Preview
SUPERIOR COURT 0ints and Authorities
Statutes
Government Code section 815.6,
California Vehicle Code 40220, 40221, and 40222
San Francisco’s’ Administrative Code Chapter 21, Section 21.35.
CA Penal Code 236;
California Penal Code Section 207 PC.
Article I § 7 of the California Constitution
California Civil Code Section 2338
Cases
Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch, Dist. (1997) 14 Cal.4" 1066, 1070, 929 P2d 582.
Societa per Azioni de Navigazione Italia v. City of Los Angeles (1982) 31 Cal.3d 446, 461, 645 P.2d
102,
Ashcraft v. King (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 604, 611 [278 CaLRptr. 900], internal citations omitted.),
State Rubbish [66 Cal. App. 3d 170] etc, Assn. v. Siliznoff (1952) 38 Cal. 2d 330, 333-339 [240 P.2d
282],
5. Cornblith v. First Maintenance Supply Co. (1968) 268 Cal. App. 2d 564, 565 [74 Cal. Rptr. 216]
6. Spackman v. Good (1966) 245 Cal, App. 2d 518, 528-529 [54 Cal, Rptr. 78],
7. Lowry v. Standard Oil Co. of California (1944) 63 Cal. App.2d 1, 6—7 [146 P.2d 57],
8.
9.
» Pr
>
Moore vy, Greene (9th Cir. 1970) 431 F.2d 584, 590.)
. Golden y, Dungan (1971) 20 Cal. App. 3d 295, 302-311 [97 Cal. Rptr. 577
10. Aweeka v. Bonds (1971) 20 Cal. App. 3d 278, 281-282 [97 Cal. Rptr, 650);
11. Fletcher v, Western National Life Ins, Co. (1970) 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 396-397 {89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 47
A.L.R3d 286);
12, Grimes v. Carter (1966) 241 Cal, App. 24 694, 699-700 [50 Cal. Rptr. 808, 19 A.L.R.3d 1310];
Agostini v. Trisula (1965) 231 Cal. App. 2d 804, 808-809 [42 Cal. Rptr. 314];
13, Perati v. Atkinson (1963) 213 Cal, App. 2d 472, 474 [28 Cal. Rptr, 898];
14, Vargas y. Ruggiero (1961) 197 Cal. App. 2d 709, 718 [17 Cal, Rptr. 368};
15. Gulllory v. Godfrey (1955) 134 Cal. App. 2d 628, 633 [286 P.2d 474]; 4
16. People y. Ramirez, 25 Cal.3d 260, 268-69 (1979
17, Saleeby v. State Bar of California, 39 Cal.3d 547, 563-64 (1985)
18. Civil Service Assn. v, City and County of San Francisco (1978) 22 Cal, 3d 552, 561 (150 Cal. Rpir.
129, 586 P.2d 162].).
19, Krainski v. Nevada ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Nevada System of Higher Educ., 616 F.3 d 963, 970 (Oth
Cir, 2010)
20. Spackman v. Good, supra, 245 Cal, App. 2d 518, 530;
Authorities
Witkin, Summary of California Law (8th ed. 1974) Torts, sections 234-241
Restatement Second of Torts (1965) section 46, page 71.
4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed. 1974)
Torts, § 235, p. 2516, and see authority there cited.) [66 Cal. App. 3d 171), ges 2515-2522.
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTTS - 2L INTRODUCTION
This amendment to the original lawsuit filed, shall be adopted and added to that original filed
complaint as if it were part of the original according to California Civil Procedure 472 which
states: Any pleading may be amended once by the party of course, and without costs, at
any time before the answer or demurrer is filed, or after demurrer and before the trial of
the issue of law thereon, by filing the same as amended and serving a copy on the
adverse party, and the time in which the adverse party must respond thereto shall be
computed from the date of notice of the amendment..
This amendment subtracts or strikes nothing, and only does add to that certain already filed
complaint as Case number CGC-18-563861, JOEL DROTTS IN PRO PER v. SAN
FRANCISCO MUNICIPAL TRANSPORTATION AGENCY, TEGSCO, LLC, DBA AUTO
RETURN TOWING; JOHN DOE BADGE #426 OF SEMTA; AND JOHN DOE TOW TRUCK
DRIVER. Furthermore, the title and name of the case shall be amended to read is hereby
amended to include the following defendants and should read EDWARD D. REISKIN in
his official capacity as the Director of Transportation of the San Francisco Municipal
Transit Authority; San Francisco Municipal Transit Authority; SAN FRANCISCO
MUNICIPAL TRANSIT AGENCY; TEGSCO LLC DBA SAN FRANCISCO AUTO
RETURN; DOES 1-10, inclusive; Officer #632 of the San Francisco Police Depariment,
SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT. Moreover, the already filed Case number
CGC-18-563861 is herein incorporated by reference in the entirety, and then farther
amended by adding the following to that original complaint. This is therefore, the second
amended complaint in that case. There have been no answers in that case.
1. This action challenges: (1) Defendant’s ' tows and impoundments, without notice, of the
Plaintiff Joel Drotts’ safely and lawfully parked vehicle, as well as the lack of due process before|
and after the government takings in violation of the Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments; as well
as other California State statutes on point, on six separate occasions. Furthermore, the Plaintiff
has included those tort claims springing from the incidents surrounding the taking of the
Plaintiffs’ vehicle from his direct possession.
2. Respondents’ have a policy and practice of seizing vehicles without notice where there is no
community caretaking rationale; and
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTTS - 33, Respondents’ policy and practice of towing vehicles without notice, and without a reasonable
opportunity to be heard from vehicle owners who cannot afford to pay parking tickets and is a
gross disregard for constitutional right to due process, as well as the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures according to the California State Constitution.
4. Defendants have a policy of taking by force vehicles they believe they have a right to
impound, and even going so far as blocking in vehicles with tow trucks so the vehicle owners
cannot leave with their vehicles, as well as towing vehicles with the owners still in the vehicle as
an intimidation tactic to force the capitulation of vehicle owners into unwantedly surrendering
possession of their vehicle.
5. Plaintiff seeks damages to recover the financial harms caused by the unconstitutional acts of
the Defendant Respondents, which the Respondents had a duty not to undertake due to the fact
those acts violated the Plaintiff Drotts’ civil rights.
6, San Francisco Municipal Transit Authority ("SFMTA") is a municipal agency responsible for
ground transportation in San Francisco, California, including towing vehicles as ordered by
SFMTA's Enforcement Division or the San Francisco Police Department.
7. Joel Drotts is a 40-year-old resident of San Francisco. Drotts is bringing this action after the
Respondents denied the Plaintiff Drotts any meaningful chance to protest the un-noticed,
unconstitutional, and unwarranted actions of the Defendants, which resulted in four separate
takings of his lawfully parked vehicle.
8. SFMTA ordered Mr. Drotts’ truck towed on five of six of the aforementioned separate
occasions to enforce Vehicle Code section 22651(i) or “SCOF/651.I Scofflaw-Citations,” to
coerce payment on several outstanding parking citations, none of which was more than three
months overdue at the time of the tow. SFMTA did not provide Mr, Drotts with notice that the
car would be towed, nor a meaningful opportunity to resolve the citations before tow, nor after
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTTS - 4the multiple tows, as evidenced by the attached exhibits. The sixth most recent tow being done
by SFPD, for reasons still not exactly made clear by the Defendants the SFPD.
9. The sixth and most recent tow and impoundment by the badge number #632 of the SFPD, is
nothing less than grand theft auto under the color of Jaw. This, as at approximately 1AM on the
early morning of 4/5/2018, #632 of the SFPD did tow and impound the lawfully and safely
parked, lawfully registered, passed due parking ticket free, Volvo, 2000, C70, license plate
number 7LPU070, which the Plaintiff purchased for $1250.00 only three days prior. SFPD had a
complete lack of any probable cause or legal reason for this last tow and impound of the
Plaintiff's Volvo and has literally committed grand theft auto under the color of law. The Volo
was purchased to replace the Lincoln, 2003, Aviator, license plate number CA TYHE0S®, which
SEMTA towed and impounded on 3/28/2018. The Aviator was purchased by the Plaintiff, to
replace the Ford Expedition License plate number #7UVZ482), which the Defendants took from
the Plaintiff for the final time on approximately 7/20/2017.
10. As a result of these tow takings of Mr. Drotts’ only vehicle, Mr. Drotts was forced to go
deeply in debt due to his inability to pay the fees demanded by the Defendants for the release of
his vehicle. This has directiy cost the Plaintiff at least $12,000.00 (Ford, Lincoln, and Volvo) in
purchased and lost vehicles, $5,000.00 in tools, clothes, cash, electronics (Stolen from inside
towed vehicles), $20,000.00 in lost wages (Lack of proper vehicle), $578.00 paid for vehicle
return on 4/28/2017, $1,700 paid for vehicle return on 4/29/2017, $2300 paid for vehicle return
on 6/1/2017, $1989.00 paid for vehicle return on 7/6/2017, and $5,989.00 (fees and price of new!
replacement for Ford) on approximately 7/20/2017, lost reputation, torts inflicted on the
Plaintiff and his civil rights, as well as not to mention the emotional distress causing an increase
in the Plaintiffs’ blood pressure. At the same time, these unconstitutional takings and
impoundments forced Mr. Drotts to barrow heavily, to facilitate the immediate release of his
only vehicle and primary source of income. These principle on these loans alone are/were
$15,000.
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTTS - 511. Plaintiff Drotts is also suing separately for a number of other more serious torts which
occurred on the first two incidents, and are a direct result of the unconstitutional and tortious
manner the same Defendant’s in the current case at bar did in fact take, seize, or strong-arm the
Plaintiffs’ first vehicle in question out of the direct control and possession of the Plaintiff Drotts,
causing both physical and psychological harms to the person Mr. Drotts, as well as greatly
injuring his reputation and standing in the community.
12. The Defendants acts were negligent per ce in accordance with Government Code
section 815.6, when they breached their statutory duty on five separate occasions when they
breached the statutorily mandatory duty of care created by California Vehicle Code 40220,
40221, and 40222, which specifically makes mandatory the manner “the processing agency shall
|proceed...in order to collect an unpaid parking penalty,” in that the two Defendants repeatedly
took the Plaintiff's vehicle without his permission, without first obtaining a civil judgement
against the Plaintiff, and without then putting him on notice about the existence of a civil
judgement being made against his personal property, as is specifically made mandatory
according to California Vehicle Code 40220, 40221, and 46222. Two of those violations being
only the first tort, in a series of increasingly more outrageous, invasive, humiliating, and
offensive torts visited upon the Plaintiff, as the two Defendant’s not only failed to first obtain the
required civil judgements before taking the vehicle, but then twice committed even more torts
when they took the vehicle from the direct physical possession of the Plaintiff. The two
Defendants then proceeded to commit the torts of false imprisonment, slander, as well as
intentional infliction of emotional harm in order that they could twice accomplish the unlawful
and tortious acts of literally taking the Plaintiff's vehicle by forcible tow, while he was still
visibly in the vehicle.
13. Towing a vehicle constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, and under the California Constitution Article 1, Section 13. Exceptions to the
warrant requirement for seizures are limited, and even statutorily authorized tows must comply
with constitutional requirements. These tows did not, and Mr. Drotts was deprived of his
property without the procedural due process protections required by the Fourteenth
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTTS - 6Amendment and by Article 1, Section 7 of the California Constitution, because he did not
receive notice or an opportunity to be heard before SFMTA ordered his car towed. Additionally,
Mr. Drotts was denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard after the tow, as evidenced by the e-
mail response received by Mr. Drotts from the SFMTA hearing officer, denying him a hearing,
and stating “Someone would review the file, and get back to Mr. Drotts in 3-4 weeks.”
Admittedly, after realizing how the “tow hearing” system worked the first time, Mr. Drotts didn’t
even bother to receive another official blow-off letter (Exhibit one), in which the SFMTA
promises to have a “review” of the file, to satisfy the due process requirements Drotts, has a right}
to.
14, It is clear from the e-mail response (Exhibit One ) and (Exhibit Two) that the SFMTA
would not allow Mr, Drotts a meaningful opportunity to confront the witness against him, would
not allow him to enter any new evidence, would not allow his access through discovery to the
evidence in the “file” against him, and declined to consider any evidence or legal authority
beyond the fact of past-due parking citations. As a result, Mr. Drotts vehicle was taken by the
Defendants on six separate occasions without warning or opportunity for meaningful hearing, to
determine the facts and legal rights of Mr. Drotts pertaining to those takings,
15, What’s more is that on two of the six takings were conducted and effectuated by force, as the
Plaintiff was still visibly present in the vehicle. However, the knowledge that the Plaintiff had
immediate possession of his vehicle, did not deter the Defendants. They instead trapped the
vehicle into a bounded area with their tow truck and refused to move or allow the Plaintiff to
leave with his property despite his verbal demands to be allowed to leave with his property
unmolested. The Defendants then turned the Plaintiffs’ vehicle into a bounded area from which
he could not safely escape, by intentionally lifting the front end of his vehicle four feet up into
the air with the towing mechanism on the tow truck. Despite demands to be let down, the
Defendants refused, forcing the plaintiff to have to jump down to the pavement. This lengthy
drop caused the Plaintiff to severely sprain his ankle. This prevented him from walking properly
for three days. These takings the vehicle from the direct and immediate control and possession of
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTTS ~ 7Mr, Drotts, resulted in the torts of false imprisonment, battery, assault, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and slander being inflicted upon Mr. Drotts by the same two Defendants.
16. Furthermore, Mr. Drotts was denied a hearing of any sort, prior to these unconstitutional
government takings. What’s even more outrageous is the fact that the government took the
vehicle of Mr. Drotts on alt five of the six separate occasions, based solely upon unproven and
unsubstantiated debts the City claimed to be created by the ticketing of meter-maids. However,
the policies and practices of the City caused the Defendants to completely disallow the Plaintiff
Mr. Drotts any meaningful manner, procedure, or hearing to substantiate the merits or legality of
those tickets through proper examination of the issuing meter-maids. Mr. Drotts has a
Constitutional right to face his accuser and examine all witnesses against him. This right is
particularly important in the case of Mr. Drotts who has come to believe and has evidence that
not all parking tickets given were valid and may have been issued as a part of a greater on-going
conspiracy to harass Mr. Drotts personally by certain meter-maid employees of the SFMTA.
17. Those unsubstantiated claimed amounts of debt, which the City wrongfully claims the
Plaintiff owes and has owed, based on little more than the opinion of meter-maids, cannot be
substantiated by the City. Meter-maids, who have unknown levels of training and expertise in
determining the legality of how the Plaintiff was parked, are a part of a parking enforcement
system lacking in any accountability. This is especially true, whereby the SFMTA has a stated
policy of disallowing the examination of the ticket issuing meter-maids, and thusly denying all
citizens their Constitutional right to examine witnesses, face their accusers, or verify that any
ticket issued is lawful and with merit. Moreover, this system has no way to validate these debts
caused by parking violations, other than the word of highly incentivized and prejudiced meter-
maid parties working for the SFMTA. All of which serve as gross examples of the way the
policies and practices of the SFMTA are devoid of basic constitutional considerations, many of
which have come to harm the Plaintiff.
18, The Plaintiff Drotts has been forced to pay for the return of his own property on at least four
occasions. Those four occasions did force Drotts to take on increasing fevels of personal debt, to
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTIS - 8pay the demanded amounts for the return of his vehicle, until a point finally Mr. Drotts simply
could not barrow or acquire any more money. It was at that point Defendant Auto Return
wrongfully declared the vehicle “abandoned,” and simply stole ownership of the vehicle for
itself, causing the permanent logs to Mr. Drotts. The amounts of debt or the amounts Drotts was
forced to pay were: $578.00 on 4/28/2017, $1,700 on 4/29/2017, $2300 on 6/1/2017, $1989.00
on 7/6/2017, and $5,989.00 on approximately 7/20/2017 resulting from the permanent loss
and/or control of the vehicle. Auto Return has already settled with Mr. Drotts on four of the six
tows, for $1,500.00, However, Auto Return now is wrongfully in possession of the Plaintiff’ s
Lincoln and his Volvo and refiuses to release either to the Plaintiff.
19. Respondents also violated the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the California and
federal constitutions, by towing and depriving Mr. Drotts of his car as punishment for Mr. Drotts
failure to pay parking citations, even though Mr. Drotts could not afford to pay the full cost of
the citations or the tow and storage fees. Mr. Drotts seeks an order of administrative mandate
under CCP § 1094.5 overturning the SFMTA hearing decisions, which the SFMTA has claimed
to have held but which the Plaintiff was disallowed to attend, in which it was ruled his truck and
Volvo should be towed and impounded, and immediately grant Mr. Drotts a refund of all moneys
paid to the codefendants, the immediate release of both his vehicles currently being held by the
Defendants.
20. The SEMTA has in no way ended their unconstitutional practices and have now claimed Mr.
Drotts has over forty-five unpaid parking tickets and owes over $8,100.00 in fines or fees.
Moreover, the Defendants have unconstitutionally taken from the Plaintiff Drotts his 2003
Lincoln Aviator, which he paid $5,000.00 for, as a replacement for the 2003 Ford Expedition the
defendants unconstitutional policies and practices permanently deprived the Plaintiff of earlier.
As well as his 2000 Volvo C70 for unknown and unlawful reasons.
21. Mr. Drotts seeks also is seeking an immediate injunction ordering the Defendant’s to release
both his vehicles to him immediately, as well as ordering the Defendants to pay to the Plaintiff
all Damages resulting from their tortious acts that harmed the Plaintiff.
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTTS — 922. The Plaintiff further seeks an immediate restraining order preventing the Defendants from
selling either of the two cars the Defendant Auto Return has in their possession belonging to the
Plaintiff, The Plaintiff further asks the court to order the Defendants restrained from any further
harassment, targeted ticketing of his vehicles, fraudulent ticket issuing, and above all else
restrain the Defendants from towing the any of the Plaintiff's vehicles now or in the future,
regardless of whether the Defendants come to believe the Plaintiff has too many passed due
parking tickets, without first granting the Plaintiff a legal hearing before a truly neutral
magistrate, in which the standard rules of evidence apply, whereby the Plaintiff may cal!
witnesses if he believes it relevant that he face his ticket issuing accusers, and that neutral arbiter
has the ability to take the financial situation of the Plaintiff strongly into consideration in
ordering the ultimate amount the Plaintiff must ultimately pay, as well as arrange payment plans
for the Plaintiff. Furthermore, that this is ordered to become the new policies and practices of the
SFMTA as the current policies and practices of the SFMTA are devoid of any of the
Constitutional protections required for a lawful government taking. The Plaintiff therefore seeks
a peremptory writ of mandate pursuant to CCP § 1085, directing Respondents to comply with
their legal duties under the United States and California Constitutions, and grant a meaningful
hearing prior to taking the vehicle.
23. Mr, Drotts requests injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, to prevent Respondents to}
stop other unconstitutional tows on all citizens. Furthermore, that the Defendant SFMTA make
meaningful pre-towing hearings available, grant a neutral magistrate to preside over such
hearing, make available for examination the ticket issuing meter-maids or law enforcement
professional should said ticket be issued by law enforcement, give fair and adequate warning that
the taking may occur, base the fines and fees on the persons proven income and ability to pay
those fines and fees, as well as there being a meaningful payment plan option.
24. Finally, Mr. Drotts asks the Court to award actual damages in the amount stated below, for
the harms caused over the course of eight months which include all fines paid, the price of all
three vehicles, the price of all lost profits and income, the cost of loans and the interest there on
the Plaintiff was forced to take, the value of all lost/stolen tools, electronics, clothes, and cash
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTTS - 10repeatedly stolen from out of the various vehicles of the Plaintiff when towed several and then
permanent loss of his vehicle, the cost of the final loss of the vehicle and its contents, as well as
all lost wages. While bifurcating and preserving for separate trial the causes of action already
filed in CFP-18-516045, filed January 25, 2018, titled JOEL DROTTS IN PRO PER, vs. SAN
FRANCISCO MUNICIPAL TRANSPORTATION AGENCY; TEGSCO LLC DBA AUTO
RETURN TOWING; JOHN DOE BADGE #426 OF SFMTA; AND JOHN DOE TOW TRUCK
DRIVER.
U,___ THE PARTIES
25. Plaintiff/Petitioner Joel Drotts is a 40-year-old community leader and nonprofit founder,
has been a resident of San Francisco, California for the past eighteen years. The Petitioner
currently resides in an SRO on Jones Street, which he has shared with his fiancé for the past
seven months. Aside from operating the registered California non-profit dedicated to education
and the digital and electronic privacy rights of American consumers, the Petitioner earns a living
as a part time security guard at a popular local nightclub, performing various “odd-jobs” as a
“handy-man/mechanic,” as well as freelance per a job “light industrial and retail hauling and/or
material moving.” His fiancé works nights as an exotic dancer on Broadway. Prior to the agency
decisions that are the subject of this petition, Mr. Drotts regularly parked his now-towed only
vehicle, and source of income on Jones Street, in San Francisco.
26. Defendant/Respondent EDWARD D. REISKIN is the Director of Transportation of the
SEMTA and is responsible for managing SFMTA and its vehicle tows in accordance with the
law. Respondent is sued in his official capacity as the municipal official responsible for ensuring
that the SEMTA and its agents act in conformity with federal and state law.
Defendant/Respondent SAN FRANCISCO MUNICIPAL TRANSPORTATION AGENCY
("SEMTA" or "Respondent") is the municipal agency responsible for ensuring lawful
administration of vehicle tows and impounds within the City of San Francisco, Chief William
“Bill” Scott is the Chief of Police of San Francisco and is responsible for managing the actions
of his officers, and the policing activities of his agents and officers. Badge number #632 did
unlawfully order the lawfully and safely parked, legally registered, and passed due ticket free
vehicle from 415 Jones street on 4/5/2018 at one am. He did so without probable cause, or any
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTTS - 11proper police or state need or function. Badge #632 committed no less than grand theft auto
under the color of law and did so presumptively to annoy and harass the Plaintiff as a
continuation of the on-going harassment suffered by the Plaintiff at the hands of the City
Government of San Francisco disguised as merely being hyper aggressive parking enforcement.
27. Defendant/Real party in interest TEGSCO, LLC dba SAN FRANCISCO AUTORETURN
("Auto Return") is the exclusive provider of all tow-related services for the City and County of
San Francisco. Auto Return carried out the tow of Mr. Drotts Car on the following dates of
4/28/2017, 4/29/2017, 6/1/2017, 7/6/2017, and approximately 7/20/2017, and then holding his
vehicle as a bailment against the wishes and permission of the Plaintiff Drotts in the following
amounts $578.00 on 4/28/2017, $1,700 on 4/29/2017, $2300 on 6/1/2017, $1989.00 on
7/6/2017, and $5,989.00 on 7/20/2017, except of the final date which they then took permanent
possession of the vehicle as Mr. Drotts could not afford to pay the final demanded amount of
money losing him the full value of his $5,000.00+ vehicle and all its contents.
28. Auto Return has contracted with San Francisco to provide dispatch, towing, impound.
management and vehicle disposal services to the City and County of San Francisco since 2004,
In 2015, Auto Return was awarded the San Francisco contract for a five-year term beginning on
April 1, 2016. Mandate lies against Auto Return as well as the City because serves a city
function by performing city-ordered tow and storage services as part of the City's enforcement of
local and state laws. See Anchor Pacifica Mgmt. Co. v. Green, 205 Cal. App. 4th 232, 244
(2012) (holding that private landlord was taking state action for purposes of constitutional
analysis because landlord's administration of city-subsidized housing was "subject to City
oversight and approval"); City of King City v. Community Bank of Central California, 131
Cal. App. 4th 913, 927 (2005) ("{MJandate will sometimes lie against a private person to
compel performance of a duty.").
29. The true names and capacities, whether individuals, corporate, associate, or otherwise, of
DOES 1 through 10 are unknown to Mr. Droits who therefore sue these Respondents by such
fictitious names. Mr. Drotts is informed and believes, and based upon such information and
belief, alleges that at all times material herein, each of the Doe Respondents was an agent or
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTTS - 12employee of one or more of the named Respondents, and was acting within the course and scope
of said agency or employment. Mr. Drotts is further informed and believes, and based thereon
alleges, that each of the Doe Respondents is legally responsible in some manner for the
occurrences herein alleged. All allegations in this Petition that refer to the named Respondents
refer in like manner to those Respondents identified as Respondents DOES 1-10, inclusive. Mr.
Drotts will amend that Petition to allege the true names and capacities of the Doe Respondents
when the same have been ascertained.
I, LEGAL FRAMEWORK
30. The three Defendant Agency Entities are liable and responsible for all acts and harms
caused by the John Doe Defendants as their employees, due to the legal construction of
respondent superior.
31. The doctrine of respondent superior, literally “let the master answer,” allows that an
employer is vicariously liable for the wrongful conduct of his or her employees or agents
committed within the scope of the employment or agency. Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified
Sch. Dist. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1066, 1070, 929 P2d 582. See also California Civil Code Section
2338, which states that a principal is liable to third persons for the negligence of its agent. The
rationale for the doctrine lies in the fact that the principal or employer derives the benefit from
the service of the agent or employee and is a better position to insure itself against losses arising
out of the service. The losses caused by employee torts are placed on the employer as a cost of
doing business. To apply the doctrine, two criteria must be established. First, the employment or
agency relationship must be proven. Second, it must also be shown that the employee or agent
was acting within the scope of that employment. Societa per Azioni de Navigazione Italia v.
City of Los Angeles (1982) 31 Cal.3d 446, 461, 645 P.2d 102, Upon establishing these two
criteria, the employer or principal can be held responsible for its employees’ torts absent any
other showing of independent negligence on the part of the employer or principal.
32. As such, it is undisputed that the two John Doe defendants were acting within the scope of
their employment, as they were both wearing uniforms denoting as such. Moreover, the fact that
the two John Doe defendants undertook all actions for the stated and purposeful benefit of the
two Agency Defendants, is further undisputed factual evidence that not only were the John Doe
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTTS ~- 13defendants employed and on duty, were acting with-in the scope of their employment, and at
times carrying out the policies of their employers. This can be further evidenced by the fact that,
at least during the time period complained of, it was the standard practice and policy of the
SFMTA and Auto Return to regularly send out combined agency units, early in the morning,
whereby a meter-maid would travel in tow truck, with tow truck driver, and these units would
essentially steal the cars of individuals suspected of having more than five over-due and unpaid
parking tickets. The manner which those units chose whose car to tow on any given day remains
unknown to the Plaintiff but given the racial slurs the Plaintiff was made to suffer being called
while one such agency combined unit took his vehicle from his physical possession, it is a fair
assumption to assume that the taking of cars is racially motivated at least in part.
33. A. Reasonableness Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Article I, Section 13 of the California Constitution
34. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution bars "unreasonable searches
and seizures" of a person's property. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Article I, Section 13 of the
California Constitution provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated," a
provision that provides at least as much protection as does the Fourth Amendment. See People v.
Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 548-52 (1975), abrogated on other grounds as discussed in In re
Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873,879 (1985).
35. Aseizure "occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's
possessory interests in that property." United States v, Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
Impounding a vehicle constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 2005).
36. Warrantless seizures are "per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a
few specifically established and well delineated exceptions." Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S.
366,372 (1993).
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTTS - 1437. No exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement permits warrantless
vehicle tows for the purpose of satisfying a municipal debt. The only warrant exception relevant
to vehicle impoundment is for "community caretaking." Miranda, 429 F.3d at 862. The
community caretaking exception permits warrantless towing “only to impound vehicles that
jeopardize public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic.” Brewster v. Beck, 859
F.3d 1194, 1196 (9th Cir, 2017); see also South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364,369
(1976).
38. A tow conducted under the community caretaking doctrine must be reasonably related to
farthering one of these caretaking purposes to be valid. Miranda, 429 F.3d at 863 (noting that
the U.S. Supreme Court "has limited the discretion of the impounding officer and has taken a
more finely tuned approach to determining reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment").
39. Legal violations such as parking citations are not relevant to justify the constitutionality off
a tow under the community caretaking doctrine. Miranda, 429 F.3d at 864.
40. An officer cannot reasonably order an impoundment in situations where the location of
the vehicle does not create any need for the police to protect the vehicle or to avoid a hazard to
other drivers. Miranda, 429 F.3d at 866; accord United States v. Duguay, 93 F.3d 346, 353
(7th Cir, 1996) ("The policy of impounding the car without regard to whether the defendant can
provide for its removal is patently unreasonable if the ostensible purpose for impoundment is for
the 'caretaking' of the streets.”).
41. "The need to deter a driver's unlawful conduct is by itself insufficient to justify a tow
under the ‘caretaker’ rationale." Miranda, 429 F.3d at 866.
42. California Vehicle Code 22651(i) provides that an officer "may remove" a vehicle if “it
is known that the vehicle has been issued five or more notices of parking violations...." However,
a local statute authorizing impoundment “does not, in and of itself, determine the reasonableness
of the seizure under the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTTS - 15Amendment." Miranda, 429 F.3d at 864; see also United States v. Cervantes, 703 F.3d 1135,
1142 (9th Cir. 2012); Lavan vy. City of Los Angeles, 693 F.3d 1022, 1029 (9th Cir. 2012)
("Violation of a City ordinance does not vitiate the Fourth Amendment's protection of one's
property. Were it otherwise, the government could seize and destroy any illegally parked car or
unlawfully unattended dog without implicating the Fourth Amendment.").
43. B, Procedural Due Process Under the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 1, Section 7
of the California Constitution
44. A state cannot "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of Jaw."
U.S. Const. amend. XIV. "A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law." Cal. Const. art. 1, § 7. The U.S. Supreme Court has determined that the process
due depends on "the private interest that will be affected by the official action," "the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards,” and "the Government's interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,335 (1976).
4S. Generally, these Mathews v. Eldridge factors are interpreted in the vehicle tow
context to require notice before the tow and the opportunity for a meaningful hearing within two
days of an owner's request after the tow. See Clement v. City of Glendale, 518 F.3d 1090, 1093)
(9th Cir, 2008) (pre-tow notices generally required); Goichman v. Rheuban Motors, Inc.,
682 F.2d 1320, 1325 (9th Cir. 1982) (post-tow hearing required within forty-eight hours of a
request).
46. Under the California Constitution, there is a fourth element of the analysis: "the dignitary|
interest in informing individuals of the nature, grounds and consequences of the action and in
enabling them to present their side of the story before a responsible governmental official.”
People v. Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d 260,269 (1979). Notice Under the Fourteenth Amendment, "the
government may not take property like a thief in the night; rather, it must announce its intentions
and give the property owner a chance to argue against the taking." Clement, 518 F.3d at 1093
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTTS - 16o™ oo!
(requiring the government to present "strong justification" for not providing notice to a vehicle
owner prior to a non-emergency tow because "removal of an automobile is a big deal" that
disrupts an individual's life, imposes significant retrieval costs, and can create anxiety at the
unexplained loss of a vehicle).
47. Pre-deprivation notice has been required in the context of tows unless there is "an
emergency, or if notice would defeat the entire point of the seizure, or when the interest at stake
is small relative to the burden that giving notice would impose." Clement, 518 F.3d at 1093-94.
The use of one's automobile is a significant interest compared to the small burden of notice. Id at
1094; Scofield, 862 F.2d at 762 ("The uninterrupted use of one's vehicle [on public roads] isa
significant and substantial private interest.").
48, Post-Tow Hearing
49. "The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner." Mathews, 424 U.S, at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo,
380 U.S. 545,552 (1965)), An agency violates a vehicle owner's post-tow due process rights if it
adopts a policy of not offering hearings or not conducting those hearings in a meaningful time
and manner. Scofield, $62 F.2d at 765. In addition, an agency violates a vehicle owner's post-
tow due process right to a meaningful hearing, if there is no opportunity to examine the evidence
on which the hearing officer relies or to confront the towing officer. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at
335. This includes the right to question ones’ ticket issuing accusers.
50. The Supreme Court has taken for granted that a City must bring the officer who ordered the
tow to the administrative tow hearing. City of Los Angeles v. David, 538 U.S. 715, 718 (2003)
(noting that "the city has to contact the towing officer and arrange for his appearance") in
detailing the administrative steps required for tow hearings). The 6th Amendment states, “In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted with the witnesses
against him.” The 14th Amendment has made the 6th Amendment's right to confrontation
applicable to state court as well as federal court. The confrontation clause guarantees criminal
defendants the opportunity to face the prosecution's witnesses in the case against them and
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTIS - 17dispute the witnesses’ testimony. This guarantee applies to both statements made in court and
statements made outside of court that are offered as evidence during trial. For a hearing to be
meaningful, an agency should give notice of the criteria that will determine the administrative
decision. Anderson v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. App. 3d 1321, 1330 (1989). Further, an
agency must permit presentation of all relevant claims as required to exhaust the administrative
remedy. See Jonathan Neil & Assoc., Inc. v. Jones, 33 Cal. 4th 917,933 (2004) (exhaustion
requires agency decision of "entire controversy"); Bleeckv. State Bd. of Optometry 18 Cal.
App. 3d 415,432 (1971) (exhaustion requires "a full presentation to the administrative agency
upon all issues of the case and at all prescribed stages of the administrative proceedings"). In this
same vein the City may not designate parking tickets to be a Civil matter, as parking tickets carry]
with them the criminal designation of being infractions.
51. C. Due Process and Equal Protection Under the Fourteenth Amendment
52. Using the principles of both Due Process and Equal Protection, the Supreme Court has heid it}
is “fundamentally unfair" to punish indigent individuals for their inability to pay fines and fees.
See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668--69 (1983) (holding that it is unconstitutional to
revoke probation for failure to pay a fine); Griffin v. Minois, 351 DS. 12, 18 (1956) (holding
that it is fundamentally unfair to deny access to an appeal solely because of inability to pay court
costs).
53, The Bearden analysis requires that an ability-to-pay determination be part of the pre-
punishment process and requires the consideration of alternatives to punishment. Bearden, 461
U.S. at 674 (finding punishment unconstitutional because it was imposed "simply because [the
person] could not pay the fine, without considering the reasons for the inability to pay or the
propriety of reducing the fine or extending the time for payments or making alternative
orders....").
54, D. Trespass to Chattels/Conversion
‘Trespass to chattels "lies where an intentional interference with the possession of personal
property has proximately caused injury." Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1559,
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTTS - 181565 (1996). Alleging that a vehicle has been towed and held for a prolonged time in storage
with exorbitant tow and storage fees is sufficient to state a claim for trespass to chattels. Garcia
v. City of King, 2017 WL 5194519, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2017). Conversion is the wrongful
exercise of dominion over the property of another.
55. The elements of a conversion claim are: (1) the plaintiff's ownership or right to possession of
the property; (2) the defendant's conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights;
and (3) damages." Lee v. Hanley, 61 Cal. 4th 1225, 1240 (2015). The wrongful act in question
need not be in bad faith to be the basis of a conversion claim; intent is not relevant. We/co
Elecs., Inc. v. Mora, 223 Cal. App. 4th 202, 208 (2014) (finding that in deciding a conversion
claim, "questions of the defendant's good faith, lack of knowledge, and motive are ordinarily
immaterial").
56. E. Government Code section 815.6
57. Agent for SFMTA John Doe Meter-Maid #426 (hereinafter #426) and codefendant Agent for
Auto Return John Doe Tow Truck Driver (hereinafter TTD) had an absohite duty to obey the
enactments found in California Vehicle Code 40220, 40221, and 40222, according to
Government Code section 815.6. Government Code section 815.6 provides for liability when
a public entity fails to discharge “a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to
protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury.” To state a cause of action under Section
815.6, a plaintiff must assert an enactment that (1) imposes a mandatory rather than a
discretionary duty, and (2) is intended to protect against the kind of injury suffered.
*Enactments" defined by Government Code section 810.6 include statutes, ordinances, and
regulations adopted “by an agency of the state pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act.” It
is the contention of the plaintiff that Government Code section 815.6 created a mandatory duty
to obey California Vehicle Code 40220, 40221, and 40222, which were created to prevent the
specific types of harms caused by the failure of the Defendant’s to obey those statutes.
58. The Defendants acts were negligent per ce in accordance with Government Code section
815.6, when they breached their statutory duty on two separate occasions by failing to perform
“dropped tows,” as made mandatory according to SFMTA Contract No. 2014-48, which where
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTTS - 19was made agency regulations according to San Francisco’s’ Administrative Code Chapter 21,
Section 21.35.
59, F. False imprisonment
False imprisonment requires some restraint of the person and that he be deprived of his
liberty or compelled to stay where he does not want to remain or compelled to go where he does
not wish to go; and that the person be restrained of his liberty without sufficient complaint or
authority.” (Collins v. County of Los Angeles (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 451, 459-460 [50 Cal.
Rptr. 586]. “[The tort of false imprisonment] consists of the “ ‘nonconsensual intentional
confinement of a person, without lawful privilege, for an appreciable length of time, however
short.” (Scofield, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 1001. Here, on two separate occasions the
Defendants did intentionally place the Plaintiff into a confined and bounded area, for a period of
not less than twenty minutes or longer, from which the Plaintiff could not safely escape against
his will, and in so doing among other harms caused severe intentional emotional distress in the
process of the commission of that tort. “In addition to recovery for emotional suffering and
humiliation, one subjected to false imprisonment is entitled to compensation for other resultant
harm, such as loss of time, physical discomfort or inconvenience, any resulting physical illness
or injury to health, business interruption, and damage to reputation, as well as punitive damages
in appropriate cases.” (Scofield, supra, 45 Cal.App.4that p. 1009, internal citation omitted.).
60. G. Defamation of character
Defamation of character as the statements made intentionally so the Plaintiffs neighbors
and landlord would hear the Plaintiff called a criminal, loser, and a scoff-law by an individual
who appeared to be making those statements on behalf of the government in an official public
punishment, complete with a taking of the Plaintiff's vehicle by force, did harm the plaintiffs’
reputation and standing in the community, by causing the plaintiff to become the object of scorn
and shunning by his local community of neighbors.
61, H. Intentional infliction of emotional distress
This same rule is stated in Restatement Second of Torts (1965) section 46, page 71, in
this manner: “One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTTS - 20severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if
bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm." The Restatement's equating of
reckless with intentional extreme and. outrageous conduct appears also to be embodied in the law
of this state. (See Spackman v. Good, supra, 245 Cal. App. 2d 518, 530; 4 Witkin, Summary
of Cal. Law (8th ed. 1974) Torts, § 235, p. 2516, and see authority there cited.) [66 Cal.
App. 3d 171]. Conduct is outrageous if a reasonable person would regard the conduct as
intolerable in a civilized community. Outrageous conduct does not include trivialities such as
indignities, annoyances, hurt feelings, or bad manners that a reasonable person is expected to
endure, but it does include attacks and verbal degradation of a victim’s race, color, or heritage,
especially when done by an uniformed government official, and during what appears to be an
official government action, even if it later is shown to be done without any true legal authority.
62. I. Civil battery
The crimes of assault and battery are intentional torts. In the perpetration of such crimes
negligence is not involved. As between the guilty aggressor and the person attacked the former
may not shield himself behind the charge that his victim may have been guilty of contributory
negligence, for such a plea is unavailable to him.” (Bartosh v. Banning (1967) 251 Cal. App.2d
378, 385 [59CalRptr. 382].) “ ‘It has long been established, both in tort and criminal law, that
“the least touching” may constitute battery. In other words, force against the person is enough, it
need not be violent or severe, it need not cause bodily harm or even pain, and it need not leave
any mark,’ ” (People v. Mansfield (1988) 200Cal.App.3d 82, 88 [245 Cal-Rptr. 800], internal
citations omitted.). “[T]he tort of battery generally is not limited to direct body-to-body contact.
In fact, the commentary to the Restatement Second of Torts clearly states that the meaning of
“contact with another’s person” ° . .. does not require that one‘ should bring any part of his own
body in contact with another’s person. . . [One] is liable [for battery] in this Section if [one]
throws a substance, such as water, upon the other... .”” (Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v.
Busby (2013) 219Cal.App.4th 876, 881 [162 Cal.Rptr.3d 211].), “The element of lack of
consent to the particular contact is an essential element of battery.” (Rains, supra, 150
Cal. App.3d at p. 938.)* “As a general rule, one who consents to a touching cannot recover in an
action for battery. . .. However, it is well-recognized a person may place conditions on the
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTTS - 21consent, If the actor exceeds the terms or conditions of the consent, the consent does not protect
the actor from liability for the excessive act.” (Asheraft v. King (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 604,
609-610 [278 Cal. Rptr. 900].). “In an action for civil battery the element of intent is satisfied if
the evidence shows defendant acted with a ‘willful disregard’ of the plaintiff's rights.”
(Ashcraft, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at p. 613, internal citation omitted.). “ “The usages of
decent society determine what is offensive.’ ” (Barowh, supra,26 Cal.App.4th at p. 46, fn. 5,
internal citation omitted,
63. J. Enactment of SFMTA Contract No, 2014-48 as San Francisco’s’ Administrative
Code Chapter 21, Section 21.35 did give that contract the statutory force of government
agency regulations.
Government Code section 815.6 provides for liability when a public entity fails to
discharge “a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk
of a particular kind of injury.” To state a cause of action under Section 815.6, a plaintiff must
assert an enactment that (1) imposes a mandatory rather than a discretionary duty, and (2) is
intended to protect against the kind of injury suffered. "Enactments" defined by Government
Code section 810.6 include statutes, ordinances, and regulations adopte
Preview
SUPERIOR COURT 0ints and Authorities Statutes Government Code section 815.6, California Vehicle Code 40220, 40221, and 40222 San Francisco’s’ Administrative Code Chapter 21, Section 21.35. CA Penal Code 236; California Penal Code Section 207 PC. Article I § 7 of the California Constitution California Civil Code Section 2338 Cases Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch, Dist. (1997) 14 Cal.4" 1066, 1070, 929 P2d 582. Societa per Azioni de Navigazione Italia v. City of Los Angeles (1982) 31 Cal.3d 446, 461, 645 P.2d 102, Ashcraft v. King (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 604, 611 [278 CaLRptr. 900], internal citations omitted.), State Rubbish [66 Cal. App. 3d 170] etc, Assn. v. Siliznoff (1952) 38 Cal. 2d 330, 333-339 [240 P.2d 282], 5. Cornblith v. First Maintenance Supply Co. (1968) 268 Cal. App. 2d 564, 565 [74 Cal. Rptr. 216] 6. Spackman v. Good (1966) 245 Cal, App. 2d 518, 528-529 [54 Cal, Rptr. 78], 7. Lowry v. Standard Oil Co. of California (1944) 63 Cal. App.2d 1, 6—7 [146 P.2d 57], 8. 9. » Pr > Moore vy, Greene (9th Cir. 1970) 431 F.2d 584, 590.) . Golden y, Dungan (1971) 20 Cal. App. 3d 295, 302-311 [97 Cal. Rptr. 577 10. Aweeka v. Bonds (1971) 20 Cal. App. 3d 278, 281-282 [97 Cal. Rptr, 650); 11. Fletcher v, Western National Life Ins, Co. (1970) 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 396-397 {89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 47 A.L.R3d 286); 12, Grimes v. Carter (1966) 241 Cal, App. 24 694, 699-700 [50 Cal. Rptr. 808, 19 A.L.R.3d 1310]; Agostini v. Trisula (1965) 231 Cal. App. 2d 804, 808-809 [42 Cal. Rptr. 314]; 13, Perati v. Atkinson (1963) 213 Cal, App. 2d 472, 474 [28 Cal. Rptr, 898]; 14, Vargas y. Ruggiero (1961) 197 Cal. App. 2d 709, 718 [17 Cal, Rptr. 368}; 15. Gulllory v. Godfrey (1955) 134 Cal. App. 2d 628, 633 [286 P.2d 474]; 4 16. People y. Ramirez, 25 Cal.3d 260, 268-69 (1979 17, Saleeby v. State Bar of California, 39 Cal.3d 547, 563-64 (1985) 18. Civil Service Assn. v, City and County of San Francisco (1978) 22 Cal, 3d 552, 561 (150 Cal. Rpir. 129, 586 P.2d 162].). 19, Krainski v. Nevada ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Nevada System of Higher Educ., 616 F.3 d 963, 970 (Oth Cir, 2010) 20. Spackman v. Good, supra, 245 Cal, App. 2d 518, 530; Authorities Witkin, Summary of California Law (8th ed. 1974) Torts, sections 234-241 Restatement Second of Torts (1965) section 46, page 71. 4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed. 1974) Torts, § 235, p. 2516, and see authority there cited.) [66 Cal. App. 3d 171), ges 2515-2522. SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTTS - 2L INTRODUCTION This amendment to the original lawsuit filed, shall be adopted and added to that original filed complaint as if it were part of the original according to California Civil Procedure 472 which states: Any pleading may be amended once by the party of course, and without costs, at any time before the answer or demurrer is filed, or after demurrer and before the trial of the issue of law thereon, by filing the same as amended and serving a copy on the adverse party, and the time in which the adverse party must respond thereto shall be computed from the date of notice of the amendment.. This amendment subtracts or strikes nothing, and only does add to that certain already filed complaint as Case number CGC-18-563861, JOEL DROTTS IN PRO PER v. SAN FRANCISCO MUNICIPAL TRANSPORTATION AGENCY, TEGSCO, LLC, DBA AUTO RETURN TOWING; JOHN DOE BADGE #426 OF SEMTA; AND JOHN DOE TOW TRUCK DRIVER. Furthermore, the title and name of the case shall be amended to read is hereby amended to include the following defendants and should read EDWARD D. REISKIN in his official capacity as the Director of Transportation of the San Francisco Municipal Transit Authority; San Francisco Municipal Transit Authority; SAN FRANCISCO MUNICIPAL TRANSIT AGENCY; TEGSCO LLC DBA SAN FRANCISCO AUTO RETURN; DOES 1-10, inclusive; Officer #632 of the San Francisco Police Depariment, SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT. Moreover, the already filed Case number CGC-18-563861 is herein incorporated by reference in the entirety, and then farther amended by adding the following to that original complaint. This is therefore, the second amended complaint in that case. There have been no answers in that case. 1. This action challenges: (1) Defendant’s ' tows and impoundments, without notice, of the Plaintiff Joel Drotts’ safely and lawfully parked vehicle, as well as the lack of due process before| and after the government takings in violation of the Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments; as well as other California State statutes on point, on six separate occasions. Furthermore, the Plaintiff has included those tort claims springing from the incidents surrounding the taking of the Plaintiffs’ vehicle from his direct possession. 2. Respondents’ have a policy and practice of seizing vehicles without notice where there is no community caretaking rationale; and SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTTS - 33, Respondents’ policy and practice of towing vehicles without notice, and without a reasonable opportunity to be heard from vehicle owners who cannot afford to pay parking tickets and is a gross disregard for constitutional right to due process, as well as the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures according to the California State Constitution. 4. Defendants have a policy of taking by force vehicles they believe they have a right to impound, and even going so far as blocking in vehicles with tow trucks so the vehicle owners cannot leave with their vehicles, as well as towing vehicles with the owners still in the vehicle as an intimidation tactic to force the capitulation of vehicle owners into unwantedly surrendering possession of their vehicle. 5. Plaintiff seeks damages to recover the financial harms caused by the unconstitutional acts of the Defendant Respondents, which the Respondents had a duty not to undertake due to the fact those acts violated the Plaintiff Drotts’ civil rights. 6, San Francisco Municipal Transit Authority ("SFMTA") is a municipal agency responsible for ground transportation in San Francisco, California, including towing vehicles as ordered by SFMTA's Enforcement Division or the San Francisco Police Department. 7. Joel Drotts is a 40-year-old resident of San Francisco. Drotts is bringing this action after the Respondents denied the Plaintiff Drotts any meaningful chance to protest the un-noticed, unconstitutional, and unwarranted actions of the Defendants, which resulted in four separate takings of his lawfully parked vehicle. 8. SFMTA ordered Mr. Drotts’ truck towed on five of six of the aforementioned separate occasions to enforce Vehicle Code section 22651(i) or “SCOF/651.I Scofflaw-Citations,” to coerce payment on several outstanding parking citations, none of which was more than three months overdue at the time of the tow. SFMTA did not provide Mr, Drotts with notice that the car would be towed, nor a meaningful opportunity to resolve the citations before tow, nor after SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTTS - 4the multiple tows, as evidenced by the attached exhibits. The sixth most recent tow being done by SFPD, for reasons still not exactly made clear by the Defendants the SFPD. 9. The sixth and most recent tow and impoundment by the badge number #632 of the SFPD, is nothing less than grand theft auto under the color of Jaw. This, as at approximately 1AM on the early morning of 4/5/2018, #632 of the SFPD did tow and impound the lawfully and safely parked, lawfully registered, passed due parking ticket free, Volvo, 2000, C70, license plate number 7LPU070, which the Plaintiff purchased for $1250.00 only three days prior. SFPD had a complete lack of any probable cause or legal reason for this last tow and impound of the Plaintiff's Volvo and has literally committed grand theft auto under the color of law. The Volo was purchased to replace the Lincoln, 2003, Aviator, license plate number CA TYHE0S®, which SEMTA towed and impounded on 3/28/2018. The Aviator was purchased by the Plaintiff, to replace the Ford Expedition License plate number #7UVZ482), which the Defendants took from the Plaintiff for the final time on approximately 7/20/2017. 10. As a result of these tow takings of Mr. Drotts’ only vehicle, Mr. Drotts was forced to go deeply in debt due to his inability to pay the fees demanded by the Defendants for the release of his vehicle. This has directiy cost the Plaintiff at least $12,000.00 (Ford, Lincoln, and Volvo) in purchased and lost vehicles, $5,000.00 in tools, clothes, cash, electronics (Stolen from inside towed vehicles), $20,000.00 in lost wages (Lack of proper vehicle), $578.00 paid for vehicle return on 4/28/2017, $1,700 paid for vehicle return on 4/29/2017, $2300 paid for vehicle return on 6/1/2017, $1989.00 paid for vehicle return on 7/6/2017, and $5,989.00 (fees and price of new! replacement for Ford) on approximately 7/20/2017, lost reputation, torts inflicted on the Plaintiff and his civil rights, as well as not to mention the emotional distress causing an increase in the Plaintiffs’ blood pressure. At the same time, these unconstitutional takings and impoundments forced Mr. Drotts to barrow heavily, to facilitate the immediate release of his only vehicle and primary source of income. These principle on these loans alone are/were $15,000. SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTTS - 511. Plaintiff Drotts is also suing separately for a number of other more serious torts which occurred on the first two incidents, and are a direct result of the unconstitutional and tortious manner the same Defendant’s in the current case at bar did in fact take, seize, or strong-arm the Plaintiffs’ first vehicle in question out of the direct control and possession of the Plaintiff Drotts, causing both physical and psychological harms to the person Mr. Drotts, as well as greatly injuring his reputation and standing in the community. 12. The Defendants acts were negligent per ce in accordance with Government Code section 815.6, when they breached their statutory duty on five separate occasions when they breached the statutorily mandatory duty of care created by California Vehicle Code 40220, 40221, and 40222, which specifically makes mandatory the manner “the processing agency shall |proceed...in order to collect an unpaid parking penalty,” in that the two Defendants repeatedly took the Plaintiff's vehicle without his permission, without first obtaining a civil judgement against the Plaintiff, and without then putting him on notice about the existence of a civil judgement being made against his personal property, as is specifically made mandatory according to California Vehicle Code 40220, 40221, and 46222. Two of those violations being only the first tort, in a series of increasingly more outrageous, invasive, humiliating, and offensive torts visited upon the Plaintiff, as the two Defendant’s not only failed to first obtain the required civil judgements before taking the vehicle, but then twice committed even more torts when they took the vehicle from the direct physical possession of the Plaintiff. The two Defendants then proceeded to commit the torts of false imprisonment, slander, as well as intentional infliction of emotional harm in order that they could twice accomplish the unlawful and tortious acts of literally taking the Plaintiff's vehicle by forcible tow, while he was still visibly in the vehicle. 13. Towing a vehicle constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and under the California Constitution Article 1, Section 13. Exceptions to the warrant requirement for seizures are limited, and even statutorily authorized tows must comply with constitutional requirements. These tows did not, and Mr. Drotts was deprived of his property without the procedural due process protections required by the Fourteenth SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTTS - 6Amendment and by Article 1, Section 7 of the California Constitution, because he did not receive notice or an opportunity to be heard before SFMTA ordered his car towed. Additionally, Mr. Drotts was denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard after the tow, as evidenced by the e- mail response received by Mr. Drotts from the SFMTA hearing officer, denying him a hearing, and stating “Someone would review the file, and get back to Mr. Drotts in 3-4 weeks.” Admittedly, after realizing how the “tow hearing” system worked the first time, Mr. Drotts didn’t even bother to receive another official blow-off letter (Exhibit one), in which the SFMTA promises to have a “review” of the file, to satisfy the due process requirements Drotts, has a right} to. 14, It is clear from the e-mail response (Exhibit One ) and (Exhibit Two) that the SFMTA would not allow Mr, Drotts a meaningful opportunity to confront the witness against him, would not allow him to enter any new evidence, would not allow his access through discovery to the evidence in the “file” against him, and declined to consider any evidence or legal authority beyond the fact of past-due parking citations. As a result, Mr. Drotts vehicle was taken by the Defendants on six separate occasions without warning or opportunity for meaningful hearing, to determine the facts and legal rights of Mr. Drotts pertaining to those takings, 15, What’s more is that on two of the six takings were conducted and effectuated by force, as the Plaintiff was still visibly present in the vehicle. However, the knowledge that the Plaintiff had immediate possession of his vehicle, did not deter the Defendants. They instead trapped the vehicle into a bounded area with their tow truck and refused to move or allow the Plaintiff to leave with his property despite his verbal demands to be allowed to leave with his property unmolested. The Defendants then turned the Plaintiffs’ vehicle into a bounded area from which he could not safely escape, by intentionally lifting the front end of his vehicle four feet up into the air with the towing mechanism on the tow truck. Despite demands to be let down, the Defendants refused, forcing the plaintiff to have to jump down to the pavement. This lengthy drop caused the Plaintiff to severely sprain his ankle. This prevented him from walking properly for three days. These takings the vehicle from the direct and immediate control and possession of SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTTS ~ 7Mr, Drotts, resulted in the torts of false imprisonment, battery, assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and slander being inflicted upon Mr. Drotts by the same two Defendants. 16. Furthermore, Mr. Drotts was denied a hearing of any sort, prior to these unconstitutional government takings. What’s even more outrageous is the fact that the government took the vehicle of Mr. Drotts on alt five of the six separate occasions, based solely upon unproven and unsubstantiated debts the City claimed to be created by the ticketing of meter-maids. However, the policies and practices of the City caused the Defendants to completely disallow the Plaintiff Mr. Drotts any meaningful manner, procedure, or hearing to substantiate the merits or legality of those tickets through proper examination of the issuing meter-maids. Mr. Drotts has a Constitutional right to face his accuser and examine all witnesses against him. This right is particularly important in the case of Mr. Drotts who has come to believe and has evidence that not all parking tickets given were valid and may have been issued as a part of a greater on-going conspiracy to harass Mr. Drotts personally by certain meter-maid employees of the SFMTA. 17. Those unsubstantiated claimed amounts of debt, which the City wrongfully claims the Plaintiff owes and has owed, based on little more than the opinion of meter-maids, cannot be substantiated by the City. Meter-maids, who have unknown levels of training and expertise in determining the legality of how the Plaintiff was parked, are a part of a parking enforcement system lacking in any accountability. This is especially true, whereby the SFMTA has a stated policy of disallowing the examination of the ticket issuing meter-maids, and thusly denying all citizens their Constitutional right to examine witnesses, face their accusers, or verify that any ticket issued is lawful and with merit. Moreover, this system has no way to validate these debts caused by parking violations, other than the word of highly incentivized and prejudiced meter- maid parties working for the SFMTA. All of which serve as gross examples of the way the policies and practices of the SFMTA are devoid of basic constitutional considerations, many of which have come to harm the Plaintiff. 18, The Plaintiff Drotts has been forced to pay for the return of his own property on at least four occasions. Those four occasions did force Drotts to take on increasing fevels of personal debt, to SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTIS - 8pay the demanded amounts for the return of his vehicle, until a point finally Mr. Drotts simply could not barrow or acquire any more money. It was at that point Defendant Auto Return wrongfully declared the vehicle “abandoned,” and simply stole ownership of the vehicle for itself, causing the permanent logs to Mr. Drotts. The amounts of debt or the amounts Drotts was forced to pay were: $578.00 on 4/28/2017, $1,700 on 4/29/2017, $2300 on 6/1/2017, $1989.00 on 7/6/2017, and $5,989.00 on approximately 7/20/2017 resulting from the permanent loss and/or control of the vehicle. Auto Return has already settled with Mr. Drotts on four of the six tows, for $1,500.00, However, Auto Return now is wrongfully in possession of the Plaintiff’ s Lincoln and his Volvo and refiuses to release either to the Plaintiff. 19. Respondents also violated the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the California and federal constitutions, by towing and depriving Mr. Drotts of his car as punishment for Mr. Drotts failure to pay parking citations, even though Mr. Drotts could not afford to pay the full cost of the citations or the tow and storage fees. Mr. Drotts seeks an order of administrative mandate under CCP § 1094.5 overturning the SFMTA hearing decisions, which the SFMTA has claimed to have held but which the Plaintiff was disallowed to attend, in which it was ruled his truck and Volvo should be towed and impounded, and immediately grant Mr. Drotts a refund of all moneys paid to the codefendants, the immediate release of both his vehicles currently being held by the Defendants. 20. The SEMTA has in no way ended their unconstitutional practices and have now claimed Mr. Drotts has over forty-five unpaid parking tickets and owes over $8,100.00 in fines or fees. Moreover, the Defendants have unconstitutionally taken from the Plaintiff Drotts his 2003 Lincoln Aviator, which he paid $5,000.00 for, as a replacement for the 2003 Ford Expedition the defendants unconstitutional policies and practices permanently deprived the Plaintiff of earlier. As well as his 2000 Volvo C70 for unknown and unlawful reasons. 21. Mr. Drotts seeks also is seeking an immediate injunction ordering the Defendant’s to release both his vehicles to him immediately, as well as ordering the Defendants to pay to the Plaintiff all Damages resulting from their tortious acts that harmed the Plaintiff. SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTTS — 922. The Plaintiff further seeks an immediate restraining order preventing the Defendants from selling either of the two cars the Defendant Auto Return has in their possession belonging to the Plaintiff, The Plaintiff further asks the court to order the Defendants restrained from any further harassment, targeted ticketing of his vehicles, fraudulent ticket issuing, and above all else restrain the Defendants from towing the any of the Plaintiff's vehicles now or in the future, regardless of whether the Defendants come to believe the Plaintiff has too many passed due parking tickets, without first granting the Plaintiff a legal hearing before a truly neutral magistrate, in which the standard rules of evidence apply, whereby the Plaintiff may cal! witnesses if he believes it relevant that he face his ticket issuing accusers, and that neutral arbiter has the ability to take the financial situation of the Plaintiff strongly into consideration in ordering the ultimate amount the Plaintiff must ultimately pay, as well as arrange payment plans for the Plaintiff. Furthermore, that this is ordered to become the new policies and practices of the SFMTA as the current policies and practices of the SFMTA are devoid of any of the Constitutional protections required for a lawful government taking. The Plaintiff therefore seeks a peremptory writ of mandate pursuant to CCP § 1085, directing Respondents to comply with their legal duties under the United States and California Constitutions, and grant a meaningful hearing prior to taking the vehicle. 23. Mr, Drotts requests injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, to prevent Respondents to} stop other unconstitutional tows on all citizens. Furthermore, that the Defendant SFMTA make meaningful pre-towing hearings available, grant a neutral magistrate to preside over such hearing, make available for examination the ticket issuing meter-maids or law enforcement professional should said ticket be issued by law enforcement, give fair and adequate warning that the taking may occur, base the fines and fees on the persons proven income and ability to pay those fines and fees, as well as there being a meaningful payment plan option. 24. Finally, Mr. Drotts asks the Court to award actual damages in the amount stated below, for the harms caused over the course of eight months which include all fines paid, the price of all three vehicles, the price of all lost profits and income, the cost of loans and the interest there on the Plaintiff was forced to take, the value of all lost/stolen tools, electronics, clothes, and cash SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTTS - 10repeatedly stolen from out of the various vehicles of the Plaintiff when towed several and then permanent loss of his vehicle, the cost of the final loss of the vehicle and its contents, as well as all lost wages. While bifurcating and preserving for separate trial the causes of action already filed in CFP-18-516045, filed January 25, 2018, titled JOEL DROTTS IN PRO PER, vs. SAN FRANCISCO MUNICIPAL TRANSPORTATION AGENCY; TEGSCO LLC DBA AUTO RETURN TOWING; JOHN DOE BADGE #426 OF SFMTA; AND JOHN DOE TOW TRUCK DRIVER. U,___ THE PARTIES 25. Plaintiff/Petitioner Joel Drotts is a 40-year-old community leader and nonprofit founder, has been a resident of San Francisco, California for the past eighteen years. The Petitioner currently resides in an SRO on Jones Street, which he has shared with his fiancé for the past seven months. Aside from operating the registered California non-profit dedicated to education and the digital and electronic privacy rights of American consumers, the Petitioner earns a living as a part time security guard at a popular local nightclub, performing various “odd-jobs” as a “handy-man/mechanic,” as well as freelance per a job “light industrial and retail hauling and/or material moving.” His fiancé works nights as an exotic dancer on Broadway. Prior to the agency decisions that are the subject of this petition, Mr. Drotts regularly parked his now-towed only vehicle, and source of income on Jones Street, in San Francisco. 26. Defendant/Respondent EDWARD D. REISKIN is the Director of Transportation of the SEMTA and is responsible for managing SFMTA and its vehicle tows in accordance with the law. Respondent is sued in his official capacity as the municipal official responsible for ensuring that the SEMTA and its agents act in conformity with federal and state law. Defendant/Respondent SAN FRANCISCO MUNICIPAL TRANSPORTATION AGENCY ("SEMTA" or "Respondent") is the municipal agency responsible for ensuring lawful administration of vehicle tows and impounds within the City of San Francisco, Chief William “Bill” Scott is the Chief of Police of San Francisco and is responsible for managing the actions of his officers, and the policing activities of his agents and officers. Badge number #632 did unlawfully order the lawfully and safely parked, legally registered, and passed due ticket free vehicle from 415 Jones street on 4/5/2018 at one am. He did so without probable cause, or any SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTTS - 11proper police or state need or function. Badge #632 committed no less than grand theft auto under the color of law and did so presumptively to annoy and harass the Plaintiff as a continuation of the on-going harassment suffered by the Plaintiff at the hands of the City Government of San Francisco disguised as merely being hyper aggressive parking enforcement. 27. Defendant/Real party in interest TEGSCO, LLC dba SAN FRANCISCO AUTORETURN ("Auto Return") is the exclusive provider of all tow-related services for the City and County of San Francisco. Auto Return carried out the tow of Mr. Drotts Car on the following dates of 4/28/2017, 4/29/2017, 6/1/2017, 7/6/2017, and approximately 7/20/2017, and then holding his vehicle as a bailment against the wishes and permission of the Plaintiff Drotts in the following amounts $578.00 on 4/28/2017, $1,700 on 4/29/2017, $2300 on 6/1/2017, $1989.00 on 7/6/2017, and $5,989.00 on 7/20/2017, except of the final date which they then took permanent possession of the vehicle as Mr. Drotts could not afford to pay the final demanded amount of money losing him the full value of his $5,000.00+ vehicle and all its contents. 28. Auto Return has contracted with San Francisco to provide dispatch, towing, impound. management and vehicle disposal services to the City and County of San Francisco since 2004, In 2015, Auto Return was awarded the San Francisco contract for a five-year term beginning on April 1, 2016. Mandate lies against Auto Return as well as the City because serves a city function by performing city-ordered tow and storage services as part of the City's enforcement of local and state laws. See Anchor Pacifica Mgmt. Co. v. Green, 205 Cal. App. 4th 232, 244 (2012) (holding that private landlord was taking state action for purposes of constitutional analysis because landlord's administration of city-subsidized housing was "subject to City oversight and approval"); City of King City v. Community Bank of Central California, 131 Cal. App. 4th 913, 927 (2005) ("{MJandate will sometimes lie against a private person to compel performance of a duty."). 29. The true names and capacities, whether individuals, corporate, associate, or otherwise, of DOES 1 through 10 are unknown to Mr. Droits who therefore sue these Respondents by such fictitious names. Mr. Drotts is informed and believes, and based upon such information and belief, alleges that at all times material herein, each of the Doe Respondents was an agent or SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTTS - 12employee of one or more of the named Respondents, and was acting within the course and scope of said agency or employment. Mr. Drotts is further informed and believes, and based thereon alleges, that each of the Doe Respondents is legally responsible in some manner for the occurrences herein alleged. All allegations in this Petition that refer to the named Respondents refer in like manner to those Respondents identified as Respondents DOES 1-10, inclusive. Mr. Drotts will amend that Petition to allege the true names and capacities of the Doe Respondents when the same have been ascertained. I, LEGAL FRAMEWORK 30. The three Defendant Agency Entities are liable and responsible for all acts and harms caused by the John Doe Defendants as their employees, due to the legal construction of respondent superior. 31. The doctrine of respondent superior, literally “let the master answer,” allows that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrongful conduct of his or her employees or agents committed within the scope of the employment or agency. Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1066, 1070, 929 P2d 582. See also California Civil Code Section 2338, which states that a principal is liable to third persons for the negligence of its agent. The rationale for the doctrine lies in the fact that the principal or employer derives the benefit from the service of the agent or employee and is a better position to insure itself against losses arising out of the service. The losses caused by employee torts are placed on the employer as a cost of doing business. To apply the doctrine, two criteria must be established. First, the employment or agency relationship must be proven. Second, it must also be shown that the employee or agent was acting within the scope of that employment. Societa per Azioni de Navigazione Italia v. City of Los Angeles (1982) 31 Cal.3d 446, 461, 645 P.2d 102, Upon establishing these two criteria, the employer or principal can be held responsible for its employees’ torts absent any other showing of independent negligence on the part of the employer or principal. 32. As such, it is undisputed that the two John Doe defendants were acting within the scope of their employment, as they were both wearing uniforms denoting as such. Moreover, the fact that the two John Doe defendants undertook all actions for the stated and purposeful benefit of the two Agency Defendants, is further undisputed factual evidence that not only were the John Doe SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTTS ~- 13defendants employed and on duty, were acting with-in the scope of their employment, and at times carrying out the policies of their employers. This can be further evidenced by the fact that, at least during the time period complained of, it was the standard practice and policy of the SFMTA and Auto Return to regularly send out combined agency units, early in the morning, whereby a meter-maid would travel in tow truck, with tow truck driver, and these units would essentially steal the cars of individuals suspected of having more than five over-due and unpaid parking tickets. The manner which those units chose whose car to tow on any given day remains unknown to the Plaintiff but given the racial slurs the Plaintiff was made to suffer being called while one such agency combined unit took his vehicle from his physical possession, it is a fair assumption to assume that the taking of cars is racially motivated at least in part. 33. A. Reasonableness Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the California Constitution 34. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution bars "unreasonable searches and seizures" of a person's property. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Article I, Section 13 of the California Constitution provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated," a provision that provides at least as much protection as does the Fourth Amendment. See People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 548-52 (1975), abrogated on other grounds as discussed in In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873,879 (1985). 35. Aseizure "occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property." United States v, Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). Impounding a vehicle constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 2005). 36. Warrantless seizures are "per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions." Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366,372 (1993). SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTTS - 1437. No exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement permits warrantless vehicle tows for the purpose of satisfying a municipal debt. The only warrant exception relevant to vehicle impoundment is for "community caretaking." Miranda, 429 F.3d at 862. The community caretaking exception permits warrantless towing “only to impound vehicles that jeopardize public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic.” Brewster v. Beck, 859 F.3d 1194, 1196 (9th Cir, 2017); see also South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364,369 (1976). 38. A tow conducted under the community caretaking doctrine must be reasonably related to farthering one of these caretaking purposes to be valid. Miranda, 429 F.3d at 863 (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court "has limited the discretion of the impounding officer and has taken a more finely tuned approach to determining reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment"). 39. Legal violations such as parking citations are not relevant to justify the constitutionality off a tow under the community caretaking doctrine. Miranda, 429 F.3d at 864. 40. An officer cannot reasonably order an impoundment in situations where the location of the vehicle does not create any need for the police to protect the vehicle or to avoid a hazard to other drivers. Miranda, 429 F.3d at 866; accord United States v. Duguay, 93 F.3d 346, 353 (7th Cir, 1996) ("The policy of impounding the car without regard to whether the defendant can provide for its removal is patently unreasonable if the ostensible purpose for impoundment is for the 'caretaking' of the streets.”). 41. "The need to deter a driver's unlawful conduct is by itself insufficient to justify a tow under the ‘caretaker’ rationale." Miranda, 429 F.3d at 866. 42. California Vehicle Code 22651(i) provides that an officer "may remove" a vehicle if “it is known that the vehicle has been issued five or more notices of parking violations...." However, a local statute authorizing impoundment “does not, in and of itself, determine the reasonableness of the seizure under the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTTS - 15Amendment." Miranda, 429 F.3d at 864; see also United States v. Cervantes, 703 F.3d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 2012); Lavan vy. City of Los Angeles, 693 F.3d 1022, 1029 (9th Cir. 2012) ("Violation of a City ordinance does not vitiate the Fourth Amendment's protection of one's property. Were it otherwise, the government could seize and destroy any illegally parked car or unlawfully unattended dog without implicating the Fourth Amendment."). 43. B, Procedural Due Process Under the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 1, Section 7 of the California Constitution 44. A state cannot "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of Jaw." U.S. Const. amend. XIV. "A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." Cal. Const. art. 1, § 7. The U.S. Supreme Court has determined that the process due depends on "the private interest that will be affected by the official action," "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards,” and "the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,335 (1976). 4S. Generally, these Mathews v. Eldridge factors are interpreted in the vehicle tow context to require notice before the tow and the opportunity for a meaningful hearing within two days of an owner's request after the tow. See Clement v. City of Glendale, 518 F.3d 1090, 1093) (9th Cir, 2008) (pre-tow notices generally required); Goichman v. Rheuban Motors, Inc., 682 F.2d 1320, 1325 (9th Cir. 1982) (post-tow hearing required within forty-eight hours of a request). 46. Under the California Constitution, there is a fourth element of the analysis: "the dignitary| interest in informing individuals of the nature, grounds and consequences of the action and in enabling them to present their side of the story before a responsible governmental official.” People v. Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d 260,269 (1979). Notice Under the Fourteenth Amendment, "the government may not take property like a thief in the night; rather, it must announce its intentions and give the property owner a chance to argue against the taking." Clement, 518 F.3d at 1093 SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTTS - 16o™ oo! (requiring the government to present "strong justification" for not providing notice to a vehicle owner prior to a non-emergency tow because "removal of an automobile is a big deal" that disrupts an individual's life, imposes significant retrieval costs, and can create anxiety at the unexplained loss of a vehicle). 47. Pre-deprivation notice has been required in the context of tows unless there is "an emergency, or if notice would defeat the entire point of the seizure, or when the interest at stake is small relative to the burden that giving notice would impose." Clement, 518 F.3d at 1093-94. The use of one's automobile is a significant interest compared to the small burden of notice. Id at 1094; Scofield, 862 F.2d at 762 ("The uninterrupted use of one's vehicle [on public roads] isa significant and substantial private interest."). 48, Post-Tow Hearing 49. "The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Mathews, 424 U.S, at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,552 (1965)), An agency violates a vehicle owner's post-tow due process rights if it adopts a policy of not offering hearings or not conducting those hearings in a meaningful time and manner. Scofield, $62 F.2d at 765. In addition, an agency violates a vehicle owner's post- tow due process right to a meaningful hearing, if there is no opportunity to examine the evidence on which the hearing officer relies or to confront the towing officer. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. This includes the right to question ones’ ticket issuing accusers. 50. The Supreme Court has taken for granted that a City must bring the officer who ordered the tow to the administrative tow hearing. City of Los Angeles v. David, 538 U.S. 715, 718 (2003) (noting that "the city has to contact the towing officer and arrange for his appearance") in detailing the administrative steps required for tow hearings). The 6th Amendment states, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” The 14th Amendment has made the 6th Amendment's right to confrontation applicable to state court as well as federal court. The confrontation clause guarantees criminal defendants the opportunity to face the prosecution's witnesses in the case against them and SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTIS - 17dispute the witnesses’ testimony. This guarantee applies to both statements made in court and statements made outside of court that are offered as evidence during trial. For a hearing to be meaningful, an agency should give notice of the criteria that will determine the administrative decision. Anderson v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. App. 3d 1321, 1330 (1989). Further, an agency must permit presentation of all relevant claims as required to exhaust the administrative remedy. See Jonathan Neil & Assoc., Inc. v. Jones, 33 Cal. 4th 917,933 (2004) (exhaustion requires agency decision of "entire controversy"); Bleeckv. State Bd. of Optometry 18 Cal. App. 3d 415,432 (1971) (exhaustion requires "a full presentation to the administrative agency upon all issues of the case and at all prescribed stages of the administrative proceedings"). In this same vein the City may not designate parking tickets to be a Civil matter, as parking tickets carry] with them the criminal designation of being infractions. 51. C. Due Process and Equal Protection Under the Fourteenth Amendment 52. Using the principles of both Due Process and Equal Protection, the Supreme Court has heid it} is “fundamentally unfair" to punish indigent individuals for their inability to pay fines and fees. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668--69 (1983) (holding that it is unconstitutional to revoke probation for failure to pay a fine); Griffin v. Minois, 351 DS. 12, 18 (1956) (holding that it is fundamentally unfair to deny access to an appeal solely because of inability to pay court costs). 53, The Bearden analysis requires that an ability-to-pay determination be part of the pre- punishment process and requires the consideration of alternatives to punishment. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 674 (finding punishment unconstitutional because it was imposed "simply because [the person] could not pay the fine, without considering the reasons for the inability to pay or the propriety of reducing the fine or extending the time for payments or making alternative orders...."). 54, D. Trespass to Chattels/Conversion ‘Trespass to chattels "lies where an intentional interference with the possession of personal property has proximately caused injury." Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1559, SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTTS - 181565 (1996). Alleging that a vehicle has been towed and held for a prolonged time in storage with exorbitant tow and storage fees is sufficient to state a claim for trespass to chattels. Garcia v. City of King, 2017 WL 5194519, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2017). Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over the property of another. 55. The elements of a conversion claim are: (1) the plaintiff's ownership or right to possession of the property; (2) the defendant's conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and (3) damages." Lee v. Hanley, 61 Cal. 4th 1225, 1240 (2015). The wrongful act in question need not be in bad faith to be the basis of a conversion claim; intent is not relevant. We/co Elecs., Inc. v. Mora, 223 Cal. App. 4th 202, 208 (2014) (finding that in deciding a conversion claim, "questions of the defendant's good faith, lack of knowledge, and motive are ordinarily immaterial"). 56. E. Government Code section 815.6 57. Agent for SFMTA John Doe Meter-Maid #426 (hereinafter #426) and codefendant Agent for Auto Return John Doe Tow Truck Driver (hereinafter TTD) had an absohite duty to obey the enactments found in California Vehicle Code 40220, 40221, and 40222, according to Government Code section 815.6. Government Code section 815.6 provides for liability when a public entity fails to discharge “a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury.” To state a cause of action under Section 815.6, a plaintiff must assert an enactment that (1) imposes a mandatory rather than a discretionary duty, and (2) is intended to protect against the kind of injury suffered. *Enactments" defined by Government Code section 810.6 include statutes, ordinances, and regulations adopted “by an agency of the state pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act.” It is the contention of the plaintiff that Government Code section 815.6 created a mandatory duty to obey California Vehicle Code 40220, 40221, and 40222, which were created to prevent the specific types of harms caused by the failure of the Defendant’s to obey those statutes. 58. The Defendants acts were negligent per ce in accordance with Government Code section 815.6, when they breached their statutory duty on two separate occasions by failing to perform “dropped tows,” as made mandatory according to SFMTA Contract No. 2014-48, which where SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTTS - 19was made agency regulations according to San Francisco’s’ Administrative Code Chapter 21, Section 21.35. 59, F. False imprisonment False imprisonment requires some restraint of the person and that he be deprived of his liberty or compelled to stay where he does not want to remain or compelled to go where he does not wish to go; and that the person be restrained of his liberty without sufficient complaint or authority.” (Collins v. County of Los Angeles (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 451, 459-460 [50 Cal. Rptr. 586]. “[The tort of false imprisonment] consists of the “ ‘nonconsensual intentional confinement of a person, without lawful privilege, for an appreciable length of time, however short.” (Scofield, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 1001. Here, on two separate occasions the Defendants did intentionally place the Plaintiff into a confined and bounded area, for a period of not less than twenty minutes or longer, from which the Plaintiff could not safely escape against his will, and in so doing among other harms caused severe intentional emotional distress in the process of the commission of that tort. “In addition to recovery for emotional suffering and humiliation, one subjected to false imprisonment is entitled to compensation for other resultant harm, such as loss of time, physical discomfort or inconvenience, any resulting physical illness or injury to health, business interruption, and damage to reputation, as well as punitive damages in appropriate cases.” (Scofield, supra, 45 Cal.App.4that p. 1009, internal citation omitted.). 60. G. Defamation of character Defamation of character as the statements made intentionally so the Plaintiffs neighbors and landlord would hear the Plaintiff called a criminal, loser, and a scoff-law by an individual who appeared to be making those statements on behalf of the government in an official public punishment, complete with a taking of the Plaintiff's vehicle by force, did harm the plaintiffs’ reputation and standing in the community, by causing the plaintiff to become the object of scorn and shunning by his local community of neighbors. 61, H. Intentional infliction of emotional distress This same rule is stated in Restatement Second of Torts (1965) section 46, page 71, in this manner: “One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTTS - 20severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm." The Restatement's equating of reckless with intentional extreme and. outrageous conduct appears also to be embodied in the law of this state. (See Spackman v. Good, supra, 245 Cal. App. 2d 518, 530; 4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed. 1974) Torts, § 235, p. 2516, and see authority there cited.) [66 Cal. App. 3d 171]. Conduct is outrageous if a reasonable person would regard the conduct as intolerable in a civilized community. Outrageous conduct does not include trivialities such as indignities, annoyances, hurt feelings, or bad manners that a reasonable person is expected to endure, but it does include attacks and verbal degradation of a victim’s race, color, or heritage, especially when done by an uniformed government official, and during what appears to be an official government action, even if it later is shown to be done without any true legal authority. 62. I. Civil battery The crimes of assault and battery are intentional torts. In the perpetration of such crimes negligence is not involved. As between the guilty aggressor and the person attacked the former may not shield himself behind the charge that his victim may have been guilty of contributory negligence, for such a plea is unavailable to him.” (Bartosh v. Banning (1967) 251 Cal. App.2d 378, 385 [59CalRptr. 382].) “ ‘It has long been established, both in tort and criminal law, that “the least touching” may constitute battery. In other words, force against the person is enough, it need not be violent or severe, it need not cause bodily harm or even pain, and it need not leave any mark,’ ” (People v. Mansfield (1988) 200Cal.App.3d 82, 88 [245 Cal-Rptr. 800], internal citations omitted.). “[T]he tort of battery generally is not limited to direct body-to-body contact. In fact, the commentary to the Restatement Second of Torts clearly states that the meaning of “contact with another’s person” ° . .. does not require that one‘ should bring any part of his own body in contact with another’s person. . . [One] is liable [for battery] in this Section if [one] throws a substance, such as water, upon the other... .”” (Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Busby (2013) 219Cal.App.4th 876, 881 [162 Cal.Rptr.3d 211].), “The element of lack of consent to the particular contact is an essential element of battery.” (Rains, supra, 150 Cal. App.3d at p. 938.)* “As a general rule, one who consents to a touching cannot recover in an action for battery. . .. However, it is well-recognized a person may place conditions on the SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF JOEL DROTTS - 21consent, If the actor exceeds the terms or conditions of the consent, the consent does not protect the actor from liability for the excessive act.” (Asheraft v. King (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 604, 609-610 [278 Cal. Rptr. 900].). “In an action for civil battery the element of intent is satisfied if the evidence shows defendant acted with a ‘willful disregard’ of the plaintiff's rights.” (Ashcraft, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at p. 613, internal citation omitted.). “ “The usages of decent society determine what is offensive.’ ” (Barowh, supra,26 Cal.App.4th at p. 46, fn. 5, internal citation omitted, 63. J. Enactment of SFMTA Contract No, 2014-48 as San Francisco’s’ Administrative Code Chapter 21, Section 21.35 did give that contract the statutory force of government agency regulations. Government Code section 815.6 provides for liability when a public entity fails to discharge “a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury.” To state a cause of action under Section 815.6, a plaintiff must assert an enactment that (1) imposes a mandatory rather than a discretionary duty, and (2) is intended to protect against the kind of injury suffered. "Enactments" defined by Government Code section 810.6 include statutes, ordinances, and regulations adopte