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Knox Vs Travelers Lloyd

Case Last Refreshed: 3 years ago

Knox , Karen, filed a(n) Deceptive Trade Practices - Consumer case represented by Allan William Nelson, against Travelers Lloyds Of Texas Insurance Company, King , James Jehu, represented by Kaye Edward Frank, in the jurisdiction of Travis County, TX, . Travis County, TX Superior Courts .

Case Details for Knox , Karen v. Travelers Lloyds Of Texas Insurance Company , et al.

Filing Date

April 04, 2014

Category

Deceptive Trade Practice (Gen Lit )

Last Refreshed

February 20, 2021

Practice Area

Consumer

Filing Location

Travis County, TX

Matter Type

Deceptive Trade Practices

Parties for Knox , Karen v. Travelers Lloyds Of Texas Insurance Company , et al.

Plaintiffs

Knox , Karen

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Allan William Nelson

Defendants

Travelers Lloyds Of Texas Insurance Company

King , James Jehu

Attorneys for Defendants

Kaye Edward Frank

Case Documents for Knox , Karen v. Travelers Lloyds Of Texas Insurance Company , et al.

MTN:OTHER MOTION

Date: October 10, 2014

RULE 11 AGREEMENT

Date: July 30, 2014

ORD:NTC/ORD DISMISSAL/NONSUIT

Date: October 16, 2014

Case Events for Knox , Karen v. Travelers Lloyds Of Texas Insurance Company , et al.

Type Description
Docket Event ORD:NTC/ORD DISMISSAL/NONSUIT
Docket Event MTN:OTHER MOTION
Docket Event RULE 11 AGREEMENT
Docket Event ORIG ANSWER/SPECIAL APPEARANCE
Docket Event UNEXECUTED RETURN OF SERVICE
Docket Event ISS:CITATION
Docket Event ORIGINAL PETITION/APPLICATION
See all events

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Ruling

FRIDA LOPEZ-SANCHEZ, ET AL. VS AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, ET AL.
Jul 09, 2024 | 23AHCV01072
Case Number: 23AHCV01072 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: P [TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFFS DEPOSITIONS AND AWARDING SANCTIONS IN THE AMOUNT OF $2,847.20 II. INTRODUCTION On January 24, 2022, Plaintiffs Frida Lopez-Sanchez, and Isela Sanchez (Plaintiffs) purchased a 2022 Honda HR-V, subject to warranty by Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc., (Defendant). On June 11, 2023, Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit by filing a complaint alleging causes action for: (1) violation of the Song-Beverly Act breach of express warranty, (2) violation of the Song-Beverly Act breach of implied warranty, (3) violation of the Song-Beverly Act Section 1793.2, and (4) negligent repair. On June 12, 2023, Defendant answered the complaint. On May 6, 2024, Defendant filed a motion to compel the depositions of Plaintiffs and request for sanctions concurrently with proof of e-mail service, a proposed order, and the declaration of Andres F. Michel (Michel Decl.). On June 25, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an opposition to Defendants motion. On July 1, 2024, Defendant filed a reply to Plaintiffs opposition. The hearing is scheduled for July 9, 2024. II. LEGAL STANDARD A. Depositions C.C.P. § 2025.450(a) provides that [i]f, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action& without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination&, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponents attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice. C.C.P. § 2025.410(a) provides that [a]ny party served with a deposition notice that does not comply with [the notice requirements in C.C.P. §§2025.210 through 2025.290] waives any error or irregularity unless that party promptly serves a written objection specifying that error or irregularity at least three calendar days prior to the date for which the deposition is scheduled, on the party seeking to take the deposition and any other attorney or party on whom the deposition notice was served. C.C.P. §2025.450(b)(1) provides that [t]he motion [to compel deposition] shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice. B. Sanctions Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030 is a general statute authorizing the Court to impose discovery sanctions for misuse of the discovery process, which includes (without limitation) a variety of conduct such as: making, without substantial justification, an unmeritorious objection to discovery; making an evasive response to discovery; and unsuccessfully and without substantial justification making or opposing a motion to compel or limit discovery.¿ (Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.010.)¿ If sanctions are sought, Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.040 requires that the notice specify the identity of the person against whom sanctions are sought and the type of sanction requested, that the motion be supported in the points and authorities, and the facts be set forth in a declaration supporting the amount of any monetary sanction.¿¿¿ The court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorneys fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct. (CCP § 2023.030(a).) Misuse of the discovery process includes: (d) failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery. (CCP § 2023.010(d).) Reasonable expenses under CCP section 2023.030(a) include the time spent in researching and preparing the motion, as well as court time and travel time spent in connection with the motion. ( Ghanooni v. Super Shuttle (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 256, 262.) ¿If a CCP section 2025.450(a) motion is granted, the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) in favor of the party who noticed the deposition and against the deponent & unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (CCP § 2025.450(g)(1).) III. DISCUSSION A. Procedural Considerations Meet and Confer Defendants counsel attests to the following facts: On March 19, 2023, Defendant served by e-mail a Notice of Deposition of Plaintiff Frida Lopez-Sanchez and Request for Production of Documents for April 12, 2024, at 10:00 am, and a Notice of Deposition of Plaintiff Isela Sanchez and Request for Production of Documents for April 12, 2024, at 1:00 pm. (Michel Decl., ¶ 2; Exh. A.) On April 10, 2024, Plaintiffs served an objection arguing that Defendant unilaterally selected the April 12 th date and that neither Plaintiffs nor their counsel were available. (Decl. of David Derderian, ¶ 5; Exh. 1.) On April 16, Plaintiffs counsel informed Defendant that deposition availability would be provided by April 19, 2024. (Michel Decl., ¶ 6, Exh. E.) On May 6, 2024, not having received any additional communication, Defendant filed the instant motion to compel. On June 24, 2024, Plaintiffs counsel emailed Defendants counsel with four dates in August 2024, and stated they will meet and confer further in good faith in order to schedule a mutually agreeable date. (Derderian Decl., ¶ 7.) As of July 8, 2024, there is no evidence that Plaintiffs depositions have proceeded since the filing of the instant motion. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the meet and confer requirement is fulfilled. B. Motion to Compel Deposition Defendant argues that it served a deposition request on Plaintiffs and that they are entitled to Plaintiffs testimony because they are the buyers of the vehicle. (Mot. to Compel, p. 1.) Defendants March 19, 2024 service of the Notice to Depose Plaintiffs and request for production of documents set the depositions for April 12, 2024. ( Id. ) However, Plaintiffs did not object to the notice until April 10, 2024, only two days prior to the depositions. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff misused discovery by failing to provide alternative availability for the depositions for two months until the filing of this motion. (Reply, p. 3.) After Plaintiffs April 10, 2024 objection, Plaintiffs promised to offer dates as soon as April 19, 2024, yet did not until June 24, 2024. Plaintiffs oppose this motion as moot and maintain they are willing to meet and confer in good faith. (Derderian Decl., ¶ 6, 7l Ex. 2.) However, given that Plaintiff did not follow up with additional availability until after the motion was filed, the motion cannot be considered moot. Therefore, the Court finds it proper to GRANT Defendants motion to compel attendance at the required depositions within 30 days of the date of this order. A. Sanctions Defendant requests the court to impose a monetary sanction of $2,874.20 on Plaintiffs and/or their counsel for Plaintiffs alleged (1) failed meet and confer attempts, (2) untimely objections by Plaintiffs, and (3) failure to provide availability for the deposition. (Mot. to Compel, pp. 1-2.) Defendants Counsel, Andres F. Michel, a California-licensed attorney, and associate of Wilson Turner Kosmo LLP, states that $840 were incurred in preparing this motion, based on: (1) his hourly rate of $325.00 being applied to 2.4 hours to prepare this motion; and (2) the $60.00 filing fee. (Michel Decl. ¶ 8.) Attorney Michel also estimates additional fees incurred of $975 for an estimated 3 hours spent preparing the reply, preparing for oral argument and attending the hearing. ( Id. ) Attorney Michel argues that Plaintiffs untimely objection cost $1,059.20 based on (1) his hourly rate of $325.00 being applied 0.3 hours at $70.50, and (2) Court Reporter fees of $988.70 ( Id., Exh. F.) Attorney Michels declaration requests sanctions in the amount of $2,847.00 based on the following calculations: Mot. to Compel Preparation 2.4 hours at $325.00 $780.00 Deposition Objection 0.3 hours at $[N/A] $70.50 Estimated Reply Fees 3.0 hours at $325.00 $975.00 Court Reporter Fees Imagine Reporting $988.70 Motion Reservation Fee $60.00 TOTAL $2,874.20 Plaintiffs argue that Defendant failed identify every person, party, and attorney against whom the sanction is sought, or the specific type of sanctions sought. Plaintiffs argue that the accompanying declaration of Defendants counsel fails to set forth any facts supporting the amount of any monetary sanctions sought. The Court disagrees. Defendant asks the Court to impose sanctions on Plaintiff and Plaintiffs attorney of record, jointly and severally. As noted above, Defendant sets forth a detailed itemization of the hours and amounts sought. The Court finds that sanctions are warranted and payable within 30 days of this order. IV. CONCLUSION The motion by Defendant American Honda Motor Co. Inc., for an order compelling the depositions of Plaintiffs is GRANTED. Plaintiffs Frida Lopez-Sanchez and Isela Sanchez are ordered to appear for deposition within 30 days of the date of this order. Defendants request for sanctions is granted. Sanctions of $2,874.20 must be paid within 30 days of this order. Counsel for Defendant is ordered to give notice of this ruling. Dated: July 9, 2024 JARED D. MOSES JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

Ruling

STEVEN KAUFMAN, ET AL. VS TESLA, INC. D/B/A TESLA MOTORS, INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION
Jul 12, 2024 | 24GDCV00199
Case Number: 24GDCV00199 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: D TENTATIVE RULING Calendar: 13 Date: 7/12/2024 Case No.: 24 GDCV00199 Trial Date: None Set Case Name: Kaufman, et al. v. Tesla, Inc. MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION Moving Party: Defendant Tesla, Inc. Responding Party: Plaintiffs Steven Kaufman and Triad Communications Group, Inc. (No Opposition) FACTUAL BACKGROUND: Plaintiffs Steven Kaufman and Triad Communications Group, Inc. allege that in September of 2021, plaintiffs purchased a 2021 Tesla Model S vehicle, and that express warranties accompanied the lease of the vehicle to plaintiff by which defendant Tesla, Inc. undertook to preserve or maintain the utility or performance of plaintiffs vehicle or to provide compensation if there was a failure in such utility or performance. Plaintiff alleges that the vehicle was delivered to plaintiffs with serious defects and nonconformities to warranty and developed other serious defects and nonconformities to warranty, including structural and electrical system defects. Plaintiffs allege that the defects manifested themselves in the vehicle within the applicable warranty period, and substantially impair the use, value, or safety of the vehicle. Plaintiffs allege that plaintiffs delivered the vehicle to an authorized repair facility to repair the nonconformities, but defendant has been unable to conform the vehicle to warranty after a reasonable number of repair attempts. Plaintiffs allege that despite their entitlement, defendant Tesla Motors, Inc. has failed to either promptly replace the vehicle or to promptly make restitution. The complaint alleges three causes of action for Violation of the Song Beverly Act, for breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, and violation of Song-Beverly Act section 1793.2. OPPOSITION: (Served and filed within 10 days after service of petition, or within 30 days if service outside the state, after petition is served (§1290.6) [unless extension granted by stipulation or court order determining good cause]) No opposition. ANALYSIS: Procedural No Opposition There is no timely opposition to this motion. Under CCP § 1290.6, a response to a petition to compel arbitration shall be served and filed within 10 days of the service of the petition. Here, the motion was served on June 3, 2024, by electronic transmission. Allowing two days for service by email, opposition was due on or before June 15, 2024, weeks ago. Opposition has also not been filed within nine court days of the date set for hearing, as required for standard motions under CCP §1005(b), which would have been on June 28, 2024. The motion may be granted on the grounds no timely opposition has been served or filed. Substantive Defendant Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) seeks an order compelling plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims in accordance with an arbitration agreement with Tesla and to stay this action pending the outcome of the arbitration. CCP § 1281.2, governing orders to arbitrate controversies, provides, in pertinent part: On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist for rescission of the agreement. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, arbitration agreements shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, save upon such grounds that exist at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract. 9 U.S.C. section 2. There is a strong public policy in favor of arbitration of disputes and any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable disputes should be resolved in favor of arbitration. Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 9 (courts will indulge every intendment to give effect to such proceedings.) (quotation omitted). [A]rbitration agreements should be liberally interpreted, and arbitration should be ordered unless the agreement clearly does not apply to the dispute in question. Vianna v. Doctors Management Co. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1189, quoting Weeks v. Crow (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 350, 353. See also AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 339. In this case, defendant has submitted a copy of a Motor Vehicle Order Agreement affiliated with plaintiffs file, as well as a Retail Installment Sale Contract between plaintiffs and Tesla Motors, Inc., which are authenticated by a Staff Business Resolution Partner at Tesla, Raymond Kim, as company records. [Kim Decl., paras. 2-13, Exs. 1, 2]. Both documents include arbitration provisions. The Retail Installment Sale Contract, which was executed by both plaintiffs as well as defendant, provides, in pertinent part: The Retail Installment Sale Contract, which was executed by both plaintiffs as well as defendant, provides, in pertinent part: ARBITRATION PROVISION PLEASE REVIEWIMPORTANTAFFECTS YOUR LEGAL RIGHTS 1. EITHER YOU OR WE MAY CHOOSE TO HAVE ANY DISPUTE BETWEEN US DECIDED BY ARBITRATION AND NOT IN COURT OR BY JURY TRIAL&. Any claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise (including the interpretation and scope of this Arbitration Provision, and the arbitrability of the claim or dispute), between you and us or our employees, agents, successors or assigns, which arises out of or relates to your credit application, purchase or condition of this vehicle, this contract or any resulting transaction or relationship (including any such relationship with third parties who do not sign this contract) shall, at your or our election, be resolved by neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court action&. [Kim Decl., paras. 8-13, Ex. 2, Retail Installment Sale Contract, p. 7, emphasis in original]. The Motor Vehicle Order Agreement includes an arbitration agreement which is set off in a box and provides: Agreement to Arbitrate. Please carefully read this provision, which applies to any dispute between you and Tesla, Inc. and its affiliates, (together Tesla). If you have a concern or dispute, please send a written notice describing it and your desired resolution to resolutions@tesla.com. If not resolved within 60 days, you agree that any dispute arising out of or relating to any aspect of the relationship between you and Tesla will not be decided by a judge or jury but instead by a single arbitrator in an arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) under its Consumer Arbitration Rules. This includes claims arising before this Agreement, such as claims related to statements about our products. We will pay all AAA fees for any arbitration, which will be held in the city or county of your residence. To learn more about the Rules and how to begin an arbitration, you may call any AAA office or go to www.adr.org. The arbitrator may only resolve disputes between you and Tesla and may not consolidate claims without the consent of all parties. The arbitrator cannot hear class or representative claims or requests for relief on behalf of others purchasing or leasing Tesla vehicles. In other words, you and Tesla may bring claims against the other only in your or its individual capacity and not as a plaintiffs or class member in any class or representative action. If a court or arbitrator decides that any part of this agreement to arbitrate cannot be enforced as to a particular claim for relief or remedy, then that claim or remedy (and only that claim or remedy) must be brought in court and any other claims must be arbitrated. If you prefer, you may instead take an individual dispute to small claims court. You may opt out of arbitration within 30 days after signing this Agreement by sending a letter to: Tesla, Inc.; P.O. Box 15430; Fremont, CA 94539-7970, stating your name, Vehicle Identification Number, and intent to opt out of the arbitration provision. If you do not opt out, this agreement to arbitrate overrides any different arbitration agreement between us, including any arbitration agreement in a lease or finance contract. [Kim Decl., paras. 3-6, Ex. 1, p. 4, bold in original]. Teslas representative also indicates that plaintiffs file includes no opt outs. [Kim Decl., para. 7]. This showing is sufficient to establish the existence of an agreement to arbitrate between the parties. The declaration of counsel for defendant also indicates, On June 3, 3024, my office asked that Plaintiffs stipulate to arbitration. Plaintiffs did not agree to stipulate to arbitration. [Ameripour Decl., para. 3]. There is no opposition to the motion to dispute this evidence, and, in fact, under CCP § 1290, The allegations of a petition are deemed to be admitted by a respondent duly served therewith unless a response is duly served and filed. The complaint here clearly arises from any dispute arising out of or relating to any aspect of the relationship between plaintiff and Tesla, as set forth in the Motor Vehicle Order Agreement, and which arises out of or relates to& the purchase or condition of the vehicle, the contract or any resulting transaction or relationship, as set forth in the Retail Installment Sale Contract. This situation is not a case where a non-signatory is attempting to enforce the agreement. Absent opposition showing a waiver or rescission of the agreements to arbitrate, the court must order the parties to arbitrate. Under CCP § 1281.4, where the court has ordered arbitration of a controversy, the court "shall, upon motion of a party to such action or proceeding, stay the action or proceeding until an arbitration is had in accordance with the order to arbitrate or until such earlier time as the court specifies." Defendant has requested in the motion that the action be stayed. The matter is currently pending only between plaintiffs and defendant as a named defendant. The entire action is stayed pending arbitration. RULING: [No Opposition] Defendant Tesla, Inc.s UNOPPOSED Motion to Compel Binding Arbitration is GRANTED. The Court notes that it received no timely opposition to the motion to compel, as required by CCP § 1290.6. Accordingly, pursuant to CCP §1290, the allegations of the motion are deemed to be admitted by plaintiffs. The Court finds that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, that there is no showing that there has been any waiver of the right to compel arbitration, and no showing that the agreement has been rescinded or that grounds exist for rescission of the agreement. The Court orders plaintiffs Steven Kaufman and Triad Communications Group, Inc. and defendant Tesla, Inc. to arbitrate this matter according to the Arbitration Provision included in the Retail Installment Sale Contract between the parties, dated 09/21/2021. The Court further orders pursuant to CCP § 1281.4 that this action is stayed until an arbitration has been had according to this order. UNOPPOSED Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Defendant Tesla, Inc.s Motion to Compel Binding Arbitration is GRANTED. DEPARTMENT D IS CONTINUING TO CONDUCT AND ENCOURAGE AUDIO OR VIDEO APPEARANCES Please make arrangement in advance if you wish to appear via LACourtConnect by visiting www.lacourt.org to schedule a remote appearance. Please note that LACourtConnect offers free audio and video appearances. However, ADVANCE REGISTRATION IS REQUIRED. If no appearance is set up through LACourtConnect, or no appearance is otherwise made, then the Court will assume the parties are submitting on the tentative.

Ruling

JULIA SARABI VS AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION
Jul 09, 2024 | 23AHCV02228
Case Number: 23AHCV02228 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 3 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST DISTRICT JULIA SARABI , Plaintiff(s), vs. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC. , Defendant(s). ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO.: 23AHCV02228 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFFS DEPOSITION Dept. 3 8:30 a.m. July 9 , 2024 ) Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (Defendant) moves for an order to compel the deposition of plaintiff Julia Sarabi (Plaintiff) pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450. On June 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed a limited opposition brief which specified that no substantive opposition would be filed. Therefore, Plaintiff does not dispute that in December 2023, Defendant noticed her deposition for February 14, 2024, and that she served objections stating she would not attend. It is also undisputed that Plaintiff has not provided any dates for a deposition. Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED and Plaintiff is ordered to appear for her deposition within 20 days of the date of this Order. Sanctions are also imposed against Plaintiff in the total amount of $260, consisting of 1 hour at defense counsels hourly rate of $200 and a $60 filing fee, to be paid no later than 20 days after the date of this order. Dated this 9th day of July , 2024 William A. Crowfoot Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

Ruling

MARTHA GONZALEZ CHAIDEZ VS FCA US LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, ET AL.
Jul 10, 2024 | 23AHCV01642
Case Number: 23AHCV01642 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: X Tentative Ruling Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X HEARING DATE: July 10, 2024 TRIAL DATE: September 10, 2024 CASE: MARTHA GONZALEZ CHAIDEZ AKA MARTHA GONZALEZ v. FCA US LLC; CHAMPION DODGE, LLC dba CHAMPION CHRYSLER JEEP DODGE RAM FIAT; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive. CASE NO.: 23AHCV01642 (1) MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSE TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES FROM DEFENDANT FCA US LLC, AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS (2) MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSE TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES FROM DEFENDANT FCA US LLC, AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS MOVING PARTY : Plaintiff Martha Gonzalez Chaidez RESPONDING PARTY : FCA US LLC SERVICE: Filed April 9, 2024 RELIEF REQUESTED Compel Defendant FCA US LLC to provide code-compliant responses to Plaintiff Martha Gonzalez Chaidezs First Set of Requests for Production, Nos. 45-46, and First Set of Special Interrogatories, Nos. 45-48. In addition, impose total sanctions of $5,240 ($2,620 per motion) against the defendant and its counsel of record, Ongaro P.C. BACKGROUND This is a lemon law action. Plaintiff Martha Gonzalez Chaidez aka Martha Gonzalez (Plaintiff) alleges that she entered into a warranty contract with Defendant FCA US LLC (FCA) for a vehicle (a 2020 RAM 1500). After defects and nonconformities manifested in the vehicle during the warranty period, Plaintiff delivered the vehicle to an authorized FCA repair facility for repair. However, FCA was unable to conform the vehicle to the applicable warranties. FCA breached its obligations under the Song-Beverly Act by failing to remedy the defects and nonconformities or give restitution. On April 9, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motions to compel FCAs further responses to Plaintiffs First Set of Requests for Production (RPD) and Special Interrogatories (SROG). On June 25, 2024, FCA filed its opposition to the RPD motion. On June 26, 2024, FCA filed its opposition to the SROG motion. On July 2, 2024, Plaintiff filed her reply to both oppositions. A jury trial is set for September 10, 2024. TENTATIVE RULING Plaintiffs motions to compel further responses are GRANTED. Defendant FCA US LLC is ordered to serve verified, further responses to Plaintiff Martha Gonzalez Chaidezs First Set of Requests for Production, Nos. 45-46, and First Set of Special Interrogatories, Nos. 45-48, within 30 days of this ruling. The defendant is further ordered to pay the plaintiff total sanctions of $2,840. LEGAL STANDARD On receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that any of the following apply: ¶ (1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete. ¶ (2) An exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate. ¶ (3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a).) Similarly, [o]n receipt of a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, the demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand if the demanding party deems that any of the following apply: ¶ (1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete. ¶ (2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive. ¶ (3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (a).) Except as provided in subdivision (j) [which concerns electronically stored information] the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (h).) DISCUSSION A. Timeliness Motions to compel further response to interrogatories and requests for production must be brought within 45 days of service of the verified response, supplemental verified response, or on a date to which the propounding and responding parties have agreed to in writing; otherwise, the propounding party waives the right to compel further responses. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (c); 2031.310, subd. (c); but see Golf & Tennis Pro Shop, Inc. v. Superior Court (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 127, 134-136 [suggesting that the 45-day deadline does not apply to objections-only responses].) [T]he time within which to make a motion to compel production of documents is mandatory and jurisdictional just as it is for motions to compel further answers to interrogatories. ( Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.) The 45-day deadline is jurisdictional in the sense that it renders the court without authority to rule on motions to compel other than to deny them. ( Ibid. ) The Court finds the instant motions timely. According to Plaintiffs counsel declaration, FCA served its verifications to its responses on February 22, 2024. (Declarations of Armando Lopez, filed April 9, 2024 (Lopez Decl.), ¶ 4; Exhibits B copies of the responses, Proof of Service pages [showing FCA served the responses electronically].) 45 days from February 22, 2024, was Sunday, April 7, 2024. However, Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6, subdivision (a)(3)(B) extends by two court days any right or duty to do any act or make any response within any period or on a date certain after the service of the document & by electronic means &. Here, since service was made electronically, the deadline was extended by two court days to Tuesday, April 9, 2024. Plaintiff filed the motions on that date. Therefore, they are timely. B. Meet and Confer The instant motions to compel further responses must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (b)(1); 2031.310, subd. (b)(2).) The Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied the meet and confer requirement for each motion. (Lopez Decl., ¶¶ 5-9.) FCA appears to argue in its oppositions that the meet and confer process was insufficient. However, that is not grounds for denying the motions. Accordingly, the Court will rule on the motions on their merits. C. Separate Statement The motions must be accompanied by a separate statement. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(a)(2), (3).) A separate statement is a separate document filed and served with the discovery motion that provides all the information necessary to understand each discovery request and all the responses to it that are at issue. The separate statement must be full and complete so that no person is required to review any other document in order to determine the full request and the full response. Material must not be incorporated into the separate statement by reference. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(c).) Here, Plaintiff has satisfied the separate statement requirement of each motion. D. RPDs at Issue Plaintiff moves to compel FCAs further responses to RPDs No. 45-46. Those RPDs asked FCA to produce the following, respectively. · All DOCUMENTS evidencing complaints by owners of the 2020 RAM 1500 vehicle regarding any of the complaints that the SUBJECT VEHICLE was presented to YOUR or YOUR authorized repair facilities for repair during the warranty period. · All DOCUMENTS evidencing warranty repairs to 2020 RAM 1500 vehicles regarding any of the components that YOU or YOUR authorized repair facilities performed repairs on under warranty. The party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling has been directed shall respond separately to each item or category of item by any of the following: ¶ (1) A statement that the party will comply with the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling by the date set for the inspection, copying, testing, or sampling pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of Section 2031.030 and any related activities. ¶ (2) A representation that the party lacks the ability to comply with the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of a particular item or category of item. ¶ (3) An objection to the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.210, subd. (a).) Here, FCA objected to the RPDs, arguing that the requests were vague, ambiguous, overly broad, sought irrelevant information, and sought information protected by the attorney client privilege and work product doctrine. (Separate Statement, pp. 1:6-18, 5:15-28.) In its opposition to the RPD motion, FCA argues that the RPD motion is moot because, on June 25, 2024, it served further supplemental responses to the RPDs, with verifications to follow. (Opposition to RPD Motion, p. 1:14-18.) However, the request to compel FCAs further responses to RPD Nos. 45-46 is not moot because FCA failed to serve verifications. As Plaintiff argues in her reply, [u]nsworn responses are tantamount to no responses at all. ( Appleton v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 632, 636.) Given that FCA is not opposed to supplementing its initial response to RPD Nos. 45-46, the request to compel further responses to RPD Nos. 45-46 is GRANTED. E. SROGs at Issue Plaintiff also moves to compel FCAs further responses to Plaintiffs SROG Nos. 45-48, which asked FCA the following, respectively. · At the time of release for the 2020 RAM 1500 vehicles, state your anticipated range for repairs per thousand vehicles sold (R/1000). · State the repairs per thousand vehicles sold (R/1000) for 2020 RAM 1500 vehicles. · Identify in order the five symptoms with the highest repairs per thousand (R/1000) for 2020 RAM 1500 vehicles, and the corresponding repairs per thousand. · Identify in order the five components with the highest repairs per thousand (R/1000) for 2020 RAM 1500 vehicles, and the corresponding repairs per thousand. If an objection is made to an interrogatory or to a part of an interrogatory, the specific ground for the objection shall be set forth clearly in the response. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.240, subd. (b).) Here, FCA objected to each of the SROGs above, arguing that they seek irrelevant information, are overly broad, and are not limited to any claim, defect, or nonconformity in this case. In opposition to the SROG motion, FCA argues that the request to compel further responses to SROG Nos. 45-48 is moot because it served supplemental responses and is working to obtain verifications for those responses. However, responses without verifications amount to no responses, as stated above. Accordingly, Plaintiffs request to compel FCAs further responses to SROG Nos. 45-48 is GRANTED. F. Request for Sanctions Plaintiff seeks total sanctions of $5,240 ($2,620 per motion) against the defendant and its counsel of record, Ongaro P.C. The requested amount of $2,620 consists of 2.4 hours Plaintiffs counsel spent on the moving papers, 2 hours counsel anticipated spending reviewing the opposition and drafting a reply, 2 hours counsel anticipates spending preparing for and attending the hearing, a total of 6.4 hours at counsels billing rate of $400 per hour ($,2,560), plus a $60 filing fee. (Lopez Decl., ¶¶ 9-10.) Under the relevant statutes, a court shall impose monetary sanctions against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand or interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2031.310, subd. (h); 2030.300, subd. (d).) Here, FCA argues that sanctions are not warranted because Plaintiff prematurely abandoned the meet and confer efforts, did not have legitimate grounds for bringing the motion, the defendant substantially complied with the discovery requests, and even though the defendants objections were valid, it willingly supplemented its responses. However, FCA did not serve verifications. In addition, Plaintiff did not prematurely abandon the meet and confer process if she only had 45 days under the relevant statute to bring the motion or lose that right. Although FCA states it would have extended the motion to compel deadline, Plaintiff was not required to agree to an extension. Finally, FCAs responses to the RPDs were not code-compliant. According to the relevant statute, If the responding party objects to the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of an item or category of item, the response shall do both of the following: (1) Identify with particularity any document, tangible thing, land, or electronically stored information falling within any category of item in the demand to which an objection is being made. (2) Set forth clearly the extent of, and the specific ground for, the objection. If an objection is based on a claim of privilege, the particular privilege invoked shall be stated. If an objection is based on a claim that the information sought is protected work product under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 2018.010), that claim shall be expressly asserted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.240, subd. (b).) Here, FCA did not comply with subdivision (a) of that statute. Therefore, the Court finds the imposition of sanctions proper. However, the Court finds the requested sanctions of $2,620 per motion excessive because some papers were nearly identical to each other (specifically, the declarations filed in support of the moving papers, opposition papers, and reply papers), making it unlikely that Plaintiffs counsel spent the same amount of time on each motion. It is also unlikely that Plaintiffs counsel will spend 4 hours at the hearing (i.e., 2 hours per motion). Accordingly, the Court will only impose sanctions of $1,420 (i.e., 3.4 hours at counsels billing rate of $400 per hour, plus a $60 filing fee) against FCA per motion (total of $2,840). CONCLUSION Plaintiffs motions to compel further responses are GRANTED. Defendant FCA US LLC is ordered to serve verified, further responses to Plaintiff Martha Gonzalez Chaidezs First Set of Requests for Production, Nos. 45-46, and First Set of Special Interrogatories, Nos. 45-48, within 30 days of this ruling. The defendant is further ordered to pay the plaintiff total sanctions of $2,840 within 30 days. Moving party to give notice. Dated: July 10, 2024 ___________________________________ Joel L. Lofton Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court indicating their intention to submit. alhdeptx@lacourt.org

Ruling

VARTOUHIE ACHAKIAN, AN INDIVIDUAL VS MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, ET AL.
Jul 11, 2024 | 23GDCV02489
Case Number: 23GDCV02489 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: E Hearing Date: 07/11/2024 8:30am Case No. 23GDCV02489 Trial Date: UNSET Case Name: VARTOUHIE ACHAKIAN, an individual; v. MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC, A Delaware Limited Liability Company, and CALSTAR MOTORS INC., a California Corporation d/b/a CALSTAR MOTORS, and DOES 1-10, inclusive TENTATIVE RULING COMPEL RESPONSES BACKGROUND Plaintiff, Vartouhie Achakian, filed a Complaint on 11/22/2023 alleging three causes of action. The first two causes of action for (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act Breach of Express Warranty and (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act Breach of Implied Warranty are alleged against Defendant, Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC. The third cause of action for negligent repair is alleged against Defendant, Calstar Motors Inc., a California Corporation dba Calstar Motors. RELIEF REQUESTED ¿ Plaintiff Vartouhie Achakian (Plaintiff) will, and hereby does, move for an order deeming the truth of matters admitted in Plaintiffs Request for Admissions, Set One. This Motion pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 2033.280, subdivision (a), and 2033.280, subdivision (b), on the grounds that Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, (MBUSA or Defendant) has failed to provide any responses to Plaintiffs Request for Admissions (RFA), which seek information directly relevant and material to their claims under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (SBA). Thus, Plaintiff seeks an order deeming the truth of matters admitted. Moreover, Plaintiff seeks monetary sanctions in the amount of $2,904.00, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §§ 2031.310, 2023,030, et seq for Defendants misuse and abuse of the discovery act and its failure to file any responses or production to Plaintiffs initial set of RFAs. The Motion is based upon this Notice, the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declaration of Luis A. Serrano, the papers on file, and upon any other matters that may be presented to the Court at the hearing. No separate statement is being submitted in support of the instant Motion, as it is not required pursuant to rule 3.1345(b), of the California Rules of Court. (LAS Decl., ¶ 18.) (Mot. p. 2.) Procedural Moving Party: Plaintiff, Vartouhie Achakian Responding Party: Defendant, Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC Moving Papers: Notice/Motion; Serrano Declaration; Proposed Order Opposition Papers: Opposition Reply: Reply; Serrano Declaration 16/21 Day Lapse (CCP § 12c and § 1005(b): Ok Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, Rule 3.1300): Ok Correct Address (CCP § 1013, § 1013a): Ok LEGAL STANDARD REQUEST TO DEEM ADMISSIONS ADMITTED Within 30 days after service of requests for admission, the party to whom the requests are directed shall serve the original of the response to them on the requesting party, and a copy of the response on all other parties who have appeared, unless on motion of the requesting party the court has shortened the time for response, or unless on motion of the responding party the court has extended the time for response. (CCP § 2033.250(a).) If a party to whom requests for admission are directed fails to serve a timely response, the requesting party may move for an order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests be deemed admitted, as well as for a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010). (CCP § 2033.280(b).) Further, If a party to whom requests for admission are directed fails to serve a timely response, the following rules apply: (a) The party to whom the requests for admission are directed waives any objection to the requests, including one based on privilege or on the protection for work product under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 2018.010). The court, on motion, may relieve that party from this waiver on its determination that both of the following conditions are satisfied: (1) The party has subsequently served a response that is in substantial compliance with Sections 2033.210, 2033.220, and 2033.230. (2) The partys failure to serve a timely response was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. (CCP § 2033.280(a).) The court shall make this order, unless it finds that the party to whom the requests for admission have been directed has served, before the hearing on the motion, a proposed response to the requests for admission that is in substantial compliance with Section 2033.220. (CCP § 2033.280(c).) ANALYSIS Plaintiffs Moving Arguments Plaintiff moves this Court for an order deeming all requests admitted without objections, to Plaintiffs Requests for Admissions, due to Defendant, Mercedes-Benz USA, LLCs (MBUSA) failure and outright refusal to provide any responses to Plaintiffs Requests for Admissions. Plaintiffs counsel, Serrano, states that the instant discovery was propounded on January 3, 2024. (Serrano Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. 1.) Serrano states that responses were due no later than February 2, 2024. (Serrano Decl. ¶ 10.) As of May 29, 2024, Serrano states that Defendants counsel has not responded to Plaintiffs discovery. (See Serrano Decl. ¶ 14.) Defendants Opposition Arguments Defendants Opposition appears to argue that either: (1) this hearing be continued for 60-75 days to investigate the issues raised in the motion, or (2) this motion be denied because Plaintiff failed to properly serve the RFAs to Defendants email authorized for service of pleadings and written discovery; therefore, Defendant had no obligation to provide the responses Plaintiff now seeks via its motion. Continuance Defendant first argues that the hearing on this motion be continued for 60-75 days. Defendant argues that the attorney handling the discovery and motions in this case has recently taken a leave of absence and has not been in communication with the Defendants firm. Defendant thus argues that its counsel has been unable to discuss the facts of the preparation and service of discovery with the handling attorney. Defendant argues that a 60-75 day continuance will provide the time necessary to investigate the status of the discovery in this case and present all relevant facts to the Court. Defendant also argues: It is MBUS contention that such circumstances provide the substantial justification or are the kind of circumstances [which] make the imposition of the sanction unjust that the California Legislature had in mind pursuant to Civil Code Section 2030.290(c). Therefore, the Court should deny Plaintiffs requested relief at least for the moment and in turn continue the Motion hearing for 60-75 days. (Oppo. p. 2.) Courts Discussion on Continuance The Court does not find Defendants request for a 60-75 day continuance availing. First, Defendant argued that the attorney handling the discovery and motions in this case recently took a leave of absence and has not been in communication with Defendants law firm. Because of this, Defendant explains that counsel has been unable to discuss the facts of the preparation and service of discovery with the handling attorney. The Court does not find Defendants excuse persuasive or compelling. It is up to Defendants counsel to effectively operate its own law firm so that it can diligently represent its client. Second, Defendant provides no legal authority for its request for a continuance. Defendant cited to 2030.290(c) which pertains to interrogatories, and the instant motion pertains to RFAs. Further, even if this motion pertained to interrogatories, 2030.290(c) addresses the issue of sanctions when compelling responses to interrogatories. CCP § 2030.290(c) does not address what the legal standard is for granting or denying a continuance on a motion to compel responses to RFAs. Failing to Properly Serve the RFAs Defendant argues that the subject discovery requests were not properly served, thus it did not owe a response. Defendant argues as follows: California Rules of Court, Rule 2.251 states: When a document may be served by mail, express mail, overnight delivery, or fax transmission, the document may be served electronically under Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6. Electronic service under Civ. Proc. Code section 1010.6 means service of a document, on a person, by either electronic transmission or electronic notification. Electronic transmission, in turn, means the transmission of a document by electronic means to the electronic service address at or through which a person receives electronic service. Section 1010.6(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Similarly, Electronic notification means the notification of the person that a document is served by sending an electronic message to the electronic address at or through which the person receives electronic service , specifying the exact name of the document served, and providing a hyperlink at which the served document may be viewed and downloaded. Section 1010.6(a)(1)(C). Electronic service is only effective under the Code if the service is to the electronic service address which the receiving party has agreed to be served. That was not done. In this case, the electronic service address is MBUSA@clarkhill.com. Plaintiff cannot produce evidence that he served the MBUSA@clarkhill.com email address, the correct email account. In the Proof of Service dated January 3, 2024, Noel Castellon of Plaintiffs law firm declares under penalty of perjury that Castellon served the subject discovery BY ELECTORNIC MAIL to several addresses, none of which was MBUSA@clarkhill.com. (Hom Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. A.) While it is correct that Plaintiff and MBUSA had an agreement to accept service by e-mail, by and through counsel, that agreement required Plaintiff to serve any such documents to the email address MBUSA@clarkhill.com. Any documents not served to MBUSA@clarkhill.com falls outside of the e-service agreement and is not proper service. This is not a valid service address for MBUSA in this case. (Hom Decl., ¶ 4.) Plaintiffs counsel knew that all service by e-mail must be sent to the email address MBUSA@clarkhill.com. The current motion to compel, for instance, was served on May 29, 2024, on MBUSA@clarkhill.com. The agreement of the parties to accept service by e-mail did not change between January 3, 2024, when Plaintiff served the discovery requests, and May 29, 2024, when Plaintiff served the present motion. Plaintiffs counsel knew and understood what email addresses needed to be served and failed to serve the correct email box MBUSA@clarkhill.com when they served the subject discovery. That failing is fatal to the instant Motion because it demonstrates that the subject discovery was not properly served, and no responses were required. (Hom Decl., ¶ 5.) Plaintiffs Requests for Admissions were not properly served pursuant to C.C.P. section 2031.080(a), and MBUSA was not obligated to respond. (Oppo. p. 2-4.) Courts Discussion on Failing to Properly Serve the RFAs Defendant cites to CRC, Rule 2.251 without specifying which subsection of 2.251 it is citing. It appears as if Defendant is citing to a portion of 2.251(a) which states in relevant part, When a document may be served by mail, express mail, overnight delivery, or fax transmission, the document may be served electronically under Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6[.] (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 2.251(a).) The Court notes that Defendants citation to 2.251(a) is not particularly helpful. Defendant argued that Plaintiff served the wrong e-mail address, but Defendants citation provides no help on how the Court is determine what the proper service address is for any given party. Defendant also cited to CCP § 1010.6(a)(1)(B) and 1010.6(a)(1)(C). These citations are also unhelpful to the Court. As stated in CCP § 1010.6(a): (a) A document may be served electronically in an action filed with the court as provided in this section, in accordance with rules adopted pursuant to subdivision (h). (1) For purposes of this section: (A) Electronic service means service of a document, on a person, by either electronic transmission or electronic notification. Electronic service may be performed directly by a person, including a party, by a persons agent, including the persons attorney, or through an electronic filing service provider, and by a court. (B) Electronic transmission means the transmission of a document by electronic means to the electronic service address at or through which a person receives electronic service. (C) Electronic notification means the notification of the person that a document is served by sending an electronic message to the electronic address at or through which the person receives electronic service, specifying the exact name of the document served, and providing a hyperlink at which the served document may be viewed and downloaded. (D) Electronic filing means the electronic transmission to a court of a document presented for filing in electronic form. For purposes of this section, this definition of electronic filing concerns the activity of filing and does not include the processing and review of the document and its entry into the courts records, which are necessary for a document to be officially filed. (CCP § 1010.6(a)(1)(A)-(D).) Defendant argues that Electronic service is only effective under the Code if the service is to the electronic service address which the receiving party has agreed to be served. (Oppo. p. 3.) As a preliminary matter, the Court points out that Defendant provided no legal authority for this argument. Defendant then concedes that Plaintiff and MBUSA had an agreement to accept service by e-mail and that that agreement required Plaintiff to serve documents to the email address MBUSA@clarkhill.com. Defendant argues that since Plaintiffs counsel knew that all service by e-mail must be sent to MBUSA@clarkhill.com, and since the discovery was not served to MBUSA@clarkhill.com, the subject discovery was not properly served and no responses were required. While Defendant bolded specific portions of § 1010.6(a)(1)(B) that stated, to the electronic service address at or through which a person receives electronic service, this citation does not address how the Court is to determine what is the proper electronic service address. Further, even if the Court were to accept Defendants argument that electronic service is only effective under the Code if the service is to the electronic service address which the receiving party has agreed to be served, Defendant does not come forward with proof of any type of agreement that shows where the parties agreed to be electronically served. Defendants counsels declaration simply stated in relevant part, While it is correct that Plaintiff and MBUSA had an agreement to accept service by email, by and through counsel, that agreement required Plaintiff to serve any such documents to the email address MBUSA@clarkhill.com." (Hom Decl. ¶ 4.) The Opposition also argues that Plaintiff served the instant motion to the correct email address, as opposed to the discovery at issue, because Plaintiffs counsel knew and understood what email address needed to be served. Opposition argues that even though the instant motion was served at the proper email address on 5/29/2024, when Plaintiff previously served the discovery on January 3, 2024, nothing between January 3, 2024 and 5/29/2024 changed with the parties agreement, thus, Opposition appears to be implying that Plaintiff knew the proper service email address all along. However, this argument doesnt help the Court assess how it is to determine what the proper email service address of the parties is. The Court will hear argument on what Defendant is attempting to assert with respect to CCP § 1010.6(a)(1). Plaintiffs Reply Arguments Courts Discussion on Untimely Opposition Plaintiff points out that Defendant untimely served the Opposition on 6/27/2024. The Court does not find this argument availing. First, Plaintiff neither explains nor makes it clear to how the Opposition is untimely. Further, even if the Opposition is untimely, the Court will utilize its discretion and consider the Opposition. Courts Discussion on CCP § 1010.6 and CRC, rule 2.251 Plaintiffs Reply argues that when Defendant, a represented party, filed its Answer on December 21, 2023, Defendant affirmatively consented to e-service under § 1010.6 et seq. and Rule 2.251(b)(1)(B). For the reasons explained below, the Court will explain the problems it had analyzing Plaintiffs arguments that the instant discovery was properly served. Plaintiff states in the Reply: Rule 2.251(c)(1) of the California Rules of the Court, expressly provides that [a] court may require parties to serve documents electronically in specified civil actions by local rule or court order, as provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6 and the rules in this chapter. (Reply, p. 4.) The Court fails to understand Plaintiffs argument. CRC, rule 2.251(c)(1) states, A court may require parties to serve documents electronically in specified civil actions by local rule or court order, as provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6 and the rules in this chapter. (CRC, Rule 2.251(c)(1).) The Court fails to understand Plaintiffs argument because 2.251(c)(1) does not address how the Court is to determine what the proper email address is for the parties to be served at. Plaintiff also stated in Reply: Section 1010.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that documents filed by represented parties in all limited, unlimited, and complex civil actions must be filed electronically and allow for service electronically , unless the Court excuses parties from doing so. Although not required, self-represented parties are encouraged to participate in electronic filing and service. If a party with a fee waiver files documents electronically, that party is exempt from the fees and costs associated with electronic filing. Thus, contrary to MBUSAs position, Rule 2.251 et seq. confirms that service of Plaintiffs initial set of discovery was properly on effected on December 21, 2023. (Serrano Decl., ¶ 7, Ex. 1.) (Reply, p. 4-5.) The Court again fails to understand Plaintiffs argument. First, Plaintiff does not specify which subsection of § 1010.6 that Plaintiff is quoting from, and the Court is unclear as to which subsection of § 1010.6 Plaintiff is quoting from. Further, whatever legal authority Plaintiff is attempting to cite, Plaintiffs argument does not address the issue of how the Court is to determine the proper electronic service address for the parties. Plaintiff also stated in Reply: Section 1010.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, made effective January 1, 2023, works in conjunction with Rule 2.251 of the California Rules of the Court, which, together, unequivocally authorizes electronic service as an appropriate medium of service for parties that have appeared in action and are represented by counsel for which the Court requires mandatory e-filing under 1010.6(h), without requiring any prior consent. In fact, 1010.6(b)(2), expressly confirms that [a] person represented by counsel, who has appeared in an action or proceeding, shall accept electronic service of a notice or document that may be served by mail, express mail, overnight delivery, or facsimile transmission. Notably, the statutory schemes only reference to prior consent to e-service is embodied in subdivision (c)(1-2). However, this is limited to unrepresented part[ies], which MBUSAs Answer confirms it is not. In any event 1010.6(c)(3)(ii), provides that affirmative consent to e-service of even non-represented parties can be established through electronic means with the court or the court's electronic filing service provider, and concurrently providing the party's electronic address with that consent for the purpose of receiving electronic service. (Reply, p. 5, ln. 7-19.) The Court has several problems with Plaintiffs arguments. First, Plaintiff cites § 1010.6(b)(2) which states, A person represented by counsel, who has appeared in an action or proceeding, shall accept electronic service of a notice or document that may be served by mail, express mail, overnight delivery, or facsimile transmission. ( Ibid .) An issue with Plaintiffs argument is that the citation does not address how the Court is to determine the proper service address of the parties. Second, Plaintiff cites to § 1010.6(c)(1)-(2). The Court does not find Plaintiffs citation availing. Although Plaintiff argues that the statutory schemes only reference to prior consent to e-service is embodied in § 1010.6(c)(1)-(2), that does not appear to be the case. CCP § 1010.6(c) applies to electronic service by consent of an unrepresented person in a civil action. Here, the Defendant that Opposed this motion is not an unrepresented person. Further, while Plaintiff argues the only reference to prior consent to e-service is embodied in § 1010.6(c)(1)-(2), § 1010.6(b)(3) seems to be more on point as it pertains to represented parties and what must be done before first serving electronically. With respect to the Replys arguments on page 5, lines 7-19, the Court does not find the arguments availing because it does not provide legal authority that addresses the issue that is before this Court, i.e. , how the Court is to determine what the proper service address is. Further, while the Reply on page 5, lines 7-19 cites 1010.6(b)(2), the Reply fails to cite § 1010.6(b)(3), which appears as if it would have been helpful to the Court. As stated in § 1010.6(b): (b) (1) This subdivision applies to mandatory electronic service. The court may order electronic service on a person represented by counsel who has appeared in an action or proceeding. (2) A person represented by counsel, who has appeared in an action or proceeding, shall accept electronic service of a notice or document that may be served by mail, express mail, overnight delivery, or facsimile transmission. (3) Before first serving a represented person electronically, the person effecting service shall confirm the appropriate electronic service address for the counsel being served. (4) A person represented by counsel shall, upon the request of any person who has appeared in an action or proceeding and who provides an electronic service address, electronically serve the requesting person with any notice or document that may be served by mail, express mail, overnight delivery, or facsimile transmission. (CCP § 1010.6(b)(1)-(4).) Therefore, § 1010.6(b)(2) appears relevant because the Defendant opposing this motion seems to have appeared on 12/21/2023 when its counsel filed an Answer. Further, what the Reply failed to cite to was § 1010.6(b)(3) which stated, Before first serving a represented person electronically, the person effecting service shall confirm the appropriate electronic service address for the counsel being served. ( Ibid .) Here, the Reply does not address 1010.6(b)(3). Under 1010.6(b)(3), it appears as if Plaintiff was to confirm the appropriate electronic service address for the counsel being served; however, the Reply does not address this. The Court will hear argument. Reply also states: Rule 2.251(b)(1)(B) sets forth the means by which a party may manifest express consent to eservice, specifically providing that [m]anifesting affirmative consent through electronic means with the court or the court's electronic filing service provider, and concurrently providing the partys electronic service address with that consent for the purpose of receiving electronic service. A party or other person may manifest affirmative consent by serving notice of consent to all parties and other persons and either: (i) Agreeing to the terms of service with an electronic filing service provider, which clearly states that agreement constitutes consent to receive electronic service; or (ii) Filing Consent to Electronic Service and Notice of Electronic Service Address (form EFS-005-CV). (See also, Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.253, subds. (b)(1)-(6) [conditions for mandatory e-filing set forth by local rule.) Here, because MBUSA, a represented party, electronically filed its Answer, on December 21, 2023, it has affirmatively consented to e-service under Section 1010.6 et seq. and Rule 2.251(b)(1)(B). (Serrano Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. 1.) Moreover, Plaintiff properly effectuated service on Defendants counsel of record after Defendants Answer was electronically filed with Court. (Serrano Decl. ¶¶ 7-9.) Moreover, Plaintiffs electronic service of the RFAs was made on the attorneys listed on the first page of Defendants Answer. (Serrano Decl. ¶ 9.) Whats more, Defendant failed to list their electronic service address of MBUSA@clarkhill.com on their email when they electronically served their Answer on Plaintiffs counsel. Consequently, Plaintiffs service of RFAs was unequivocally occurred electronically on January 3, 2024; thereby rendering MBUSAs boilerplate objections as improper and an abuse of discovery under Rule 2.251(b)(1)(A). MBUSAs tactics are clearly a bad faith stratagem designed to obstruct Plaintiffs efforts to conduct meaningful discovery, which Plaintiff is rightfully entitled. (Reply, p. 5, ln. 20-28 p.6 ln. 1-12.) The Court has several issues with the arguments asserted in the Reply from page 5, lines 20-28 to page 6, lines 1-12. Plaintiff cites to CRC, rule 2.251(b)(1(B) to argue that by Defendant electronically filing an Answer, and by Defendant listing several email addresses on said Answer, the email addresses listed on the Answer demonstrate that Defendant affirmatively consented to be electronically served documents at the email addresses listed on said Answer. The Court does not find this argument availing because rule 2.251(b)(1)(B) does not say anything about how the email addresses listed on an Answer determine where a party can receive electronic service. For the sake of clarity, the Court will cite CRC, rule 2.251(b) in full below: (b) Electronic service by express consent (1) A party or other person indicates that the party or other person agrees to accept electronic service by: (A) Serving a notice on all parties and other persons that the party or other person accepts electronic service and filing the notice with the court. The notice must include the electronic service address at which the party or other person agrees to accept service; or (B) Manifesting affirmative consent through electronic means with the court or the court's electronic filing service provider, and concurrently providing the party's electronic service address with that consent for the purpose of receiving electronic service. A party or other person may manifest affirmative consent by serving notice of consent to all parties and other persons and either: (i) Agreeing to the terms of service with an electronic filing service provider, which clearly states that agreement constitutes consent to receive electronic service; or (ii) Filing Consent to Electronic Service and Notice of Electronic Service Address (form EFS-005-CV). (2) A party or other person that has consented to electronic service under (1) and has used an electronic filing service provider to serve and file documents in a case consents to service on that electronic filing service provider as the designated agent for service for the party or other person in the case, until such time as the party or other person designates a different agent for service. (CRC, Rule 2.251(b)(1)-(2).) Although Plaintiffs Reply argues that 2.251(b) shows that Defendant can be served at the email addresses listed on the Answer because the Answer was electronically filed, the Court fails to see how Plaintiff arrives at such a conclusion based on 2.251(b). Therefore, both parties should be prepared to address all aspects of CRC, rule 2.251(b) at the hearing. For example, both parties should be prepared to address if 2.251(b)(1) or 2.251(b)(2) is applicable here. Further, if the parties think 2.251(b)(1) is applicable, they need to explain if 2.251(b)(1) has been met by either 2.251(b)(1)(A) or 2.251(b)(1)(B). Further, the Court notes that eCourt lists counsel for MBUSA as Brian Hom. On eCourt, Brian Homs email address is listed as bhom@clarkhill.com. The discovery at issue here was in fact served at bhom@clarkhill.com. CRC, rule 2.251(b)(1)(B) states, Manifesting affirmative consent through electronic means with the court or the court's electronic filing service provider, and concurrently providing the party's electronic service address with that consent for the purpose of receiving electronic service. Here, it would be helpful for the Court if Defendant came forward with any documents it filed/signed with the electronic service provider when initially filing its Answer. The instant discovery was served at the email address that Defendants counsel provided on eCourt; however, it is unclear as to what email address Defendants counsel provided to the electronic filing service provider as the email address that it consents to for the purpose of receiving electronic service. Further, the parties should be prepared to address 2.251(b)(2) because (b)(2) addresses how a party can consent to service on the electronic filing service provider. Likewise, Defendant alleged it had an agreement to be electronically served at MBUSA@clarkhill.com; therefore, Defendant should be prepared to come forward with this alleged agreement. Courts Discussion on Additional Arguments in Reply On page 2 of the Reply, Plaintiff points out that nowhere in the Opposition or the accompanying Brian Hom Declaration does MBUSA claim it was not in possession or had not received Plaintiffs discovery. Reply points out that the declaration merely points out that service was improper. Reply argues that it is thus safe to assume that MBUSA received the discovery. The Court notes that while it is true that the Opposition and the Hom Declaration fail to state that it never received the discovery, the problem with the Replys argument is it fails to explain how this argument is legally relevant. This argument seems to be rooted in the common-sense argument that Defendant must have received the discovery because Defendants declaration did not state that it did not receive the discovery. However, this does not help the Court because Plaintiff does not explain how this argument is legally relevant for determining the ruling on this motion. On page 2 of the Reply, Plaintiff also argues that MBUSA cited no applicable statutory authority to support its position that it did not have to respond to the discovery because the service address was improper. Here, the Court will hear argument. TENTATIVE RULING OVERALL The Court will hear argument. Both parties should be prepared to address all issues the Court noted in its Analysis section. Both parties should be prepared to address CCP § 1010.6(b)(3) and CRC, Rule 2.251(b)(1)-(2). Further, both parties should be prepared to come forward with any alleged agreements on service, or any documents filed/signed with the Courts electronic filing service provider that either party would need to prove its argument. If the Court were to find that the instant discovery was properly served, the Court notes that Opposition did not address the merits of Plaintiffs motion. Therefore, it would appear as if the Court could deem the truth of the matters admitted in Plaintiffs Request for Admissions, Set One, since Defendant has not provided any responses, much less timely responses. Further, Defendants argument on a request for a continuance is unavailing. But to take a step back for a moment from the minutiae of e-service procedures, the Court is aware that the parties before the Court handle matters together frequently. The parties appear in this Department almost daily on various matters. It is well accepted in the case law and elsewhere that discovery is primarily meant to be dealt with by counsel, corresponding and discussing the issues that arise with each other in good faith and with a spirit of professionalism. To require the parsing of various statutes and Rules of Court regarding electronic service on discovery matters such as this oneif disputes like this one became commonplacewould literally bring the calendar in this Department to a grinding halt. For perspective, imagine a member of the public reading this tentative decision. Besides having their eyes glaze over, that imagined member of the public would perhaps justifiably ask themselves what was going on in the courts the taxpayers were funding? Thirteen pages of small type about email addresses? In any event, in the interests of efficiency, the parties are encouraged to attempt, as best they can, to talk to each other and work out issues like service and confirming receipt of discovery requests and other items with professional courtesies such as a follow up telephone call or email. Simple follow-up steps like these could potentially save the parties and the Court unnecessary expenditure of resources on contretemps such as the one presented in this motion. Sanctions Requests for Admission It is mandatory that the court impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) on the party or attorney, or both, whose failure to serve a timely response to requests for admission necessitated this motion. (CCP § 2033.280(c).) The court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1348(a).) Plaintiff seeks monetary sanctions in the amount of $2,904.00. Plaintiff bases its sanctions request on the following: " Draft Plaintiffs meet and confer letter regarding Defendants lack of responses to Plaintiffs Requests for Admissions. .5 of an hour; " Draft Plaintiffs Notice of Motion and Motion to Deem the RFAs Admitted Without Objections. 2 hours; " Draft Declaration in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Deem the RFAs Admitted Without Objections Plaintiffs Request for Admissions, Set One. - .7 hours; " Anticipated time to review Defendants Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion Deem Admitted to Plaintiffs Request for Admissions, Set One, and Draft Plaintiffs Reply Brief. 2.5 hours; " Anticipated time to prepare for, and attend, the hearing regarding Motion to Deem the RFAs Admitted to Plaintiffs Request for Admissions, Set One. 1 hour " Filing fee - $60.00 16. (Serrano Decl. ¶ 15.) Plaintiffs counsels also states his billable rate is $395.00 per hour. (See Serrano Decl. ¶ 16.) The Court will hear argument.

Ruling

MARIA AVINA JACOBO, ET AL. VS AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION
Jul 10, 2024 | 22NWCV01597
Case Number: 22NWCV01597 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: C JACOBO, ET AL. v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC. CASE NO.: 22NWCV01597 HEARING : 7/10/24 @ 10:30 A.M. #7 TENTATIVE RULING Plaintiff Maria Avina Jacobo and Alfredo Lopez Gomezs motion to compel the deposition of American Honda Motor Company, Inc.s Person Most Qualified is GRANTED. No sanctions are awarded. Moving Party to give NOTICE. This is a Song-Beverly action. Plaintiff Marina Avina Jacobo and Alfredo Lopez Gomez mo ve to compel Defendants Person Most Qualified (PMQ) deposition according to Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450. Discussion If a party or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party, or a person designated by an organization that is a party under Section 2025.230 does not appear for deposition after service of a deposition notice and the party has not validly objected, the noticing party may move to compel the deponents attendance and testimony. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (a).) Article 2, commencing with Section 2025.210, sets forth the grounds for objection . (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.410, subd. (a).) A party served with a deposition notice waives any error or irregularity unless that party serves a written objection specifying that error or irregularity at least three calendar days before the deposition. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.410, subd. (a).) On February 8, 2024, Plaintiffs noticed the deposition of Defendants person most qualified. (Lupinek Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. A.) On March 1, 2024, Defendant objected to the requests for documents accompanying the deposition notice and offered July 22, 2024 as an alternative date. (Dowling Decl., ¶ 7, Ex. C.) On March 11, 2024, Plaintiff declined the proposed July 22, 2024 date. Plaintiff requested an earlier date because trial is scheduled for August 27, 2024. (Dowling Decl., ¶ 11, Ex. G.) Based on the above, the motion is GRANTED. The deposition is ordered for July 22, 2024. The parties are not foreclosed from seeking a trial continuance in Dept. SE-F. Sanctions Code of Civil Procedure section¿2025.450(c) further provides, (1) If a motion under subdivision (a) is granted, the court shall impose a monetary sanction . . . in favor of the party who noticed the deposition and against the deponent or the party with whom the deponent is affiliated, unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. ( Id., § 2025.450(c).) In its discretion, the Court does not award sanctions.

Ruling

ROSA FLORES VS FORD MOTOR COMPANY, A DELAWARE CORPORATION
Jul 12, 2024 | 24GDCV00188
Case Number: 24GDCV00188 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: A LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT NORTH CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK DEPARTMENT A TENTATIVE RULING JULY 12, 2024 MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 24GDCV00188 MP: Rosa Flores (Plaintiff) RP: Ford Motor Company (Defendant) NOTICE: The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter. The Court is guided by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) whereby notice of intent to appear is requested. Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument is requested and any party seeking argument should notify all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the partys intention to appear and argue. The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no argument is received. Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412. ALLEGATIONS: Plaintiff Rosa Flores (Plaintiff) brings this action against Ford Motor Company (Ford) for an alleged violation of the Song Beverly Act. Plaintiff alleges that Ford sold her a defective 2020 Ford Explorer (the Subject Vehicle). Before the Court is a motion by Plaintiff to compel Fords further response to Plaintiffs Request for the Production of Documents (RFPD) Nos. 1-31. Ford opposes the motion and Plaintiff replies. ANALYSIS: I. LEGAL STANDARD A motion to compel further responses to a demand for inspection or production of documents may be brought based on: (1) incomplete statements of compliance; (2) inadequate, evasive, or incomplete claims of inability to comply; or (3) unmerited or overly generalized objections. (C.C.P. § 2031.310(c).) A motion to compel further production must set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand. (See C.C.P. § 2031.310(b)(1).) In Digital Music News LLC v Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216 at 224, the Court defined good cause as a showing that there a disputed fact that is of consequence in the action and the discovery sought will tend in reason to prove or disprove that fact or lead to other evidence that will tend to prove or disprove the fact. If the moving party has shown good cause for the requests for production, the burden is on the objecting party to justify the objections. ( Kirkland v. Sup.Ct (2002) 95 Cal. App.4th 92, 98.) The court shall limit the scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (C.C.P. § 2017.020(a).) Generally, objections on the ground of burden require the objecting party to produce evidence of (a) the propounding party's subjective intent to create burden or (b) the amount of time and effort it would take to respond. (See West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417.) However, no such evidence is necessary where discovery is obviously overbroad on its face. (See Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431.) II. MERITS A motion to compel further responses to a request for production must include a meet and confer declaration consistent with C.C.P. § 2016.040. (C.C.P. § 2031.310 (b)(2).) In turn, Section 2016.040 requires that the moving party have made a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion. (C.C.P. § 2016.040.) A single letter, followed by a response which refuses concessions, might in some instances be an adequate attempt at informal resolution, especially when a legitimate discovery objective is demonstrated. The time available before the motion filing deadline, and the extent to which the responding party was complicit in the lapse of available time, can also be relevant. An evaluation of whether, from the perspective of a reasonable person in the position of the discovering party, additional effort appeared likely to bear fruit, should also be considered ( Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 432.) Upon review of the parties submissions, the Court finds the meet and confer efforts of Plaintiff were insufficient. As evidence of their meet and confer efforts, Plaintiff submits a letter sent on April 18, 2024 to Fords counsel. (Sogoyan Decl. Exh. 5.) This letter appears to thoroughly address the issues that Plaintiff had with Fords initial production and identifies RFPD Nos. 15-31 as requiring further response. ( Id .) The Court notes that the RFPD identified as requiring further response in this letter differs from the RFPD identified in Plaintiffs separate statement, which appears to be all 31 of the RFPD. In response to this letter, Fords counsel agreed to further production of documents on condition that the parties enter into a stipulated protected order preventing the release of certain sensitive information. (Sogoyan Decl. Exh. 6.) These sorts of stipulated protected orders are extremely common in Song-Beverly cases. On April 25, 2024, Ford served the proposed protective order and asked Plaintiff to confirm. (Abramova Decl. ¶ 7, Exh. A.) Plaintiffs declaration includes an email exchange dated May 24, 2024 at 11:31 a.m. (See Sogoyan Decl. Exh. 7.) This email consists of Plaintiffs counsel returning the stipulated protective order to Fords counsel. ( Id .) In the email, Plaintiff requests that Ford stipulate to a two-week extension on the timeline for Plaintiff to bring a motion to compel further responses. ( Id .) Also on May 24, 2024 at 6:55 p.m. Plaintiff filed this motion. The Court does not construe Fords not responding to this email for a period of roughly seven hours to be a refusal to stipulate to extend the time period. Plaintiffs counsel had the stipulated protective order in his possession for a period of over a month by the time he returned it to Ford. Additionally, Plaintiff received Fords initial responses to her discovery on April 8, 2024. (Abramova Decl. ¶ 5.) By the Courts calculation, Plaintiffs deadline to file this motion would have been May 23, 2024. (See C.C.P.§ 2031.310(c) [providing the motion to compel further responses must be filed within 45 days of service.].) As such, the deadline to file the motion to which Plaintiff sought an extension had already passed at the time of the May 24 email. Essentially Plaintiffs counsel waited until the eleventh hour to sign and return the protective order and request an extension to file this motion. When Plaintiffs counsel did not receive a response after seven hours, he proceeded to file the motion. This is not evidence that Fords counsel refused Plaintiffs request and it certainly is not evidence of a good faith meet and confer effort. The Court may deny a motion to compel discovery for lack of a reasonable and good faith attempt to meet and confer. ( Townsend v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1436-1439; Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 434-435.) Given the above, the Court orders denies the motion to compel, and he parties are ordered to meet and confer in good faith as mandated by C.C.P. §2023.010(i). It appears to the Court that Ford is willing to produce further documentation at this juncture which would address several of the requests in Plaintiffs motion. --- RULING : In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the courts records. ORDER Rosa Floress Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production of Documents came on regularly for hearing on July 12, 2024, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: THE MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES IS DENIED. THE PARTIES ARE ORDERED TO FURTHER MEET AND CONFER WITHIN 30 DAYS CONCERNING DISCOVERY COMPLIANCE. THE OSC RE: PROOF OF SERVICE SET FOR AUGUST 12, 2024 IS ADVANCED AND DISCHARGED. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATE: July 12, 2024 _______________________________ F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles

Ruling

RYAN RIOS VS MESA IMPORTS, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, ET AL.
Jul 10, 2024 | 22NWCV01038
Case Number: 22NWCV01038 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: C Rios vs. Mesa Imports, LLC, Case No. 22NWCV01038 This is a Song-Beverly action. Plaintiff moves ex parte to set the Motion to Compel Defendant Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.s Responses to Plaintiffs First Set of Form Interrogatories and Request for Monetary Sanctions and Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Defendant Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.s Responses to Plaintiffs First Set of Special Interrogatories and Request for Monetary Sanctions to December 10, 2024. They are currently set for January 23, 2025 and March 25, 2025. Plaintiffs argue judicial economy because the Court will then decide four motions on that same day that arise out of the same facts. Defendant argues that the parties can informally resolve the issues if Plaintiff re-serves the discovery. Based on the above, the Court GRANTS the motion. The motions are ADVANCED to today and CONTINUED to Tuesday, December 10, 2024, at 10:30 A.M. in Dept. SE-C. The parties are ordered to meet and confer and file a JOINT STATEMENT, no later than 10 days before the hearing, setting forth which, if any, issues remain unresolved and the respective position of the parties. Moving party to give notice.

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