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  • MEAGAN BURNETT ET AL VS. NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC. ET AL CONTRACT/WARRANTY document preview
  • MEAGAN BURNETT ET AL VS. NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC. ET AL CONTRACT/WARRANTY document preview
  • MEAGAN BURNETT ET AL VS. NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC. ET AL CONTRACT/WARRANTY document preview
  • MEAGAN BURNETT ET AL VS. NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC. ET AL CONTRACT/WARRANTY document preview
  • MEAGAN BURNETT ET AL VS. NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC. ET AL CONTRACT/WARRANTY document preview
  • MEAGAN BURNETT ET AL VS. NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC. ET AL CONTRACT/WARRANTY document preview
  • MEAGAN BURNETT ET AL VS. NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC. ET AL CONTRACT/WARRANTY document preview
  • MEAGAN BURNETT ET AL VS. NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC. ET AL CONTRACT/WARRANTY document preview
						
                                

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1 Paul S. Lecky (SBN 154480) plecky@bhc.law 2 BHC LAW GROUP LLP 5900 Hollis Street, Suite O ELECTRONICALLY 3 Emeryville, CA 94608-2604 F I L E D Telephone: (510) 658-3600 Superior Court of California, 4 Facsimile: (510) 658-1151 County of San Francisco 03/23/2020 5 Attorneys for Defendant Clerk of the Court NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC. BY: ERNALYN BURA 6 Deputy Clerk 7 8 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA 9 COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 10 11 MEAGAN BURNETT fka Case No.: CGC-20-581974 MEAGAN MAFNAS and (Civil Unlimited Jurisdiction) 12 RAIMAHR C BURNETT, REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT 13 Plaintiff, NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC.’S DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO FOURTH 14 v. CAUSE OF ACTION OF PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT 15 NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC., a California Corporation, and DOES 1 Date: March 30, 2020 16 through 10, inclusive, Time: 9:30 a.m. Dept: 302 17 Defendant(s). RESERVATION NO.: 02130330-13 18 Action Filed: January 6, 2020 19 Trial Date: None Set 20 21 22 Becherer 23 Kannett & Schweitzer ________ 24 1255 Powell St. Emeryville, CA 25 94608 510-658-3600 26 27 28 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC.’S DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION OF PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT 1 I. INTRODUCTION 2 Nissan North America, Inc. (“NNA”) hereby submits the following Reply addressing the 3 reasons why its Demurrer to the Fourth Cause of Cause of Action of Plaintiffs’ Complaint 4 (”Demurrer”) addressing Plaintiffs’ purported fraud claims should be sustained. As addressed 5 below, the arguments set forth in Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition 6 to Nissan North America, Inc.’s Demurrer to the Fourth Cause of Action of Plaintiffs’ Complaint 7 (“Plaintiffs’ Opposition”) do not demonstrate otherwise. NNA’s Demurrer should be sustained. 8 II. LEGAL ARGUMENT 9 Every element in a cause of action for fraud must be alleged both factually and 10 specifically; the policy of liberal construction of pleadings will not be evoked to sustain a 11 defective complaint. Cooper v. Equity General Insurance (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1252, citing 12 Hall v. Department of Adoptions (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 898, 904. When fraud is based upon a 13 concealment, it is actionable only if the defendant had a duty to disclose the concealed fact. 14 Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp., 34 Cal.4th 979, 990. This legal duty to disclose can only 15 arise through statute, contract, the general character of the activity, or the relationship between 16 the parties. Alexandria S. v. Pacific Fertility Medical Center, Inc. (1997) 55 Cal. App. 4th 100, 116. 17 Plaintiffs’ instant fraud claim is not being pursued under any statute per se, but there is 18 case law discussing legal duty in the context of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”) 19 statutory violation. For example, in Daugherty v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., (2006) 144 20 Cal. App. 4th 824, addressing statutory liability under the California Unfair Competition Law 21 (“UCL”) and the CLRA, the trial court refused to extend liability to a manufacturer for the failure to 22 disclose an alleged product defect. Daugherty involved a nationwide class action lawsuit against Becherer 23 Honda for owners of certain Honda Accords and Preludes equipped with the F22 engine. The Kannett & Schweitzer ________ 24 plaintiffs claimed that Honda knew about a defect that could result in oil loss and ultimately, 1255 Powell St. Emeryville, CA 25 engine failure, but deliberately failed to remedy the problem or to warn consumers of the risk of 94608 510-658-3600 26 damage to their engine. The trial judge sustained Honda’s demurrer without leave because: 27 Opening the door to plaintiffs’ new theory of liability would change the landscape of warranty and product liability law in California. 28 Failure of a product to last forever would become a ‘defect,’ a -1- REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC.’S DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION OF PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT 1 manufacturer would no longer be able to issue limited warranties, and product defect litigation would become as widespread as 2 manufacturing itself. If such a change is to come, another court must be its harbinger. Id. at 829. 3 4 The appellate court affirmed, holding that plaintiffs’ CLRA claim did not set forth any 5 representation by Honda regarding the claimed defect and failed to identify any other duty to 6 disclose the defect. The court was not prepared to make a manufacturer, distributor, or seller 7 liable for consumer fraud simply because a known product defect was not disclosed to the 8 consumer, noting that "although a claim may be stated under the CLRA in terms constituting 9 fraudulent omissions, to be actionable, the omission must be contrary to a representation 10 actually made by the defendant, or an omission of a fact the defendant was obliged to disclose." 11 Id. at 835. The logical significance of the Daugherty decision was that it avoided a result that 12 would make product defect litigation “as widespread as manufacturing itself.” See also Bardin v. 13 Daimlerchrysler Corp. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1255 (no duty under CLRA to disclose use of 14 tubular steel exhaust manifolds instead of cast iron despite increased failure rate). 15 Here, as set forth in the moving papers and below, the Plaintiff has failed to plead 16 sufficient facts to avoid the bar of the economic loss rule or to establish the necessary elements 17 of the existence of damages, a duty to disclose, or justifiable reliance, or damages so to state a 18 claim for fraud. Plaintiffs should not be permitted to turn every breach of warranty case into a 19 tort. 20 A. Defendant Has Repeatedly Met and Conferred on the Issues in its Demurrer 21 NNA acknowledges that it did not meet and confer via telephone or in person with 22 plaintiffs’ counsel before filing this particular demurrer. However, pursuant to the Declaration of 23 Paul S. Lecky in Support of NNA’s demurrer, NNA’s counsel has recently filed approximately two BHC LAW 24 dozen similar demurrers, which all addressed the exact same legal assertions and striking GROUP LLP ________ 25 similar factual allegations related to Nissan Sentras as in this case. These prior meet and confer 5900 Hollis Street, Suite O 26 Emeryville, CA 94608 experiences have not been successful. Furthermore, “[a]ny determination by the court that the 510-658-3600 27 T: 510-658-3600 F: 510-658-1151 meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer.” 28 (California Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 430.41(a)(4)) -2- REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC.’S DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION OF PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT 1 B. NNA’s Demurrer Should be Sustained as to Plaintiffs’ Fourth Cause of Action as the Fraud Claims Within Are Barred by the Economic Loss Rule. 2 3 The economic loss rule bars fraud claims where the damages sought by a plaintiff are the 4 same economic losses arising from the alleged breach of the contract at issue. Robinson 5 Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp. (2004) 34 Cal. 4th 979, 988-989; see also Foster Poultry 6 Farms v. Alkar-Rapidpak-MP Equip., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 983, 991 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (“Courts 7 have applied the economic loss rule to bar fraud claims where the damages Plaintiff seek are the 8 same economic losses arising from the alleged breach of contract.”). Thus, the economic loss 9 rule prevents a plaintiff from recovery of tort damages for the breach of duties that merely restate 10 contractual obligations, such as the contractual obligation to provide a product free of defects. 11 Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp. (2004) 34 Cal. 4th 988. 12 In the present action, Plaintiffs’ Complaint seeks recovery in tort for an alleged breach of 13 warranty due to a purported defect in the Subject Vehicle alleging that, had Plaintiffs been aware 14 of the breach, he would not have purchased the Subject Vehicle. Complaint ¶¶ 56 and 143, 15 attached as Exhibit 1 to Declaration of Paul S. Lecky submitted contemporaneously with NNA’s 16 moving papers. This is the sole purported injury allegedly suffered by Plaintiffs as the result of 17 NNA’s alleged concealment. There are no allegations in the Complaint that Plaintiff suffered any 18 form of bodily harm or personal injury; or that Plaintiffs were ever in an automotive crash or 19 accident. There are no allegations in the Complaint of any claim or potential claim against 20 Plaintiff for liability by a third party arising from Plaintiffs’ purchase or use of the Subject Vehicle. 21 Likewise, Plaintiffs’ Opposition makes no claim of any harm arising from the alleged breach of 22 warranty due to a purported defect in the Subject Vehicle alleging that, other than Plaintiffs’ 23 purchase of the Subject Vehicle. Plaintiffs’ Opposition, 12:15-18. The only injury allegedly BHC LAW 24 suffered by Plaintiffs as the result of NNA’s alleged concealment is Plaintiffs’ alleged economic GROUP LLP ________ 25 loss resulting from the purchase of the Subject Vehicle. In short, such damages resulting from 5900 Hollis Street, Suite O 26 Emeryville, CA 94608 NNA’s purported ‘”fraud” are the same economic losses arising from the alleged breach of 510-658-3600 27 T: 510-658-3600 F: 510-658-1151 warranty at issue. The economic loss rule bars Plaintiffs’ “fraud” claims. 28 In an effort to avoid the bar of the economic loss rule, Plaintiffs’ Opposition baldly states -3- REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC.’S DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION OF PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT 1 that NNA’s alleged breach of warranty “put Plaintiff at risk of great bodily harm and personal 2 injury” and “could potentially expose her [sic] to monetary damages in lawsuits from injured 3 persons.” Plaintiffs’ Opposition, 8:2-4. This statement has neither support in law or in fact. First, 4 California law does not permit a plaintiff to seek compensation for speculative injuries or harm 5 that “could potentially” occur. To the contrary, it is longstanding law that a plaintiff, whether 6 seeking recovery in contract or in tort, is only capable of recovering for actual damages arising 7 from a defendant’s conduct. Civ. Code § 3333; see also Ramsey v. Penry (1942) 53 Cal.App.2d 8 773, 778 (“[S]peculative damages may not be recovered.”); Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton 9 Saudi Arabia Ltd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503, 516. (Tort damages are awarded to compensate the 10 victim for injury actually suffered.). None of the case law cited in Plaintiffs’ Opposition states 11 otherwise. See generally Plaintiffs’ Opposition. Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to plead facts capable 12 of giving rise to such speculative injuries and, further, it contains no allegations to demonstrate 13 the existence of any such injured persons or such lawsuits. In addition, even if Plaintiffs 14 presumably had been in an accident caused by the alleged defect, there are no facts alleged in 15 the Complaint demonstrating that Plaintiffs could be found at fault for any injuries arising from 16 such an accident. Unlike the manufacturer plaintiff in Robinson Helicopter, supra., Plaintiff is a 17 consumer and not in the chain of commerce of the alleged defective product. Complaint ¶¶ 8, 18 15, & 62. Unlike a manufacturer plaintiff, the consumer Plaintiff cannot be held liable in strict 19 liability for personal injuries arising from the alleged defect at issue in this case. Robinson 20 Helicopter, 34 Cal.4th at 985-987, 991 fn 7, & 993. Plaintiffs’ Opposition does not suggest the 21 existence of facts to the contrary. See generally Plaintiffs’ Opposition. Thus, to the extent that, 22 as Plaintiffs’ Opposition contends, Robinson Helicopter holds that “only exposure to liability is 23 needed” to invalidate the bar of the economic loss rule, the opinion is readily distinguished. BHC LAW 24 Compare Plaintiffs’ Opposition, 7:26-28, to Robinson Helicopter, 34 Cal.4th at 985-987 & 993. GROUP LLP ________ 25 The Fourth Cause of Action of Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to plead around the bar of the economic 5900 Hollis Street, Suite O 26 Emeryville, CA 94608 loss rule. Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to state a cause of action for fraud and Demurrer is proper. 510-658-3600 27 T: 510-658-3600 F: 510-658-1151 Further, the exception to the economic loss rule articulated in Robinson Helicopter Co., 28 Inc. arose out of defendant Dana Corp. intentional misrepresentations that the clutches it -4- REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC.’S DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION OF PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT 1 provided to the plaintiff, as part of the original contract, continued to conform to the “type 2 certificate” issued by the Federal Aviation Administration when in fact the clutches no longer 3 complied. Id. at 991. In addition, it was the provision of these faulty clutches that “exposed 4 Robinson to liability for personal damages if a helicopter crashed and to disciplinary action by the 5 FAA. Id. The court concluded: “Thus, Dana’s fraud is a tort independent of the breach itself” Id. 6 In other words, Dana’s breach, and what it concealed, was providing faulty clutches and 7 the independent tort that created the exception was communicating directly to its customer that 8 the clutches it was providing were in compliance with the FAA regulations in conformance with 9 the supply contract. There are no such facts alleged against NNA in Plaintiffs’ complaint. 10 C. NNA’s Demurrer Should be Sustained as the Fourth Cause of Action of the Complaint Fails to State a Cause of Action for Fraud as It Fails to Plead the 11 Necessary Element of Damages. 12 The Fourth Cause of Action of Plaintiffs’ Complaint purported to plead claims for 13 fraudulent concealment. Complaint ¶¶ 135-145. Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that the CVT 14 (transmission) defect identified as forming the basis for Plaintiffs’ claims for fraudulent 15 concealment reportedly manifests by “juddering” or “shuddering”, which the Complaint describes 16 as a “hard stop”, “hard shaking”, and “violent jerking”. Complaint ¶¶ 18, 36, 37, 39, 46, 48, & 17 136-139. While Plaintiffs had their CVT replaced on February 11, 2019, there is no indication the 18 repair was not paid for pursuant to NNA’s new vehicle limited warranty. Complaint ¶¶ 67-73 see 19 also generally Complaint. There are no allegations that Plaintiff had any complaint regarding the 20 transmission after the repair on February 11, 2019. Complaint ¶¶ 64-68; see generally 21 Complaint. In other words, Plaintiffs’ new vehicle limited warranty was honored and their repairs 22 were paid for by NNA. Plaintiffs have no damages. NNA’s Demurrer should be sustained. 23 D. NNA’s Demurrer Should be Sustained Because Plaintiffs’ Complaint Fails to BHC LAW 24 Plead “Material Facts” to Establish a Duty to Disclose. GROUP LLP To allege a duty to disclose, a plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) is in a fiduciary ________ 25 5900 Hollis Street, relationship with the plaintiff (2) had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the Suite O 26 Emeryville, CA 94608 510-658-3600 plaintiff; (3) actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) makes partial 27 T: 510-658-3600 F: 510-658-1151 representations but also suppresses some material fact. LiMandri v. Judkins, (1997) 52 28 -5- REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC.’S DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION OF PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT 1 Cal.App.4th 326, 336. 2 Plaintiffs’ Complaint cannot plead the element of the duty to disclose as there was no 3 transactional relationship between Plaintiff and NNA, which was not a party to the sale of the 4 Subject Vehicle. A duty to disclose facts arises only when the parties are in a relationship giving 5 rise to the duty, such as `"seller and buyer, employer and prospective employee, doctor and 6 patient, or parties entering into any kind of contractual arrangement." See Shin v. Kong (2000) 7 80 Cal.App.4th 498, 509; Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc., (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276 (no privity 8 between product manufacturer and end-user patient). Bigler-Engler is particularly instructive 9 since it discussed the requisite relationship necessary for a duty to disclose, suggesting that a 10 device manufacturer never had such a relationship or transaction with plaintiff. In Bigler-Engler, 11 the plaintiff used a medical device, the Polar Care 500, manufactured by Breg, Inc. prescribed by 12 her medical doctor. Bigler-Engler, supra. at 284. The appellate court addressed whether the 13 evidence at trial supported the jury’s verdict in favor of Engler on an intentional concealment 14 claim against Breg. Id. at 310. Breg contended that it did not owe a duty to disclose because 15 there was no transactional relationship between Breg and Engler. Id. at 311. The appellate 16 court expressly acknowledged that a transactional relationship arises only from direct dealings 17 between the parties.” Such a transaction must necessarily arise from direct dealings between 18 the plaintiff and the defendant; it cannot arise between the defendant and the public at large. Id. 19 at 312. Accordingly, the appellate court agreed with Breg, holding the evidence was insufficient 20 to establish a duty to disclose. Id. at 314. Thus, the appellate court reversed judgment in favor 21 of Engler as to the cause of action for intentional concealment against Breg. Id. at 332. The 22 appellate court in Bigler-Engler specifically rejected the argument that there is a duty to warn of a 23 products hazards and faults for the purposes of a common law fraud claim, rather than a product BHC LAW 24 liability claim: “Products liability law involves a set of circumstances, elements, and doctrines that GROUP LLP ________ 25 are independent from, and not directly applicable to, fraud. The duties underlying each cannot 5900 Hollis Street, Suite O 26 Emeryville, CA 94608 simply by applied to the other.” Id. at 312. Rejecting the application of product liability rules in 510-658-3600 27 T: 510-658-3600 F: 510-658-1151 an effort to impose fraud claims on a manufacturer defendant, judgment against the 28 manufacturer as to the cause of action for intentional concealment was reversed. -6- REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC.’S DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION OF PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT 1 Plaintiffs purchased the Subject Vehicle from Momentum Nissan in Fairfield, CA and 2 seek to hold NNA liable based upon its publicly available marketing materials as a manufacturer. 3 Complaint ¶ 65. There was no direct dealing between Plaintiffs and NNA. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ 4 claim for fraud against the manufacturer of the Subject Vehicle fails to state a cause of action. 5 Plaintiffs’ Opposition fails to substantively distinguish the present action from Bigler-Engler or to 6 address the reasoned arguments that support the ruling in Bigler-Engler. Rather, Plaintiffs’ 7 Opposition merely asserts that Bigler-Engler should be disregarded because it involved a 8 medical device rental and, instead, cites Daniel v. Ford Motor Co. (9th Cir. 2015) 806 F.3d 1217. 9 Plaintiffs’ Opposition, 5:8-27. However, Daniel fails to save Plaintiffs’ fraud claims. First, Daniel 10 is a non-binding federal court decision that predated the California court’s ruling in Bigler-Engler. 11 Second, the Daniel court did not address a common law fraud claim. Daniel, 806 F.3d at 1221. 12 Like Bigler-Engler, this matter is before a California Court and involves a claim of common law 13 fraud. Daniel is not instructive; Plaintiffs’ reliance upon it is misplaced. 14 Plaintiffs’ Opposition also argues that NNA had exclusive knowledge, thus creating a 15 duty. Plaintiffs’ Opposition, 10:25-27. However, the facts alleged in the Complaint belie the 16 fraud claim. Simply put, the Complaint suggests that various vehicles had an alleged history of 17 transmission acceleration/deceleration issues. Complaint ¶¶ 17-48 & 137-141. The Complaint 18 suggests that NNA was publishing information about CVT issues starting in 2013 and every year 19 thereafter. In other words, to the extent that Plaintiffs may claim some unspecified harm arising 20 from NNA’s purported concealment of alleged defects, admissions by Plaintiffs establish that this 21 information was disclosed and available. Judicial admissions also conceded the existence of a 22 complaints regarding the CVT issues being included in an “automated database” available to the 23 public. Complaint ¶ 43; Request for Judicial Notice ¶ 1. 1 Accordingly, the facts as alleged in the BHC LAW 24 GROUP LLP ________ 25 5900 Hollis Street, 1 Despite their judicial admission regarding the existence of this public database, Plaintiffs filed Plaintiffs’ Objections Suite O 26 Emeryville, CA 94608 to Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice (“Plaintiffs’ Objections”). Plaintiffs’ Objections expressly concedes that 510-658-3600 judicial notice of the database is proper. Plaintiffs’ Objections, 1:16. However, Plaintiffs’ Objections urge the Court to 27 T: 510-658-3600 F: 510-658-1151 ignore the existence of the public database on the purported basis that the TSBs may not be “accurate” and that the database is incomplete as it may not contain “all TSB’s and recalls related to the defect”. Such arguments do not avoid demurrer. First, the fraud claims of Plaintiffs’ Complaint rely upon the assertion that the TSBs are “accurate” in 28 demonstrating NNA’s knowledge of a purported defect. If they are not “accurate” as Plaintiffs’ Objections assert, then Plaintiff cannot state the element of knowledge for a claim for fraud and demurrer is proper. Regardless, Plaintiffs’ -7- REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC.’S DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION OF PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT 1 Complaint cannot support a “concealment” or “suppression” claim. Through Plaintiffs’ own 2 averment, the information was clearly not suppressed or concealed; it was published. 3 E. NNA’s Demurrer Should be Sustained as Plaintiffs’ Fourth Cause of Action 4 Fails to Adequately Plead Reasonable Reliance. 5 To state a claim for fraud, “A plaintiff must show that the reliance was reasonable by 6 showing that (1) the matter was material in the sense that a reasonable person would find it 7 important in determining how he or he would act; and (2) it was reasonable for the Plaintiff to 8 have relied on the misrepresentation.” Hoffman v. 162 N. Wolfe LLC (2014) 228 Cal. App. 4th 9 1178, 1194, as modified on denial of reh’g (Aug. 13, 2014). As set forth more fully in NNA’s 10 moving papers, reasonable, justifiable reliance is an essential element of a claim for fraudulent 11 inducement. United Guar. Mortg. Indem. Co. v. Countrywide Financial Corp., 660 F.Supp.2d 12 1163, 1189 (C.D. Ca. 2009) citing Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226, 13 1239. Reasonable reliance is judged by an objective standard and can be decided as a matter 14 of law. Id. The causal elements of a claim for misrepresentation, particularly the allegations of 15 reliance, must be specifically pleaded. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. 16 Cambridge Integrated Services Group, Inc. (2009) 1 71 Cal.App.4th 35, 50. Reasonable 17 reliance must be pled whether the “misrepresentation” was the result of an affirmative statement 18 or “concealment”. Anderson v. Deloitte & Touche (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1468, 1474 quoting 19 Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1108 superseded on other grounds by statue 20 as stated in Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 847-848. Thus, regardless of 21 the label that Plaintiff may apply to the element of misrepresentation, justifiable reliance 22 nevertheless remains an essential element of his fraud claim—one that Plaintiff failed to 23 adequately plead. BHC LAW 24 GROUP LLP ________ 25 5900 Hollis Street, Suite O 26 Emeryville, CA 94608 510-658-3600 27 T: 510-658-3600 F: 510-658-1151 Objection is a mischaracterization of NNA’s request. NNA requests that the Court acknowledge the existence of the public database and that Plaintiff, therefore, had access to the information therein prior to the time of purchase of the Subject Vehicle. The fact that such information was not “accurate” or “incomplete” as Plaintiffs’ Objections now assert, 28 does not alter the judicially noticeable fact that such information was published and that such information was not concealed. -8- REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC.’S DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION OF PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT 1 1. Judicial Admissions Establish Plaintiffs Contemplated Potential Defects. 2 3 Plaintiffs’ Complaint contains a judicial admission that the warranty for the Subject 4 Vehicle expressly acknowledged the potential for defects resulting from materials and 5 workmanship. Complaint ¶¶ 59-61. Thus, any assumption by Plaintiffs that the Subject Vehicle 6 would be free of defects was not reasonable. Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate any reasonable 7 belief that the Subject Vehicle would be free of defects or any justifiable reliance upon any 8 statement or omission on the part of NNA. Demurrer is proper. 9 2. Plaintiffs Failed to Plead Their Awareness of NNA’s 10 “Misrepresentations”. 11 Plaintiffs’ Complaint baldly alleges: “Plaintiff reviewed marketing brochures, viewed 12 television commercials and/or heard commercials about the qualities of the Nissan 13 Sentra…Plaintiff further relied on the statements made during the sales process by NISSAN’s 14 agents and within marketing brochures provided by NISSAN.” Complaint ¶ 66; see also 15 Plaintiffs’ Opposition, 1:15-17. Yet, neither the operative pleading nor Plaintiffs’ Opposition 16 specifies what those “qualities” were. See generally Complaint ¶ 66 and Plaintiffs’ Opposition. 17 Indeed, the Complaint is devoid of any allegations as to the content of any statement made 18 during the “sale process”. See generally Complaint. Not a single marketing brochure, 19 commercial, or sale’s statement is described in the operative complaint by name, date, or other 20 identifiable characteristic. In short, the Complaint fails to allege any basis for any reliance upon 21 such statements, let alone any reasonable reliance. What exactly did NNA say about the 22 transmission of the Subject Vehicle that Plaintiffs allegedly relied upon? Neither the Complaint 23 nor Plaintiffs’ Opposition says. The omission of such specific facts are fatal to a fraud claim, BHC LAW 24 particularly in a claim against a corporate defendant. Shapiro v. Wells Fargo (1984) 152 GROUP LLP ________ 25 Cal.App.3d 467, 474, Tarmann v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (1991) 2 5900 Hollis Street, Suite O 26 Emeryville, CA 94608 Cal.App.4th 153, 157-158. Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to state a cause of action for fraud and 510-658-3600 27 T: 510-658-3600 F: 510-658-1151 Plaintiff have not demonstrated that they can reasonably plead facts sufficient to do so. NNA’s 28 Demurrer should be sustained without leave to amend. McKenney v. Purepac Pharmaceutical -9- REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC.’S DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION OF PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT 1 Co. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 72, 78. 2 III. CONCLUSION 3 The allegations of Plaintiffs’ Complaint are insufficient to state a fraud cause of action 4 against NNA. Plaintiffs’ Opposition fails to demonstrate how Plaintiff could now do so. The 5 Fourth Cause of Action of Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not adequately alleges facts to avoid the bar 6 of the economic loss rule, demonstrate the existence of damages from the defect that NNA 7 purportedly concealed, demonstrate any justifiable reliance by Plaintiffs, or show that NNA had a 8 duty to disclose. Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to state a cause of action for fraud. Demurrer is 9 proper. The Court should sustain NNA’s Demurrer without leave to amend. 10 Dated: March 23, 2020 BHC LAW GROUP LLP 11 12 By: Paul S. Lecky 13 Attorneys for Defendant NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC. 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 BHC LAW 24 GROUP LLP ________ 25 5900 Hollis Street, Suite O 26 Emeryville, CA 94608 510-658-3600 27 T: 510-658-3600 F: 510-658-1151 28 -10- REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC.’S DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION OF PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT 1 PROOF OF SERVICE 2 I, Lisa Rubino, declare that I am, and was at the time of service of the documents herein referred to, over the age of 18 years, and not a party to the action; and I am employed in the 3 County of Alameda, State of California. My business address is 5900 Hollis Street, Suite O, Emeryville, California 94608. 4 On March 23, 2020, at my employer’s above-stated place of business, I served the 5 foregoing document(s) described as: 6 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC.’S DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION OF PLAINTIFFS’ 7 COMPLAINT 8 on interested parties in this action by placing ( ) the original (X) a true copy thereof enclosed in a separate sealed envelope to each addressee as follows: 9 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 10 Steve Mikhov, Esq. Amy Morse, Esq. 11 KNIGHT LAW GROUP, LLP 10250 Constellation Blvd., Suite 2500 12 Los Angeles, CA 90067 (310) 552-2250 Telephone 13 (310) 552-7973 Facsimile emailservice@knightlaw.com 14 (By U.S. Mail) I enclosed the documents in a sealed envelope or package addressed to 15 the persons at the addresses shown above and placed the envelope for collection and mailing, following our ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar with the 16 business’s practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the 17 ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service, in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid. 18 (By Electronic Mail) Based on a court order or an agreement of the parties to accept 19 service by electronic transmission, I served the documents to be sent to the persons at the electronic notification addresses listed above. I did not receive, within a reasonable 20 time after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful. 21 (By Overnight Delivery) I enclosed the documents in an envelope or package provided 22 by an overnight delivery carrier and addressed to the persons at the addresses above. I placed the envelope or package for collection and overnight delivery at an office or a 23 regularly utilized drop box of the overnight delivery carrier. BHC LAW 24 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the GROUP LLP foregoing is true and correct. ________ 25 5900 Hollis Street, Executed on March 23, 2020, at Emeryville, California. Suite O 26 Emeryville, CA 94608 510-658-3600 27 T: 510-658-3600 F: 510-658-1151 Lisa Rubino 28 -1- PROOF OF SERVICE