Motion-Secondary: NICOLE ARRINGTON VS. GENERAL MOTORS LLC A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY ET AL

On March 12, 2019 a Motion-Secondary was filed involving a dispute between Arrington, Nicole, and Does 1 To 10, General Motors Llc', General Motors Llc A Delaware Limited Liability, for CONTRACT/WARRANTY in the District Court of San Francisco County.

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1 Mary Lynn Arens, Esq. SBN: 282459
Jacqueline Mandel, Esq. SBN: 317119
2 Erskine Law, PC
3995 East La Palma Ave ELECTRONICALLY
3 F I L E D
Anaheim, CA 92807
4 Tel: (949) 777-6032 Superior Court of California,
County of San Francisco
Fax: (714) 844-9035
marens@erskinelaw.com 12/30/2019
5 Clerk of the Court
jmandel@erskinelaw.com BY: EDNALEEN ALEGRE
6 Deputy Clerk
Attorneys for Defendant
7 GENERAL MOTORS LLC

9 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

10 FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

11
NICOLE ARRINGTON, an individual ) Case No. CGC-19-574462
12 )
Plaintiff, )
13 ) DECLARATION OF JACQUELINE
v. ) MANDEL IN SUPPORT OF GENERAL
14 ) MOTORS LLC’S OPPOSITION TO
GENERAL MOTORS, LLC, a Delaware ) PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL
15 Limited Liability Company; and DOES 1 ) FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS
through 10, inclusive, ) FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS;
16 ) REQUEST FOR MONETARY
Defendants. ) SANCTIONS
17 )
) Filed Concurrently With:
18 )
) 1) Separate Statement
19 ) 2) Memo of Points and Authorities
)
20 )
) Hearing Date: January 14, 2020
21 ) Hearing Time: 9:00 a.m.
) Department: 302
22 )
)
23 )
)
24

28
1 I, JACQUELINE MANDEL, declare as follows:

2 1. I am an attorney duly admitted to practice before all courts in the State of California.

3 I am an attorney with the law firm Erskine Law, PC, counsel to Defendant General Motors LLC

4 (“GM”). I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein and, if called to testify, could and

5 would testify competently thereto.

6 2. On June 27, 2019, Plaintiff served her requests for production with 37 requests, 6

7 of which are at issue here. (Declaration of Amy Morse (“Morse Decl.”) Ex. A). Most were

8 overbroad or sought irrelevant information.

9 3. The parties granted various mutual deadline extensions. (Morse Decl. Exs. B & D).
10 4. GM timely served full and complete responses on September 9. (Morse Decl. Ex.
11 C). Plaintiff characterized GM’s objections as “boilerplate,” but GM only objected to specific
12 requests to the extent they sought information (1) outside GM’s possession, custody, or control, (2)
13 about vehicles or issues unrelated to Plaintiff’s Cruze, (3) protected by the attorney-client privilege,
14 work product doctrine, or Section 2034.010, et seq., of the Code of Civil Procedure, and/or (4)
15 confidential, proprietary, or competitively sensitive in nature. (Id). GM also produced all the
16 documents listed in the Introduction to this memorandum, and, as expressly permitted under Code
17 Civ. Proc., § 2030.230, GM answered certain requests by referring Plaintiff to responsive
18 documents.
19 5. On October 24, Plaintiff sent GM a letter about its discovery responses and
20 objections. (Morse Decl. Ex. E). Rather than narrow the scope of the requests at issue, Plaintiff

21 demanded that GM withdraw its objections and supplement its production within eight days. (Id).

22 In fact, Plaintiff’s letter did not try to resolve any disputes; it is the same pro forma letter that her

23 counsel recycles in every breach of warranty matter against GM after GM has served its responses

24 to Plaintiff’s counsel’s standard requests for production, which are the exact same in every case.

25 (Id. Ex. E).

26 6. GM responded to Plaintiff’s letter on November 5, explaining why it would be

27 standing by its objections and offering to use this Court’s informal discovery process to resolve

28 any dispute. (Attached as Exhibit A is a copy of GM’s November 5th letter). Notably, GM
___________________________________________________________________________________
DECLARATION OF JACQUELINE MANDEL IN SUPPORT OF GM’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
TO COMPEL AND REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS
-2-
1 indicated that, pursuant to the LA County Addendum, GM would supplement its document

2 production and produce additional documents concerning (i) other customer complaints within

3 GM’s ESI database that are substantially similar to Plaintiff’s complaint(s) concerning the alleged

4 defects, for vehicles purchased in California of the same year, make and model as the Subject

5 Vehicle (subject to GM’s highly confidential protective order); (ii) available TSBs and recalls for

6 vehicles of the same year, make and model as the Subject Vehicle; and (iii) GM’s Warranty Policy

7 & Procedure manual as well as its policies and procedures used to evaluate lemon law claims and

8 repurchase requests (subject to GM’s highly confidential protective order). Thus, Plaintiff’s instant

9 motion is unnecessary, as GM has already offered to make supplemental production of the
10 information sought.
11 7. On November 8, Plaintiff sent another letter, providing some additional information
12 regarding the alleged defects and again demanding a response within 10 days. (Morse Decl. Ex.
13 F).
14 8. GM responded on November 18, restating its positions, including its offers to
15 supplement and the need for an appropriate protective order. (Id. Ex. G).
16 9. Plaintiff proceeded to file her motion on December 11, leaving GM no choice but
17 to oppose it.
18 10. Plaintiff continues to demand supplemental responses without compromise, despite
19 the fact that the discovery requests are ridiculously overly-broad, vague, argumentative, and
20 unnecessary. These discovery tactics have not only put an undue burden on GM, but they have

21 also put a significant burden on the Courts. (James Michael Smith v. General Motors LLC, Los

22 Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC631861 – a transcript of which is attached hereto as Exhibit

23 B). In a March 1, 2017 motion to compel hearing, the Honorable Barbara Meiers denied the

24 plaintiff’s motion to compel for being, inter alia, overbroad. (Id at 12:17-19). In doing so, Judge

25 Meiers recognized that these discovery motions, along with the additional conflicts they cause,

26 “are creating a tremendous burden for the Courts.” (Id at 13:5-10). Further, Judge Meiers stated

27 that “the Courts are just getting swamped with these extraordinarily broad, apparently standard or

28 stock discovery requests that are being pulled out of the back pockets of the plaintiff’s counsel.”
___________________________________________________________________________________
DECLARATION OF JACQUELINE MANDEL IN SUPPORT OF GM’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
TO COMPEL AND REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS
-3-
1 (Id at 6:14-18). These tactics have been nothing short of abusive, and Plaintiff’s motion should be

2 denied in its entirety for this reason alone.

3 Similarly, in another matter, the honorable Richard Fruin summarized this egregious abuse

4 of the discovery process in stating that, “[t]hese interrogatories are extremely broad. There is no

5 effort to comply with 2031.310(b)(1) in stating specific facts showing good cause for the

6 production of the documents indeed, when you have a very broad interrogatory that requires all

7 documents relating to some topic it’s not possible to comply with the requirements of the code.”

8 (Michael Azran v. Ford Motor Company, et al., Los Angeles Superior Court Case No: BC534973

9 – A transcript of which is attached hereto as Exhibit C).
10 11. Plaintiff’s Motion is without merit and is yet another attempt for her counsel to
11 bolster costs and attorney fees. Therefore, for these reasons, as well as those set forth in GM’s
12 motion to compel opposition and separate statement, GM requests that Plaintiff’s motion be denied
13 in its entirety.
14

15 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
16 foregoing is true and correct.
17

18 DATED: December 30, 2019 ERSKINE LAW, PC
19
20

21 By: _______________________________
Jacqueline Mandel
22 Attorney for Defendant
GENERAL MOTORS LLC
23

28
___________________________________________________________________________________
DECLARATION OF JACQUELINE MANDEL IN SUPPORT OF GM’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
TO COMPEL AND REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS
-4-
EXHIBIT A
3995 East La Palma Ave
Anaheim, CA 92807

P: 949.777.6032
F: 714.844.9035

Jacqueline Mandel
jmandel@erskinelaw.com
November 5, 2019

Natalee Fisher
Knight Law Group, LLP
10250 Constellation Blvd., Suite 2500
Los Angeles, CA 90067

Subject: Nicole Arrington v. General Motors, LLC
Case No. CGC-19-574462

Dear Counsel,
I am in receipt of your letter dated October 24, 2019. While we are encouraged by
your openness to the meet and confer process, the following should better inform you as to
the status of General Motors LLC’s (“GM”) discovery responses, as well as its positions
regarding the issues you have raised.

As you are aware, California law has very specific rules about discovery. In fact,
California Code of Civil Procedure § 2019.030 states that the selected method of discovery
cannot be unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the amount in controversy
and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation.

Most importantly, the California Code of Civil Procedure §2017.010 provides that the
information sought must be (1) "not privileged," (2) "relevant to the subject matter of the
action," and (3) either admissible or "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.”

Keeping this in mind, the issues raised in your letter are addressed below.

FORM INTERROGATORIES

While Plaintiff takes issue with GM’s responses to Form Interrogatory Nos. 15.1 and
17.1, GM’s responses are indeed Code-compliant and has answered these interrogatories to
the best of its ability at this time. GM has not yet inspected the Subject Vehicle, nor deposed
Plaintiff. Thus, it is necessary for GM to conduct additional investigation and discovery before
the referenced facts, documents and persons can be fully ascertained and provided to Plaintiff.
Accordingly, GM disagrees that its responses need supplementation.

To begin with, Form Interrogatory 15.1 asks GM to identify each denial of material
allegation and each special or affirmative defense in its pleadings and to state the facts upon
which it is based, identifying information of those who have knowledge of those facts, and
documents which tend to support those defenses. Again, because GM’s investigation is
ongoing, it is not possible at this time for GM to state all facts upon which GM bases its denials
and affirmative defenses. Additional investigation and discovery are necessary before the
referenced facts, documents, and persons can be fully ascertained and provided to Plaintiff.
Accordingly, GM disagrees that its response is pure boilerplate and needs supplementation.

Form Interrogatory 17.1 asks for the facts upon which GM based its responses to
Plaintiff’s Requests for Admissions along with the names, addresses, and phone numbers of
persons with knowledge of those facts, and to identify all documents that support the
response. Consequently, GM incorporates its responses and objections to Plaintiff’s Request
for Admissions, Set One, which are self-explanatory with respect to the information sought.
Again, GM has appropriately responded to each of Plaintiff’s Request for Admissions, Set One,
by reasonably and clearly qualifying its responses as required by the California Code of Civil
Procedure.

With regards to Plaintiff seeking information concerning the specific identities of any
individuals who have knowledge of facts concerning the Subject Vehicle, California Code of
Civil Procedure § 2030.230 clearly permits the responding party to direct the requesting
party to documents rather than compile a list of information when such information is just
as easily identifiable by Plaintiff. Accordingly, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure
§ 2030.230, GM further refers Plaintiff to the following produced documents:

• any incidentally obtained repair orders;
• any Service Request Activity Report; and/or
• the Global Warranty Vehicle History Printout.

GM does not maintain such records in the regular course of business to which it can
identify each and every individual who has the specific information that Plaintiff seeks
regarding the Subject Vehicle, other than by how those individuals are identified in the
responsive documents GM produced. If Plaintiff is unable to ascertain the information sought
from the produced documents referenced, please identify in detail what information Plaintiff
is seeking by providing the Bates number and reference to the information at issue.

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks additional information, GM maintains its objections,
as previously stated in its initial responses to these interrogatories. As always, should more
information become available during the course of this proceeding, GM will supplement or
amend its responses accordingly.

SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS

With regards to Special Interrogatory Nos. 8-34 and 47; and Requests for
Admissions 13-28, GM’s responses are Code-compliant and its objections are proper – not
evasive. As previously stated, Plaintiffs’ requests make general reference to repair orders
without giving any specific dates or specific documents. Yet, Plaintiff maintains that GM must
respond with information that corresponds with Plaintiff’s alleged defects or non-
conformities (“concerns”) in the Subject Vehicle. While Plaintiff claims that the requests
“narrow the breadth of the materials sought by limiting the information requested to that
specifically pertaining to the Subject Vehicle,” the fact of the matter is that these requests are

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in fact overbroad, vague and ambiguous, as the requests ask GM to identify each document,
each person, and all facts supporting or evidencing/relating/referring to information
concerning alleged conditions, defects, or non-conformities. Clearly, Plaintiff is essentially
asking GM to make legal conclusions and define the purported defects or non-conformities
in the Subject Vehicle for Plaintiff by pointing to specific documents. Certainly, “[a] party's . .
. legal reasoning or theory behind [its] contention[s]” are not the subject of discovery. (Sav-
On Drugs, Inc. v. Super.Ct. (Botney) (1975) 15 C3d 1, 5 (citing to Burke v. Superior Court, 71
Cal.2d 276, 284-285; Southern Pac. Co. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.App.3d 195, 197-198)).
Accordingly, GM’s objections are absolutely valid and GM stands by them. Should Plaintiff
narrow the scope of the information sought to the facts and allegations made in this matter,
GM will respond accordingly.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
In all instances, GM’s responses to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production of Documents
are indeed Code-compliant and its objections are proper. Meanwhile, the requests at issue in
Plaintiff’s letter continue to encompass an abundance of information that has absolutely
nothing to do with this lawsuit.

Code Compliance

Plaintiff argues at length that GM’s responses to Request for Production Nos. 3-14,
16-21, 23-26, 29-33, 35 and 36 are not Code-compliant because they do not state the
reason that it is unable to comply in full or provide any contact information of persons or
organizations known or believed to have possession, custody or control of the requested
documents; or that GM fails to identify with particularity any document in the respective
category to which the objection is being made. However, Plaintiff’s concerns are
disingenuous, given that Plaintiff’s requests demand such overly broad, ambiguous,
irrelevant, and unduly burdensome information from GM, which by and large, extend far
beyond the scope of this individual breach of warranty claim. The overbreadth of Plaintiff’s
requests would undoubtedly encapsulate GM’s confidential and/or proprietary information.
Nevertheless, where applicable, GM identified and referred Plaintiff to the specific
documents produced that are directly responsive to Plaintiff’s requests. Should Plaintiff
narrow the scope of the requests to this lawsuit and the claims that this Plaintiff is making,
M will be better able to respond.
Meanwhile, in response to certain requests, M indicated that it is complying in part
or is unable to identify with particularity the documents to which objections are being made
in these requests because of the intentional nature of their overbreadth. Accordingly, M’s
responses are indeed Code-compliant and supplemental responses are unwarranted.

Overbroad, Unduly Burdensome, Irrelevant Objections

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Plaintiff’s concerns regarding GM’s overbroad, unduly burdensome and irrelevant
objections in Request for Production Nos. 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 14, 17-21, 23-26, 29-33, 35,
36 and 38-43 are disingenuous and driven solely by your need to drive attorney fees
through needless and irrelevant discovery. Where GM asserts such objections, Plaintiff’s
requests are intentionally drafted so broadly so as to require letter campaigns just such as
these. Litigants do not possess unfettered access to all information they seek. (Covell v.
Superior Court (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 39, 42-43; 205 Cal.Rptr. 371). A key limitation on a
litigant’s right to discovery is that the information sought must be relevant to the issues of
the lawsuit. (National Steel Products Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 476, 492-93;
210 Cal.Rptr. 535). Where information sought in discovery does not relate in any way to the
issues involved in a lawsuit, the relevance requirement is not met, and a court must invoke
its broad discretion in supervising the course and scope of discovery to limit the requests at
issue. (Covell, 159 Cal.App.3d at 42-43). By exercising this discretion, the courts prevent
litigants from abusing the discovery process in hopes of uncovering supporting evidence that
the party should have possessed prior to taking legal action or in an attempt to extort a
higher settlement. (Id.).

Additionally, Plaintiff may not use “omnibus” descriptions in her requests for
documents. (Flora Crane Serv., Inc., v. Super. Ct. of San Francisco (1965) 234 Cal.App.3d 767,
786). “The unlimited characteristics of such a description may impair or destroy exactitude
so that the custodian of the records is not reasonably apprised of what he must produce.”
(Id). When discovery requests are grossly overbroad on their face, it is reasonable to infer
“an intent to harass and improperly burden.” (Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67
Cal.App.4th 424, 431).
Plaintiff’s Requests for Production at issue here contradict Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §
2019.030 and are intended for such harassment. Undoubtedly, the issues at stake in this
litigation are de minimis when compared to the cost and burden of compiling and producing
the vast number of irrelevant documents Plaintiff seeks. With respect to the scope of this
case, the sheer breadth, depth and nature of Plaintiff’s requests may well cost GM more than
this entire breach of warranty case is worth. The Subject Vehicle is a 2011 Chevrolet Cruze,
and if GM were held liable for a repurchase under Song Beverly, the award would be in the
range of Plaintiff’s purchase price. Yet, the vast majority of Plaintiff’s requests pertain to
documents that relate to other vehicles, which necessarily say nothing about Plaintiff’s
vehicle. By way of example, in Request No. 30, Plaintiff asks for “ALL DOCUMENTS
IDENTIFYIN repurchases made by YOU of the 2011 Chevrolet Cruze vehicles and allegedly
containing any of the conditions, defects, or nonconformities for which Plaintiff presented
the SUBJECT VEHICLE to YOU for repair . . . (emphasis added). Clearly, your contention that
such information is within the scope of this Plaintiff’s matter is utterly disingenuous.

This is a breach of warranty case, not a products liability case. This case is about this
Plaintiff’s repair history alone, and documents relating to other vehicles and design issues
simply are not relevant to prove whether M breached its warranty in this case and whether
M failed to repair Plaintiff’s vehicle in a reasonable number of repair attempts. Accordingly,
M stands by its objections in this regard.

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Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Privilege

Plaintiff’s assertion that M improperly claims an attorney-client privilege is
completely misguided. While Plaintiff takes issue with the fact that GM has claimed some
information as privileged and/or confidential, GM, like any other defendant, may claim
documents that fall under the attorney-client privilege or attorney work product doctrine as
privileged. Consequently, where M asserts such privilege, Plaintiff’s Requests for
Production are intentionally drafted so broadly, so as to cast a net over any and all documents,
regardless of relevance to this matter. Undoubtedly, the breadth of these requests would
encapsulate the legal file of GM legal staff and local counsel, along with all correspondence
and documents created in anticipation of the litigation of this case. Indeed, M is entitled to
keep its privilege, and any request for a privilege log is groundless.

Confidential, Proprietary, Trade Secret Information

With regards to Plaintiff’s concerns with GM’s trade secret objections, the documents
sought relate not only to GM’s proprietary information about the Subject Vehicle, but also to
information regarding all documents, communications, correspondence, reports (and the
like), which certainly encompasses GM’s internal investigations, analysis, policies and
procedures. How Plaintiff could claim that these documents are not proprietary and a trade
secret to GM is incomprehensible.
The fact of the matter is that the breadth of Plaintiff’s requests seek such production.
Under California law, “[t]rade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern,
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process that: (1) derives independent
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to the public or to other
persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (2) is the subject of
efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.” (McGuan v.
Endovascular Technologies, Inc. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 974, 988-989 (holding that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendant’s motion to seal records where [1]
the documents discussed the details of defendant’s quality system procedures, complaint
handling procedures, device tracking procedures, process validation procedures, and
corrective action procedures; [2] the records would have economic value to many medical
device manufacturers, including defendant’s competitors, because they reveal the business
methods and processes defendants have developed to comply with the requirement of very
technical FDA regulations; [3] the value and utility of this information is not completely
dependent on the specific design of the device being manufactured, but could have
application across a range of different Class III medical devices; and [4] the records were
maintained as confidential and disseminated within defendant’s organization on a limited
basis); see also AFCS v. United Parcel Serv. Co. (S.D. Cal. July 27, 2011) 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
106925 *10 (holding that trade secret or confidential business information includes
important proprietary information or information that a party has historically sought to
maintain as confidential).

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Undoubtedly, wholesale disclosure of GM’s internal, confidential materials, as well as
its policies and procedures, would cause GM competitive harm as well as harm in the
marketplace. Fittingly, GM will not produce any internal, confidential or proprietary
documents without a heightened showing of the need for the documents to prove Plaintiffs’
case. Because such a showing has not been made, GM stands by its objections to these
requests. And in any instance(s) where GM has agreed to supplement its document
production, or produce internal policy and procedure information, GM only agrees to do so
subject to the stipulation and entry of an appropriate protective order so that GM’s
confidential, proprietary and/or trade secret information will be sufficiently protected.

GM Has Already Produced Responsive Documents

Request for Production Nos. 3-8, 10, 14, 16, 17, 21, 23, 24 and 29 concern the
Plaintiff and/or the Subject Vehicle and seek documents or information that is either already
in Plaintiff’s possession, custody, or control or is not in/beyond GM’s possession, custody or
control. As indicated in GM’s initial responses, GM conducted a diligent inquiry and (where
applicable) GM identified and referred Plaintiff to the corresponding documents from GM’s
document production (or equally available resource) that are responsive to Plaintiff’s
request(s) as expressly permitted by California Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.230
(i.e., the repair orders, the Global Warrant History, any Service Request Activity Report (to
the extent that one exists), the owner’s manual, New Vehicle Limited Warranty Booklet, sales
brochure, and/or any incidentally obtained field service report or sales documents). Thus,
GM has nothing further to add and further responses are unwarranted. Should additional
information become available throughout the course of discovery, GM will supplement its
responses accordingly.

Policies and Procedures

With respect to Requests for Production Nos. 9, 11, 18-20, 35 and 36 relating to
GM’s policies and procedures, GM’s responses are Code-compliant and its objections are
proper. Plaintiff is asking for all documents that reflect practically each and every GM policy
and procedure, encompassing other claims made under the Song-Beverly Warranty Act.
Such broad requests are not permitted under California law and GM’s objections are
appropriate. The information sought goes far beyond what would be relevant and
discoverable in this case. These documents also contain confidential, trade secret
information, and the fact that this is a simple breach of warranty case supports GM’s
objections to this material.
Nevertheless, GM has agreed to produce applicable policy and procedure information
subject to the entry of an appropriate protective order. Attached hereto is the Stipulated
Protective Order that GM and this firm have previously stipulated to. Upon entry of the same,
GM will produce its Warranty Policy and Procedure Manual and its policies and procedures
used to evaluate lemon law claims and repurchase requests made under the Song-Beverly
Warranty Act during the relevant time period. Please review and sign the attached protective

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order for this supplemental document production so that we may avoid unnecessary motion
practice.

Information Regarding the Alleged “Conditions, Defects, or Non-Conformities” in
Other Consumers’ Vehicles
With respect to Request for Production Nos. 25, 26, 30-33 involving owners of
vehicles of the same year, make and model as the Subject Vehicle, Plaintiff’s reliance on
Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. is misplaced. That case does not even remotely address the
scope of discovery, and the quote you take from it is dicta from a discovery referee. Having
already resolved the “discovery issue,” outside of the opinion, the Doppes court considered
whether terminating sanctions were warranted for failure to comply with discovery orders.
(174 Cal.App.4th 967, 991-97). As the Honorable Richard Fruin explained in a September
10, 2014 hearing involving similar discovery requests, (Michael Azran v. Ford Motor
Company, et al., Los Angeles Superior Court Case No: BC534973), the Court of Appeals in
Doppes did not rule on the specific discovery requests at issue. Rather the case dealt with the
issue of discovery abuse and terminating sanctions. Quoting the Court, “It wasn’t along the
same lines…I actually don’t know what the scope of discovery was in that case, and there was
a discovery master appointed in that case. I don’t regard that as a discovery scope case. I
regard that as a discovery abuse case; that is you assume the existence of the court order,
and it was clear that the manufacturer didn’t comply with it, but there was no discussion
about objections to the scope of the discovery request that was made to the manufacturer.”
Moreover, the production requests in Doppes, where the plaintiff sued Bentley Motors
under the Act for its failure to repair, repurchase, or replace his 2001 Bentley Arnage, were
far more tailored to the claim. ((2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 971). For instance, the plaintiff
in Doppes asked only for “notices,” id., whereas Plaintiff in this case requests “[a]ll
DOCUMENTS which evidence, describe, relate, or refer to the numbers of owners of the 2011
Chevrolet Cruze vehicle who have complained of any of the conditions, defects, or
nonconformities for which Plaintiff presented the SUBJECT VEHICLE to YOU or YOUR
authorized repair facility for repair.” (See RFP No. 33). Plaintiff’s requests are far broader
than anything the court was forced to address in the Doppes written opinion.

In the other case you mentioned in your letter, Donlen v. Ford Motor Company,
requests for production were not even at issue. That case concerned whether an expert could
rely on hearsay evidence regarding other vehicles with defective transmissions when
forming an opinion on the plaintiff’s transmission. (217 Cal.App.4th 138, 154 (2013)). It did
not involve overbroad or unduly burdensome requests for documents, as the plaintiff had
already assembled the information on his own.
Here, RFP Nos. 30-33 seeking GM’s internal communications, reports, as well as its
handling of other consumers’ complaints or repurchases for the alleged conditions, defects,
or nonconformities are not inherently relevant to the reasonableness of repairs to this
Plaintiff’s vehicle. Without an established link (and to date there is none) such information
lacks “any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence

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to the determination of the action.” (Cal. Evid. Code § 210). Further, these requests assume
that such “conditions, defects, or nonconformities” exist in the Subject Vehicle and
improperly demand GM to assert (premature) legal conclusions and define the purported
defects in the Subject Vehicle for Plaintiff by pointing to specific documents or stating
specific facts. Again, based on Sav-On Drugs, Inc. v. Super. Ct. cited above, GM’s objections are
proper and therefore maintains them.

Likewise, Plaintiff’s ‘entitlement’ to all documents that evidence, refer, or relate to
every single technical service bulletin (“TSB”) and recall issued for all 2011 Chevrolet Cruze
vehicles (RFP Nos. 25 and 26) – is completely misguided. As discussed in GM’s responses,
Plaintiff’s requests are ridiculously overbroad, irrelevant, and seek information that is
confidential and/or proprietary. For example, if your client is alleging a defect with the
engine or electrical system, then a TSB on the windshield wiper is not relevant in the least.
This is not a class action, yet you are intent on imposing a one-size-fits-all discovery
approach on GM without tailoring Plaintiff’s requests to the facts of this individual breach of
warranty case. Without an established link to the instant case (and to date there is none)
much of the information sought lacks “any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any
disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.” (Cal. Evid. Code §
210). Additionally, the information sought in these requests is protected by the attorney-
client privilege and/or work-product doctrine. Thus, GM’s objections are proper.
Still, without waiving any objections, and in the spirit of cooperation, M proposes
adoption of the LA County Addendum to avoid unnecessary motion practice. Pursuant to the
LA County Addendum (section 2 (h)), GM is willing to supplement its document production
to include other customer complaints within GM’s ESI database that are substantially similar
to Plaintiff’s complaint(s) concerning the alleged defects, for vehicles purchased in California
of the same year, make and model as the Subject Vehicle. GM is willing to supplement its
document production pursuant to the stipulation and entry of the Stipulated Protective
Order attached hereto. Please review and sign the attached protective order for this
supplemental document production.

To address Plaintiff’s concerns regarding TSBs and recalls, the list of TSBs that may
apply to a 2011 Chevrolet Cruze vehicle was already produced (Bates Nos. 000067-000068).
Any recall(s) that may apply to Plaintiff’s vehicle would be found in the produced Global
Warranty Management Vehicle Transaction History Report (Bates Nos. 000046-000058).
Upon Plaintiff’s review of the same, and Plaintiff’s reasonable request for appropriate TSBs
and/or recalls as they relate to this case and these Plaintiff’s allegations, GM will produce any
responsive TSBs and/or recalls accordingly (if any exist).

CONCLUSION

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GM offers

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Garrett L. Wong Track Judge’s New Case

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Document Filed Date

December 30, 2019

Case Filing Date

March 12, 2019

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Motion-Secondary: NICOLE ARRINGTON VS. GENERAL MOTORS LLC A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY ET AL

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