Preview
EXEMPT FROM FILING FEES PURSUANT
TO GOVERNMENT CODE § 6103
1 LOUIS A. LEONE (SBN 099874)
IOANA R. BURSON (SBN 20947 1)
2 ELECTRONICALLY
LEONE & ALBERTS
3 1390 Willow Pass Rd., Suite 700 F I L E D
Superior Court of California,
Concord, CA 94520 County of San Francisco
4 Telephone: (925) 97 4-8600
03/12/2020
Facsimile: (925) 974-8601 Clerk of the Court
5
BY: YOLANDA TABO-RAMIREZ
Deputy Clerk
6 Attorneys for Defendant
SAN FRANC ISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL
7 DISTRICT
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
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COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
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D'LONI JONES, a minor, by and through Case No.: CGC-18-570338
11 his Guardian ad Litem, LALONI JONES, Reservation No.: 02200602-08
12
Pla intiff,
13 DEFENDANT SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED
SCHOOL DISTRICT'S MEMORANDUM
14
OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
V.
15 SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
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17
Date: June 2, 2020
Time: 9:30 a.m.
SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL
18 Dept.: 302
DISTRICT, and Does 1 through 100,
19 inclusive,
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Complaint Filed: February 20, 20 19
Defendants. Trial Date: July 6, 2020
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DEFENDANT SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
2 Page
3 No.
4 I. INTRODUCTION .. ........................ ......... ...... ......... ................... ..... ..... ... .. ..... ... .....
1
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II . STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................... .......... ..
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111. 5
ARGUMENT ............................................ ............ ... ...... .. ... ........ .... ,.. ........ ..
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8 A The Standard for Summary 5
9 Judgment. ..... .... ... .... ................ ..
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B The On ly Alleged Bases for Statutory Liability in the
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Complaint is Neg ligent Supervision And Unauthorized Use of
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the Trampoline as Special Education Accommodation in the
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Classroom .. ......... ......................................... .............. .. .......... ......
14 6
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1. D'Lon i Cannot Show that The District Breached Its Duty of
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Reasonab le 7
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Supervision .... .... .... ...... ..... ........................ .. .. ....
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2. D'Lon i Cannot Show Proximate Cause Between Any Alleged
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Breach of Duty and His 12
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Fall ... .... .... .. .. ..... . .... ...... ....... . .. ... .... .
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22 3. The District is Immune From Liability From Implementing The
23 Trampo line As Part of the Special Education 16
24 Curricu lum.. .. ...... ..
25 IV. CONCLUSION .. . .. .... . ....................... .... ................. . ...... .... .. .. ... . ..
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DEFENDANT SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2 Page(s
State Cases
3
Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. v. Superior Court,
4
46 Cal. App . 4th 476 (1996) ..... ............ ............................ ... ., ... ... ... ...................... .. ...... .
5
Ford v. Riverside City Sch. Dist.,
121 Cal. App . 2d 554 (1953) ... ....... ... ...... ... ... .... ... .. ......... .......... ....... .............. ...... ...
1
6
Forgnone v. Salvador U. E. School Dist.,
7
41 Cal. App. 2d 423 (1940) ............. ... ..... ... ..... ..... .... ....... ..... .. ........ ............. ... ........ .
1
8
Hood v. Hacienda La Puente Unified Sch. Dist.,
65 Cal. App. 4th 435 (1998) .. ....... ... .. .......... .... .. ..... ... ., ... ....... ... ... ... .... ...... ...... ... ........ .
9
J. H. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist.,
183 Cal. App. 4th 123 (2010) ... ....... ... ...... ... ... ................... .. ..... ............ ....... ..........
7,
10
Joyce v. Simi Valley Unified School District
11
110 Cal.App.4th 292 (2003) ........ ....... ........................ ................................. .. .... .........
1
12
Larsen v. Johannes,
7 Cal. App . 3d 491 (1970) ........................... .. .......... .. ............... ....................... ., ......... .... 3
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Luna v. Needles Elementary School Dist.,
14
154 Cal. App . 2d 803 (1957) ., .... ..................... ....... ..... .. ... ... .... ... ... ................. ... .. ... .... .. ...
15
Ortega v. Sacramento Cty. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
161 Cal. App. 4th 713 (2008) .. ..... .. ... .......... .. ....... .... ... .......... .... .. .......... ..... .......... ,..
1
16
Pena v. WH. Douthitt Steel & Supply Co.
17
179 Cal. App. 3d 924,(1986) .... ........ ..... .... ... .... .. .... ... ............. .......... .................. .......
1
18
Peralta v. Vons Companies, Inc.,
24 Cal. App . 5th 1030, (2018) .............................. ... .... ....... ... ..................................
1
19
Peter W v. San Francisco Unified School District
20
60 Cal.App.3d 814 (1976) .... ..................................... ... ......................................
17, 1
21
Pirkle v. Oakdale Union Grammar School Dist.,
40 Cal. 2d 207 (1953) ... ..... .. .. ., ......................... .. . ., ...... .. ......... ............. .... .................. ..
22
S.M. v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist.,
23 184 Cal. App. 4th 712 (2010) .......... ......... .. .. ......... .. .. .... .... ..... .................. ...... .... ... ... .
24 Skinner v. Vacaville Unified School Dist.,
37 Cal. App. 4th 31 (1995) ......... ... ............. .............. .......... ... ...... ... ... ... .. ..... ..
9, 13, 1
25
Taylor v. Oakland Scavenger Co.,
26 17 Cal. 2d 594 (1941) ... .. ... .... ., ... ....... ... ., .. ...... .. . ., ...... ... .......... ...... ...... .. .... .. ....... ... ..... .. .
27 Thompson v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist.,
107 Cal. App. 4th 1352 (2003) ........ .......... ... ... ....... .. .... ......................... .. .......... ..
9, 1
28
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DEFENDANT SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGM ENT
Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Sa vings & Loan Assn.
57 Cal. App. 4th 1334, 1342 (1997) .......... ...... ..... ........... ................. ........... .............. ..
2
Woodsmall v. Mount Diab/a Unified School Dist.,
3 188 Cal. App. 2d 262 (1961) ....... ... ... ............. .. .. .. ............. ............. ... .. .. ..
9, 12, 15, 1
4 Wright v. San Bernardino High School Dist.,
121 Cal. App. 2d 342 (1953) ... ............. ........... ....... ... ........... .... ............... ..... .....
passim
5
ST ATE STATUTES
6
Education Code§ 44807 ...... .. ....... ........ ... ................... ... .... ... ..... .......... ....... ... ....... ... ..... ..... .
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Government Code§ 811.2 .. .. ......... .... ... ... ..... ...... ... ...... ....... .... ... ..... .,..... ..... ........... ... ... ..
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Government Code§ 815 .... .... ... ., ..... ....... ............. .. .... .. ... .... ......... ..... .. .... ... ., ......... .... ...... .
10 Government Code §815.2 ..... .. ........... .............. ................. .................... ...... ........ ........ ...
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11 Government Code §820 .2 ............... ................. ... .... ............ .. ........ ............ ...... 2,
8, 16, 1
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DEFENDANT SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITI ES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
2
In his Complaint for Damages ("Complaint"), Plaintiff D'Loni Jones ("D'Loni")
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through his mother and guardian ad litem, Laloni Jones, alleges one cause of action
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for "Personal Injury" under Government Code §815.2(a) against Defendant San
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Francisco Unified School District (the "District"). D'Loni, a second grader at Sherman
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Elementary School within the District, felloff a floor trampoline in his special education
7
classroom. D'Loni sustained a small cut to his forehead and has made a thorough
8
recovery. D'Loni, a special education student diagnosed with autism and Attention
9
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD"), knew how to use the trampoline and had been
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doing so for at least three years prior to the incident. He fell because he was not
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holding onto the safety bar when stepping off the trampoline. It was the first time that
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he or anyone else in the classroom was injured using the trampoline.
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While the District regrets D'Loni's injury, as a matter of law, it isnot liable for it.
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The District was providing reasonable supervision at the time in compliance with its
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statutory duty. The District is not required to be the absolute insurer of student safety
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and to prevent all accidents; such a standard would be impossible to meet and
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effectively imposes strict liability on the District. At the time of the incident, there were
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at least two, if not three adults in the classroom, special education teacher Alexis
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Stephenson and one or two Para-educators, including Carleen Leung, supervising ten
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students.
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Ms. Stephenson, an experienced special education teacher, had incorporated the
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trampoline in her classroom as part of her teaching to help students with behavior or
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attention deficit issues focus better during instruction . Additionally, the trampoline was
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in fact a required accommodation in at least one of her students' Individual Education
25
Plan ("IEP"). The school's choice of curriculum and Ms. Stephenson's choice of the
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trampoline as a means to aid with instruction of her special education students is
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entitled to immunity under the Government Code. See Gov. Code §820.2.
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DEFENDANT SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Moreover, D'Loni's injury happened suddenly and was the type of accident that
2 could occur irrespective of a surplus or an absence of supervision. Controlling case
3 law holds that under these circumstances, D'Loni cannot establish the proximate cause
4 required for statutory liability. As "Li]ustice requires that a defendant be as much
5 entitled to be rid of an unmeritorious lawsuit as a plaintiff is entitled to maintain a good
6 one[,)" Larsen v. Johannes, 7 Cal. App. 3d 491, 507 (1970), the District is entitled to
7 summary judgment on the Complaint.
8 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 1
9 The District is a public entity that operates Sherman Elementary School
10 ("Sherman") in San Francisco, which serves students from transitional kindergarten
11 through fifth grade. (SS No. 1). On April 17, 2018, D'Loni was a seven-year-old
12 second grade student at Sherman in Alexis Stephenson's K through 2 nd Grade mild to
13 moderate autism-focus classroom. (SS No. 2). D'Loni alleges that he was jumping on
14 a floor model trampoline in the classroom, when he fell and injured himself due to
15 "inadequate supervision of students use of [the trampoline], as well as inadequate
16 safety measures in place and/or exercised by Plaintiff's teachers and/or
17 classroom/school staff assigned to student care, supervision, and safety." (SS No. 3).
18 Further, according to Plaintiff, the "[a]uthorized use of the trampoline remains in
19 question." (SS No. 4).
20 D'Loni sustained a small laceration to his forehead as a result of the fall and has
21 received stitches. (Deposition of Laloni Jones, attached as Exhibit A to Declaration of
22 loana R. Burson ("Burson Dec") in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, at
23 101: 10-22). He healed well and other than a small scar on his forehead he has no
24 residuals from the incident and does not need any further medical treatment. (Burson
25
26
All citations marked "SS" refer to the District's Separate Statement of Undisputed
27 Material Facts submitted with this Motion, and the evidentiary citations referenced
therein. Facts not included in the Separate Statement are provided herein as
28
background facts with separate evidentiary citations.
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DEFENDANT SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Dec., Ex. A, at 72:11 -17; 101:10-22; 114:7-14). Ms. Jones has not decided whether or
2 not she will seek the services of a plastic surgeon to remove the scar. (Burson Dec.,
3 Ex. A, at 72: 18-24.)
4 As to the supervision of students, Ms. Stephenson took numerous steps to
5 ensure that students are reasonably supervised when using the trampoline.
6 Specifica lly, prior to implementing the trampoline in her classroom, she verbally
7 instructed the students on the rules for using it, including that on ly one student is
8 allowed on the trampoline at the time and that the students must hold on to the safety
9 bar at all times while on the trampoline. (SS No. 5). Ms. Stephenson also prepared a
10 poster with the rules, which she displayed in her classroom every day. (SS No. 6).
11 Add itionally, Ms. Stephenson modeled the use of the trampoline regularly, and
12 showed students how to hold on to the safety bar when jumping. (SS No. 7). She
13 always reminded the students to hold on to the safety bar when using the trampoline
14 and she would have reprimanded any student who was not obeying the rules. (SS No.
15 8).
16 The trampoline that Ms. Stephenson used in the classroom at the time of the
17 incident was a sma ll floor-model trampoline, standing about one foot off the ground
18 and was equipped with a safety bar. (SS No. 9). The trampoline was placed on an
19 area rug, away from sharp objects, or furniture, such as cha irs or tab les. (SS No. 10.)
20 Ms. Stephenson has several years of experience working with special education
21 students both as a teacher and as a para-educator. (SS No. 11.) Based on her
22 practice and experience teaching students with special needs, she knows that the
23 trampoline is a useful tool helping students suffering from autism and/or ADHD focus
24 better during classroom instruction. (SS No. 12). At the time of the incident, at least
25 one of her students' IEP incorporated the use of the trampoline as a special
26 accommodation. (SS No. 13). There were no incidents of students getting hurt or
27 falling off the trampoline prior to D'Loni's incident. (SS No. 14).
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DEFENDANT SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff admitted in discovery responses that he has no documents to support
2 his claim that at the time of the incident there was inadequate classroom supervision
3 or that the incident was caused by inadequate classroom supervision, or inadequate
4 safety measures. (SS No. 15). Likewise, he adm itted that he has no documents to
5 support his claim that the use of the trampoline in the classroom was unauthorized.
6 (SS No. 16). In her deposition, Ms. Jones testified that the on ly sou rce of information
7 as to what happened is Ms. Stephenson, who is a "good teacher." (SS No. 17.)
8 On April 17, 20 18, at the time of the incident, there were approximately ten
9 students in the classroom and at least two, possibly three supervising adults. (SS No.
10 18). As the school day ended, D'Loni started jumping on the trampoline while holding
11 on to the safety bar. (SS No. 19). Ms. Stephenson was stand ing no more than five
12 feet away from him and was looking directly at him. (SS No. 20). She ca lled out to
13 him to stop jumping and gather his belongings to go home. (SS No. 21). She then
14 briefly took her eyes off him to help another student, but was able to still see him in the
15 corner of her eye. (SS No. 22). Within ten to thirty seconds thereafter, she heard him
16 crying and saw him on the floor. (SS No. 23). The time that elapsed between when
17 she took her eyes of him and the time he fell was about two to three seconds. (SS No.
18 24). D'Lon i told Ms. Stephenson that he fell and that he was not holding on to the
19 safety bar. (SS No. 25). While D'Lon i was on the trampoline, Ms. Stephenson was
20 visually scann ing the entire room and would have reprimanded D'Lon i or any other
21 student whom she saw misusing the trampoline or otherwise misbehaving. (SS No.
22 26). Ms. Stephenson would have also walked over to the trampoline and as.ked the
23 student to step off, and she would have modeled the safe use of the trampoline while
24 reiterating the rules. (Id).
25 D'Loni knew how to use the trampoline because he had a similar trampoline at
26 home and had been using it for at least the prior three years. (SS No. 27). D'Loni also
27 jumped on trampolines at the trampoline park. (SS No. 28). Ms. Jones allowed D'Loni
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DEFENDANT SAN FRANCISCO UNI FIED SCHOOL DISTRICT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITI ES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
to use the trampoline because she received information from different sources that it is
2 a useful tool for children with autism to work out excess energy. (SS No. 29).
3 After the incident, Ms. Stephenson cleaned D'Loni's cut and applied a Band-Aid.
4 She immediately called his mother and notified her. She then escorted him to the
5 office, where she waited with a CPR-certified para-educator, Ms. Lakisha, until
6 D'Loni's mother came to pick him up. (Stephenson Deel. at ,TB). Ms. Stephenson and
7 Ms. Lakisha played with building blocks with D'Loni while waiting for Ms. Jones to
8 arrive at school to ensure D'Loni remained alert and was able to think logically. Id.
9 D'Loni calmed down, stopped crying and was able to respond and play well with his
10 teachers. Id.
11 After she picked him up from school, Ms. Jones took D'Loni to the Emergency
12 Room where he received stitches and was sent home. Thereafter, he went to the
13 pediatrician for two follow up visits to remove the stitches and ensure he was healing
14 well. (Burson Deel., Ex. A, at 89:3-8.) The doctor concluded that there was no
15 infection of the wound, that the laceration was healing well and recommended use of
16 sunscreen to limit pigmentation changes. (Id. at 86: 15-22.) Ms. Jones admitted that
17 D'Loni did not use sunscreen on a daily basis as recommended by his physician. (Id.
18 at 87:4-9.)
19 The incident occurred within a couple of seconds while Ms. Stephenson turned
20 her attention away from D'Loni to help another student in the classroom. (SS No. 30).
21 Accordingly, as a matter of law, the District is not liable for negligent supervision and
22 summary judgment should be granted.
23 Ill. ARGUMENT
24 A. The Standard for Summary Judgment.
25 Summary judgment is appropriate where "all the papers submitted show that
26 there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
27 judgment as a matter of law" Code Civ. P. § 437c(c). "A defendant moving for
28 summary judgment meets its burden of showing that there is no merit to a cause of
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DEFENDANT SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
action if that party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot
2 be established or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action." S.M. v. L.A.
3 Unified Sch. Dist., 184 Cal. App. 4th 712, 716 (2010) (citing Code Civ. P. § 437c). The
4 burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of fact exists as to that
5 cause of action or defense. Id. In doing so, the plaintiff cannot rely on the mere
6 allegations or denial of her pleadings, but, must set forth the specific facts showing the
7 existence of a triable issue of material fact on which a jury could reasonably find for
8 her. Id.; Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. App. 4th 476,481
9 (1996). "A triable issue of material fact exists 'if,and only if, the evidence would allow
10 a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the
11 motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof."' Id. (quoting Aguilar v.
12 Atlantic Richfield Co., 25 Cal. 4th 826, 850 (2001).
13 B. The Only Alleged Bases for Statutory Liability in the Complaint is
14 Negligent Supervision And Unauthorized Use of the Trampoline as
15 Special Education Accommodation in the Classroom.
16 D'Loni alleges in his Complaint that the school did not exercise reasonable care
17 in supervising him while using the trampoline and that the use of the trampoline in the
18 classroom is "questionable." Additionally, he alleges that there was inadequate
19 supervision, monitoring and training of the staff assigned to student care. (SS No.3-4).
20 As a public entity, the District is liable only as provided for by statute. 2 Gov.
21 Code§ 815(a). If D'Loni had wished to bring any other claims against the District in
22 the Complaint, he was required to plead the statutory basis for any such claims with
23
24
2 Under the California Tort Claims Act, a public entity is not liable for injury
25 "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute[.]" Gov. Code§ 815(a). The District is a
26 public entity for the purposes of the California Tort Claims Act: "'Public entity' includes
the State, the Regents of the University of California, a county, city, district, public
27 authority, public agency, and any other political subdivision or public corporation in the
State." Gov. Code§ 811.2; Complaint at ,I2 (alleging and admitting that the District is a
28
public entity).
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DEFENDANT SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
specificity. E.g., Hood v. Hacienda La Puente Unified Sch. Dist., 65 Cal. App. 4th 435,
2 438 (1998) ("to state a cause of action against a public entity, every fact material to the
3 existence of its statutory liability must be pleaded with particularity") (internal quotation
4 marks and citation omitted).
5 On a motion for summary judgment, the court's "first task is to identify the issues
6 framed by the pleadings." S.M., 184 Cal. App. 4th at 716. The moving party need
7 address on ly those issues actually pied in the operative comp laint. Id. at 717 (citing
8 Tsemetzin v. Coast Fed. Savings & Loan Assn., 57 Cal. App. 4th 1334, 1342 (1997).
9 Thus, the alleged negligent supervision of D'Loni and the use of trampoline in the
10 special education classroom are the on ly issues that the District needs to address in
11 order to prevail on this motion as those are the only alleged basis for liability. See
12 Tsemetzin, 57 Cal. App. 4th at 1342.
13 As detailed below, the District can show that it met its statutory duty to provide
14 reasonable supervision and that the use of the trampoline was authorized and safely
15 implemented by D'Loni's special education teacher. Moreover, D'Loni's injury was the
16 type of sudden accident that could have occurred despite a surplus of supervision, or
17 in the absence of supervision. Additionally, the District has immunity for authorizing
18 and implementing the use of trampolines in special education curricu lum and classes
19 under the Government Code. See Gov. Code §820 .2.
20 Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot establish a breach of duty or the proximate cause
21 required for liability aga inst the District.
22 1. D'Loni Cannot Show that The District Breached Its Duty of Reasonable
23 Supervision.
24 The District is not under a statutory duty to protect students such as D'Loni from
25 all accidents, especially those that happen suddenly like D'Loni's fall from the
26 trampoline. That is impossible and would equate to imposing strict liability on school
27 districts.
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DEFENDANT SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Instead, "California law has long imposed on school authorities a duty to
2 'supervise at all times the conduct of the children on school grounds and to enforce
3 those rules and regulations necessary to their protection."' J.H. v. Los Angeles Unified
4 School Dist.,183 Cal. App. 4th 123, 140-41 (2010) (citations omitted); Taylorv.
5 Oakland Scavenger Co., 17 Cal. 2d 594, 600 (1941 ). The standard of care imposed
6 upon school personnel in carrying out this duty to supervise is "that degree of care
7 which a person of ordinary prudence, charged with [comparable] duties, would
8 exercise under the same circumstances." J.H. v. Los Angeles Unified School District,
9 183 Cal. App. 4th 123, 140-41 (internal quotation omitted). Therefore, the standard of
10 care imposed upon a school district in carrying out its duty of supervision is the degree
11 of care that a reasonable person of ordinary prudence, charged with comparable
12 duties, would exercise under the same circumstances. Ed. Code§ 44807; Pirkle v.
13 Oakdale Union Grammar Schoo/ Dist., 40 Cal. 2d 207,210 (1953); Thompson v.
14 Sacramento City Unified School Dist., 107 Cal. App. 4th 1352, 1370 (2003).
15 It is well-established that negligence cannot be inferred from the mere
16 happening of an accident itself. See Luna v. Needles Elementary School Dist., 154
17 Cal. App. 2d 803, 807 (1957). Merely because a student is injured does not
18 automatically make a school district liable for it. Id. It goes without saying that "[t]here
19 is some possible danger in any game and in almost every act in life." Wright v. San
20 Bernardino High School Dist., 121 Cal. App. 2d 342, 347 (1953).
21 A school district is not an insurer of its pupils' safety. To hold otherwise would
22 impose strict liability upon school districts, no matter how careful they might be.
23 Woodsmall v. Mount Diab/a Unified School Dist., 188 Cal. App. 2d 262,265 (1961)
24 (school district is not an insurer of student safety and is not charged with constant
25 supervision of all movements of all pupils at all times); Skinner v. Vacaville Unified
26 School Dist., 37 Cal. App. 4th 31, 38 (1995) (refusing to impose "an unrealistically high
27 standard of care on teachers that would in effect make them 'insurers of the safety of
28 children on the premises."')
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DEFENDANT SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Courts long ago rejected the idea that a school district is liable merely because
2 an accident happens. In Wright v. City of San Bernardino High School District, a
3 teacher left severa l boys in the gymnasium alone and unsupervised during P.E. class.
4 Wright v. City of San Bernardino High Sch. Dist., 121 Cal. App. 2d 342, 343 (1953).
5 Some of the boys began playing handball with tennis balls. Two boys started a
6 different game where one threw a ball to the other, who batted it with a tennis racket.
7 The plaintiff was struck in the eye and sued for negligent supervision because the
8 teacher left the students alone and did not prevent or stop the alleged dangerous
9 game. Id. The Court of Appeal held that the appropriate standard of care was
10 "whether the teacher of this class did what a reasonable person would have done
11 under the circumstances." Id. at 345. The trial court granted nonsuit, and the
12 appellate court affirmed, because "regardless of whether the ball was being thrown or
13 batted," there is always some risk of injury involved in games. Id. at 346. The teacher
14 was not negligent by leaving the boys alone because the game "would naturally seem
15 harmless" and because the sudden injury was "one of those events which cou ld occur
16 equa lly as well in the presence of the teacher as during [his] absence." Id. at 346
17 (citation om itted).
18 Under the reasonably prudent person standard of care, D'Loni cannot present
19 admissible evidence that the District breached its duty to provide reasonable
20 supervision. The staff at Sherman took numerous steps to supervise the students and
21 to instruct them on the safe use of the trampo line. (SS Nos. 5-8). Ms. Stephenson
22 had placed the trampoline on an area rug in her classroom, away from furniture or
23 sharp objects to minimize the risk of injury to students. (SS No. 10). The trampoline
24 was a small floor model standing just about one foot off the ground and was equipped
25 with a safety bar (SS No.9). The students were told and shown how to use the
26 trampoline and how to hold on to the bar when jumping. (SS No. 5-8).
27 The classroom, consisting of just ten students, was adequately staffed with at
28 least two, if not three adults, including the special education teacher, Ms. Stephenson,
9
DEFENDANT SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 and one or two para-educators, including Ms. Leung. (SS No.18). Further, the
2 trampoline had proved to be an effective means to regulate behavior for the students
3 with autism or ADHD and it was a required accommodation for at least one of Ms.
4 Stephenson's students. (SS Nos. 12-13). Ms. Stephenson took the additional step of
5 modeling the safe use of the trampoline, always reminded the students to hold on to
6 the safety bar when jumping and she would have reprimanded any student who was
7 not obeying the rules (SS Nos. 7-8). There isno statutory requirement that the District
8 have taken this step; it was simply an extra discretionar