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1 MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
Barbara J. Miller, Bar No. 167223
2 Christopher J. Taylor, Bar No. 298738
600 Anton Boulevard ELECTRONICALLY
3 Suite 1800
Costa Mesa, CA 92626-7653
F I L E D
Superior Court of California,
4 Tel: +1.714.830.0600 County of San Francisco
Fax: +1.714.830.0700 02/11/2020
5 barbara.miller@morganlewis.com Clerk of the Court
christopher.taylor@morganlewis.com BY: RONNIE OTERO
Deputy Clerk
6
MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
7 Robert Jon Hendricks, Bar No. 179751
One Market, Spear Street Tower
8 San Francisco, CA 94105-1596
Tel: +1.415.442.1000
9 Fax: +1.415.442.1001
rj.hendricks@morganlewis.com
10
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent
11 CBRE GROUP, INC.
12
13 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
14 COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
15
16 MELISSA WOODS, Case No. CGC-14-537527
17 Claimant, Hon. John K. Stewart
Dept. 504
18 vs.
RESPONDENT CBRE GROUP, INC.’S
19 CBRE GROUP, INC., and DOES 1 through POST-TRIAL BRIEF
100 inclusive,
20 Complaint Filed: February 14, 2014
Respondent. Trial Date: January 27, 2020
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DB2/ 38180339.3 DEFENDANT’S POST-TRIAL BRIEF
1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page(s)
2
3 I. INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................................7
4 II. SUMMARY OF FACTS AND RELEVANT PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND .....................................................................................................................10
5
III. ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................................14
6
A. The Court Should Dismiss This Action Because Plaintiff Failed to Appear for
7 Trial and Failed to Diligently Prosecute This Action ...............................................................14
8 B. The Arbitration Order Has No Preclusive Effect In Favor of the State, the Real
9 Party In Interest in This Court Action, Because the State Was Not a Party To
the Arbitration ...........................................................................................................................16
10
C. The Arbitrator Did Not Make Any Findings of Liability As To CBRE Group,
11 Inc..............................................................................................................................................18
12 D. Plaintiff’s PAGA Claim Fails Because She Has No Evidence That She Was
Employed by CBRE Group, Inc. and Because the Arbitrator Conclusively
13
Determined that Plaintiff Was Not Employed By CBRE Group, Inc. ......................................19
14
E. Any Attempt to Pursue a PAGA Claim Against CBRE, Inc. Fails Because
15 Plaintiff Has Failed to Exhaust Her Administrative Prerequisites With Respect
to CBRE, Inc. ............................................................................................................................21
16
F. Defendant’s Requests for Admissions Should Be Deemed Admitted, Because
17 Plaintiff Failed to Provide Verified Responses and Failed to Oppose
Defendant’s Motion to Have the Requests Deemed Admitted .................................................17
18
19 G. With Consent, An Employer May Deduct from Wages for ERISA Benefits,
Even If This Makes Take-Home Pay Less Than Minimum Wage ...........................................25
20
1. The Deduction At Issue Was Lawful ..................................................................................25
21
2. Plaintiff’s Minimum Wage Violation Theory Is Incorrect .................................................30
22
3. Plaintiff’s Wage Statement Argument Is Meritless ............................................................31
23
H. Even If the Arbitration Award Could Provide a Basis for a PAGA Award in
24 Favor of the State Against CBRE Group, Inc., There Is Only One Pay Period
25 and a Penalty of $100 At Issue..................................................................................................31
26 I. Plaintiff’s Attempt to Obtain Public Injunctive Relief Must Be Rejected ................................32
27 IV. CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................35
28
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DB2/ 38180339.3 DEFENDANT’S POST-TRIAL BRIEF
1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
2 Cases
3
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila,
4 542 U.S. 200 (2004) ............................................................................................................24, 26
5 Aguirre v. Genesis Logistics,
2013 WL 10936035 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2013) ........................................................................21
6
Allen-Pac., Ltd. v. Superior Court,
7 57 Cal. App. 4th 1546 (1997)....................................................................................................20
8 Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2,
9 163 Cal. App. 4th 1157 (2008)..................................................................................................28
10 In re Anthem, Inc.,
2015 WL 5286992 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2015) ...........................................................................25
11
Arias v. Superior Court,
12 46 Cal. 4th 969 (2009) ........................................................................................................14, 17
13 Armiger v. Kiewit Const. Co.,
14 2010 WL 1239554 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2010) ..........................................................................26
15 Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co.,
28 Cal. App. 5th 824, 839 (2018) .............................................................................................18
16
Butler v. National Community Renaissance of Cal.,
17 766 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2014)...................................................................................................19
18 Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp.,
532 U.S. 424 (2001) ..................................................................................................................21
19
20 Cotter v. Lyft,
193 F. Supp. 3d 1030, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2016) ..........................................................................21
21
Davis v. Farmers Ins. Exch.,
22 245 Cal. App. 4th 1302 (2016), as modified on denial of reh’g (Apr. 21, 2016),
review denied (June 29, 2016) ............................................................................................22, 27
23
Diliberti v. Stage Call Corp.,
24 4 Cal. App. 4th 1468 (1992)......................................................................................................18
25
Esparza v. Safeway, Inc.,
26 36 Cal. App. 5th 42, 59-61 (2019), as modified on denial of reh’g (June 28,
2019), review denied (Sept. 25, 2019) ................................................................................17, 18
27
Feitelberg v. Credit Suisse First Bos., LLC,
28 134 Cal. App. 4th 997 (2005)....................................................................................................30
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DB2/ 38180339.3 DEFENDANT’S POST-TRIAL BRIEF
1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
2 Page(s)
3 Cases
4 Fleming v. Covidien, Inc.,
2011 WL 7563047 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2011) ..........................................................................21
5
Fossen v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mont.,
6 660 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2011).............................................................................................24, 25
7 Gomez v. Cal. Physicians Serv.,
299 Fed. App’x 687 (9th Cir. 2008)..........................................................................................25
8
9 Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC,
59 Cal. 4th 348 (2014) ..........................................................................................................4, 13
10
Johnson v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
11 No. EDCV 17-2477...................................................................................................................31
12 Kelly v. Vons Companies, Inc.,
67 Cal. App. 4th 1329 (1998)....................................................................................................15
13
14 Kresal v. RFID Global Solutions, Inc.,
2012 WL 1701770 (D. Md. May 14, 2012) ..............................................................................26
15
Magana v. DoorDash, Inc.,
16 343 F. Supp. 3d 891, 900 (N.D. Cal. 2018) ..............................................................................31
17 Marin Gen. Hosp. v. Modesto & Empire Traction Co.,
581 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2009).....................................................................................................26
18
Marshall v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.,
19
2 Cal. 4th 1045 (1992) ..............................................................................................................24
20
Martinez v. Combs,
21 49 Cal. 4th 35 (2010) ................................................................................................................15
22 McGill v. Citibank, N.A.,
2 Cal. 5th 945 (2017) ..........................................................................................................30, 31
23
McKenna v. Elliott & Horne Co.,
24 118 Cal. App. 2d 551 (1953).....................................................................................................10
25
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor,
26 481 U.S. 58 (1987) ..............................................................................................................24, 26
27 Mir v. Kirchmeyer,
2016 WL 2745338 (S.D. Cal. May 11, 2016) ...........................................................................19
28
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DB2/ 38180339.3 DEFENDANT’S POST-TRIAL BRIEF
1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
2 Page(s)
3 Cases
4 Mitchell v. National Auto. & Casualty Ins. Co.,
38 Cal. App. 3d 599 (1974).......................................................................................................18
5
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,
6 481 U.S. 41 (1987) ....................................................................................................................24
7 Ross v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.,
2016 WL 7634445 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016) ............................................................................16
8
9 Santos v. TWC Admin. LLC,
2014 WL 12558274 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2014) ....................................................................15, 16
10
Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Med. Servs., Inc.,
11 547 U.S. 356 (2006) ..................................................................................................................25
12 Shalz v. Union Sch. Dist.,
58 Cal. App. 2d 599 (1943).......................................................................................................23
13
14 Stephens v. Berry,
249 Cal. App. 2d 474 (1967).....................................................................................................18
15
Stewart v. Stewart,
16 156 Cal. 651 (1909) ..................................................................................................................10
17 Tiffany v. Hometown Buffet, Inc.,
2006 WL 1749577 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 22, 2016) ...........................................................................18
18
Vandenberg v. Superior Court,
19
21 Cal. 4th 815 (1999) ..............................................................................................4, 12, 13, 14
20
Varity Corp. v. Howe,
21 516 U.S. 489 (1996) ..................................................................................................................25
22 Vernon v. Great Western Bank,
51 Cal. App. 4th 1007 (1996)..............................................................................................11, 12
23
Vernon v. State,
24 116 Cal. App. 4th 114 (2004)....................................................................................................16
25
Wilcox v. Birtwhistle,
26 21 Cal. 4th 973 (1999) ..............................................................................................................20
27 Wilcox v. Bitwhistle,
21 Cal. App. 4th 973 (1999)......................................................................................................20
28
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DB2/ 38180339.3 DEFENDANT’S POST-TRIAL BRIEF
1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
2 Page(s)
3 Cases
Zevnik v. Super. Ct.,
4 159 Cal. App. 4th 76 (2008)......................................................................................................16
5
Statutes
6 29 CFR
§ 825.212 ...................................................................................................................................23
7 § 825.213 ...................................................................................................................................23
8 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(1) ...................................................................................................................................24
9 § 1003(a)(1)...............................................................................................................................24
10 § 1132(a)(3),..............................................................................................................................25
11 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 340(a) .........................................................................................................17
12 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 473........................................................................................................18, 19
13 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 581..............................................................................................................10
14 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 583.410.......................................................................................................11
15 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.220.....................................................................................................20
16 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.240(a) ................................................................................................20
17
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.280(b) ................................................................................................20
18
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.300.....................................................................................................20
19
Cal. Lab. Code § 204.......................................................................................................................28
20
Cal. Lab. Code § 221.................................................................................................................22, 23
21
Cal. Lab. Code § 224............................................................................................................... passim
22
Cal. Lab. Code § 226.......................................................................................................................27
23
24 Cal. Lab. Code § 299(g) ..................................................................................................................29
25 Cal. Lab. Code § 2699............................................................................................................. passim
26 ERISA § 502(a)(3) ..........................................................................................................................25
PAGA ...................................................................................................................................... passim
27
UCL ......................................................................................................................................... passim
28
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DB2/ 38180339.3 DEFENDANT’S POST-TRIAL BRIEF
1 I. INTRODUCTION
2 Plaintiff Melissa Woods did not appear for trial and did not offer any evidence to support
3 her claims. Yet Plaintiff’s counsel contends that in his client’s absence, and without any
4 testimonial evidence, this Court should award Plaintiff civil penalties under PAGA. Plaintiff’s
5 counsel’s attempt to pursue a PAGA claim without an actual aggrieved employee is an abuse of
6 the PAGA statute and must be rejected.
7 At trial, Plaintiff’s counsel presented the Court with two flawed legal arguments. First,
8 Plaintiff’s counsel invoked the doctrine of collateral estoppel and claimed that an award issued in
9 the individual arbitration between Plaintiff and CBRE Group, Inc. (which, in fact, exonerated
10 CBRE Group, Inc.) can be used to establish liability to the state of California on a PAGA claim in
11 court. Plaintiff’s counsel is so committed to this position that he made no attempt to admit any
12 evidence at trial, other than the arbitration award itself and Plaintiff’s civil complaint. Perhaps
13 knowing that his attempt to use collateral estoppel in favor of the State would fail, Plaintiff tried
14 to add an entirely new issue to the trial—a request for injunctive relief, which is not permitted
15 under PAGA. Both claims are meritless.
16 To have standing to prosecute a claim under PAGA, one must be an aggrieved employee
17 of the defendant. Under general standing principles, a litigant must have an interest in the
18 outcome of the litigation, at all stages in the litigation. Here, Plaintiff did not even show up at
19 trial, and has been largely absent from the litigation for years. Since there is not an aggrieved
20 employee pursuing this action, it should be dismissed.
21 Plaintiff also lacks standing because she was not employed by CBRE Group, Inc., but by
22 CBRE, Inc., a separate entity that is not a party to this action. Plaintiff and her counsel have had
23 notice of this fact for more than five years, but have never made any effort to name or bring a
24 claim against CBRE, Inc. Plaintiff offers no evidence—none whatsoever—that CBRE Group,
25 Inc. (the actual defendant) exercised control over her wages, hours or working conditions.
26 Moreover, in the arbitration of Plaintiff’s individual claims, the arbitrator found that CBRE
27 Group, Inc. was not Plaintiff’s employer and that Plaintiff named the wrong party in her
28
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DB2/ 38180339.3 DEFENDANT’S POST-TRIAL BRIEF
1 arbitration (CBRE, Inc. rather than CBRE Group, Inc.). This finding conclusively establishes that
2 CBRE Group, Inc. was not Plaintiff’s employer.
3 CBRE, Inc., who is not a party to this litigation, could not be added as a defendant
4 because Plaintiff never exhausted her administrative prerequisites with the Labor and Workforce
5 Development Agency (“LWDA”) as to CBRE, Inc., which is a jurisdictional prerequisite to
6 pursue a PAGA claim against it. Instead, Plaintiff only gave notice to CBRE Group, Inc. in her
7 PAGA exhaustion letter and then never made any attempt to correct this within the one-year
8 statute of limitations period. It is undisputed that Plaintiff’s actual employer, CBRE, Inc., never
9 received notice under PAGA, and the failure to exhaust as to CBRE, Inc. precludes her from
10 attempting to pursue a PAGA claim against it now.
11 Plaintiff’s counsel claims, incorrectly, that Plaintiff’s individual arbitration award can be
12 used to establish liability on her representative PAGA claim. California Supreme Court
13 precedent is clear, however, that a private arbitration award, even if judicially confirmed (which
14 has never occurred here), can have no collateral estoppel effect in favor of third parties unless the
15 arbitral parties agreed, in the particular case, that such a consequence should apply. Vandenberg
16 v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 4th 815, 831 (1999). Yet that is precisely what Plaintiff attempts to do
17 here. The California Supreme Court has held that a PAGA action is a dispute between the State
18 of California and the employer, making the State the real party in interest in Plaintiff’s PAGA
19 action—not Plaintiff Melissa Woods. See Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, 59
20 Cal. 4th 348 (2014) (the state, not the employee-plaintiff, is the real party in interest in a PAGA
21 action). The State, however, was not a party to Plaintiff’s arbitration, where only her individual
22 claims were decided, and the Arbitrator expressly declined to rule on any aspect of Plaintiff’s
23 PAGA claim. Arb. Order at p. 16. Thus, the arbitration award cannot be given collateral effect in
24 the State’s favor. As a result, at trial Plaintiff has presented no evidence in support of her PAGA
25 claim and judgment must be entered in Defendant’s favor.
26 As to the underlying substance of Plaintiff’s claim against CBRE, Inc., which cannot be
27 asserted for the reasons stated above, the law permits deductions from wages to pay for ERISA
28 benefits. Thus, even if the court ignored all of the procedural hurdles to Plaintiff’s claim and
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DB2/ 38180339.3
1 mistakenly applied collateral estoppel to the arbitration award in the State’s favor, the Court
2 would still have discretion to reduce any PAGA amount to zero to avoid an unjust, arbitrary,
3 oppressive, or confiscatory result. See Labor Code § 2699(e)(2). Labor Code Section 224
4 expressly permits deductions that are for an employee’s own benefit for insurance premiums and
5 other benefits and are authorized in writing. In addition, the Family and Medical Leave Act
6 (“FMLA”) regulations permit an employer to recover an employee’s portion of insurance and
7 other benefit premiums the employer pays for the employee in order to maintain the employee’s
8 coverage during a leave of absence. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”)
9 also preempts Plaintiff’s claim.
10 Even if the arbitration award somehow could provide a basis for a PAGA award in favor
11 of the State against CBRE Group, Inc. (it cannot), the arbitration award shows only one pay
12 period where there was a deduction below minimum wage that was not reversed within the time
13 for payment of wages. The deduction for that period was later reversed as well. Plaintiff
14 suggests two pay periods, but there is no evidence of a deduction below minimum wage for two
15 pay periods (that was not reversed within a day). Also, there cannot be imposition of the
16 heightened $200 per pay period penalty, unless a court had found a first violation. There is no
17 evidence of a “subsequent violation” after a court finding of an improper deduction.
18 Finally, Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief must be rejected for several reasons. First,
19 a plaintiff cannot obtain injunctive relief under PAGA. Since the only claim before this Court for
20 trial is Plaintiff’s Seventh Cause of Action for civil penalties under PAGA, Plaintiff cannot obtain
21 injunctive relief. Second, the Court rejected Plaintiff’s argument in opposition to Defendant’s
22 motion to compel arbitration that her purported claim for injunctive relief was not subject to
23 arbitration, and Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action under California’s Unfair Competition Law
24 (“UCL”) was compelled to arbitration for a final decision. Third, in arbitration the Arbitrator
25 rejected Plaintiff’s claim that she could obtain injunctive relief despite voluntarily resigning her
26 employment and thus granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s UCL claim in favor of Defendant.
27 This issue was conclusively decided in arbitration and cannot be revisited now at trial. Fourth,
28 since there is no evidence of any ongoing harm to Plaintiff and no evidence of harm to anyone
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DB2/ 38180339.3
1 else, the Court cannot issue injunctive relief. Fifth, since Plaintiff cannot pursue California Labor
2 Code violations on behalf of the general public, she does not and cannot seek “public injunctive
3 relief.”
4 For all of these reasons, which are discussed in detail below, this case should be dismissed
5 and judgment should be entered in Defendant’s favor.
6 II. SUMMARY OF FACTS AND RELEVANT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
7 On February 18, 2014, Plaintiff filed her original Complaint in this action. On July 1,
8 2014, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), in which she asserted the
9 following causes of action against CBRE Group, Inc.: (1) unlawful wage deductions, (2) failure to
10 pay minimum wage, (3) failure to issue accurate wage statements, (4) unfair and unlawful
11 business practices, (5) conversion, (6) nonpayment of final wages, and (7) a claim for civil
12 penalties under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”). Trial Exh. 2. Plaintiff
13 did not name any other defendants, aside from Defendant CBRE Group, Inc. Id. 1
14 Plaintiff attached as exhibits to her FAC letters from her counsel addressed to the “PAGA
15 Administrator” claiming that CBRE Group, Inc. was Plaintiff’s employer and had committed
16 various violations of the California Labor Code. See FAC, Exhs. C and D. Both of these letters
17 were addressed to CBRE Group, Inc. and named CBRE Group, Inc. as the alleged violator.
18 Neither of the letters attached to the FAC named CBRE, Inc. or alleged that CBRE, Inc. had
19 committed any Labor Code violations. Id. Plaintiff also attached as exhibits to her FAC letters
20 from the LWDA, stating that the LWDA did not intend to investigate Plaintiff’s allegations. See
21 FAC, Exhs. E and F. Both letters from the LWDA listed “CBRE Group, Inc.” as the entity
22 against whom Plaintiff asserted Labor Code violations, making it quite clear that the LWDA
23 understood that Plaintiff asserted allegations against CBRE Group, Inc. and not against another
24 entity, such as CBRE, Inc.
25
26 1
A detailed summary of the pretrial and arbitration proceedings is set forth in Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss and Defendant’s Trial Brief, both of which were filed with the Court during
27 trial on January 27, 2020. Defendant incorporates by reference the statement of facts contained in
the Motion to Dismiss and Trial brief, and the Declarations of Christopher J. Taylor in support
28 thereof.
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DB2/ 38180339.3
1 Defendant moved to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s individual claims. In opposition,
2 Plaintiff argued that the agreement was an unlawful waiver of her representative PAGA claim and
3 her purported claim for public injunctive relief. See Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion to Compel
4 Arbitration, filed September 4, 2014. On September 16, 2014, the Court granted Defendant’s
5 motion to compel arbitration, ordering Plaintiff to arbitrate causes of action one through six on an
6 individual basis (including her UCL claim), dismissing Plaintiff’s class action claims, and staying
7 Plaintiff’s PAGA claim pending the completion of arbitration. Thus, the Court rejected any
8 argument that a claim for “public injunctive relief” could be carved out of the arbitration; the
9 entire UCL claim (including any claim for injunctive relief) was compelled to arbitration in full.
10 The Court cannot now change this result.
11 Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in arbitration. On September 14, 2017,
12 Arbitrator John True (“the Arbitrator”) issued an Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part
13 Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Arbitration Order” or “Arb. Order”), dismissing
14 four of Plaintiff’s six claims. See Arb. Order, admitted as Trial Exhibit 1. The Arbitrator rejected
15 Plaintiff assertion that she was entitled to injunctive relief and granted summary judgment in
16 Defendant’s favor on Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action under the UCL. Id. at pp. 14-15. In his
17 Arbitration Order, Arbitrator True found that “Claimant was hired by CBRE, Inc.” and “claimant
18 has named the wrong party in this matter, (CBRE Group, Inc. rather than CBRE, Inc.)….” Arb.
19 Order at pp. 2 and 7. Plaintiff never moved to confirm the Arbitration Order. Following the
20 Arbitration Order, the only claim that remained to be tried in court was Plaintiff’s Seventh Cause
21 of Action under PAGA, which had been stayed pending completion of arbitration of Plaintiff’s
22 individual claims.
23 Trial commenced on January 27, 2020. Although counsel, Brian Van Vleck, was present,
24 Plaintiff Melissa Woods did not appear. Transcript, 7:5-6.2 In Plaintiff’s absence, Plaintiff’s
25 counsel and Defendant’s counsel identified issues for the Court to decide. According to
26 Plaintiff’s counsel, the issue before the Court is whether Plaintiff is entitled to any civil penalties
27
2
All citations to “Transcript” refer to the Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings at trial in this
28 action on January 27, 2020.
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DB2/ 38180339.3
1 under PAGA. Plaintiff’s counsel argued that, based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel, this
2 issue has already been decided by the Arbitrator. Transcript, 5:4-19.
3 Plaintiff also argued that the issue of whether Plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief is
4 properly before the Court. The Court agreed with Defendant, however, that the Arbitrator already
5 ruled on issue of whether Plaintiff may obtain an injunction by granting summary judgment in
6 favor of Defendant on Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action under the UCL. Transcript, 23:1-15.
7 The Court, while reviewing the FAC, noted that the Seventh Cause of Action under PAGA does
8 not specifically mention a claim for injunctive relief. Id. at 23:18-24:12. After Defendant’s
9 counsel explained that PAGA does not permit injunctive or declaratory relief, the Court made it
10 quite clear that it would not consider Plaintiff’s injunctive relief request:
11 THE COURT: Then I would have to go back and decide if there
was injunctive relief. Under that theory, I would have to go back
12
and revisit the other, and I just don’t think that makes sense. The
13 cause of action that was -- that he left open was the seventh cause
of action, which is Labor Code Private Attorney General Act. And
14 if a Private Attorney General Act does not provide for injunctive
relief, then the Court is not going to entertain a claim for injunctive
15 relief.
16
MR. VANVLECK: If the Court rules that way, it will so rule but --
17 I just -- you know, we have briefed the issue, and I think it’s --
since it was not cited, the arbitration award, it was outside, it should
18 remain for the Court.
19 But that’s -- you know, I do believe it is an issue that can be
20 determined I believe based on the law, based on the arbitration
award and the complaint.
21
So perhaps -- and we’re going to be doing a posttrial briefing, so
22 perhaps I can change the Court’s mind. But if that’s your
inclination, then I understand.
23
24 THE COURT: Well, I don’t want to take on work that I don’t have
to take on. And this seems to me that the arbitrator was clear that
25 he denied the motion for injunctive relief on whatever basis he
denied it on.
26
And the only thing he didn’t rule on was the 7th cause of action,
27
and that does not allow a claim for injunctive relief.
28
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DB2/ 38180339.3
1 So he didn’t say he was reserving to this Court all issues not
decided. He just said the 7th cause of action.
2
3 Transcript, 27:2-28:8.
4 With respect to Plaintiff’s Seventh Cause of Action under PAGA, Defendant identified
5 several reasons why the court should enter judgment in Defendant’s favor. First, Defendant
6 explained that the entire action should be dismissed under California Code of Civil Procedure
7 Sections 581(b)(5) and 581(l) based on Plaintiff’s failure to appear for trial and failure to
8 prosecute her claim, which is the subject of a Motion to Dismiss Defendant filed on January 27,
9 2020, taken under submission by the Court. Transcript, 7:1-13, 31:22-32:11. Second, Defendant
10 explained that Defendant’s Requests for Admission—which include requests for Plaintiff to admit
11 that CBRE Group, Inc. was not her employer—should be deemed admitted due to Plaintiff’s
12 failure to provide verified responses thereto, which would entitle CBRE Group, Inc. to judgment
13 as a matter of law. Id. at 7:18-8:4. Third, Defendant explained that, based on collateral estoppel,
14 the Arbitration Order conclusively establishes that CBRE Group, Inc. was not Plaintiff’s
15 employer, which means she cannot be an aggrieved employee who can pursue a PAGA claim
16 against it. Id. at 8:9-9:10. Fourth, because Plaintiff did not provide the requisite notice to the
17 LWDA stating that she intended to pursue a claim against CBRE, Inc., Plaintiff cannot attempt to
18 pursue a claim against CBRE, Inc. now. Id.
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1 MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP Barbara J. Miller, Bar No. 167223 2 Christopher J. Taylor, Bar No. 298738 600 Anton Boulevard ELECTRONICALLY 3 Suite 1800 Costa Mesa, CA 92626-7653 F I L E D Superior Court of California, 4 Tel: +1.714.830.0600 County of San Francisco Fax: +1.714.830.0700 02/11/2020 5 barbara.miller@morganlewis.com Clerk of the Court christopher.taylor@morganlewis.com BY: RONNIE OTERO Deputy Clerk 6 MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP 7 Robert Jon Hendricks, Bar No. 179751 One Market, Spear Street Tower 8 San Francisco, CA 94105-1596 Tel: +1.415.442.1000 9 Fax: +1.415.442.1001 rj.hendricks@morganlewis.com 10 Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 11 CBRE GROUP, INC. 12 13 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA 14 COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 15 16 MELISSA WOODS, Case No. CGC-14-537527 17 Claimant, Hon. John K. Stewart Dept. 504 18 vs. RESPONDENT CBRE GROUP, INC.’S 19 CBRE GROUP, INC., and DOES 1 through POST-TRIAL BRIEF 100 inclusive, 20 Complaint Filed: February 14, 2014 Respondent. Trial Date: January 27, 2020 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW COSTA MESA DB2/ 38180339.3 DEFENDANT’S POST-TRIAL BRIEF 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page(s) 2 3 I. INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................................7 4 II. SUMMARY OF FACTS AND RELEVANT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND .....................................................................................................................10 5 III. ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................................14 6 A. The Court Should Dismiss This Action Because Plaintiff Failed to Appear for 7 Trial and Failed to Diligently Prosecute This Action ...............................................................14 8 B. The Arbitration Order Has No Preclusive Effect In Favor of the State, the Real 9 Party In Interest in This Court Action, Because the State Was Not a Party To the Arbitration ...........................................................................................................................16 10 C. The Arbitrator Did Not Make Any Findings of Liability As To CBRE Group, 11 Inc..............................................................................................................................................18 12 D. Plaintiff’s PAGA Claim Fails Because She Has No Evidence That She Was Employed by CBRE Group, Inc. and Because the Arbitrator Conclusively 13 Determined that Plaintiff Was Not Employed By CBRE Group, Inc. ......................................19 14 E. Any Attempt to Pursue a PAGA Claim Against CBRE, Inc. Fails Because 15 Plaintiff Has Failed to Exhaust Her Administrative Prerequisites With Respect to CBRE, Inc. ............................................................................................................................21 16 F. Defendant’s Requests for Admissions Should Be Deemed Admitted, Because 17 Plaintiff Failed to Provide Verified Responses and Failed to Oppose Defendant’s Motion to Have the Requests Deemed Admitted .................................................17 18 19 G. With Consent, An Employer May Deduct from Wages for ERISA Benefits, Even If This Makes Take-Home Pay Less Than Minimum Wage ...........................................25 20 1. The Deduction At Issue Was Lawful ..................................................................................25 21 2. Plaintiff’s Minimum Wage Violation Theory Is Incorrect .................................................30 22 3. Plaintiff’s Wage Statement Argument Is Meritless ............................................................31 23 H. Even If the Arbitration Award Could Provide a Basis for a PAGA Award in 24 Favor of the State Against CBRE Group, Inc., There Is Only One Pay Period 25 and a Penalty of $100 At Issue..................................................................................................31 26 I. Plaintiff’s Attempt to Obtain Public Injunctive Relief Must Be Rejected ................................32 27 IV. CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................35 28 MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW COSTA MESA 2 DB2/ 38180339.3 DEFENDANT’S POST-TRIAL BRIEF 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) 2 Cases 3 Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 4 542 U.S. 200 (2004) ............................................................................................................24, 26 5 Aguirre v. Genesis Logistics, 2013 WL 10936035 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2013) ........................................................................21 6 Allen-Pac., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 7 57 Cal. App. 4th 1546 (1997)....................................................................................................20 8 Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 9 163 Cal. App. 4th 1157 (2008)..................................................................................................28 10 In re Anthem, Inc., 2015 WL 5286992 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2015) ...........................................................................25 11 Arias v. Superior Court, 12 46 Cal. 4th 969 (2009) ........................................................................................................14, 17 13 Armiger v. Kiewit Const. Co., 14 2010 WL 1239554 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2010) ..........................................................................26 15 Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 28 Cal. App. 5th 824, 839 (2018) .............................................................................................18 16 Butler v. National Community Renaissance of Cal., 17 766 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2014)...................................................................................................19 18 Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., 532 U.S. 424 (2001) ..................................................................................................................21 19 20 Cotter v. Lyft, 193 F. Supp. 3d 1030, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2016) ..........................................................................21 21 Davis v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 22 245 Cal. App. 4th 1302 (2016), as modified on denial of reh’g (Apr. 21, 2016), review denied (June 29, 2016) ............................................................................................22, 27 23 Diliberti v. Stage Call Corp., 24 4 Cal. App. 4th 1468 (1992)......................................................................................................18 25 Esparza v. Safeway, Inc., 26 36 Cal. App. 5th 42, 59-61 (2019), as modified on denial of reh’g (June 28, 2019), review denied (Sept. 25, 2019) ................................................................................17, 18 27 Feitelberg v. Credit Suisse First Bos., LLC, 28 134 Cal. App. 4th 997 (2005)....................................................................................................30 MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW COSTA MESA 3 DB2/ 38180339.3 DEFENDANT’S POST-TRIAL BRIEF 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) 2 Page(s) 3 Cases 4 Fleming v. Covidien, Inc., 2011 WL 7563047 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2011) ..........................................................................21 5 Fossen v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mont., 6 660 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2011).............................................................................................24, 25 7 Gomez v. Cal. Physicians Serv., 299 Fed. App’x 687 (9th Cir. 2008)..........................................................................................25 8 9 Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348 (2014) ..........................................................................................................4, 13 10 Johnson v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 11 No. EDCV 17-2477...................................................................................................................31 12 Kelly v. Vons Companies, Inc., 67 Cal. App. 4th 1329 (1998)....................................................................................................15 13 14 Kresal v. RFID Global Solutions, Inc., 2012 WL 1701770 (D. Md. May 14, 2012) ..............................................................................26 15 Magana v. DoorDash, Inc., 16 343 F. Supp. 3d 891, 900 (N.D. Cal. 2018) ..............................................................................31 17 Marin Gen. Hosp. v. Modesto & Empire Traction Co., 581 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2009).....................................................................................................26 18 Marshall v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 19 2 Cal. 4th 1045 (1992) ..............................................................................................................24 20 Martinez v. Combs, 21 49 Cal. 4th 35 (2010) ................................................................................................................15 22 McGill v. Citibank, N.A., 2 Cal. 5th 945 (2017) ..........................................................................................................30, 31 23 McKenna v. Elliott & Horne Co., 24 118 Cal. App. 2d 551 (1953).....................................................................................................10 25 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 26 481 U.S. 58 (1987) ..............................................................................................................24, 26 27 Mir v. Kirchmeyer, 2016 WL 2745338 (S.D. Cal. May 11, 2016) ...........................................................................19 28 MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW COSTA MESA 4 DB2/ 38180339.3 DEFENDANT’S POST-TRIAL BRIEF 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) 2 Page(s) 3 Cases 4 Mitchell v. National Auto. & Casualty Ins. Co., 38 Cal. App. 3d 599 (1974).......................................................................................................18 5 Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 6 481 U.S. 41 (1987) ....................................................................................................................24 7 Ross v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 2016 WL 7634445 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016) ............................................................................16 8 9 Santos v. TWC Admin. LLC, 2014 WL 12558274 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2014) ....................................................................15, 16 10 Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Med. Servs., Inc., 11 547 U.S. 356 (2006) ..................................................................................................................25 12 Shalz v. Union Sch. Dist., 58 Cal. App. 2d 599 (1943).......................................................................................................23 13 14 Stephens v. Berry, 249 Cal. App. 2d 474 (1967).....................................................................................................18 15 Stewart v. Stewart, 16 156 Cal. 651 (1909) ..................................................................................................................10 17 Tiffany v. Hometown Buffet, Inc., 2006 WL 1749577 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 22, 2016) ...........................................................................18 18 Vandenberg v. Superior Court, 19 21 Cal. 4th 815 (1999) ..............................................................................................4, 12, 13, 14 20 Varity Corp. v. Howe, 21 516 U.S. 489 (1996) ..................................................................................................................25 22 Vernon v. Great Western Bank, 51 Cal. App. 4th 1007 (1996)..............................................................................................11, 12 23 Vernon v. State, 24 116 Cal. App. 4th 114 (2004)....................................................................................................16 25 Wilcox v. Birtwhistle, 26 21 Cal. 4th 973 (1999) ..............................................................................................................20 27 Wilcox v. Bitwhistle, 21 Cal. App. 4th 973 (1999)......................................................................................................20 28 MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW COSTA MESA 5 DB2/ 38180339.3 DEFENDANT’S POST-TRIAL BRIEF 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) 2 Page(s) 3 Cases Zevnik v. Super. Ct., 4 159 Cal. App. 4th 76 (2008)......................................................................................................16 5 Statutes 6 29 CFR § 825.212 ...................................................................................................................................23 7 § 825.213 ...................................................................................................................................23 8 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) ...................................................................................................................................24 9 § 1003(a)(1)...............................................................................................................................24 10 § 1132(a)(3),..............................................................................................................................25 11 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 340(a) .........................................................................................................17 12 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 473........................................................................................................18, 19 13 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 581..............................................................................................................10 14 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 583.410.......................................................................................................11 15 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.220.....................................................................................................20 16 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.240(a) ................................................................................................20 17 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.280(b) ................................................................................................20 18 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.300.....................................................................................................20 19 Cal. Lab. Code § 204.......................................................................................................................28 20 Cal. Lab. Code § 221.................................................................................................................22, 23 21 Cal. Lab. Code § 224............................................................................................................... passim 22 Cal. Lab. Code § 226.......................................................................................................................27 23 24 Cal. Lab. Code § 299(g) ..................................................................................................................29 25 Cal. Lab. Code § 2699............................................................................................................. passim 26 ERISA § 502(a)(3) ..........................................................................................................................25 PAGA ...................................................................................................................................... passim 27 UCL ......................................................................................................................................... passim 28 MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW COSTA MESA 6 DB2/ 38180339.3 DEFENDANT’S POST-TRIAL BRIEF 1 I. INTRODUCTION 2 Plaintiff Melissa Woods did not appear for trial and did not offer any evidence to support 3 her claims. Yet Plaintiff’s counsel contends that in his client’s absence, and without any 4 testimonial evidence, this Court should award Plaintiff civil penalties under PAGA. Plaintiff’s 5 counsel’s attempt to pursue a PAGA claim without an actual aggrieved employee is an abuse of 6 the PAGA statute and must be rejected. 7 At trial, Plaintiff’s counsel presented the Court with two flawed legal arguments. First, 8 Plaintiff’s counsel invoked the doctrine of collateral estoppel and claimed that an award issued in 9 the individual arbitration between Plaintiff and CBRE Group, Inc. (which, in fact, exonerated 10 CBRE Group, Inc.) can be used to establish liability to the state of California on a PAGA claim in 11 court. Plaintiff’s counsel is so committed to this position that he made no attempt to admit any 12 evidence at trial, other than the arbitration award itself and Plaintiff’s civil complaint. Perhaps 13 knowing that his attempt to use collateral estoppel in favor of the State would fail, Plaintiff tried 14 to add an entirely new issue to the trial—a request for injunctive relief, which is not permitted 15 under PAGA. Both claims are meritless. 16 To have standing to prosecute a claim under PAGA, one must be an aggrieved employee 17 of the defendant. Under general standing principles, a litigant must have an interest in the 18 outcome of the litigation, at all stages in the litigation. Here, Plaintiff did not even show up at 19 trial, and has been largely absent from the litigation for years. Since there is not an aggrieved 20 employee pursuing this action, it should be dismissed. 21 Plaintiff also lacks standing because she was not employed by CBRE Group, Inc., but by 22 CBRE, Inc., a separate entity that is not a party to this action. Plaintiff and her counsel have had 23 notice of this fact for more than five years, but have never made any effort to name or bring a 24 claim against CBRE, Inc. Plaintiff offers no evidence—none whatsoever—that CBRE Group, 25 Inc. (the actual defendant) exercised control over her wages, hours or working conditions. 26 Moreover, in the arbitration of Plaintiff’s individual claims, the arbitrator found that CBRE 27 Group, Inc. was not Plaintiff’s employer and that Plaintiff named the wrong party in her 28 MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW COSTA MESA 7 DB2/ 38180339.3 DEFENDANT’S POST-TRIAL BRIEF 1 arbitration (CBRE, Inc. rather than CBRE Group, Inc.). This finding conclusively establishes that 2 CBRE Group, Inc. was not Plaintiff’s employer. 3 CBRE, Inc., who is not a party to this litigation, could not be added as a defendant 4 because Plaintiff never exhausted her administrative prerequisites with the Labor and Workforce 5 Development Agency (“LWDA”) as to CBRE, Inc., which is a jurisdictional prerequisite to 6 pursue a PAGA claim against it. Instead, Plaintiff only gave notice to CBRE Group, Inc. in her 7 PAGA exhaustion letter and then never made any attempt to correct this within the one-year 8 statute of limitations period. It is undisputed that Plaintiff’s actual employer, CBRE, Inc., never 9 received notice under PAGA, and the failure to exhaust as to CBRE, Inc. precludes her from 10 attempting to pursue a PAGA claim against it now. 11 Plaintiff’s counsel claims, incorrectly, that Plaintiff’s individual arbitration award can be 12 used to establish liability on her representative PAGA claim. California Supreme Court 13 precedent is clear, however, that a private arbitration award, even if judicially confirmed (which 14 has never occurred here), can have no collateral estoppel effect in favor of third parties unless the 15 arbitral parties agreed, in the particular case, that such a consequence should apply. Vandenberg 16 v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 4th 815, 831 (1999). Yet that is precisely what Plaintiff attempts to do 17 here. The California Supreme Court has held that a PAGA action is a dispute between the State 18 of California and the employer, making the State the real party in interest in Plaintiff’s PAGA 19 action—not Plaintiff Melissa Woods. See Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, 59 20 Cal. 4th 348 (2014) (the state, not the employee-plaintiff, is the real party in interest in a PAGA 21 action). The State, however, was not a party to Plaintiff’s arbitration, where only her individual 22 claims were decided, and the Arbitrator expressly declined to rule on any aspect of Plaintiff’s 23 PAGA claim. Arb. Order at p. 16. Thus, the arbitration award cannot be given collateral effect in 24 the State’s favor. As a result, at trial Plaintiff has presented no evidence in support of her PAGA 25 claim and judgment must be entered in Defendant’s favor. 26 As to the underlying substance of Plaintiff’s claim against CBRE, Inc., which cannot be 27 asserted for the reasons stated above, the law permits deductions from wages to pay for ERISA 28 benefits. Thus, even if the court ignored all of the procedural hurdles to Plaintiff’s claim and MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW 8 COSTA MESA DEFENDANT’S POST-TRIAL BRIEF DB2/ 38180339.3 1 mistakenly applied collateral estoppel to the arbitration award in the State’s favor, the Court 2 would still have discretion to reduce any PAGA amount to zero to avoid an unjust, arbitrary, 3 oppressive, or confiscatory result. See Labor Code § 2699(e)(2). Labor Code Section 224 4 expressly permits deductions that are for an employee’s own benefit for insurance premiums and 5 other benefits and are authorized in writing. In addition, the Family and Medical Leave Act 6 (“FMLA”) regulations permit an employer to recover an employee’s portion of insurance and 7 other benefit premiums the employer pays for the employee in order to maintain the employee’s 8 coverage during a leave of absence. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) 9 also preempts Plaintiff’s claim. 10 Even if the arbitration award somehow could provide a basis for a PAGA award in favor 11 of the State against CBRE Group, Inc. (it cannot), the arbitration award shows only one pay 12 period where there was a deduction below minimum wage that was not reversed within the time 13 for payment of wages. The deduction for that period was later reversed as well. Plaintiff 14 suggests two pay periods, but there is no evidence of a deduction below minimum wage for two 15 pay periods (that was not reversed within a day). Also, there cannot be imposition of the 16 heightened $200 per pay period penalty, unless a court had found a first violation. There is no 17 evidence of a “subsequent violation” after a court finding of an improper deduction. 18 Finally, Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief must be rejected for several reasons. First, 19 a plaintiff cannot obtain injunctive relief under PAGA. Since the only claim before this Court for 20 trial is Plaintiff’s Seventh Cause of Action for civil penalties under PAGA, Plaintiff cannot obtain 21 injunctive relief. Second, the Court rejected Plaintiff’s argument in opposition to Defendant’s 22 motion to compel arbitration that her purported claim for injunctive relief was not subject to 23 arbitration, and Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action under California’s Unfair Competition Law 24 (“UCL”) was compelled to arbitration for a final decision. Third, in arbitration the Arbitrator 25 rejected Plaintiff’s claim that she could obtain injunctive relief despite voluntarily resigning her 26 employment and thus granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s UCL claim in favor of Defendant. 27 This issue was conclusively decided in arbitration and cannot be revisited now at trial. Fourth, 28 since there is no evidence of any ongoing harm to Plaintiff and no evidence of harm to anyone MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW 9 COSTA MESA DEFENDANT’S POST-TRIAL BRIEF DB2/ 38180339.3 1 else, the Court cannot issue injunctive relief. Fifth, since Plaintiff cannot pursue California Labor 2 Code violations on behalf of the general public, she does not and cannot seek “public injunctive 3 relief.” 4 For all of these reasons, which are discussed in detail below, this case should be dismissed 5 and judgment should be entered in Defendant’s favor. 6 II. SUMMARY OF FACTS AND RELEVANT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 7 On February 18, 2014, Plaintiff filed her original Complaint in this action. On July 1, 8 2014, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), in which she asserted the 9 following causes of action against CBRE Group, Inc.: (1) unlawful wage deductions, (2) failure to 10 pay minimum wage, (3) failure to issue accurate wage statements, (4) unfair and unlawful 11 business practices, (5) conversion, (6) nonpayment of final wages, and (7) a claim for civil 12 penalties under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”). Trial Exh. 2. Plaintiff 13 did not name any other defendants, aside from Defendant CBRE Group, Inc. Id. 1 14 Plaintiff attached as exhibits to her FAC letters from her counsel addressed to the “PAGA 15 Administrator” claiming that CBRE Group, Inc. was Plaintiff’s employer and had committed 16 various violations of the California Labor Code. See FAC, Exhs. C and D. Both of these letters 17 were addressed to CBRE Group, Inc. and named CBRE Group, Inc. as the alleged violator. 18 Neither of the letters attached to the FAC named CBRE, Inc. or alleged that CBRE, Inc. had 19 committed any Labor Code violations. Id. Plaintiff also attached as exhibits to her FAC letters 20 from the LWDA, stating that the LWDA did not intend to investigate Plaintiff’s allegations. See 21 FAC, Exhs. E and F. Both letters from the LWDA listed “CBRE Group, Inc.” as the entity 22 against whom Plaintiff asserted Labor Code violations, making it quite clear that the LWDA 23 understood that Plaintiff asserted allegations against CBRE Group, Inc. and not against another 24 entity, such as CBRE, Inc. 25 26 1 A detailed summary of the pretrial and arbitration proceedings is set forth in Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Defendant’s Trial Brief, both of which were filed with the Court during 27 trial on January 27, 2020. Defendant incorporates by reference the statement of facts contained in the Motion to Dismiss and Trial brief, and the Declarations of Christopher J. Taylor in support 28 thereof. MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW 10 COSTA MESA DEFENDANT’S POST-TRIAL BRIEF DB2/ 38180339.3 1 Defendant moved to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s individual claims. In opposition, 2 Plaintiff argued that the agreement was an unlawful waiver of her representative PAGA claim and 3 her purported claim for public injunctive relief. See Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion to Compel 4 Arbitration, filed September 4, 2014. On September 16, 2014, the Court granted Defendant’s 5 motion to compel arbitration, ordering Plaintiff to arbitrate causes of action one through six on an 6 individual basis (including her UCL claim), dismissing Plaintiff’s class action claims, and staying 7 Plaintiff’s PAGA claim pending the completion of arbitration. Thus, the Court rejected any 8 argument that a claim for “public injunctive relief” could be carved out of the arbitration; the 9 entire UCL claim (including any claim for injunctive relief) was compelled to arbitration in full. 10 The Court cannot now change this result. 11 Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in arbitration. On September 14, 2017, 12 Arbitrator John True (“the Arbitrator”) issued an Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part 13 Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Arbitration Order” or “Arb. Order”), dismissing 14 four of Plaintiff’s six claims. See Arb. Order, admitted as Trial Exhibit 1. The Arbitrator rejected 15 Plaintiff assertion that she was entitled to injunctive relief and granted summary judgment in 16 Defendant’s favor on Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action under the UCL. Id. at pp. 14-15. In his 17 Arbitration Order, Arbitrator True found that “Claimant was hired by CBRE, Inc.” and “claimant 18 has named the wrong party in this matter, (CBRE Group, Inc. rather than CBRE, Inc.)….” Arb. 19 Order at pp. 2 and 7. Plaintiff never moved to confirm the Arbitration Order. Following the 20 Arbitration Order, the only claim that remained to be tried in court was Plaintiff’s Seventh Cause 21 of Action under PAGA, which had been stayed pending completion of arbitration of Plaintiff’s 22 individual claims. 23 Trial commenced on January 27, 2020. Although counsel, Brian Van Vleck, was present, 24 Plaintiff Melissa Woods did not appear. Transcript, 7:5-6.2 In Plaintiff’s absence, Plaintiff’s 25 counsel and Defendant’s counsel identified issues for the Court to decide. According to 26 Plaintiff’s counsel, the issue before the Court is whether Plaintiff is entitled to any civil penalties 27 2 All citations to “Transcript” refer to the Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings at trial in this 28 action on January 27, 2020. MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW 11 COSTA MESA DEFENDANT’S POST-TRIAL BRIEF DB2/ 38180339.3 1 under PAGA. Plaintiff’s counsel argued that, based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel, this 2 issue has already been decided by the Arbitrator. Transcript, 5:4-19. 3 Plaintiff also argued that the issue of whether Plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief is 4 properly before the Court. The Court agreed with Defendant, however, that the Arbitrator already 5 ruled on issue of whether Plaintiff may obtain an injunction by granting summary judgment in 6 favor of Defendant on Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action under the UCL. Transcript, 23:1-15. 7 The Court, while reviewing the FAC, noted that the Seventh Cause of Action under PAGA does 8 not specifically mention a claim for injunctive relief. Id. at 23:18-24:12. After Defendant’s 9 counsel explained that PAGA does not permit injunctive or declaratory relief, the Court made it 10 quite clear that it would not consider Plaintiff’s injunctive relief request: 11 THE COURT: Then I would have to go back and decide if there was injunctive relief. Under that theory, I would have to go back 12 and revisit the other, and I just don’t think that makes sense. The 13 cause of action that was -- that he left open was the seventh cause of action, which is Labor Code Private Attorney General Act. And 14 if a Private Attorney General Act does not provide for injunctive relief, then the Court is not going to entertain a claim for injunctive 15 relief. 16 MR. VANVLECK: If the Court rules that way, it will so rule but -- 17 I just -- you know, we have briefed the issue, and I think it’s -- since it was not cited, the arbitration award, it was outside, it should 18 remain for the Court. 19 But that’s -- you know, I do believe it is an issue that can be 20 determined I believe based on the law, based on the arbitration award and the complaint. 21 So perhaps -- and we’re going to be doing a posttrial briefing, so 22 perhaps I can change the Court’s mind. But if that’s your inclination, then I understand. 23 24 THE COURT: Well, I don’t want to take on work that I don’t have to take on. And this seems to me that the arbitrator was clear that 25 he denied the motion for injunctive relief on whatever basis he denied it on. 26 And the only thing he didn’t rule on was the 7th cause of action, 27 and that does not allow a claim for injunctive relief. 28 MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW 12 COSTA MESA DEFENDANT’S POST-TRIAL BRIEF DB2/ 38180339.3 1 So he didn’t say he was reserving to this Court all issues not decided. He just said the 7th cause of action. 2 3 Transcript, 27:2-28:8. 4 With respect to Plaintiff’s Seventh Cause of Action under PAGA, Defendant identified 5 several reasons why the court should enter judgment in Defendant’s favor. First, Defendant 6 explained that the entire action should be dismissed under California Code of Civil Procedure 7 Sections 581(b)(5) and 581(l) based on Plaintiff’s failure to appear for trial and failure to 8 prosecute her claim, which is the subject of a Motion to Dismiss Defendant filed on January 27, 9 2020, taken under submission by the Court. Transcript, 7:1-13, 31:22-32:11. Second, Defendant 10 explained that Defendant’s Requests for Admission—which include requests for Plaintiff to admit 11 that CBRE Group, Inc. was not her employer—should be deemed admitted due to Plaintiff’s 12 failure to provide verified responses thereto, which would entitle CBRE Group, Inc. to judgment 13 as a matter of law. Id. at 7:18-8:4. Third, Defendant explained that, based on collateral estoppel, 14 the Arbitration Order conclusively establishes that CBRE Group, Inc. was not Plaintiff’s 15 employer, which means she cannot be an aggrieved employee who can pursue a PAGA claim 16 against it. Id. at 8:9-9:10. Fourth, because Plaintiff did not provide the requisite notice to the 17 LWDA stating that she intended to pursue a claim against CBRE, Inc., Plaintiff cannot attempt to 18 pursue a claim against CBRE, Inc. now. Id.