xxxxxxxx xxxxxx Vs Gal Aharonov Et Al

Case Number: 24STCV17117 Hearing Date: December 13, 2024 Dept: 56 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT SIOBHAN N. HANNA , Plaintiff, vs. TELUS INTERNATIONAL (CDA) INC.; TELUS INTERNATIONAL (U.S.) CORP.; TELUS INTERNATIONAL AI ACQUISITION, INC,; TELUS INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS (U.S.A.) CORP.; TELUS INTERNATIONAL AI INC.; TELUS INTERNATIONAL SERVICES LTD.; and DOES 1-10, inclusive, Defendants. CASE NO.: 24STCV17117 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: FIRST AMENDED APPLICATION OF DALLIN R. WILLSON TO APPEAR PRO HAC VICE FIRST AMENDED APPLICATION OF KATHERINE E. PERRELLI TO APPEAR PRO HAC VICE Date: December 13, 2024 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept. 56 MOVING PARTIES: Defendants Telus International (CDA) Inc.; Telus International (U.S.) Corp.; Telus International AI Acquisition, Inc.; Telus International Holdings (U.S.A.) Corp.; Telus International AI Inc.; Telus International Services Ltd. (collectively, Defendants) RESPONDING PARTY: None. The Court has considered the moving papers. No opposition or reply has been filed. BACKGROUND On July 10, 2024, Plaintiff Siobhan N. Hanna (Plaintiff) filed a complaint asserting the following causes of action: (1) Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief Under California Code of Civil Procedure § 1060 et seq. ; (2) Violation of California Labor code § 925; (3) Violation of California Business & Professions Code § 16600 et seq. ; and (4) Violation of California Business & Professions Code § 17200. On November 14, 2024, Defendants filed the instant (1) Verified First Amended Application of Dallin R. Wilson (Wilson) and (2) Verified First Amended Application of Katherine E. Perrelli (Perrelli) to appear pro hac vice as counsel, along with local counsel, Jesse L. Miller, in this action (the Applications). DISCUSSION California Rules of Court (CRC) rule 9.40 provides that an attorney in good standing in another jurisdiction may apply to appear pro hac vice in this State by way of written application upon due notice to all interested parties, as well as service on the State Bar in San Francisco with payment of a fee, provided that the attorney (a) is not a California resident, (b) does not work in California, and (c) does not perform regular or substantial business, professional or other activities in California. An application for pro hac vice admission must set forth: (1) the applicant attorneys residence and office addresses; (2) the courts to which the applicant attorney has been admitted and dates of admission; (3) a representation that the attorney applicant is a member in good standing in the courts of admission and is not currently suspended or disbarred in any court; (4) the title of each court and action in which the applicant attorney has appeared pro hac vice in this State in the prior two years; and (5) the name, address and phone number of the active California State Bar member with whom the applicant is associated. (CRC, rule 9.40 subd. (d).) The Court finds that Wilson and Perrelli have each established that they satisfied the requirements to appear as counsel pro hac vice pursuant to CRC rule 9.40. The Verified First Amended Application of Dallin R. Wilson to Appear Pro Hac Vice is GRANTED. The Verified First Amended Application of Katherine E. Perrelli to Appear Pro Hac Vice is GRANTED. Moving parties are ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Case Number: 24STCV06168 Hearing Date: December 10, 2024 Dept: 68 Dept. 68 Date: 12-10-24 c/f 12-5-24 Case #24STCV06168 Trial Date: Not Set ADMISSIONS MOVING PARTY: Defendants City of Redondo Beach Police Department RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Kelly Nicole Deckers RELIEF REQUESTED Motion to Deem Requests for Admissions Admitted SUMMARY OF ACTION Plaintiff Kelly Deckers was formerly employed by Redondo Beach Police Department as an Emergency Dispatcher. Plaintiff alleges a cancer diagnosis required subsequent accommodation, which was not provided. The hostile work environment forced resignation from the position in November 2023. On March 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint for 1. Discrimination Based On Physical Disability (Govt. Code §12940(A)); 2. Hostile Work Environment (Govt. Code §12940 Et Seq.); 3. Retaliation In Violation Of Govt. Code §12940 Et Seq.; 4. Failure To Prevent Discrimination (Govt. Code §12940(K)); 5. Harassment (Govt. Code §12940(J); 6. Failure To Accommodate Physical Disability In Violation Of Govt. Code §12940(M); 7. Failure To Engage In A Good Faith Interactive Process In Violation Of Govt. Code §12940(N); And 8. Wrongful Constructive Termination In Violation Of Public Policy In Violation Of Govt. Code §12940 et seq.; 9. Failure To Pay Premium Double Time Wages Due (Cal. Labor Code §§ 510, 558, 1194, 1198); 10. Failure To Provide Timely Off Duty Meal Periods (Cal. Labor Code §§ 226.7, 512); 11. Failure To Provide Rest Periods (Cal. Labor Code § 226.7); 12. Failure To Maintain Records And Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements (Cal. Labor Code §226); 13. Failure To Pay Wages Due Upon Termination (Cal. Labor Code §§201-203); 14. Failure To Reimburse Business Expenses (Cal. Labor Code § 2802); 15. Failure To Provide Day Of Rest (Cal. Labor Code §§ 551, 552); 16. Failure To Allow Inspection Of Employment Records (Cal. Labor Code §1198.5); 17. Defamation; and 18. Unfair Competition (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§17200 Et Seq. On May 9, 2024, Plaintiff dismissed the seventeenth cause of action for Defamation. On June 10, 2024, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint for 1. Discrimination Based On Physical Disability (Govt. Code §12940(A)); 2. Hostile Work Environment (Govt. Code §12940 Et Seq.); 3. Retaliation In Violation Of Govt. Code §12940 Et Seq.; 4. Failure To Prevent Discrimination (Govt. Code §12940(K)); 5. Harassment (Govt. Code §12940(J); 6. Failure To Accommodate Physical Disability In Violation Of Govt. Code §12940(M); 7. Failure To Engage In A Good Faith Interactive Process In Violation Of Govt. Code §12940(N); and 8. Defamation. On August 22, 2024, the court denied the special motion to strike the first amended complaint brought by City of Redondo Beach. On November 7, 2024, Plaintiff dismissed Redondo Beach Police Department without prejudice. RULING : Denied/Moot. Defendant City of Redondo Beach moves to deem Request for Admissions (set one) served on Plaintiff Kelly Deckers admitted. Defendant represents service of requests for admissions on July 12, 2024. [Declaration of Aleen Hashmi, ¶ 3, Ex. A.] The responses remain outstanding at the time of the filing of the motion. [Id., ¶ 4.] Plaintiff Deckers in opposition represents service or responses, thereby rendering the motion moot. The delay in responses was the result of an internal calendaring error. Plaintiff therefore moves for relief from any waiver of objections caused by the late filed responses. [Declaration of Thomas Shelly.] Defendant in reply maintains all objections should be waived, as the delay lacks justification, and denies any meet and confer requirement. Defendant reiterates the request for sanctions. Plaintiff in opposition presents proof of responses, which consists of five responses with admit. [Shelly Decl., Ex. 2.] Given proof of service, the court denies the motion and deems the motion moot. As one court put it: If the party manages to serve its responses before the hearing, the court has no discretion but to deny the motion. But woe betide the party who fails to serve responses before the hearing. ( St. Mary v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762, 776.) The court acknowledges the request for any waiver of objections, but notes the responses present no objections and admit all items. The court therefore also finds the subject request moot. Even if objections were submitted, the court finds sufficient justification for relief. The harshness of a waiver of objections to admissions on the basis of inadvertent error unfairly prejudices Plaintiff. Normally the court imposes sanctions when response are only provided after the filing of the motion. The court declines to impose sanctions given the circumstances leading to this first time discovery motion on the subject action, and given the municipal defendant. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (c).) Multiple demurrers and a motion to strike between December 17, 2024, and January 27, 2025. Defendants to provide notice.

Case Number: 24CHCV02706 Hearing Date: December 16, 2024 Dept: F43 Dept. F43 Date: 12-16-24 Case # 24CHCV02706, McGrath v. Regal Medical Group, Inc., et al. Trial Date: None set. MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION MOVING PARTY: Defendant Regal Medical Group, Inc. RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Rebecca McGrath RELIEF REQUESTED Order compelling the case to arbitration and stay the action. RULING : Motion granted, pursuant to the arbitration agreements delegation clause delegating threshold issues to the arbitrator. SUMMARY OF ACTION On July 29, 2024, Plaintiff Rebecca McGrath (Plaintiff) filed their complaint against Defendants Regal Medical Group, Inc. (Defendant) and Sofia Pecina. The complaint alleges causes of action for FEHA disability discrimination and retaliation; failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, and retaliation; constructive termination; violation of the California Family Rights Act; violation of the federal Family and Medical Leave Act; and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. Plaintiff alleges she was employed as Prior Authorization Coordinator by Defendant from August 21, 2017 until February 11, 2022. Defendant is a healthcare network that contracts with doctors and medical facilities to provide medical care and wellness programs. Defendant is an affiliate of Heritage Provider Network, Inc. (Heritage) and has common ownership with Heritage. In 2019, Plaintiff sustained a back injurya pinched sciatica nerve and two bulged discs. Plaintiff was forced to attend several medical appointments and sought accommodations. Defendant placed Plaintiff on medical leave, allowing Plaintiff to leave work early, arrive to work late, and take days off as needed. Employees made negative comments about Plaintiff, her medical condition, and her need for accommodations. Defendants harassed and discriminated against Plaintiff based on her medical condition, forcing her to quit. Prior to filing this case, Plaintiff filed complaints with the California Civil Rights Department and received a Notice of Right to Sue. On September 25, 2024, Defendant filed this motion to compel arbitration of claims in the complaint. Summary of Arguments Defendant argues that the Court should compel arbitration based upon the disposition of a related case Plaintiff and Defendant and based upon an arbitration agreement between Plaintiff and Heritage. In the related case, Plaintiff and Defendant stipulated to arbitrating all claimssome employment-relatedin that case pursuant to an arbitration agreement between Plaintiff and Heritage. Plaintiff is estopped from pursuing her FEHA, federal, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims in court because she has already affirmed that her employment-based claims against Defendant are subject to the arbitration agreement. Although Defendant was not a signatory to the arbitration agreement, it is well-settled that non-signatory beneficiaries of an agreement may be bound by it. Because Defendant is a Heritage affiliate, the arbitration agreement covers claims with HPN affiliates, and Defendant was Plaintiffs direct employer, Defendant is included in the agreement. The arbitration agreement also requires Plaintiff to arbitrate her employment-related claims. In opposition, Plaintiff argues she did not enter into an arbitration agreement with Defendant. Defendant did not sign the alleged arbitration agreement, Defendant has not demonstrated a valid arbitration agreement exists, and the agreement Defendant presents is procedurally and substantially unconscionable. Additionally, the stipulated agreement to arbitrate applied only to those claims in the related case. In reply, Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to explain why she refuses to arbitrate the claims in this case under the same arbitration agreement against the same defendant as the related case. In the related case, Plaintiff stated she submitted her claims to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration agreement she now claims is unconscionable. Regardless, equitable estoppel and the third-party beneficiary doctrine still apply. Plaintiff disputes Defendants equitable estoppel argument and argues that Defendant is not a beneficiary of the arbitration agreement governing the employment relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of the following documents: · Exhibit A - Plaintiffs complaint filed against Defendant on January 9, 2023, in Los Angeles Superior Court case no. 23CHCV00055. · Exhibit B - Defendants Joint Stipulation to Arbitrate All Claims and Order, filed February 2, 2023, in Los Angeles Superior Court case no. 23CHCV00055. · Exhibit C Defendants Notice of Related Cases, filed on September 25, 2024, in Los Angeles Superior Court case no. 23CHCV00055. The Court takes judicial notice of these documents. ANALYSIS California law incorporates many of the basic policy objectives contained in the Federal Arbitration Act, including a presumption in favor of arbitrability. ( Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 971-972.) The petitioner bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence, the party opposing the petition then bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to demonstrate that there should be no enforcement of the agreement, and the trial court sits as a trier of fact to reach a final determination on the issue. ( Rosenthal v. Great Western Financial Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413.) Civil Procedure Code section 1281.2 empowers the Court to compel parties to arbitrate disputes pursuant to an agreement to do so. The court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2, subds. (a), (b).) A party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. For purposes of this section, a pending court action or special proceeding includes an action or proceeding initiated by the party refusing to arbitrate after the petition to compel arbitration has been filed, but on or before the date of the hearing on the petition. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2, subd. (c).) As an initial matter the Court finds that the stipulated arbitration agreement made in related case number 23CHCV00055 is not relevant here. The stipulation explicitly states that Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate all claims in the complaint for that case. Existence of Arbitration Agreement Under both the Federal Arbitration Act and California law, arbitration agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except on such grounds that exist at law or equity for voiding a contract. ( Winter v. Window Fashions Professions, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 943, 947.) The party moving to compel arbitration must establish the existence of a written arbitration agreement between the parties. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.) This is usually done by presenting a copy of the signed, written agreement to the court. A petition to compel arbitration or to stay proceedings pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 1281.2 and 1281.4 must state, in addition to other required allegations, the provisions of the written agreement and the paragraph that provides for arbitration. The provisions must be stated verbatim or a copy must be physically or electronically attached to the petition and incorporated by reference. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.) The moving party must also establish the other partys refusal to arbitrate the controversy. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2; Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1060; see also Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541 .) The filing of a lawsuit against the moving party for a controversy clearly within the scope of the arbitration agreement affirmatively establishes the other partys refusal to arbitrate the controversy. ( Hyundai Amco America, Inc. v. S3H, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 572, 577.) Defendant asserts that Plaintiff executed an enforceable Mutual Arbitration Agreement (MAA) on August 9, 2017 during Plaintiffs new employee onboarding process. (Declaration of Teresa Sanchez Lugo, ¶ 4, Exh. A.) To support this assertion, Defendant presents the declaration of Teresa Sanchez Lugo, a Director, Employee Services for Defendant. (Lugo Dec., ¶ 1.) Ms. Lugo has worked in Defendants Human Resources department since 2009. (Lugo Dec., ¶¶ 2-3.) Ms. Lugo states that Defendant is an affiliate of Heritage, and as a Heritage affiliate, Defendant utilizes certain human resources and personnel management tools including the MAA. (Lugo Dec., ¶ 2.) Heritage and its affiliates introduced the MAA in 2017 and required all its employees to submit to binding arbitration. ( Ibid. ) Ms. Luco has access to Defendants personnel records and is familiar with the onboarding process for new employees. (Lugo Dec., ¶¶ 2-4.) In 2017, Defendant conducted its onboarding process in person. (Lugo Dec., ¶ 3.) Prior to the onboarding meeting, Defendant sends new employees documents to review and sign, including the MAA. ( Ibid. ) During the onboarding meeting, a member of the Human Resources team walks new employees through and reviews the onboarding documents, including the MAA, and asks if the new employees has any questions. ( Ibid. ) The HR team member also lets the new employee know they can follow up later with questions as well. ( Ibid. ) New employees were required to sign the MAA in order to work with Defendant. ( Ibid. ) The new employee may review and sign the documents before, during, or after the onboarding meeting. ( Ibid. ) Ms. Lugo reviewed Plaintiffs personnel file, which contains a signed copy of the MAA agreement with what appears to be Plaintiffs signature, dated August 9, 2017. (Lugo Dec., ¶ 4, Exh. A, at p. 5.) The MAA states in relevant part: As consideration for Employees offer of employment with HPN Provider Network and/or its parents, subsidiaries, or affiliates (the Company), . . . the Company and Employee . . . agree to participate in this alternative dispute resolution program on the terms and conditions set forth in this Mutual Arbitration Agreement (Agreement): Except as expressly set forth in the section entitled Claims Not Covered by this Agreement, all disputes, claims, complaints, or controversies (Claims) that Employee now has or in the future may have against HPN Provider Network and/or any of its parents, subsidiaries, [and] affiliates . . . arising out of and/or directly or indirectly relating to . . . Employees employment with the Company, any terms and conditions of Employee's employment with the Company, and/or the termination of Employees employment from the Company (collectively Covered Claims), are subject to arbitration pursuant to the terms of this Agreement and will be resolved by arbitration and NOT by a court or jury . The parties hereby forever waive and give up the right to have a judge or jury decide any Covered Claims. By Signing Below, Employee Acknowledges that: · Employee has carefully read this Agreement, w1derstands the terms of this Agreement, and is entering into this Agreement voluntarily; " Employee is not relying on any promises or representations by the Company except those contained in this Agreement; · Employee is giving up the right to have all Covered Claims decided by a court or jury; * * * * · Employee was given the opportunity to discuss this Agreement with his/her own attorney if he/she wishes to do so, and also has had the opportunity to ask the Company any questions about this Agreement and request an explanation of any term of this Agreement; and · Employee understands that his/her affirmative signature and/or acknowledgement of this Agreement is not required for the Agreement to be enforced. lf Employee begins or continues working for the Company without signing this Agreement, this Agreement will be effective, and Employee will be deemed to have consented to, ratified and accepted this Agreement through Employee's knowledge of it and Employee's acceptance of and continued employment with the Company. (Lugo Dec., Exh A, at pp. 1-2, 5 (emphasis added).) The agreement appears to bear the signature Rebecca S. McGrath, Plaintiffs name, in the signature block and with the date 8/9/17. (Lugo Dec., Exh. A, at p. 5.) Defendant has met its initial burden by attaching an arbitration agreement purportedly bearing Plaintiffs signature. In opposition, Plaintiff states the agreement was with Heritage, Heritage never hired her, she had no opportunity to read or consider any arbitration agreement, Defendant did not explain arbitration to her, she was never provided with a copy of the rules or procedures for arbitration, she was not represented by an attorney when she allegedly signed the agreement, and she was not provided with an opt-out form, and no opt-out provision exists in the arbitration agreement. (Declaration or Rebecca McGrath, ¶¶ 2-10.) Plaintiffs arguments have no bearing on the existence of an arbitration agreement because she does not directly challenge the existence of the MAA or dispute that the signature on the MAA is her own. Further, the MAA includes a provision stating the parties agree to use the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (JAMS) rules and procedures. (Lugo Dec., Exh. A, at pp. 2-3.) The MAA also states the signing employee received a copy of the JAMS rules. ( Id. , Exh. A, at p. 2; Declaration of Ted A. Gehring, Exh. A.) Accordingly, the evidence strongly suggests that an arbitration agreement exists and that Plaintiff signed the agreement on August 9, 2017. Applicable Law Defendant argues the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applies the MAA because the parties agreed to this choice of law in the MAA, and Defendant is engaged in interstate commerce. Plaintiff does not dispute whether the FAA or California law applies. A party seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement has the burden of showing FAA preemption. ( Lane v. Francis Capital Mgmt. LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 676, 684.) California law provides that the parties may expressly designate that an arbitration proceeding should move forward under the FAAs procedural provisions rather than under state procedural law. ( Cronus Investments, Inc. v. Concierge Services (2005) 35 Cal. 4th 376, 394). Otherwise, the FAA provides for enforcement of arbitration provisions in any contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce. (9 U.S.C. § 2.) ( Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson (1995) 513 U.S. 265, 277; Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 227, 234, [requiring evidence establishing contract with the arbitration provision has a substantial relationship to interstate commerce].) The MAA states that FAA and the laws of the state govern the agreement to the extent that states laws are preempted by the FAA and that the Companys business and Employees employment affect interstate commerce. (Lugo Dec., Exh. A, at p. 4.) Further, Defendant employs several out-of-state employees, utilizes an out-of-state payroll provider, and procures its supplies from other states. (Lugo Dec., ¶ 5 [stating that in her role with Defendant, Plaintiff utilized software from out-of-state and Defendant receives compensation from a New Jersey company]; see also Bhan v. NME Hospitals (E.D. Cal. 1987) 669 F.Supp. 998, 1011 [finding a hospitals activities were interstate commerce where hospital purchased and shipped supplies from out-of-state].) Accordingly, the FAA applies to the MAA. Delegation Clause and Enforceability Defendant argues that only the arbitrator has the authority to resolve disputes about the enforceability of the MAA because the MAA contains a delegation clause granting the arbitrator authority to resolve disputes relating to the MAAs enforceability. Plaintiff does not directly oppose the delegation argument but does challenge the agreement as unconscionable. Under the FAA, when the arbitration agreement delegates the question of arbitrability to the arbitrator, courts must respect the parties decision as embodied in the contract. ( Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer and White Sales, Inc. (2019) 586 U.S. 63, 65; see also 9 U.S.C. § 1.) Parties may delegate threshold questions to the arbitrator as long as the agreement is clear and unmistakable. ( Ibid. ) Unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not the arbitrator. ( AT & T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America (1986) 475 U.S. 643, 649; see also Freeman v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 473, 480.) [I]t should not be assumed the parties intended the arbitrator to decide whether their dispute was arbitrable unless there is clear and unmistakable evidence that they did so. ( Dream Theater, Inc. v. Dream Theater (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 547, 552 [citing First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan (1995) 514 U.S. 938, 944]; AT & T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America (1986) 475 U.S. 643, 649; see also Freeman v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 473, 480.) [W]here the agreement is silent or ambiguous on that question, the court and not the arbitrator should decide arbitrability so as not to force unwilling parties to arbitrate a matter they reasonably thought a judge, not an arbitrator, would decide. ( Ibid. ) The MAA states: Subject only to the express language in the section entitled Class Action Waiver, the arbitrator shall have the sole and exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the scope, interpretation, applicability, enforceability or formation of this Agreement , including but not limited to any assertion that all or any part of this Agreement is void or voidable or is unconscionable and the sole authority to resolve any Covered Claim. (Lugo Dec., Exh. A, at p. 3 [emphasis added].) This language is clear and unmistakable in that it expressly delegates authority to decide the MAAs scope and enforceability to the arbitrator. Once the court determines the delegation clause is clear and unmistakable, the court must determine whether the assertion of arbitrability is wholly groundless, unless the agreement is governed by the FAA. (Cf. Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc. (2019) 586 U.S. 63, 68 [holding the wholly groundless exception does not apply to arbitration agreements governed by the FAA if the agreements contain a clear and unmistakable delegation clause]; but see Smythe v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 327, 332.) Accordingly, the MAA contains a valid delegation clause that gives the arbitrator authority to decide the threshold issues of the enforceability and scope, including whether the equitable estoppel doctrine allows Plaintiff and Defendant to arbitrate the alleged claims under the MAA. ORDER The Court orders the parties to submit the issues in Plaintiffs complaint to an arbitrator to determine the enforceability of the arbitration of Plaintiffs claims against Defendant. The case is stayed pending the arbitrators decision. Defendant to give notice.

Case Number: 24STCV21516 Hearing Date: December 12, 2024 Dept: 72 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT 72 TENTATIVE RULING JASON L. AGUILAR, Plaintiff, v. BUILD FOR YOU REMODELING CORPORATION, et al., Defendants. Case No: 24STCV21516 Hearing Date: December 12, 2024 Calendar Number: 5 Defendants Build for You Remodeling Corporation (Build for You) and Igor Rahlin (Rahlin) (collectively, Moving Defendants) demur to the Complaint filed by Plaintiff Jason Aguilar. The Court SUSTAINS the demurrer and STAYS this action pending the resolution of Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 23STCV24975. This stay shall not prevent any party from filing a notice of related case in in Case No. 23STCV24975. The Court sets a status conference the Court sets a status conference in the current case for June 26, 2025 at 8:30 a.m., after the conclusion of the trial in the earlier-filed action. Background This is an employment case. Plaintiff was employed by Defendant Build for You from approximately January 2022 to June 26, 2023 as a manager. On October 12, 2023, Plaintiff filed Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 23STCV24975 (the PAGA Case) against Moving Defendants, raising one claim for civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). Plaintiff filed this action against the Moving Defendants and Efi Biton (Biton) on August 23, 2024, raising claims for (1) failure to pay regular and minimum wages; (2) failure to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to provide rest periods; (5) failure to reimburse business expenditures; (6) failure to provide accurate wage statements; (7) failure to timely pay wages upon discharge; and (8) unfair business practices. On October 21, 2024, Moving Defendants demurred to the Complaint. Plaintiff filed an opposition and Moving Defendants filed a reply. Legal Standard The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds: (a) The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading. (b) The person who filed the pleading does not have the legal capacity to sue. (c) There is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action. (d) There is a defect or misjoinder of parties. (e) The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (f) The pleading is uncertain. As used in this subdivision, uncertain includes ambiguous and unintelligible. (g) In an action founded upon a contract, it cannot be ascertained from the pleading whether the contract is written, is oral, or is implied by conduct. (h) No certificate was filed as required by Section 411.35. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.) As a general matter, in a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. ( Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged. ( E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) The court assumes the truth of the complaints properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. ( Ibid. ) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. ( Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. ( Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. ( Ibid .; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, [i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend. ( Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245). Discussion Meet and Confer Plaintiff argues that Moving Defendants failed to meet and confer in good faith. A determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(4).) If, upon review of a declaration under section 430.41, subdivision (a)(3), a court learns no meet and confer has taken place, or concludes further conferences between counsel would likely be productive, it retains discretion to order counsel to meaningfully discuss the pleadings with an eye toward reducing the number of issues or eliminating the need for a demurrer, and to continue the hearing date to facilitate that effort. ( Dumas v. Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 348, 355, fn. 3.) The Court does not determine that further conferences are likely to be productive. Exclusive Concurrent Jurisdiction Moving Defendants argue that this case should be stayed or dismissed under the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction. Under the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction, when two [California] superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the subject matter and all parties involved in litigation, the first to assume jurisdiction has exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over the subject matter and all parties involved until such time as all necessarily related matters have been resolved. ( People ex rel. Garamendi v. American Autoplan, Inc. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 760, 769-770 [internal quotations and citations omitted].) [T]he pendency of another earlier action growing out of the same transaction and between the same parties is a ground for abatement of the second action. ( Id . at 770 [internal quotations and citations omitted].) The rule is based upon the public policies of avoiding conflicts that might arise between courts if they were free to make contradictory decisions or awards relating to the same controversy and preventing vexatious litigation and multiplicity of suits. ( Shaw v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 245, 255 [internal citations omitted].) A party against whom a complaint has been filed may object to the pleading on the grounds that [t]here is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (c).) The rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction and the statutory plea in abatement should be raised by demurrer where the issue appears on the face of the complaint and by answer where factual issues must be resolved. ( Garamendi , supra , 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 771.) Where abatement is required [under the plea in abatement or the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction], the second action should be stayed, not dismissed. ( Ibid .) Here, the parties do not dispute that Plaintiffs claim in the PAGA Case and Plaintiffs claims in this case arise out of the same alleged conduct by Moving Defendants. Plaintiff argues that his representative PAGA claim, which is brought in the PAGA Case, is separate from his individual claims, brought in this case. A plaintiffs representative claims under PAGA may be litigated separately from the plaintiffs individual claims. ( Adolph v. Uber Techs., Inc . (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1123.) Thus, this is not a classic case of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction where a stay is mandatory. However, a court ordinarily has inherent power, in its discretion, to stay proceedings when such a stay will accommodate the ends of justice. ( People v. Bell (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 323, 329.) Here, due to the overlapping factual nature of the claims, the Court determines that it would be in the interest of justice to stay this case pending the resolution of the earlier-filed PAGA Case. Staying this action would prevent much duplicative litigation. While the two actions (unless related by the Court in action 23STCV24975) will ultimately need to be litigated separately, conducting them in sequence will reduce duplicative discovery and allow the parties to engage in more realistic settlement negotiations in the latter case. From a practical point of view, the Court does not understand why the parties have not simply filed a notice of related case in the first-filed action, 23STCV24975. Such a notice of related case would allow the judicial officer in that action to relate the cases and allow litigation to proceed in an efficient manner. Nothing in the Courts stay order prevents a party from filing such a notice in Case No. 23STCV25975. Nevertheless, if the parties wish to proceed in two separate courts, the Court will stay this later-filed case until Case No. 23STCV25975 is completed. Since trial is set in that earlier-filed case for May 9, 2025, the Court sets a status conference in the current case for June 26, 2025 at 8:30 a.m. The Court therefore sustains the demurrer and stays this action pending the resolution of the PAGA Case.

Case Number: 21STCV02330 Hearing Date: December 12, 2024 Dept: 52 Defendants Lockheed Martin Corporation and Mark Marinos Motion to Reopen Discovery and Motion to Compel Compliance with Court Order Motion to Reopen Discovery Defendants Lockheed Martin Corporation and Mark Marino move to reopen discovery to depose two witnesses: Luke Giangrande and Adrian Martinez. Defendants show good cause to reopen discovery for these two depositions. Code of Civil Procedure section 2024.050, subdivision (b) provides: In exercising its discretion to grant or deny [a motion to reopen discovery], the court shall take into consideration any matter relevant to the leave requested, including, but not limited to, the following: (1) The necessity and the reasons for the discovery. (2) The diligence or lack of diligence of the party seeking the discovery or the hearing of a discovery motion, and the reasons that the discovery was not completed or that the discovery motion was not heard earlier. (3) Any likelihood that permitting the discovery or hearing the discovery motion will prevent the case from going to trial on the date set, or otherwise interfere with the trial calendar, or result in prejudice to any other party. (4) The length of time that has elapsed between any date previously set, and the date presently set, for the trial of the action. Defendants show substantial necessity and a good reason to depose Giangrande and Martinez. Both submitted declarations in support of plaintiffs opposition to defendants motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff plans to use both witnesses at trial. (Jatana Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.) Deposing them is necessary. Defendants show adequate diligence. Defendants moved for summary judgment in May 2023. The motions were ultimately heard in September 2024. Plaintiff did not identify Giangrande or Martinez as witnesses before he submitted their declarations in support of his opposition to the motions for summary judgment. (Jatana Decl., ¶¶ 5-6.) By then, the discovery cutoff was about one month away. Defendants made a good faith effort to depose both witnesses before the cutoff. There is a chance that permitting these two depositions will prevent the case from going to trial as scheduled on January 15, 2025. If plaintiff does not cooperate in completing these depositions, the court may prohibit Giangrande and Martinez from testifying at trial rather than continuing the trial. Finally, the current trial date is long after the initial trial date. Several discovery disputes have contributed to the delay. But, as discussed above, defendants did not know about these two witnesses until shortly before the discovery cutoff. After considering all relevant factors, the court finds good cause to reopen discovery to permit defendants to depose Giangrande and Martinez. Motion to Compel Compliance with Court Order Defendants Lockheed Martin Corporation and Mark Marino move to compel plaintiff Jimmy Guzman to comply with the courts order compelling the depositions of plaintiff and of Elvira Guzman. On October 25, 2024, the court ordered plaintiff and Elvira Guzman to appear and testify at deposition no later than December 2. After defendants filed this motion, the parties agreed to complete both depositions on December 17, 2024. (Jatana Reply Decl., ¶ 11, Ex. C.) Considering the repeated delays in scheduling these depositions, the court finds good cause to order plaintiff and Elvira Guzman to testify at deposition on that date. Defendants also move for $5,950 in sanctions against plaintiff. The court exercises its discretion not to impose sanctions. Each side has contributed to the various discovery disputes and the resulting delays. The court therefore finds sanctions would not be just under the circumstances. Disposition Defendants Lockheed Martin Corporation and Mark Marinos motion to reopen discovery is granted . The court hereby reopens discovery only for the depositions of witnesses Luke Giangrande and Adriano Martinez. Plaintiff shall produce Giangrande and Martinez for depositions no later than January 6, 2025. Defendants Lockheed Martin Corporation and Mark Marinos motion to compel compliance with court order is granted in part. Plaintiff Jimmy Guzman and Elvira Guzman are ordered to appear and testify at deposition on December 17, 2024.

Case Number: 24STCV13472 Hearing Date: December 10, 2024 Dept: 3 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST DISTRICT RAKHI CHAMES , Plaintiff(s), vs. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, et al. , Defendant(s). ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO.: 24STCV13472 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANT LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITYS DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT Dept. 3 8:30 a.m. December 10, 2024 I. INTRODUCTION On May 30, 2024, plaintiff Rakhi Chames (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendants Los Angeles County Development Authority (Defendant) and Keandre Butler. Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (FAC) on August 31, 2024. Plaintiff alleges claims for harassment, discrimination, retaliation, and wrongful termination, as well as intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The IIED claim is the subject of Defendants demurrer. II. LEGAL STANDARDS A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings and will be sustained only where the pleading is defective on its face. ( City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 445, 459.) We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. We accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and also consider matters which may be judicially noticed. [Citation.] ( Mitchell v. California Department of Public Health (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1007; Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604 [the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be].) Allegations are to be liberally construed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) In construing the allegations, the court is to give effect to specific factual allegations that may modify or limit inconsistent general or conclusory allegations. ( Financial Corporation of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3rd 764, 769.) A demurrer may be brought if insufficient facts are stated to support the cause of action asserted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures. ( Khoury v. Malys of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) A demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the complaint is so bad that the defendant cannot reasonably respond. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) Where the complaint contains substantial factual allegations sufficiently apprising defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet, a demurrer for uncertainty will be overruled or plaintiff will be given leave to amend. ( Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) III. DISCUSSION A. Allegations of the FAC As alleged in the FAC, Plaintiff began her employment with Defendant in or about August 2020 in Palmdale, California. (FAC, ¶ 8.) From August 2020 through September 2023, she was allegedly sexually harassed by Defendants employee, co-defendant Keandre Butler (Butler). (FAC, ¶ 9.) On multiple occasions, Butler, who was allegedly employed as a security guard for Defendant, attempted to make conversation with Plaintiff by stating that she is a queen and needed a king, and suggesting that she should end her relationship with her partner. (FAC, ¶¶ 10-11.) In November 2020, Plaintiff also witnessed Butler attempt to obtain the personal contact information of a client by providing false instructions, and the client informed Plaintiff that Butler had on occasion followed her home while making derogatory comments. (FAC, ¶ 12.) Also around November 2020, Plaintiff witnessed Butler making other sexually inappropriate comments on the phone and she complained to her managers and supervisors about Butlers sexually harassing conduct. (FAC, ¶ 13-15.) In or around February of 2022, Plaintiff alleges that she saw Butler run into the office after his lunch break wearing a tank top without a shirt; additionally, Butlers pants were unbuttoned with the zipper open. (FAC, ¶ 17.) As Plaintiff tried to leave the office, Butler attempted to make conversation with Plaintiff. (FAC, ¶ 17.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant did nothing in response to Plaintiffs complaints to end the sexual harassment she experienced and Plaintiff was forced to end her employment. (FAC, ¶¶ 19-20.) As part of Plaintiffs Seventh Cause of Action for IIED, she alleges that Defendant (and Butler) engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct including sexual harassment. (FAC, ¶ 111.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant engaged in retaliation and failed to investigate or discipline the assaulters and harassers, or provide resources or sexual harassment training. ( Ibid .) Defendants allegedly extreme and outrageous conduct also includes creating and perpetuating a hostile work environment. ( Ibid .) B. Demurrer Defendant demurs to Plaintiffs IIED claim on the grounds that Plaintiff fails to identify a statutory basis for liability and does not plead an IIED claim with sufficient specificity. The elements of an intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) intention to cause or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) severe emotional suffering; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress. ( See Moncada v. West Coast Quartz Corp. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 768, 780; Wilson v. Hynek (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 999, 1009.) To satisfy the element of extreme and outrageous conduct, defendants conduct must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized society. ( Moncada , supra , 221 Cal.App.4th at 780 (quoting Tererice v. Blue Cross of California (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 878, 883).) Liability against a public entity must be authorized by statute. ( Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1179; Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (a) [A public entity is not liable for an injury . . . except as otherwise provided by statute].) Ordinarily, negligence may be pleaded in general terms and the plaintiff need not specify the precise act or omission alleged to constitute the breach of duty. [Citation]. However, because under the Tort Claims Act all governmental tort liability is based on statute, the general rule that statutory causes of action must be pleaded with particularity is applicable. Thus, to state a cause of action against a public entity, every fact material to the existence of its statutory liability must be pleaded with particularity. ( Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 795.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues that her IIED claim is permitted pursuant to Government Code section 815.2, which imposes vicarious liability upon a public entity for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative. (Gov. Code, § 815.2.) Plaintiff contends that Defendant is liable under a vicarious liability theory for the actions of Butler or Plaintiffs managers and supervisors. (Opp., pp. 4-5.) Plaintiff additionally claims that she has properly alleged all the elements for an IIED claim. Plaintiff claims she has alleged outrageous conduct by listing Defendants failures to stop, reprimand, fire or take any action against Butler when he routinely harassed Plaintiff and others by making openly sexual remarks or attempted to control her personal life by suggesting she end her relationship with her partner. (Opp., pp. 5-6.) Plaintiff contends that Defendants failure to act amounts to outrageous conduct, especially considering that Defendant also retaliated against her for reporting Butlers sexual harassment and assault. Notably, however, the FAC does not describe what retaliation, if any, occurred in connection with Plaintiffs complaints about Butler. On reply, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs IIED claim fails because it cannot be vicariously liable for Butlers sexual harassment, which is not within the scope of his employment. (Reply, p. 3; see Farmers Ins. Group v. County of Santa Clara (1995) 11 Cal.4th 992, 1008-1019.) Additionally, even if Plaintiffs supervisors and managers alleged conduct took place within the scope of their employment, there can be no vicarious liability here because her supervisors and managers are not personally liable for their alleged failure to prevent harassment. ( See Fiol v. Doellstedt (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1327-1328 [inaction on a sexual harassment complaint is not aiding and abetting harassment and does not provide grounds for personal liability]; Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 55, 79-80.) Since mere inaction does not create personal liability for a supervisory employees failure to prevent sexual harassment (and Plaintiff alleges no specific facts supporting her claim for retaliation in connection with her complaints about Butlers conduct), it follows that her supervisors and managers cannot be personally liable for IIED for the same inaction, and thus there is no basis for vicarious liability against Defendant. ( See Lopez , supra , 40 Cal.3d at p. 795.) Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action for IIED. The demurrer is sustained to the Seventh Cause of Action. IV. CONCLUSION Defendants demurrer to the Seventh Cause of Action is SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend. Moving party to give notice. Dated this 10th day of December 2024 William A. Crowfoot Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

Case Number: 24TRCV00737 Hearing Date: December 11, 2024 Dept: E Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Southwest District Torrance Dept. E HIJAZ HIJAZ, SAMIRA HIJAZ, and MALAK HIJAZ, individuals Plaintiff, Case No.: 24TRCV00737 vs. [Tentative] Denied LAST CHANCE STORE, LLC.; AHM LIQUIDATION, INC.; BEYOND GALLERIA, INC.; BEAUTY BARGAIN, LLC.; BEAUTY BARGAINS, INC.; BEAUTY BARGAINS, INC.; BEAUTY VILLAGE, INC.; CALI'S BEAUTY SUPPLY, INC.; BAHA SHEHAB; HUSSEIN HIJAZ; ASHRAF FAHAD HIJAZ; and DOES 1 to 100, Defendants. Hearing Date: December 11, 2024 Moving Parties: Defendants Ashraf Fahad Hijaz and Hussein Hijaz Responding Party: Plaintiffs Hijaz Hijaz, Samira Hijaz, and Malak Hijaz. HEARING: Motion to Quash Service of Summons The Court considered the moving and opposition papers. RULING The Court denies the Motion to Quash Service of Summons. BACKGROUND On March 1, 2024, Plaintiffs Hijaz Hijaz, Samira Hijaz, and Malak Hijaz filed a complaint against Defendants Last Chance Store, LLC., Ahm Liquidation, Inc., Beyond Galleria, Inc., Beauty Bargain, LLC., Beauty Bargains, Inc., Beauty Bargains, Inc., Beauty Village, Inc., Cali's Beauty Supply, Inc., Baha Shehab, Hussein Hijaz, Ashraf Fahad Hijaz, And Does 1 To 100. The complaint alleges failure to pay minimum wages, failure to pay overtime wages, failure to provide meal periods, failure to provide rest periods, failure to provide accurate itemized statements, failure to reimburse employees for required expenses, failure to provide wages when due, failure to split shift premium, unfair competition, failure to produce personal and payroll records, misclassification of employees, and violation of whistleblowing law. The complaint arises from Plaintiffs employment with Defendants as salespeople. On July 16, 2024, Defendants Hussein Hijaz and Ashraf Fahad Hijaz filed the instant Motion to Quash Service of Summons. On August 2, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the Opposition to the Motion to Quash Service of Summons. No reply has been filed. LEGAL STANDARD A defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her. (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a).) In California, courts are authorized to exercise jurisdiction over parties on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of [California] or the United States. (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10.) Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific. ( Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 445.) The extent to which a California court may exercise jurisdiction over a defendant depends on the nature and quality of that defendants contacts with the state. ( Ibid .) Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific. ( Vons Companies, Inc. , supra , 14 Cal.4th at 445.) The nature and the quality of the defendants contacts determine whether jurisdiction, if exercised, is general or specific. General jurisdiction exists when a defendant is domiciled in the forum state or his activities there are substantial, continuous, and systematic. ( F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 782, 796.) Where the contacts are sufficiently substantial, continuous, and systematic, it is not necessary that the cause of action alleged be connected with the defendants business relationship to the forum. ( Vons , supra , 14 Cal.4th at 445.) However, contacts that are random, fortuitous, or attenuated do not rise to the minimum level, and general jurisdiction cannot be exercised under these circumstances. ( F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. , supra , 130 Cal.App.4th at 795.) If a defendants contacts with the forum state are not substantial, continuous, and systematic, the defendant may be subject to specific jurisdiction. A court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if: (1) the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits [citation]; (2) the controversy is related to or arises out of [the] defendant's contacts with the forum [citations]; and (3) the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with fair play and substantial justice. [Citations.] ( Pavlovich (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 269.) When a defendant challenges personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the factual basis for the exercise of jurisdiction. ( Vons , supra , 14 Cal.4th at 449.) [W]hen the facts giving rise to jurisdiction are conflicting, the trial courts factual determinations are reviewed for substantial evidence . . . . Even then, we review independently the trial court's conclusions as to the legal significance of the facts . . . . When the jurisdictional facts are not in dispute, whether the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction is purely a legal question that we review de novo. ( F. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. , supra , 130 Cal.App.4th at 794; accord Muckle v. Superior Court (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 218, 228.) Evidence consisting of vague assertions of ultimate fact rather than specific evidentiary facts is insufficient to meet the burden to show minimum contacts. ( Paneno v. Centres for Academic Programmes Abroad Ltd . (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1447, 1454.) DISCUSSION General Jurisdiction General jurisdiction over an individual is established by the individuals domicile. ( Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 571 U.S. 117, 118.) A nonresident defendant may be subject to the general jurisdiction of the forum if his or her contacts in the forum state are substantial . . . continuous and systematic. ( Vons Companies , supra , 14 Cal.4th at 445, quoting Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co . (1952) 342 U.S. 437, 445-446.) In such instances, it is not necessary that the specific cause of action alleged be connected with the defendants business relationship to the forum. ( Cornelison v. Chaney (1976) 16 Cal.3d 143, 147.) A court will look at a variety of factors to determine if a defendant is at home in the forum, such as: maintenance of offices, the presence of employees, use of bank accounts and marketing or selling products in the forum state, to analyze whether a corporation's contacts render it effectively at home in that state. ( Brue v. Shabaab (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 578, 590-591.) Plaintiffs argue that Defendants are subject to general jurisdiction based on the five stores they own in California from which they receive substantial income. (Opposition p. 8.) Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Hussein Hijaz negotiated with Plaintiffs in California, controlled the daily operations of his store in California, and fired Plaintiffs who lived in California. (Opposition p. 8; Hijaz Hijaz Decl. ¶ 2-9; Samira Hijaz Decl. ¶ 2-9.) Defendants argue that no facts support a finding that Defendants are at home in California. Neither are residents of California, have a bank account in California, nor own property in California. (Motion to Quash MTQ p. 9; Ashraf Hijza Decl. ¶12; Hussein Hijaz Decl. ¶ 12.) Instead, they are merely silent investors in Last Chance LLC. ( Ibid .) In Daimler, the Supreme Court found that Daimler was at home in California because its contacts were not continuous and systematic despite the fact that Daimler had substantial sales throughout the state. ( Daimler AG, supra, 571 U.S. 117 at 138-139.) The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not met their burden of proof to show that California has general jurisdiction over Defendants. Despite Plaintiffs assertions, Defendants contacts with California are neither substantial nor systematic enough to render them at home in the state, as required by Vons . ( Vons , supra , 14 Cal.4th at 445.; Daimler AG., supra, 571 U.S. 117 at 138-139) Both Ashraf and Hussein Hijaz are long-time residents of Alabama and have no property or bank accounts in California. (A shraf Hijaz Decl. ¶¶ 6, 8, 12; Hussein Hijaz Decl. ¶¶ 6, 8, 11.) Furthermore, while Defendants are investors in a corporation with stores located in California and are involved in some management of said corporation, these contacts are not systematic enough to render Defendants at home in the state because the mere presence of a corporation and significant sales in a state are not sufficient to create general jurisdiction. (See, Daimler AG., supra, 571 U.S. 117 at 138-139) Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to establish that the Defendants contacts with California meet the necessary threshold for general jurisdiction. Specific Jurisdiction The test for whether a court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction requires that the nonresident purposefully directed his acts to the forum state or otherwise purposefully established contacts with the forum state, that the cause of action be related to or arise or result from the acts or contacts in the forum, and that the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the forum would be reasonable. ( Muckle v. Superior Court (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 218, 227-228.) Purposeful Availment This prong is satisfied if the defendant purposefully and voluntarily directs its acts toward the forum so that it should expect, because of the benefit it receives, to be subject to the court's jurisdiction based on its forum contacts. ( In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 108.) Defendants argue that Ashraf and Hussein Hijaz have not purposefully availed themselves of California, and therefore, the Court lacks specific jurisdiction over them. They argue that neither Defendant was involved in any wage decision regarding Plaintiffs, and therefore, there were no intentional actions that would lead to a finding of purposeful availment. (MTQ p. 10; Jewish Def. Org., Inc. v. Superior Ct. (1999) 72 Cal.App . 4th 1045, 1057.) Plaintiffs argue that Defendants derived financial benefits from their California business activities and are therefore subject to Californias jurisdiction. Defendants engaged in affirmative conduct by transacting business through Plaintiffs, who worked in California, and this resulted in harms, such as the alleged wrongful termination and violations of wage and hour laws. (Hijaz Hijaz Decl. ¶ 2-9; Samira Hijaz Decl. ¶ 2-9; See Vons , supra ,14 Cal.4th at 450.) In Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II, the court found that placing products into the stream of commerce by large car manufacturers is sufficient for a finding of purposeful avaliment. ( Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II , supra , 135 Cal.App.4th 100 at 115.) Here, Plaintiffs have a much stronger connection to California than seen in Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II. (Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II , supra , 135 Cal.App.4th 100 at 115.). Like in Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II, Defendants placed products in the stream of commerce and engaged in even more significant activities within the state, including operating multiple business locations and managing employees. (Hijaz Hijaz Decl. ¶ 2-9; Samira Hijaz Decl. ¶ 2-9; Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II , supra , 135 Cal.App.4th 100 at 108.) While Defendants contend that they were not involved in any wage decisions regarding Plaintiffs, Defendants owned and operated a business in California from which they received profits and, therefore, have availed themselves of Californias laws. ( Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II , supra , 135 Cal.App.4th 100 at 108.) Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have met their burden of proof showing that Defendants purposefully availed themselves to California. Arises from Defendants Contacts Specific jurisdiction depends on the quality and nature of the defendants forum contacts in relation to the particular cause of action alleged. [Citation.] ( Anglo Irish Bank Corp., PLC v. Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 969, 978.) A controversy is related to or arises out of the defendants forum contacts, so as to satisfy the second requirement for the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction, if there is a substantial connection between the forum contacts and the plaintiff's claim. [Citation.] The forum contacts need not be the proximate cause or but for cause of the alleged injuries. [Citation.] The forum contacts also need not be substantively relevant to the cause of action, meaning those contacts need not establish or support an element of the cause of action. [Citation.] A claim need not arise directly from the defendants forum contacts in order to be sufficiently related to the contact to warrant the exercise of specific jurisdiction. Rather, as long as the claim bears a substantial connection to the nonresidents forum contacts, the exercise of specific jurisdiction is appropriate. [Citation.] Accordingly, in evaluating the quality and nature of the defendants forum contacts, we consider not only the conduct directly affecting the plaintiff, but also the broader course of conduct of which it is a part. [Citation.] ( Anglo Irish Bank Corp , supra , 165 Cal.App.4th 969 at 979.) Defendants argue that there is no substantial connection or nexus between their alleged involvement and any contacts with California, which is required for the exercise of specific jurisdiction. Additionally, Defendants argue that the claim that they were involved in wage determinations at Last Chance is false, as it was Plaintiff Hijaz Hijaz who oversaw wage-related decisions. (Ashraf Hijaz Decl. ¶ 4; Hussein Hijaz Decl. ¶ 4.) Since they had no involvement in the wage decisions, Defendants assert that there is no substantial relationship between their actions and the claims in the litigation, thus failing the specific jurisdiction test. Plaintiffs argue that the controversy in this case is related to Defendants contacts with California. Plaintiffs emphasize that Defendants forum contacts do not need to be directly aimed at the plaintiff to warrant specific jurisdiction, as long as the operative facts of the controversy are related to Defendants activities in the state. ( Snowney v. Harrahs Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1054, 1068.) Furthermore, the employment and wage disputes are tied to Defendants business operations in California, making specific jurisdiction appropriate. In Snowney, the court found that injuries suffered by a hotel patron arose out of the hotels advertisements in California. ( Snowney, Supra, 35 Cal.4th 1054 at 1069.) Plaintiffs claims arise out of their employment with Last Chance Store, LLC, which Defendants are owner-operators of. (Kordab Decl. ¶ 4.) While Defendants contend that the claims arise out of wage decisions they have no part in, [t]he forum contacts need not be the proximate cause or but for cause of the alleged injuries. ( Anglo Irish Bank Corp , supra , 165 Cal.App.4th 969 at 979.) The claim must only bear a substantial connection to the nonresident's forum contacts, which it does. ( Ibid .) Furthermore, Plaintiffs claims are more closely tied to Defendants activity than in Snowney. ( See, Snowney, Supra, 35 Cal.4th 1054 at 1069.) While in Snowney, the only connection between the defendant's and the plaintiffs claim was advertisements that were run in California, here, Plaintiffs claims arise out of Defendants owning and operating multiple stores in California. (Snowney, Supra, 35 Cal.4th 1054 at 1069.) Therefore, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have met their burden of showing a substantial connection between forum contacts and the Plaintiffs claim. Fair Play and Substantial Justice In determining fairness, California courts consider five factors: (1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the interests of the forum state; (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief; (4) the interstate judicial system's interest in efficiently resolving disputes; and (5) the shared interest of different states in promoting important social policies ( Vons , supra , 14 Cal.4th at 476.) Plaintiffs argue that exercising personal jurisdiction over Defendants is fair, reasonable, and aligns with the principles of substantial justice, and since they have established that Defendants have minimum contacts with California, the burden shifts to Defendants to demonstrate why jurisdiction would be unreasonable. Plaintiffs also argue that California has a significant interest in enforcing its wage and hour laws, and since the violations occurred there, California has a strong interest in resolving this dispute. On the other hand, Defendants argue that asserting jurisdiction over them would be unfair and unreasonable. Defendants claim that they are neither domiciled in California nor involved in the wage decisions at issue, so it would be unfair to force them to litigate in California. (Ashraf Hijaz Decl. ¶ 14; Hussein Hijaz Decl. ¶ 14.) They argue that participation in the lawsuit would impose significant financial, emotional, and physical burdens, as they have no relevant ties to the state. Additionally, Defendants contend that California has no significant interest in resolving claims against them since they were not involved in the alleged violations. In Vons, the Court found that Californias strong interest in protecting a California corporation outweighed the defendant's burden in litigating a complex case far from home. ( Vons , supra , 14 Cal.4th at 477-478.) Plaintiffs have demonstrated that Defendants have sufficient minimum contacts with California through their business operations, including hiring and managing employees in the state. By deriving benefits from Plaintiffs work in California, Defendants have purposefully availed themselves of the states jurisdiction. While Defendants argue that litigating in California would impose financial, emotional, and physical burdens, Defendants own and manage five separate stores in California. ( Kor Decl. ¶ 5) Furthermore, like in Vons, California has a strong interest in protecting its workers and enforcing Californias laws, which outweighs any travel burdens Defendant may face. (See, Vons , supra , 14 Cal.4th at 477-478.) Therefore, The Court finds that exercising personal jurisdiction over Defendants comports with fair play and substantial justice. Thus, the Court denies Defendants Motion to Quash Service of Summons for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction.

Case Number: 23STCV13030 Hearing Date: December 10, 2024 Dept: 72 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT 72 TENTATIVE RULING RHONDA RUDOLPH, Plaintiff, v. LIVING SPACES FURNITURE, LLC, et al., Defendants. Case No: 23STCV13030 Hearing Date: December 10, 2024 Calendar Number: 4 Plaintiff Rhonda Rudolph (Plaintiff) moves to compel Defendant Living Spaces Furniture, LLC (Living Spaces) to provide further responses to Plaintiffs Requests for Production of Documents, Set One. Plaintiff moves to compel Defendant Living Spaces to produce for deposition its Person Most Knowledgeable and Meghan Mabry. Plaintiff additionally moves to compel Defendant Susana Grennon to appear for her deposition. Plaintiff moves to quash the subpoenas served by Defendant Charlynn Lok (Lok) on non-parties Henkel Corporation (Henkel), Walt Disney Company (Disney), Think Thin, and Carportland Company (Carportland). The Court DENIES Plaintiffs motion to compel further responses. The Court GRANTS the motion to compel the deposition of the Person Most Knowledgeable. The deposition will occur either remotely or in La Mirada, at the determination of Plaintiffs counsel. The parties will bear their own costs. The Court does not award sanctions because it finds that Living Spaces acted with substantial justification. The Court GRANTS the motion to compel Mabrys deposition. Mabrys deposition will occur in person at Plaintiffs counsels office. All attendees other than Mabry may attend remotely if they so choose. The parties will bear their own costs. The Court does not award sanctions because it finds that Defendants acted with substantial justification and met and conferred in good faith. The Court GRANTS the motion to compel Grennons deposition. The parties will bear their own costs. The Court does not award sanctions because it finds that Defendants acted with substantial justification. The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs motion to quash by limiting the subpoenas to documents from 2016 to present. The Court does not award sanctions requested by Defendant. Background This is an employment action. Plaintiff was employed by Defendant Living Spaces Furniture, LLC (Living Spaces). Plaintiff has leukemia and alleges that Defendants Living Spaces, Charlynn Lok, and Susana Grennon failed to accommodate and discriminated against her on the basis of her medical condition. Plaintiff filed this action on June 7, 2023, raising claims for (1) wrongful termination in violation of FEHA; (2) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (3) disability discrimination; (4) failure to provide reasonable accommodations; (5) failure to engage in a good-faith interactive process; (6) associational disability discrimination; (7) hostile work environment; (8) unfair competition; and (9) assault. On September 24, 2024, Plaintiff filed the motion to compel further responses. Living Spaces filed an opposition and Plaintiff filed a reply. On September 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed the motion to quash. Lok filed an opposition and Plaintiff filed a reply. On October 1, 2024, Plaintiff filed the motion to compel depositions. Living Spaces and Grennon jointly filed an opposition. Plaintiff did not file a reply. Legal Standard In General Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with this title, any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action. Discovery may be obtained of the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter, as well as of the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any document, electronically stored information, tangible thing, or land or other property. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) Relevant evidence means evidence, including evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action. (Evid. Code, § 210.) Requests for Production A statement that the party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling has been directed will comply with the particular demand shall state that the production, inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, and related activity demanded, will be allowed either in whole or in part, and that all documents or things in the demanded category that are in the possession, custody, or control of that party and to which no objection is being made will be included in the production. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.220.) A representation of inability to comply with the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling shall affirm that a diligent search and a reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply with that demand. This statement shall also specify whether the inability to comply is because the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been lost, misplaced, or stolen, or has never been, or is no longer, in the possession, custody, or control of the responding party. The statement shall set forth the name and address of any natural person or organization known or believed by that party to have possession, custody, or control of that item or category of item. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.230.) (a) On receipt of a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, the demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand if the demanding party deems that any of the following apply: (1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete. (2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive. (3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general. (b) A motion under subdivision (a) shall comply with each of the following: (1) The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand. (2) The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040. (3) In lieu of a separate statement required under the California Rules of Court, the court may allow the moving party to submit a concise outline of the discovery request and each response in dispute. (c) Unless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the demanding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the demanding party waives any right to compel a further response to the demand. & (h) Except as provided in subdivision (j), the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310.) The burden is on the moving party to show both relevance to the subject matter and specific facts justifying discovery. ( Glenfed Develop. Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117.) Once good cause is established by the moving party, the burden then shifts to the responding party to justify any objections made to document disclosure. ( Hartbrodt v. Burke (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 168, 172-174.) Deposition A deposition subpoena may command any of the following: (a) Only the attendance and the testimony of the deponent, under Article 3 (commencing with Section 2020.310). (b) Only the production of business records for copying, under Article 4 (commencing with Section 2020.410). (c) The attendance and the testimony of the deponent, as well as the production of business records, other documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things, under Article 5 (commencing with Section 2020.510). (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.020.) Quash Subpoena If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of documents, the court may, upon motion reasonably made, make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (a).) In making an order pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1, the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorneys fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2, subd. (a).) Discussion Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production, Set One Failure to [timely move to compel] within the specified period constitutes a waiver of any right to compel a further response; indeed, similar provisions have been held at least quasi-jurisdictional. [Citations.] We do not believe the 45-day limitation is jurisdictional in the fundamental sense, but is only jurisdictional in the sense that it renders the court without authority to rule on motions to compel other than to deny them. ( Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.) The parties agreed to an extension of Plaintiffs deadline to September 20, 2024. (Chang Decl., ¶ 11, Ex. G.) Plaintiff filed her motion to compel further responses on September 24, 2024. Plaintiffs motion is therefore not timely. Plaintiff does not provide any substantive argument in response to the issue of whether her motion is timely. While Living Spaces opposition was not timely filed, the quasi-jurisdictional bar still remains. Plaintiff argues that Living Spaces has waived its timeliness argument by opposing Plaintiffs motion on the merits, but cites no authority in support of this proposition. The Court finds that Plaintiffs motion to compel further responses is untimely and therefore denies the motion. Motion to Compel Depositions Living Spaces Person Most Knowledgeable Living Spaces offered to produce its Person Most Knowledgeable (PMK), but stated that the deposition would need to occur in La Mirada because the PMK deponent has a child with serious medical conditions and cannot travel to Pasadena in case an emergency arises. Living Spaces offered either an in-person deposition in La Mirada, or a remote deposition. The Court grants the motion as to the PMK. The deposition will occur either remotely or in La Mirada, at the choice of Plaintiffs counsel. The parties will bear their own costs. The Court does not award sanctions because it finds that Living Spaces acted with substantial justification. Megan Mabry Mabrys original deposition fell through due to a dispute between the parties about whether it should occur in person. Plaintiff requested close to the deposition date that the deposition occur in-person; Defendants disagreed. In meet and confer, Defense counsel has offered to produce Mabry for deposition in person at the office of Plaintiffs counsel on the condition that all other attendees may attend remotely if they choose. The Court grants the motion to compel as to Mabry. Mabrys deposition will occur in person at Plaintiffs counsels office. All attendees other than Mabry may attend remotely if they so choose. The parties will bear their own costs. The Court does not award sanctions because it finds that Defendants acted with substantial justification and met and conferred in good faith. Susan Grennon The parties have met and conferred on the issue of Grennons deposition. Grennon appeared for her remote deposition on October 29, 2024. Plaintiffs counsel suspended the deposition because Defendants counsel instructed Grennon not to answer questions pertaining to exhibits where Grennon had not been shown the full exhibit. (Chang Decl. ¶ 9.) Plaintiffs counsel had not given Grennon a chance to review the entire document and only provided portions electronically for the witness to view. (Chang Decl. ¶ 9.) The subsequent meet and confer disputes regarded whether Defendants would pay the costs for the continued deposition, whether Defendants would agree to pay sanctions, and whether Defendants would agree to a discovery referee. Grennons deposition still needs to continue. However, the witness should have had the ability to view the entire document at the deposition. The Court grants the motion as to Grennon. The parties will bear their own costs. The Court does not award sanctions because it finds that Defendants acted with substantial justification. Motion to Quash Subpoenas Lok has issued subpoenas to non-parties Henkel, Disney, Think Thin, and Carportland. These entities are former employers of Plaintiff. Lok issued the subpoenas without any scope limitations as to time. The subpoenas thus seek at least ten years of Plaintiffs employment records. Plaintiff only disputes the issue of scope as to time. Plaintiff argues that the temporal scope of the subpoenas unduly invades her privacy interest. For his part, Defendant agrees to narrow the scope of the subpoenas in certain ways. Although work history information is not categorically subject to privacy protections, sensitive information ordinarily found in personnel files, such as evaluation of the person's work (script coverages and other critiques), income information, employment contracts and the like can be subject to privacy protections. ( Alch v. Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1433; see also Board of Trustees v. Superior Court (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 516, 528 [personnel, tenure, and promotion files relating to initial employment, promotion, additional compensation, and termination which were communicated in confidence were covered by the communicators constitutional right to privacy] disapproved of on other grounds by Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531.) Courts must [&] place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and the seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing must weigh the countervailing interests the opposing party identifies [&.] Only obvious invasions of interests fundamental to personal autonomy must be supported by a compelling interest. ( Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 557.) Plaintiff has offered to agree to the subpoenas if Lok limited them to 2016 to present allowing for roughly eight years of employment records. Plaintiffs cancer diagnosis occurred in 2016. The Court considers this a reasonable compromise. This provides Defendant with approximately six years of record from before Plaintiff started to work at Living Spaces. This balances the parties various interests, including the right to privacy.