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I Bonnie Glatzer, State Bar No. 147804
bglatzer@nixonpeabody.com
2 William S. Lisa, State Bar No. 310541
wlisa@nixonpeabody.com ELECTRONICALLY
3 NIXON PEABODY LLP
One Embarcadero Center, 32nd Floor F I L E D
Superior Court of California,
4 San Francisco, CA 94111-3600 County of San Francisco
Tel: 415-984-8200
5 Fax: 415-984-8300 11/06/2019
Clerk of the Court
BY: RONNIE OTERO
6 Attorneys for Defendant ROBERT HALF Deputy Clerk
INTERNATIONAL INC.
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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
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COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
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BRIAN F. ROGERS, Case No. CGC 16-551854
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Plaintiff, DECLARATION OF WILLIAMS. LISA
13 IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
vs. MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S
14 "MEMORANDUM OF COSTS"
ROBERT HALF INTERNATIONAL,
15 DORAN INGALLS, An Individual, SEAN Reservation Number: 10301206-04
PACHECO, An Individual, and DOES 1 Hearing Date: December 6, 2019
16 THROUGH 10, INCLUSIVE, Time: 9:30 a.m.
Dept.: 302
17 Defendants.
18 Date Action Filed: May 6, 2016
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4839-8240-7591.2
DECLARATION OF WILLIAM S. LISA ISO
MOTION TO STRIKE "MEMORANDUM OF COSTS"
1 DECLARATION OF WILLIAMS. LISA
2 I, William S. Lisa, hereby declare:
3 1. I am an associate in the law firm of Nixon Peabody LLP, counsel of record to the
4 Defendant Robert Half International Inc. ("RHI"). I am authorized and licensed to practice law
5 before all the courts of the State of California and before this Court. The facts set forth in this
6 declaration are within my personal knowledge, and if called upon to testify to these facts, I could
7 and would do so competently.
8 2. The Court entered summary judgment in RHI' s favor on April 21, 2017
9 ("Summary Judgment Order"). Plaintiff Brian F. Rogers ("Plaintiff' or "Rogers") appealed on
10 May 5, 2017 (1 st Appellate District Case No. Al51655). On May 29, 2019 the First Appellate
11 District affirmed the Summary Judgment Order without modification. A true and correct copy of
12 the Court of Appeals' Decision is attached as Exhibit A. Pursuant to California Rules of Court
13 8.500(e) and 8.512, the Court of Appeal's Order became final and non-appealable on June 28,
14 2019.
15 3. On July 30, 2019 the Clerk of the Court of Appeal entered remittitur affirming the
16 Court of Appeal's award to RHI of costs on appeal. A true and correct copy of the remittitur is
17 attached as Exhibit B. RHI timely filed its Memorandum of Costs on September 3, 2019. A true
18 and correct copy ofRHI's timely filed Memorandum of Costs is attached as Exhibit C.
19 4. Plaintiff did not move to tax or strike RHI's Memorandum of Costs. Instead,
20 Plaintiff filed a case management statement on September 23, 2019, attaching a document entitled
21 "Rebuttal to Appeals Court Decision" ("Rebuttal"). A true and correct copy of Plaintiffs
22 September 23, 2019 Case Management Statement, including the "Rebuttal," is attached as
23 Exhibit D. On the same date, Plaintiff purported to file his own Memorandum of Costs. A true
24 and correct copy of Plaintiffs purported Memorandum of Costs is attached as Exhibit E.
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4839-8240-7 591 .2
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DECLARATION OF WILLIAM S. LISA ISO
MOTION TO STRIKE "MEMORANDUM OF COSTS"
1 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
2 foregoing is true and correct, and that this Declaration was executed by me on this 6th day of
3 November 2019 in San Francisco, California.
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6 William S. Lisa
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4839-8240-7591.2
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DECLARATION OF WILLIAM S. LISA ISO
MOTION TO STRIKE "MEMORANDUM OF COSTS"
EXHIBIT A
Filed 5/29/19
COPY
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
Court of Appeal, First Appellate District
DIVISION THREE FILED
MAY 29 2019
BRIAN F. ROGERS,
Charles D. Johnson, Clerk
Plaintiff and Appellant, by Deputy Clerk
Al51655
v.
ROBERT HALF INTERNATIONAL, (City & County of San Francisco
INC., Super. Ct. No. CGC16551854)
Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff Brian Rogers sued defendant Robert Half International, Inc., alleging race
and age discrimination and failure to prevent discrimination. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of defendant. On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court erred
in: ( 1) concluding defendant met its burden of producing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for not considering plaintiff for a position and concluding plaintiff did not produce
any evidence of race or age discrimination; (2) granting defendant's motion before he
completed discovery and before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) completed its investigation of his complaint against defendant; (3) denying, in
part, plaintiffs motion to compel discovery; and (4) refusing to allow plaintiff to amend
his complaint. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In mid-November 2015, plaintiff responded to one of defendant's job postings by
submitting a resume. Plaintiffs resume stated he was a "GIL Accountant" for Centium,
Inc., from 2002 to the present. A staffing executive for defendant, Doran Ingalls,
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contacted plaintiff and asked him to come to defendant's San Francisco office for an
interview. In an email to confirm the interview, Ingalls told defendant to bring three
references, one of which had to be from his "most recent supervisor or client."
Ingalls interviewed plaintiff in late November 2015. Plaintiff brought no
references to the interview. At the interview, plaintiff told Ingalls that Centium, Inc. was
a company he founded and that he was the sole employee. Ingalls thought plaintiffs
resume was misleading because plaintiff was not merely a "GIL Accountant" at Centium,
Inc.; rather, as the owner and sole employee, he would have held all positions in the
company.
About two weeks after the interview, plaintiff emailed Ingalls and lngalls's
supervisor, Sean Pacheco, complaining he had not been contacted for any job openings.
In that email, plaintiff responded to lngalls's attempts to obtain references from him by
stating defendant already had his references from the time he worked with defendant in
the past. The references plaintiff spoke of were references he provided when he applied
to and worked with defendant previously around the mid- l 990s.
Ingalls responded to plaintiff via email on the same day. Ingalls told plaintiff that,
to be considered for any openings, he needed to provide a minimum of two references,
one from his most recent employer, and a revised resume regarding his job duties at
Centium, Inc. Ingalls said he had no records ofplaintifrs prior employment with
defendant, and was unsure what references plaintiff was referring to. Plaintiff never sent
Ingalls updated references or an updated resume. In mid-February 2016, plaintiff filed a
discrimination charge with the EEOC.
Plaintiff sued defendant in superior court in September 2016. His complaint
alleged causes of action for race and age discrimination and failure to prevent
discrimination in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA)
(Gov. Code,§ 12940, subds. (a), (k)), and race and age discrimination in violation of
public policy. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment that plaintiff opposed.
The trial court granted defendant's motion and denied plaintiff's request to amend his
complaint. Plaintiff appealed.
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DISCUSSION
A. The Grant of Summary Judgment
1. Governing Law and Standard ofReview
In the context of summary judgment in an employment discrimination case, "the
employer, as the moving party, has the initial burden to present admissible evidence
showing either that one or more elements of the plaintiffs prima facie case is lacking or
that the adverse employment action was based upon legitimate, nondiscriminatory
factors." (Hicks v. KNTV Television, Inc. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 994, 1003 (Hicks); see
Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 355 (Guz) [a prima facie case of
discrimination generally can be established by showing: "(1) [the plaintiff] was a
member of a protected class, (2) [the plaintiff] was qualified for the position he [or she]
sought ... , (3) [the plaintiff] suffered an adverse employment action, such as ... denial
of an available job, and (4) some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive"].)
"If ... the motion for summary judgment relies in whole or in part on a showing of
nondiscriminatory reasons for the [adverse action], the employer satisfies its burden as
moving party if it presents evidence of such nondiscriminatory reasons that would pennit
a trier of fact to find, more likely than not, that they were the basis for the [action]."
(Kelly v. Stamps.com Inc. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1097-1098 (Kelly).)
Where an employer meets it initial burden by setting out evidence of a
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action, the employee "then has the
burden to produce 'substantial evidence that the employer's stated nondiscriminatory
reason for the adverse action was untrue or pretextual, or evidence the employer acted
with a discriminatory animus, or a combination of the two, such that a reasonable trier of
fact could conclude the employer engaged in intentional discrimination.' " (Hicks, supra,
160 Cal.App.4th at p. 1003.) "The plaintiffs evidence must be sufficient to support a
reasonable inference that discrimination was a substantial motivating factor in the
decision. [Citations.] The stronger the employer's showing of a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason, the stronger the plaintiffs evidence must be to create a
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reasonable inference of a discriminatory motive." (Featherstone v. Southern California
Permanente Medical Group (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1158-1159 (Featherstone).)
We review an order granting summary judgment de novo. (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th
at p. 334.) "In determining whether [the foregoing] burdens were met, we must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, as the nonmoving party, liberally
construing [his] evidence while strictly scrutinizing defendanfs." (Kelly, supra,
135 Cal.App.4th at p. I 098.)
2. Analysis
In support of its motion for summary judgment, defendant presented evidence of a
non-discriminatory reason for not hiring plaintiff, i.e., plaintiffs failure to provide
references and an updated resume as requested. Thus, as stated above, to avoid summary
judgment, plaintiff had the burden of producing" 'substantial evidence that the
employer's stated nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action was untrue or
pretextual, or evidence the employer acted with a discriminatory animus, or a
combination of the two, such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the employer
engaged in intentional discrimination.' " (Hicks, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 1003.)
Plaintiff fails to show he carried that burden.
Plaintiff does not point to any evidence in the record disputing defendant's stated
nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring him, or to any evidence that defendant acted with
discriminatory animus. Plaintiff does not claim he provided references or an updated
resume as requested. Instead, he insists neither of those requests was warranted because
he already provided defendant his current resume (though it did not list all of his job titles
and job duties at Centium, Inc.) and also previously provided references at the time he
applied to work with defendant around the mid-1990s (though he did not identify them to
Ingalls). Plaintiffs mention of outdated references, however, did not satisfy defendant's
reasonable request for a recent reference. Moreover, plaintiffs disagreement with the
need to provide any further references and a revised resume is not evidence that
defendant acted with discriminatory animus, and it does not alter the fact that plaintiff did
not provide either after being requested to do so. Notably. plaintiff was asked to provide
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references at least twice, once before his interview with Ingalls. (Hersant v. Department
o/Social Services (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 997, 1005 [employee must do more than simply
"raise triable issues of fact concerning whether the employer's reasons for taking the
adverse action were sound"].)
Because the record is lacking in any evidence supporting a reasonable inference of
intentional discrimination, 1 we conclude the trial court did not err in granting the motion
for summary judgment. (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 362; see Featherstone, supra,
10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1166 ["Where ... a plaintiff cannot establish a claim for
discrimination, the employer as a matter of law cannot be held responsible for failing to
prevent same"].) Additionally, we note that the trial court granted summary judgment on
plaintiffs cause of action for race and age discrimination in violation of public policy in
part because plaintiff cited no authority showing such a claim exists when there has been
no termination of an existing employment relationship. On appeal, plaintiff fails to
address this or cite authority controverting it. (Bains v. Moores (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th
445, 455 ["' "[appellate] review is limited to issues which have been adequately raised
and briefed" ' "].)
B. The Timing of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff next claims reversal is warranted because the trial court "made a decision
on highly incomplete information" insofar as it decided the summary judgment motion
before the discovery deadline and before the EEOC completed its investigation. Plaintiff,
One of the documents that plaintiff filed in support of his opposition to the
summary judgment motion was his own declaration, but he did not cite to his declaration
in his separate statement, did not designate it to be included in the appellate record, and
did not cite to it in his appellate brief. There is nothing in the record indicating that the
trial court even considered it. (Compare United Community Church v. Garcin (1991)
231 Cal.App.3d 327,335 [" 'This is the Golden Rule of Summary Adjudication: ifit is
not set forth in the separate statement, it does not exist' "] with Castillo v. Glenair, Inc.
(2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 262,283 [trial court has discretion to consider evidence not
included in the moving party's separate statement and to grant summary judgment despite
an inadequate separate statement].) We therefore analyze the ruling on the motion
without it.
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however, makes the argument on appeal in a cursory manner, without reasoned argument
accompanied by citations to authority. Moreover, he neglects to show he raised this issue
below, such as by asking for a continuance to obtain necessary discovery. Plaintiff has
thus forfeited review of this contention. (Badie v. Bank ofAmerica ( 1998)
67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785 (Badie) [failure to provide reasoned argument and citations
to authority waives point on appeal]; In re Aaron B. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 843, 846
[failure to raise point in trial court precludes its consideration on appeal]; Code Civ.
Proc.,§ 437c, subd. (h); Denton v. City and County ofSan Francisco (2017)
16 Cal.App.5th 779, 791.)
C. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel
Plaintiff argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to compel responses to
his request for production of documents, set one. Specifically, he claims the court denied
his "request to seek a racial and gender composition of RHl's candidate and internal
employee workforce" and denied his "ability to seek electronic mail communication"
from defendant, which "would have been both compelling and revealing about
[defendant]' s conduct and policies."
Again, plaintiff fails to adequately develop this argument. He does not identify
the specific requests for production at issue in this claim; rather, his opening brief
inadequately cites to the page range covering his entire request for production of
documents, set one. (American Indian Model Schools v. Oakland Unified School Dist.
(2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 258,284 ["block-page references present difficulties because the
appellate court is unable to evaluate which facts contained on those pages support the
party's position"].) He also cites no authority in support. (Badie, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 784-785.)
Even ifwe were willing to assume plaintiff is taking issue with the trial court's
rulings on his request for production of documents, set one, numbers 1, 2, 8, and 11
through 16-which most closely fit the descriptions of the requests for production that
plaintiff discusses in his appellate brief.-plaintiff fails to show the trial court abused its
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discretion. 2 (Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 733
[review of a discovery order is for abuse of discretion].) A party moving to compel
further responses to a production demand must show good cause justifying the discovery
sought. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1 ).) "[T]hat burden is met ... by a fact-
specific showing of relevance." (G/enfed Dev. Corp. v. Superior Court ( 1997)
53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117.)
Here, each of the foregoing requests was patently broad and plaintiff fails to
demonstrate that he showed good cause below by a fact-specific showing of relevance. It
is unclear from the record what plaintiffs arguments were below as no record of the oral
proceedings concerning the motion to compel are included in the appellate record.
Further, plaintiffs declaration in support of his motion to compel contained no
allegations about why he was seeking these records. In light of these deficiencies, we
cannot conclude the trial abused its discretion. Additionally, plaintiff fails to present a
2
Request numbers 1 and 2 sought all emails sent to and from Ingalls's computer,
and to and from Pacheco's computer, since their employment with defendant dating back
to 2012 and 2005, respectively. The trial court denied the motion to compel regarding
these requests, sustaining defendant's objections that the requests were overbroad and
insufficiently specific, and that they violated third party privacy rights.
Request number 8 sought all documents "pertaining to an ethnic breakdown of
candidates sent on job assignments by [defendant] to local employers classified by race,
age, starting pay, and ending pay by ethnicity of each candidate." Request numbers 11
through 14 sought records about the total number of African-Americans and Latinos who
received jobs through defendant's San Francisco office, and the number who were
assigned to jobs by Ingalls since April 2012. Request number 15 sought records about
the total number of African-Americans who were over 40 years old who received jobs
through defendant's San Francisco office, and request number 16 sought the names of
African-American candidates who receive assignments through defendant. The trial
court granted the motion to compel regarding request numbers 8, and 11 through 15, in
part, limiting the discoverable documents to those within four years preceding the filing
of the complaint and to the San Francisco office. The trial court denied the motion to
compel regarding request number 16, sustaining defendant's objections that the requests
were overbroad and insufficiently specific, and that they violated third party privacy
rights.
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developed argument regarding prejudice. (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 475; Paterno v. State of
California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 105-106 (Paterno).) We thus reject this claim.
D. Plaintifrs Request for Leave to Amend
In the body of his opposition to the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff
requested leave to amend to correct any deficiencies in the complaint. The trial court,
however, denied the request on the grounds that plaintiff failed to explain what his
proposed amendments were or how they would remedy the deficiencies that led to its
granting of the summary judgment motion. Plaintiff now suggests this was error.
Because this argument is undeveloped, unaccompanied by citations to the record,
and unaccompanied by authority, it is not properly raised on appeal and is subject to
forfeiture. (Badie, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at pp. 784-785; Kim v. Sumitomo Bank (1993)
17 Cal.App.4th 974, 979; City of Oakland v. Public Employees' Retirement System
(2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 29, 51.) Even ifwe were to consider it properly presented, we
would find no abuse of discretion. (Board of Trustees v. Superior Court (2007)
149 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1162-1163.) Courts have the power to allow amendments to
pleadings at any time before or after commencement of trial "in the furtherance of
justice." (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 576.) But here we decline to find an abuse of discretion
because plaintiff neglected to explain the contents and timeliness of his proposed
amendments to the trial court (and to us), and failed to address how they would have
furthered justice. (Willemsen v. Mitrosilis (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 622,634; Eng v.
Brown (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 675, 707.) Moreover, plaintiffs failure to show prejudice
from the trial court's ruling compels rejection of his claim. (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 475;
Paterno, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at pp. 105-106.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendant shall recover its costs on appeal.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(l), (2).)
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Fujisaki, J.
WECONCUR:
Siggins, P. J.
Petrou, J.
A151655
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EXHIBITB
COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
350 MCALLISTER STREET
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94102
DIVISION 3
Bonnie Allycee Glatzer
Nixon Peabody
I Embarcadero Center
Suite 3200
San Francisco, CA 94111
BRIAN F. ROGERS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
ROBERT HALF INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Defendant and Respondent.
Al51655
San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. CGC 16551854
* * REMITTITUR * *
I, Charles D. Johnson, CJerk of the Court of Appeal of the State of California for the First
Appellate District, do hereby certify that the decision entered in the above-entitled cause on May 29, 2019
has now become final.
_ Appellant ~Respondent to recover costs
_ Each party to bear own costs
_ Costs are not awarded in this proceeding
_ See decision for costs detennination
Witness my hand and the Seal of the Court affixed at my office this
JUL 3 0 2019
Charles D. Johnson
Clerk of the Court
x. Ramos
Deputy Clerk
reml
EXHIBITC
·,
·•
APP-013
ATTORNEY OR PARlY WITHOUT ATTORNEY: STATE BAR NO.: 147804 FOR COURT USE ONLY
NAME: Bonnie Glatzer
FIRM NAME: NIXON PEABODY LLP
STREET ADDREss:One Embarcadero Center, 32nd Floor
c1TY:San Francisco STATE:CA ZIP CODE: 94111
(415) 984-8200
TELEPHONE NO.: FAX NO.:(415) 984-8300 ELECTRONICALLY
E-MAIL ADDRESS: bglatzer@nixonpeabody.com FILED
ATTORNEY FOR 1name1: Defendant Robert Half International Inc. Superior Court of C11/lforn/11,
County of S11n Fr11nclsco
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
sTREET ADDRESS: 400 McAllister Street 09/03/2019
MAILING ADDRESS: Clerk of the Court
BY: JUDITH NUNEZ
c1rvANDZ1PcoDE:San Francisco, CA 94102 Deputy Clerk
BRANCH NAME:
Plaintiff: Brian F. Rogers
Defendant: Robert Half International Inc.
CASE NUMBER:
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS ON APPEAL CGC -16-551854
NOTE: You must file a proof of service of this document. For this purpose, Judlclal Council proof of service
fonna are available. (See www.courts.ca.govHorms.htm?fllter=POS.) An appropriate form may be completed and
flied to show proof of service.
Prevailing party (name): Brian F. Rogers
claims from (name): Robert Half International, Inc.
the following costs on appeal: TOTALS
1. Filing fees 1.$1390.00
2. Preparation of the original and copies of clerk's transcript or appendix 2. sl415.oo
3. Preparation of reporter's transcript 3.s._l- - - -
4. Printing and copying of briefs 4.sl.__ _ ___,
5. Production of additional evidence 5.$1....._ _ _ __.
6. Transmitting, filing, and serving of record, briefs, and other papers 6.s.._l- - - -
7. Premium on any surety bond on appeal 1.s1......_ _ __
8. Other expenses reasonably necessary to secure surety bond 8.$!.____ ___.
9. Other: (specify authority): 9.$1.___ _ ___,
I TOTALCOSTS: $ 805.00
I am D the party 181 counsel for the party O agent for the party who claims the costs listed above.
To the best of my knowledge, the Items of cost are correct and were necessarily incurred in this case on appeal.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
Date: September 3, 2019
Bonnie Glatzer
(TYPE OR PRIHT NAME)
Pege 1 of 1
Fann Adopted for Mandatory u.. Code of Civil P,ocedi.n, I 1034(b);
Judlc:lel Council of Cellfcmlll MEMORANDUM OF COSTS ON APPEAL Cal. RulN of Coult, rule 8.272
APP-013 (Rev. January 1, 2016) www.QOts.ca.gov
[ A)
Americaâ– LeplNtt, Inc.
'f"
wwwfqrma\Ym\flow mm
POS-030
ATTORNEY OR PARlY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, Stale Bet number, and addnw)· FOR COURT USE ONLY
Bonnie Glatzer SBN 147804
NIXON PEABODY LLP
One Embarcadero Center, 32nd Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111
415) 984-8200
TELEPHONE NO,: (
bglatzer@nlxonpeabody.com
E-MAIL ADDRESS tOpUonaJJ: FAX NO. cop11onll):
ATTORNEYFORtNameJ.- Defendant Robert Half International Inc.
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
STREET ADDRESS: 400 McAllister Street
MAILING ADDRESS:
c1TYANDZ1PcooE: San Francisco, CA 94102
BRANCH NAME:
PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF: Brian F. Rogers
RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT: .Robert Half International, Inc.
CASE NUMBER:
PROOF OF SERVICE BY FIRST-CLASS MAIL- CIVIL CGC -16-551854
(Do not use this Proof of Service to show service of a Summons and Complaint.)
1. I am over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am a resident of or employed in the county where the malling
took place.
2. My residence or business address is:
One Embarcadero Center, 32 nd Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111
3. On (date): Sept. 3, 2019 I mailed from (city and state): San Francisco, CA
the following documents (specify):
Memorandum of Costs on Appeal
D The documents are listed in the Attachment to Proof of Service by First-Class Mail-Civil (Documents Served)
(form POS-030(0)).
4. I served the documents by enclosing them in an envelope and (check one}:
a.0 depositing the sealed envelope with the United States Postal Service with the postage fully prepaid.
b.181 placing the envelope for collection and mailing following our ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar with this
business's practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is
placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service in
a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid.
5. The envelope was addressed and mailed as follows:
a. Name of person served: Brian F. Rogers
b. Address of person served:
24661 Amador Street, Apt. 21
Hayward, CA 94544
D The name and address of each person to whom I malled the documents is listed in the Attachment to Proof of Service
by First-Class Mail-Civil (Persons Served) (POS-030(P)).
I declareunder penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing Is true and correct.
Date: September 3, 2019
Mary Yow
(lYPE OR PRINT NAME OF PERSON COMPLETING THIS FORM)
â–º
Form Approved lot 0plfon8I UH Code of CfVII Procedure, §S 1013. 1013a
Judlcfal Counal of Cllldomfll
PROOF OF SERVICE BY FIRST-CLASS MAIL-CIVIL -.ooutffnfo.C.40'/
POS-030 (New Janua,y 1. 2005) (Proof of Service)
IAmlrlcsl I
LaolllNII. Inc.
www.USCOUl1Fonna.com
EXHIBITD
CM-110
ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITifOUT ATTORNEY (N-. Sllte S., number, Ind eddlNS): NJR COURT US/! ONI.Y
Brian F. Ros:iers
24661 AmadorStreet,Apt. 21A
Hayward, CA. 94544
TELEPHONE NO.: FAX NO. (Op/k)IIII):
brog702@gmail.com
E-MAILAODRess(Op/Jonll):
ATTORNEY FOR~):
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF
400 McAllister Street
STREET ADDRESS:
MAILING ADDRESS:
atv AND zip cooe: San Francisco, CA 94102
BRANCH NAME:
PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER: Brian F. Rogers
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: Robert Half lntemational,lnc.
CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT CASE NUMBER:
(Check one}: [Z] UNLIMITED CASE . D LIMITED CASE CGC-16-551854
(Amount demanded (Amount demanded is $25,000
exceeds $25,000) or less)
A CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE Is scheduled as follows:
Date: October 23, 2019 Time: 10:30am Dept: 610 Div.: Room:
Address of court (if different from the address above}:
[Z] Notice of Intent to Appear by Telephone, by (name): Brian Rogers
INSTRUCTIONS: All applicable boxes must be checked, and the specified lnfonnatlon must be provided.
1. Party or parties (answer one}:
a. [lJ This statement is submitted by party (name):
Brian Rogers
b. D This statement is submitted Jointly by parties (names):
2. Complaint and cro88-complalnt (to be answered by plaintiffs and cross-complainants only)
a. The complaint was filed on (date}:
b. D The cross-complaint, if any, was filed on (date):
3. Service (to be answered by plaintiffs and cross-complainants only)
a. D All parties named in the complaint and cross-complaint have been served, have appeared, or have been dismissed.
b. D The following parties named in the complaint or cross-complaint
(1) D have not been served (specify names and explain why not):
(2) D have been served but have not appeared and have not been dismissed (specify names):
(3) D have had a default entered against them {specify names):
c. D The following additional parties may be added (specify names, nature of involvement In case, and date by which
they may be served):
4. Description of case
a. Type of case in[ZJ complaint D cross-complaint (Describe, Including causes of action):
Plaintiff alleges violations of California's Fair Employmnet & Housing Act based on race discrimination.
Pa e1of5
Fonn Adapled ror Mandalllry Uae CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT CII. Rldel or Court.
JudldalCoundldCallarna RMI 3. 720-.5.730
CM·UO(Rev. Jvty 1. 2011) www.coulfS.ce.gov
CM-110
CASE NUMBER:
PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER: Brian F. Rogers
-DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: Robert Half lnternaUonal,lnc.