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  • OCHIAGHA, CHIMA (FOR HIMSELF AND ALL OTHER SIMILAR vs. PASSCO ALANZA BROOK LP Code Violations document preview
  • OCHIAGHA, CHIMA (FOR HIMSELF AND ALL OTHER SIMILAR vs. PASSCO ALANZA BROOK LP Code Violations document preview
  • OCHIAGHA, CHIMA (FOR HIMSELF AND ALL OTHER SIMILAR vs. PASSCO ALANZA BROOK LP Code Violations document preview
  • OCHIAGHA, CHIMA (FOR HIMSELF AND ALL OTHER SIMILAR vs. PASSCO ALANZA BROOK LP Code Violations document preview
						
                                

Preview

CAUSE NO. 2016-48429 CHIMA OCHIAGHA, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF for himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, V. § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS PASSCO ALANZA BROOK, LP, § Defendants § 113 JUDICIAL DISTRICT PLAINTIFF’S UNOPPOSEDMOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL CLASS ACTIONSETTLEMENT Britton Monts Martin Weber, Jr. THEMONTS FIRM Richard Norman FrostBuilding CROWLEY NORMAN LLP 401 Congress Avenue,Suite ThreeRiverway, Suite 1775 Austin, Texas Houston, Texas Telephone: 512-474-6092 Telephone: 713-651-1771 Facsimile: 512-692-2981 Facsimile: 713-651-1775 bmonts@themontsfirm.com rnorman@crowleynorman.com mweber@crowleynorman.com Jason Snell THESNELL LAWFIRM, PLLC ChaseTower Street, Suite 900 Austin, Texas Telephone: 512-477-5291 Facsimile: 512-477-5294 firm@snellfirm.com Counsel for Plaintiff and the Class ABLE ONTENTS INTRODUCTION FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Procedural history Claims asserted SUMMARY OF SETTLEMENT TERMS The Settlement Class Monetary Consideration to the Class Class Representative Enhancement Attorneys’ Fees and Litigation Expenses Costs of Administration The Release of Claims The Class Notice IV. THE SETTLEMENT MERITS FINAL APPROVAL The Prerequisites for Class Certification Have Been Met Class Definition Numerosity Commonality Typicality Adequacy Predominance Superiority Manageability The Settlement is Fair, Adequate and Reasonable The Settlement Should be Approved as it is Not the Product of Fraud or Collusion Further Pursuit of This Case Would be Complex, Expensive, and Time Consuming The Settlement Should be Approved Because Class Counsel has Adequate Discovery and Other Information to Realistically Value the Claims The Settlement Should be Approved Because Ultimate Success on the Merits is Uncertain for the Claims for Additional Monetary Relief The Stipulation of Settlement Should be Approved Because the Settlement Agreement is Fair in Light of the Possible Range of Recovery and Certainty of Damages The Settlement Should be Approved Because Class Counsel and Plaintiff Support the Settlement The Settlement has No Obvious Deficiencies The Scope of Release is Tailored to the Claims Raised in this Case The Attorneys’ Fees Requested are Reasonable Class Notice NO OBJECTIONS AND NO OPT OUTS DEFENDANTS DO NOT OPPOSE THE RELIEF REQUESTED IN THIS MOTION CONCLUSION AND PRAYER ABLE UTHORITIES Cases Adams v. Reagan 791 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 1990, no writ) Adams v. S. FarmBureau Life Ins. Co. 417 F. Supp.2d 1373 (M.D.Ga.2006)aff'd 493 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir.2007) Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor 521 U.S. 591 (1997) Austin v. Penn. Dept. of Corrections 876 F. Supp. 1437 (E.D. Pa. 1995) Ayers v. Thompson 358 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2004) Ball v. Farm & Home Sav. Ass’n 747 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 1988, writ denied) Beattie v. CenturyTel, Inc. 511 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2007) Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 727 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2013) Carlough v. Amchem. Prod., Inc. 158 F.R.D. 314 (E.D.Pa.1993) Central Power & Light Co. v. City of San Juan 962 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 1998, pet. dism'd w.o.j.) Chambers v. Whirlpool Corp. 2016 WL 5922456 (C.D. Cal. 2016) Citizens Ins. Co. of America v. Daccach 217 S.W.3d 430 (Tex.2007) Citizens Insurance Co. of America v. Hakim Daccach 105 S.W.3d 712 (Tex. App.Austin 2003, pet. filed) Cotton v. Hinton 559 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1977) De La Fuente v. Stokely Van Camp, Inc. 713 F.2d 225 (7th Cir.1983) DeHoyos v. Allstate Corp. 240 F.R.D. 269 (W.D. Tex. 2007) Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Snell 847 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. App.El Paso 1993, no writ) E & V Slack, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co. 969 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. App.Austin 1998, no pet.) Employers Cas. Co.v. Texas Association Of School Boards Workers' Compensation SelfInsurance Fund, 886 S.W.2d Fontana v. Elrod 826 F.2d 729 (7th Cir.1987) Forsyth v. Lake LBJ Inv. Corp. 903 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. App.Austin 1995, writ dism'd w.o.j.) Fowler v. Birmingham News Co. 608 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir.1979) Gen. Motors Corp. v. Bloyed 916 S.W.2d Graebel/Houston Movers, Inc. v. Chastain 26 S.W.3d 24 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. dism'd w.o.j.) Hall v. Pedernales Elec. Co op., Inc. 278 S.W.3d 536 (Tex. App.Austin 2009, no pet.) Henry Schein, Inc. v. Stromboe 102 S.W.3d 675 (Tex. 2002) In re Catfish Antitrust Litig. 939 F. Supp. 493 (N.D. Miss. 1996) In re Combustion, Inc. 968 F. Supp. 1116 (W.D. La. 1997) In re Deepwater Horizon 739 F.3d 790 (5th Cir. 2014) In re General Motors Corp. 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995) In re Heartland Payment Systems, Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litigation 2012 WL 948365 (S.D. Tex. 2012) In re Linerboard Antitrust Litigation 2004 WL 1221350 (E.D. Pa. June 02, 2004) In re Nat'l Life Ins. Co. 247 F.Supp.2d 486 (D.Vt.2002) In re Nexium Antitrust Litig. 777 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2015) In re Prudential Sec. Inc. Ltd. P'ships Litig. 164 F.R.D. 362 (S.D.N.Y.1996)aff'd 107 F.3d 3 (2d Cir.1996) In re VMS Ltd. P'ship Secs. Litig. No. 90 2412, 1995 WL 355722 (N.D.Ill. June 12, 1995) In re Whirlpool Corp. Front Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig. 722 F.3d 838 (6th Cir.2 013) Jenkins v.Raymark Indus., Inc. 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir.1986) Juris v. Inamed Corp. 685 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2012) King Drug Co. v. Cephalon, Inc. No. 2:06 1797, 2015 WL 4522855 (E.D. Pa. July 27, 2015) Klein v. O'Neal, Inc. 705 F. Supp. 2d 632 (N.D. Tex. 2010) Leyva v. Medline Indus. Inc. 716 F.3d 510 (9th Cir.2013) Life Partners, Inc. v. McDermott No. 05 CV, 2014 WL 2810472 (Tex. App.Dallas June 23, 2014, no pet.) Mangone v. First USA Bank 206 F.R.D. 222 (S.D. Ill. 2001) McClain v. Lufkin Industries Inc. 2010 WL 455351 (E.D. Tex. 2010) Microsoft Corp. v. Manning 914 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. App.Texarkana 1995, writ dism'd) Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 339 U.S. 306 (1950) Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, L.L.C. 186 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 1999) Nat'l Ass'n of Chain Drug Stores v. New England Carpenters Health Benefits Fund 582 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2009) National Rural Telecommunications Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc. 221 F.R.D. 523 (C.D. Cal. 2004) Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC 2015 WL 4466919 (3d Cir. July 22, 2015) Newby v. Enron Corp. 394 F.3d 296 (5th Cir. 2004) Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Com'n of City and County of San Francisco 688 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1982) Peters v.Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. 966 F.2d 1483 (D.C.Cir.1992) Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bowden 108 S.W.3d 385 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) Riemer v. State 392 S.W.3d 635 (Tex. 2012) Rio Grande Valley Gas Co.v. City of Pharr, 962 S.W.2d631 (Tex. App. 1997) Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc. 91 F.Supp.2d 942 (E.D.Tex.2000) Silber v. Mabon 18 F.3d 1449 (9th Cir.1994) Slipchenko v. Brunel Energy, Inc. 2013 WL 4677918 (S.D. Tex. August 30, 2013) Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Marketing on Hold Inc. 308 S.W.3d 909 (Tex. 2010) Stott v. Capital Financial Services, Inc. 277 F.R.D. 316 (N.D. Tex. 2011) Sun Coast ResourcesInc. v. Cooper 967 S.W.2d Sw. Ref. Co. v. Bernal 22 S.W.3d 425 (Tex. 2000) TCI Cablevision of Dallas, Inc. v. Owens 8 S.W.3d 837 (Tex. App Beaumont 2000, pet. dism'd by agr.) Tex. S. RentalsInc. v. Gomez 267 S.W.3d 228 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 2008, no pet.) Trist v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Chester 89 F.R.D. 1 (E.D.Pa.1980) Union Pac. Res. Group, Inc. v. Hankins 111 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. 2003) WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc. 396 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2005) Weatherly v. Deloitte & Touche 905 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ dism'd w.o.j.) Statutes Section 92.019(a)(1) (3) Tex. Prop. Code § 92.019 Rules Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 Rule 42 (a)(1) Rule 42(a) Rule 42(a)(2) Rule 42(b) rule 42(b)(3) Rule 42(c)(2)(B)(v) Tex. R. Civ. P. 42 Tex. R. Civ. P. 42(a)(3) Tex. R. Civ. P. 42(a)(4) vii Tex. R. Civ. P. 42(c)(1)(D)(v) Tex. R. Civ. P. 42(e)(1)(B) Tex. R. Civ. P.42(e) Other Authorities 4 Newberg on Class Actions §§ 11.22 4 Newberg § 11.24 4 William B. Rubenstein et al., Newberg on Class Actions § 11:53 (4th ed. 2011) 7AA Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 1789.1 (3d ed. 2005) H.B. 3101 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.632 (2004) Manual for Complex Litigation, Third § 30.42 (1995) viii Plaintiff Chima Ochiagha (“Plaintiff” or “Class Representative”) for self and all others similarly situated (Plaintiff and the Class members are collectively referred to as the “Class”) file this Unopposed Motion for Final Approval of Proposed Class Settlement as follows pursuant IV Solely for purposes of settlement, Defendant Passco Alanza Brook H, LP (improperly named in the Original Petition as Passco Alanza Brook LP) (“Defendant”) do not oppose this motionor the relief requested I. INTRODUCTION After substantial pleadings review of supporting documentation and discovery numerous discussions between counsel, with the substantial involvement of the Plaintiff, and the assistance of a skilled and experienced mediator, the Parties reached a settlement (attached as Exhibit 1 , which, if approved by the Court, will end this litigation brought pursuant to ROP ODE hereafter “Section 92.019” The Settlement provides sufficient monetary consideration that each Household, on average, will receive The total Settlement amount is (the “Settlement Amount”), from which the ourt approved attorney fees, administration costs, Incentive Award to Ochiagha as Class Representative, and settlement payments to the individual Class Members will be made The Settlement will result in financial benefit to all class members, and is fair, adequate and reasonable given the defenses raised to the recovery of damages and the scope of the potential damages. An initial summary notice was mailed to each Class Member, and a website was established to provide additional details and to host the Long Form Notice. Class Counsel and Class Representative timely filed their application for attorney fees and expenses, and the deadline NOPPOSED OTION FOR INAL PPROVAL OF ROPOSED LASS ETTLEMENT AGE OF r exercising the right to object or opt out has passed. No objections have been filed, and no requests for exclusion have been filed. Plaintiffs now move for final approval of the Settlement pursuant to IV 42(e), and requests that the Court enter an order substantially in the form submitted by the Parties in order to provide final approval to this Settlement, to make an award of attorney fees and expenses to Class Counsel, and to make an award of an enhancement to the Class Representative. II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Procedural history On July 21, 2016, Plaintiff filed an Original Petition in this Court on behalf of self and a putative class alleging that Defendant committed violations of Section 92.109 On September 14, 2016 Defendant filed an answer denying all claims and allegations contained in the Original Petition and it continues to deny such claims and allegations. Plaintiff then served discovery on Defendant. Subsequently, the parties worked to collect informal discovery to ascertain the number of potential class members and amounts of class members' potential statutory damages. After both sides reviewed and analyzed the data, they agreed to mediate the case usinga well respected mediator,Tommy Proctor as the neutral. After months of analysis and negotiations, and taking into account the burdens and expense of litigation, including the risks and uncertainties associated with protracted trials and appeals, the Parties concluded and agree that the substantial benefits provided in the Settlement are in the best interests of Plaintiff, the Class Members, and Defendant. The Parties intend to resolve the Action and settle all claims asserted or that could have been asserted in the Action in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the Settlement NOPPOSED OTION FOR INAL PPROVAL OF ROPOSED LASS ETTLEMENT AGE OF Plaintiff filed his Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval on March 29 an oral hearing was held on March 31, 2017 and the Court entered its Preliminary Approval Order May 2, 2017 Plaintiff and Class Counsel timely filed their Unopposed Motion for Award of Attorney Fees, Costs and Expenses, and Incentive Award to Class Representative, on June 23, (“Motion for Fees”) Claim asserted The Texas Legislature enacted and later amended Section 92.109 to specify how “apartment house owners” are allowed to charge late fees to their tenants. Plaintiff alleged that he Texas Property Code places limits on late fees a landlord can assess tenants, detailing that under Section 92.019 a landlord may not charge a tenant a late fee for failing to pay rent unless: notice of the fee is included in a written lease; the fee is a reasonable estimate of uncertain damages to the landlord that are incapable of precise calculation and result from late payment of rent; and the rent has remained unpaid one full day after the date the rent was originally due. Plaintiff sought to recover statutory remedies for himself and the Class for unreasonable and excessive rent late fees assessed during the Class Period under Section which was enacted by the Legislature for the stated purpose of protecting residential tenants like those in the Classfrom “ excessive fees and unwarranted penalties. Section 92.019(a)(1) (3) (emphasis added). The legislative history of H.B. 3101 says: “Hardworking Texans deserve affordable housing without landlords ... charging excessive fees,or imposing unwarranted penalties that could take money needed for food, education, healthcare, and retirement....http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/scanned/hroBillAnalyses/80 HB3101.PDF NOPPOSED OTION FOR INAL PPROVAL OF ROPOSED LASS ETTLEMENT AGE OF The statute provides that [a] landlord who violates this section is liable to the tenant for an amount equal to the sum of $100, three times the amount of the late fee charged in violation of this section, and the tenant's reasonable attorney's fees. In the present case, Plaintiff alleged that Defendan charged an initial fee and a daily fee that exceeded a “reasonable estimation” of Defendant’s damages The Settlement, if app oved, provides ecovery of approximately of the isputedrent late f ees afterdeduction of all fees and expenses) The Settlement also contemplates that attorney fees to Class Counsel and the costs of prosecuting the case incurred by Class Counsel will be paid out of the Settlement Amount. The Settlement also provides for an incentive award to the Class Representative and costs of administration of the Settlement to be paid out of the Settlement Amount. III. SUMMARY OF SETTLEMENT TERMS The proposed Class Action Settlement Agreement signed by the Parties (the “Settlement”) is attached to this motion as Exhibit 1, and the Declaration of Class Counsel Britton D. Monts (“Monts Decl.”) (originally submitted in connection with the motion for preliminary approval) is attached as Exhibit 2 A declaration from the Third Party Administrator is attached as Exhibit 3Plaintiff also incorporates the exhibits submitted in support of the Motion for Fees filed on June 23, 2017 The Settlement Class he proposed Classfor settlement purposes is defined as: ll persons, who, during the Class Period, (i) wereresidential tenants of Alanza Brook Apartments under written leases where Defendantserved as an owner or landlord and (ii) were assessed late fees on past due rent. Id. at (c) (emphasis added). NOPPOSED OTION FOR INAL PPROVAL OF ROPOSED LASS ETTLEMENT AGE OF (Ex. 1, Settlement, at 6 7, ¶ 4) The Class Members are listed and identified by account number on to the Settlement. Id. The Class Period is def ined as July 21, 2012 and continuing hrough September 2, 2015Id. The following are excluded from the Settlement Class: (i) the judge(s) assigned to this case and his or her staff; (ii) governmental entities; (iii) Defendant and the Released Parties; (iv) persons adjudged to be bankrupt; and (v) persons who have previously released Defendant of the claims raised by this case. Id.Defendants have identified Households (“Household” is defined at p. of the Settlement) that were billed a total amount of disputed rent late fees of approximately $ Settlement, at , ¶ 1 B. Monetary Consideration to the Class Pursuant to the Settlement, each Participating Class Member, without the need to submit a claim form, will be mailed a check for their proportionate share of the Net Settlement Amountlculated as follows: (A/B) x C = D Amount of rent late fees paid by the Class Member as reflected on Exhibit Eto the Settlement Sum of alleged excess rent late fees paid by all Class Members Net Settlement Amount. Class Member Settlement Payment. (Settlement, at , ¶ 1 “Net Settlement Amount” means the Settlement Amount of $ after reduction for (i) Attorney fees and costs up to $1 Settlement, ¶ ); (ii) the Enhancement Award to Plaintiff of up to $10,000 Settlement, ) and (iii) all administration costs and NOPPOSED OTION FOR INAL PPROVAL OF ROPOSED LASS ETTLEMENT AGE OF associated expenses required for the Third Party Administrator (“TPA to administer the settlement set forth herein, capped at $15,000The Parties anticipate that the Net Settlement Amount should afford each Household an average payment of $683See Ex. 2, Monts Decl. No claim forms are required for Class members to receive their settlement checks. Checks will be automatically mailed once the Settlement has received final approval and has become effective.Id. at 10. Class Representative Enhancement he Defendants have agreed to pay the Plaintiff/Class Representative an enhancement award of $10,000, subject to Court approval, for his extensive time and effort pl into prosecuting this case, as well as the personal risk associated with pursuing the claims. (Settlement, ). Attorneys’ Fees and Litigation Expenses Class Counsel incurred significant time and expense prosecuting this matter over the last twelve months. Defendants have agreed to pay Class Counsel up to $100,000 out of the Settlement Amount for attorney fees and reasonable litigation expenses and costs incurred in prosecuting the action(Settlement, ¶ 1 ), subject to Court approval. Class Counsel filed an application for attorney fees and expenses, and an enhancement award for Plaintiff as the Class Representatives. The application was posted by the TPA on the website, where i was accessible to all Class Members in advance of the op out and For Participating Class Members in Households with more than one current or former tenant who is or was a named party to the lease (excluding persons merely listed as occupants), the settlement payment, as calculated above in Paragraph 18, shall be divided equally based on the number of current or former tenants who are or were a named party to the lease in the Household. (Settlement, at 10 11, ¶ 11). NOPPOSED OTION FOR INAL PPROVAL OF ROPOSED LASS ETTLEMENT AGE OF objection deadline. Both the Postcard Notice and the Long Form Notice also informed Class Members of the timing of the filing and informed Class Members that the motion would be available on the website. Costs of Administration Finally, in addition to all relief obtained, Defendants have agreed to pay aTPA for distributing notice and for administering the payments made pursuant to the Settlement, and maintaining the Settlement website. (Settlement,at 4, definition of “TPA” ). The Release of Claims In exchange for the monetary relief being provided by Defendants, the Named Plaintiff Class Representative will provide a General Release. (Settlement, ¶ 1). Class Members will provide a tailoredrelease. The claims to be released are any and all claims, obligations, causes of action, actions, demands, rights, and liabilities of every kind, nature and description, including penalties, liquidated damages, punitive damages, interest, attorneys’ fees, litigation costs, restitution, and equitable relief under any state statute, federal statute or common law theory, whether known or unknown, contingent or non contingent, whether anticipated or unanticipated, arising prior to the Final Approval Date, which were pled in the Action or could have been pled in the Action that relate to rent late fees, including, without limitation, all claims under TEX. PROP. CODE § 92.019. (Settlementat 12 ,¶1 e Class Notice Class Members were given direct mailed Postcard Notice of the terms of the proposed Settlement. The Postcard Notice directed Class Members to the Settlement Website, where the Long Form Notice was available. The Postcard Notice was not a true “postcard;” it was a summary notice wit h the content as approved by the Court. The format is attached as an exhbit to the Declaration of haffer NOPPOSED OTION FOR INAL PPROVAL OF ROPOSED LASS ETTLEMENT AGE OF IV. THE SETTLEMENT MERITS FINAL APPROVAL The law favors settlement. Court approval of class action settlements is guided by “the strong judicial policy favoring the resolution of disputes through settlement.” Hall v. Pedernales Elec. Co op., Inc., 278 S.W.3d 536, 549 (Tex. App.Austin 2009, no pet.); RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS (FIFTH) (“NEWBERG”) § 13:44 (2014) (“The law favors settlement, particularly in class actions and other complex cases where substantial resources can be conserved by avoiding lengthy trials and appeals.”). Rule42 establishes the prerequisites to class certification. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 42. “Because Rule 42 is patterned after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, federal decisions and authorities interpreting current federal class action requirements are instructive.” Riemer v. State 392 S.W.3d 635, 639 (Tex. 2012), citing Sw. Ref. Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 433 (Tex. 2000). here are defined procedures and specific criteria for settlement approval in class action settlements. The settlement approval procedure describes three distinct steps involving two distinct hearings (i) Preliminary approval of the proposed settlement upon submission to the Court of a written motion for preliminary approval; (ii) Dissemination of mailedand/or published notice of settlement to all affected Class members; and (iii) A formal fairness hearing, or final settlement approval hearing, at which class members may be heard regarding the settlement, and at which evidence and argument concerning the fairness, adequacy and reasonableness of the settlement is presented. See EDERAL UDICIAL ENTER ANUAL FOR OMPLEX ITIGATION OURTH NOPPOSED OTION FOR INAL PPROVAL OF ROPOSED LASS ETTLEMENT AGE OF The first step and second steps have occurred. Those steps are critical in ensuring the class members’ procedural due process rights and enables the Court to fulfill its role as the guardian of class interests. 4 Newberg on Class Actions §§ 11.22 et seq he last step of the approval process the final approval or “fairness” hearing, is the point where “the trial court is charged with the responsibility of determining that the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable,” which falls “within the sound discretion of the trial court.”Gen. Motors Corp. v. Bloyed, 916 S.W.2d at 955. As discussed below, that determination is guided by consideration of the six factors set forth by the Texas Supreme Court in Bloyed id., which remains the standard for settlement fairness review in Texas today. See, e.g.Hall , 278 S.W.3d at 548 549 (citing Bloyed, 916 S.W.2d at 955) (“The Texas Supreme Court has provided six factors that a trial court must take into account when determining whether a proposed class settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.”). A. The Prerequisites for Class Certification Have Been Met A rigorous analysis of the pleadings, documents, and other materials before the Court establishes that all the prerequisites for class certification under Rule have been met. For certification, a class action must meet the four requirements stated in Rule 42(a): (1) numerositythe class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2)commonality there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) typicality the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) adequacy of representationthe representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Citizens Ins. Co. of America v. Daccach, 217 S.W.3d 430, 438 (Tex.2007) (citing Tex.R. Civ. P. 42(a)). NOPPOSED OTION FOR INAL PPROVAL OF ROPOSED LASS ETTLEMENT AGE OF A class action must also satisfy at least one requirement of Rule 42(b). Here, the class action satisfies rule 42(b)(3), which requires that “questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members” and that class treatment is “superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” See Daccach, 217 S.W.3d at 43839 (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 42(b)(3)). Rule 42 contains a list of non exhaustive factors to aid a court in determining if (b)(3) certification is appropriate: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.” . at 439 (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 42(b)(3)). Because a settlement class action obviates a trial, a trial court faced with a request to certify a settlement class action “need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997)(discussing the analogous federal Rule 23) Class Definition The plain language of the definition of the class establishes that the class members are presently ascertainable by reference to objective criteria (i.e., the Class has not been defined by criteria that are subjective or that require an analysis of the merits of the case). The language of the class definition clearly identifies the persons and entities affected by the litigation. The definition unambiguously determines who is entitled to individual notice, and who is entitled to opt out of the Class should they choose to do so. The Class members are also ascertainable, and the Defendants NOPPOSED OTION FOR INAL PPROVAL OF ROPOSED LASS ETTLEMENT AGE OF have already identified the Households, and the members of those Households, who comprise the Class.SeeEx. E to Settlement. Numerosity The class representative must show that “the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable” under Rule (a)(1). In this case there are approximately 300 Households (with each Household being comprised of each person bound under the lease for that apartment unit (Settlement, ¶ 11, and Ex. E to Settlement). For numerosity, “[t]he test is whether joinder of all members is practicable in view of the size of the class and such factors as judicial economy, the nature of the action, geographical location of class members, and the likelihood that class members would be unable to prosecute individual lawsuits.” Graebel/Houston Movers, Inc. v. Chastain, 26 S.W.3d 24, 32 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. dism'd w.o.j.). Here, there ar e at least 300 Households, with each Household having at least one Class Member Given the large size of the present proposed class, the other factors are given far less weight. See, e.g., Durrett v. John Deere Co., 150 F.R.D. 555, 557 (N.D. Tex. 1993) “Because the estimate of potential class members ranges as high as 14,000, the Court has no difficulty concluding that a class certified in this cause would satisfy the numerosity requirement.”).The numerosity prerequisite has been satisfied Commonality The class representative must show “there are questions of law or fact common to the class” under Rule 42(a)(2). “The threshold for commonality is not high.” Union Pac. Res. Group, Inc. v. Hankins, 111 S.W.3d 69, 74 (Tex. 2003) (quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bowden, 108 S.W.3d 385 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.)). The threshold is met when at least one issue's resolution would affect the claims of all or a significant number of class NOPPOSED OTION FOR INAL PPROVAL OF ROPOSED LASS ETTLEMENT AGE OF members. See Tex. S. Rentals, Inc. v. Gomez, 267 S.W.3d 228, 250 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 2008, no pet.), citing Sun Coast Resources, 967 S.W.2d at 532 (quoting Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir.1986)); see, also, Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, L.L.C., 186 F.3d 620, 625 (5th Cir. 1999) (the commonality requirement “is not demanding”). “In fact, a single common issue of fact or law can be sufficient to meet the commonality requirement.” Tex. S. Rentals, 267 S.W.3d at 250, citing Microsoft Corp. v. Manning, 914 S.W.2d 602, 611 (Tex. App.Texarkana 1995, wri t dism'd), and Rio Grande Valley Gas Co., 962 S.W.2d at 641. common issue must also be applicable to the class as a whole and besubject to generalized proof. The questions of fact and law affecting the Class as a whole in this case, include, but are not limited to, (i) whether Defendants were entitled to charge the rent late fee; (ii) whether the fee charged was a reasonable estimate of uncertain damages to the landlord; (iii) whether the uncertain damages were incapable of precise calculation and result from late payment of rent; (iv)whether each member of the Class is entitled to a refund of the fees; and (v) whether each member of the Class is entitled to recover a penalty. There are questions of law or fact common to the class. The commonality prerequisite has been satisfied Typicality Rule 42 requires that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” IV . 42(a)(3). “A claim is typical if it arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members, and if his or her claims are based on the same legal theory.” Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Marketing on Hold Inc., 308 S.W.3d 909, 920 (Tex. 2010), quoting Beattie v. CenturyTel, Inc., 511 F.3d 554, 561 (6th Cir. 2007). Courts evaluate whether there is a nexus between the injuries alleged by the class representatives and those of absent class members. See NOPPOSED OTION FOR INAL PPROVAL OF ROPOSED LASS ETTLEMENT AGE OF Employers Cas. Co., 886 S.W.2d at 475. Although the representatives' injuries do not have to be identical to the injuries of the class, the presented claims must be based on the same legal theories and must originate from the same course of conduct or event. Weatherly v. Deloitte & Touche S.W.2d 642, 653 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ dism'd w.o.j.). When the claims of both “arise from the same event or practice or course of conduct ... [and] are based on the same legal theory, ... [the typicality requirement] may be satisfied even if there are factual distinctions between the claims of the named plaintiffs and those of other Class members.” Texas South Rentals, 267 S.W.3d at 252, quoting De La Fuente v. Stokely Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 225,