at Law 870 Market Street, Suite 948 P.O. Box 471146 San Francisco, CA 94102 San Francisco, CA 94147-1146 Dated: June 5, 2020 : By: eh, L! » Q R. Michael Dilés Deputy Court Clerk