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Cit Group Vs Wright

Case Last Refreshed: 1 year ago

Cit Group Consumer Finance, Inc., filed a(n) Foreclosure - Property case represented by Pruyn Thomas David, against Wright , Lameche H, Wright , Jacqueline D, in the jurisdiction of Travis County, TX, . Travis County, TX Superior Courts .

Case Details for Cit Group Consumer Finance, Inc. v. Wright , Lameche H , et al.

Filing Date

May 05, 2008

Category

Loan Foreclosure (Gen Lit )

Last Refreshed

July 11, 2023

Practice Area

Property

Filing Location

Travis County, TX

Matter Type

Foreclosure

Parties for Cit Group Consumer Finance, Inc. v. Wright , Lameche H , et al.

Plaintiffs

Cit Group Consumer Finance, Inc.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Pruyn Thomas David

Defendants

Wright , Lameche H

Wright , Jacqueline D

Case Documents for Cit Group Consumer Finance, Inc. v. Wright , Lameche H , et al.

ORD:JUDGMENT

Date: July 16, 2008

LETTER/EMAIL/CORR

Date: June 23, 2008

Case Events for Cit Group Consumer Finance, Inc. v. Wright , Lameche H , et al.

Type Description
Docket Event ORD:JUDGMENT
Docket Event AFFIDAVIT
Docket Event LETTER/EMAIL/CORR
Docket Event ORIGINAL PETITION/APPLICATION
Docket Event NTC:OTHER NOTICE
See all events

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P.J. McAuliffe Family Partnership, L.P. vs. The Testate or Intestate Successors of Nora McAuliffe, et al.
Jul 10, 2024 | 23CV-0202994
MCAULIFFE, ET AL. Case Number: 23CV-0202994 Tentative Ruling on Review of Proposed Order: This is an action to quiet title to dormant mineral rights. Plaintiff P.J. McAuliffe Family Partnership, LP brought a Motion for Terminating Sanctions against Defendant John P. “Jack” McAuliffe pursuant to CCP 2023.030(d)(4), or in the alternative, for issue sanctions designating certain facts as established pursuant to CCP 2023.030(b), (d), and (e). On June 17, 2024, this Court heard Plaintiff’s Motion. After oral argument, the Court granted the Motion and ordered Plaintiff to prepare an alternative proposed order consistent with the Court’s ruling. Today’s hearing is simply to confirm an appropriate proposed order has been filed. Proper proof of service is on file. The Court finds that the proposed order received June 18, 2024, comports with the Court’s ruling. The Court will execute the order. Today’s hearing is VACATED. No appearance is necessary on today’s calendar. ****************************************************************************** 9:00 a.m. Review Hearings ******************************************************************************

Ruling

MANKING ELS, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY VS ENHANCER ELSINORE LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, ET AL.
Jul 11, 2024 | 21PSCV00172
Case Number: 21PSCV00172 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: K Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Manking ELS LLCs and Cross-Defendants Chung Chin Tsai aka Johnny Tsais and Kenny Tsais Motion to Set Aside Default is GRANTED. The court awards attorneys fees and costs in the reduced amount of $329.04, payable within 30 days from the date of the notice of ruling. Background Plaintiff Manking ELS, LLC (Manking) alleges as follows: On May 19, 2017, Manking entered into a Commercial Lease Agreement (CLA) with Enhancer Elsinore, LLC (Enhancer), Esther Lin (Lin) and Walter Lynn (Lynn) (collectively, Defendants) pertaining to the Elsinore Hot Springs Motel (Property). The CLA, which was to be effective on June 16, 2017, called for a three-year lease term. At Defendants request, the parties on June 16, 2017 signed an Addendum, extending the lease from July 16, 2017 to such date at which inspections pass to qualify the Property for an occupancy permit. At the same time the parties executed the CLA, Defendants drafted a Hotel Management Agreement (HMA), which the parties entered into on June 16, 2017. Defendants failed to pay rent and failed to manage and maintain the Property. On November 12, 2021, Manking filed a Second Amended Complaint, asserting causes of action against Defendants and Does 1-10 for: 1. Breach of Written Contract 2. Fraud/Misrepresentation 3. Negligent Misrepresentation 4. Breach of Fiduciary Duties 5. Common Counts 6. Accounting On March 1, 2022, the court sustained Defendants demurrer to the second and third causes of action, without leave to amend. On March 25, 2024, Defendants filed a First Amended Cross-Complaint (FACC), asserting causes of action against Manking, Chung Chin Tsai aka Johnny Tsai (J. Tsai), Kenny Tsai (K. Tsai) and Roes 1-50 for: 1. Rescission 2. Breach of Contract (In the Alternative) 3. Intentional Misrepresentation 4. Negligent Misrepresentation 5. Negligence 6. Disgorgement On May 8, 2024, Mankings, J. Tsais and K. Tsais defaults were entered on the FACC. A Trial Setting Conference is set for July 11, 2024. Legal Standard The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, and shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken . . . Notwithstanding any other requirements of this section, the court shall, whenever an application for relief is made no more than six months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by an attorney's sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, vacate any (1) resulting default entered by the clerk against his or her client, and which will result in entry of a default judgment, or (2) resulting default judgment or dismissal entered against his or her client, unless the court finds that the default or dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney's mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect. . . (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) Discussion Manking, J. Tsai and K. Tsai (together, Cross-Defendants) move the court for an order, per Code of Civil Procedure § 473, subdivision (b), setting aside the default entered against them on the FACC, on the basis of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Cross-Defendants counsel Maxwell Lin (Lin) attests that the date for response to the FACC was mis-calendared due to a clerical error by a member of his staff (Lin Decl., ¶ 4); that he did not notice the mistake for several days due to an unusually heavy calendar ( Id. ); that on May 6, 2024 opposing counsel Jason Feazell (Feazell) emailed him and indicated that if a response was not filed that day, he would file a request for default ( Id. , ¶ 5); that he did not notice Feazells above statement because it was part of a thread wherein other matters were being discussed until May 8, 2024 ( Id. ); that he prepared the answer which was filed May 9, 2024 ( Id. , ¶ 5, Exh. A) and that he later learned that Cross-Defendants default had been filed and entered on May 8, 2024 ( Id. , ¶ 6). The motion is granted on the mandatory basis of attorney affidavit of fault. Enhancer, Lin and Lynn urge the court to award them attorneys fees and costs in the amount of $1,379.04 for pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 473, subdivisions (b). (Opp., 5:23-6:2). Subdivision (b) provides, in relevant part, that [t]he court shall, whenever relief is granted based on an attorneys affidavit of fault, direct the attorney to pay reasonable compensatory legal fees and costs to opposing counsel or parties . . . Under the circumstances, the court is inclined to award attorneys fees and costs in the reduced amount of $329.04 (i.e., 1 hour at $300.00/hour, plus $29.04 filing fee), which are payable within 30 days from the date of the notice of ruling.

Ruling

WALTER BROWN VS. 1625 LEAVENWORTH STREET, LLC, A LIMITED LIABILITY ET AL
Jul 10, 2024 | CGC23610747
Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 10, 2024 line 4. PLAINTIFF WALTER BROWN NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT is GRANTED. No opposition filed. =(501/HEK) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified and the opposing party does not appear. PLAINTIFF WALTER BROWN Notice Of Motion And Motion For Leave To File First Amended Complaint

Ruling

LEE GREENBERG VS. JERRY BENJAMIN ET AL
Jul 11, 2024 | CGC24612607
Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 11, 2024 line 5. DEFENDANT MICHELLE HORNEFF-COHEN , AN INDIVIDUAL, HORNEFF WADDLE CORPORATION, DBA PROPERTY DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT is SUSTAINED with leave to amend for Plaintiff to allege facts in support of each element of each cause of action against the moving defendants in light of the repeated allegations in the Complaint that Plaintiff became an owner of the Property in 2020 and Defendants started managing the property in 2003 pursuant to an agreement with the Benjamins. =(501/HEK) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified and the opposing party does not appear.

Ruling

MARIA GONZALEZ SANCHEZ VS LIDIA PACHECO
Jul 09, 2024 | 23STCV18797
Case Number: 23STCV18797 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 45 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Monica Gonzalez Sanchez, Plaintiff, vs. Lidia Pacheco, Defendants. Case No.: 23STCV18797 DEPARTMENT 45 [TENTATIVE] RULING Action Filed: 08/08/2023 [1st Amended Complaint Filed: N/A] Trial Date: None Set Hearing date: 07/09/2024 Moving Party: Defendant Lidia Pacheco Responding Party: Plaintiff Maria Sanchez Defendants Demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint The Court considered the moving papers and the opposition. Defendants Demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint is SUSTAINED in its entirety. Plaintiff is granted 20 days leave to amend. Background This case stems from a landlord-tenant dispute. Maria Sanchez (Plaintiff) alleges that Lidia Pacheco (Defendant) committed several unlawful acts while operating as landlord of 1422 E 58 th Dr., Los Angeles, CA 90001 (the Premises). (Complaint, ¶6.) Plaintiff alleges that she began renting the Premises in 2004 under a previous owner Angelina Davalos (Davalos). Davalos passed away in 2017. Thereafter, Defendant became the new owner. ( Id. ) Plaintiff alleges that she has been paying a rental fee of $900.00 each month to the Defendant. Upon entering the agreement for the rental lease of the Premises, Plaintiff alleges that she asked the owner if there was anything to be aware of prior to the start of the lease, to which the owner at that time replied in the negative. Plaintiff alleges she did not discover the alleged illegality of the unit until 2023. ( Id . at ¶ 7.) Plaintiff additionally alleges that the Premises was infested with insects, vermin, and mold at the time she entered into the lease agreement. ( Id. at ¶8.) Plaintiff alleges that she notified Defendant, but nothing was done, the issue only grew worse between 2019 and 2022. ( Id. at ¶10.) Issues with the plumbing also arose, and Plaintiff alleges that after giving notice, Defendant did not respond, and Plaintiff therefore conducted repairs at her own expense. ( Id. ) In November of 2019, Plaintiff alleges that there was no gas nor hot water for a week. ( Id. at ¶10.) In June of 2023, Plaintiff alleges that she was asked to vacate the premises, with no written eviction notice. ( Id. at ¶14.) Plaintiff alleges that no rental contract was ever provided. ( Id. ) Prior to this in 2019, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant verbally harassed her to leave. Plaintiff then filed suit. The Complaint contains the following causes of action: 1. Violation of Civil Code § 1942.4 2. Tortious Breach of Warranty of Habitability 3. Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment 4. Nuisance 5. Violation of Bus. & Prof. Code §17200 et seq. 6. Negligence 7. Fraud Intentional Misrepresentation 8. Fraud Concealment 9. Landlord Harassment 10. Constructive Eviction 11. Retaliatory Eviction 12. Negligent and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 13. Violation of AB 1482 Tenant Protection Act The motion now before the Court is Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint. Plaintiff opposes the demurrer; no reply was filed. Meet and Confer Before filing a demurrer&the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc. §430.41(a).) Defendant provides the Declaration of Thomas Shinton Regarding Meeting and Conferring. The Declaration states that Defendant reached out on September 7, 2023, but was unable to reach the Plaintiff. The requirements of Code Civ. Proc. §430.41(a) remain unsatisfied, however, per Code Civ. Proc. §430.41(a)(4), A determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer. Therefore, the Court turns to the demurrer. Discussion Legal Standard [A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint. ( Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. ( Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) Analysis Defendant demurs to the Complaint as a whole and each and every cause of action on three main grounds: (1) the pleading does not state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action, (2) the pleading is uncertain and unintelligible, and (3) that several of the causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations. The Court agrees, sustains the demurrer in its entirety and grants Plaintiff 20 days leave to amend. A. The Complaint Fails to Properly Allege a Contract Each of the causes of action are based on an alleged rental contract with Defendant, however, the contract is neither provided verbatim, nor attached. ( Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 307.) Moreover, the legal effect of the contract is not plead. ( Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198-199.) Although Plaintiff does not allege a breach of contract, without a verbal or written rental lease agreement, none of the causes of action can survive demurrer. B. The Complaint is Vague As to Defendants second contention that the Complaint is vague, the Court agrees. First, several of the causes of action plead, do not state specific facts, but rather refer back to the section labeled Facts. Second, the Complaint makes clear that from 2004 to 2017, the owner of the Premises was Davalos. (Complaint, ¶6.) The Complaint also makes clear that there were issues that began in 2004. For example, both the causes of action for fraud are based on representations made to Plaintiff upon entering into the alleged lease agreement in 2004, several years before Defendant took over. (Complaint, ¶7. Also see Opposition Papers, 31:7-16.) Another example is the issue with vermin which began in 2004, and apparently was never corrected by Davalos. It is unclear as to what time periods Defendant, the current landlord, is being sought to be liable for because Defendant took over in 2017. By this time Plaintiff was well aware of several of the issues that triggered the pleaded causes of action, which leads to concerns with the applicability of the delayed discovery doctrine (explained further below). C. Statute of Limitations Finally, Defendant asserts the defense that many of the causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff became aware of most if not all of the issues plead within the Complaint long before Defendant took over as landlord. Even the delayed discovery doctrine would provide no assistance here, as to delay the statute of limitations the accrual of a cause of action occurs when plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the injury had a wrongful cause. ( Lederer v. Gursey Schneider LLP (2018) 22 Cal.App.5 th 508, 521.) It is clear that Plaintiff discovered the necessary elements for many of these causes of action as early as 2004 (see generally, the Complaint), but only filed a Complaint with the Court in 2023. Consequently, the demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint is sustained in its entirety. Leave to Amend Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 [court shall not sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment]. As there is reasonable possibility of successful amendment, the Court grants Plaintiffs 20 days leave to amend. Conclusion Defendants Demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint is SUSTAINED in its entirety. Plaintiff is granted 20 days leave to amend. It is so ordered. Dated: July 9, 2024 _______________________ MEL RED RECANA Judge of the Superior Court

Ruling

AGUINA vs CRAWFORD REAL ESTATE SERVICES
Jul 10, 2024 | MCC1901351
AGUINA VS CRAWFORD MCC1901351 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT REAL ESTATE SERVICES AGUINA VS CRAWFORD JOINDER TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY MCC1901351 REAL ESTATE SERVICES JUDGMENT Tentative Ruling: Grant Defendant’s requests for judicial notice. Deny Plaintiff’s requests for judicial notice. Grant the motion as to all five causes of action. Deny Crawford Real Estate and Shoshone Corporation’s motion for joinder as it is untimely. I. Late Opposition Plaintiff’s opposition was not filed until July 2 and 3 – only four and five days before the hearing, respectively. No memorandum of points and authorities was filed at all. Under CCP §437c(b)(2), all opposition papers must be served on the moving party and filed with the court at least 14 days before the date set for hearing on the motion, unless the court shortens the time for good cause shown. Here, no good cause has been shown and the court did not shorten the time required to file an opposition. Thus, Plaintiff’s opposition is untimely. A court has discretion to refuse to consider papers served and filed beyond the deadline without a prior court order finding good cause for late submission. (Bozzi v. Nordstrom, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 755, 765.) If the court decides to consider late-filed papers, circumstances may require a continuance of the hearing to allow the moving party an opportunity to reply to matters contained therein. (See Hobson v. Raychem Corp. (1999) 73 CA4th 614, 623 (dictum) (disapproved on other grounds by Colmenares v. Braemar Country Club, Inc. (2003) 29 C4th 1019, 1031, fn. 6).) The court does consider the late-filed papers as even with these documents, the motion is still properly granted. Thus, there is no prejudice to Defendants if the court considers the documents filed in Opposition. The documents filed in Opposition do not provide any admissible evidence. The issues with the requests for judicial notice are discussed in the next section. The response to the separate statement indicates where Plaintiff disagrees with Defendants’ assertions, but there is no evidence provided in support. Plaintiff references documents (which are not properly judicially noticed) and makes various statements that are unsupported by a declaration or any other evidence. As a result, no evidence is provided in support of the Opposition meaning Plaintiff has not shown any triable issues of material fact. II. Joinder Defendants Crawford Real Estate and Shoshone Service Corporation filed a joinder to the MSJ on June 20, 2024. This joinder includes a memorandum of points and authorities, a separate statement 1, a list of exhibits, request for judicial notice, and declaration of Leonel Tapia. However, 75 days’ notice is required on a motion for summary judgment. (CCP §437c(a).) The motion and accompanying documents were not mailed until June 5, 2024. This does not comply with the 75- day notice requirement. Accordingly, the court does not grant the joinder. Where the moving party notices the hearing in less than the required time, notice must begin anew. The court cannot cure this defect by continuing the hearing for the missing number of days. (Robinson v. Woods (2008) 168 CA4th 1258, 1268.) Deny. III. Request for Judicial Notice Generally, a court may take judicial notice of a recorded document, the date it was recorded and executed, the parties to the transaction and the legally operative language as long as there is no genuine dispute regarding the document’s authenticity. (Scott v. JP Morgan Chase Bank (2013) 214 Cal. App. 4th 743, 755.) The court can properly take judicial notice of Defendants’ requests 1-8. The court can properly take judicial notice of Defendants’ requests 9-11 under Evidence Code §452(d) (court records). GRANTED. Plaintiff makes sixteen (16) requests for judicial notice. Requests 1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 are properly judicially noticed under Evidence Code §452(d) (court records). However, a party requesting judicial notice of any materials under Evid. Code §§ 452 or 453 must provide the court and each opposing party with copies of the material to be so noticed. (CRC 3.1306(c); see Evid. Code § 453; Creed-21 v. City of San Diego (2015) 234 CA4th 488, 519-520—although ordinance qualified for judicial notice under Evid. Code § 452, request properly denied due to insufficient information given under Evid. Code § 453.) Plaintiff did not provide copies of any of the documents they request the court to take judicial notice of. The remaining requests (not court records) are not properly subject to judicial notice. The court therefore denies all of Plaintiff’s requests. IV. First Cause of Action – Breach of Contract “A cause of action for breach of contract requires pleading of a contract, plaintiff’s performance or excuse for failure to perform, defendant’s breach and damage to plaintiff resulting therefrom.” (Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal. App. 4th 1004, 1031.) A contact will be enforced if it is sufficiently definite for the court to ascertain the parties’ obligations and to determine whether there has been a breach. (Bustamante v. Intuit Inc. (2006) 141 Cal. App. 4th 199, 209.) To plead a cause of action based on a written contract, a plaintiff may attach a copy of the written contract and incorporate it by reference or plead the terms verbatim or the legal effect of the contract. (Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198-199.) In the Fifth Amended Complaint (FAC), plaintiff alleges he entered into a written contract with Defendants on November 7, 2013, whereby Defendants agreed to and loaned Plaintiff $500,000 to develop the property. (¶13.) Then, in “mid 2016,” Plaintiff requested and received an extension on the loan, as well as an additional loan to be securitized by the property in the amount of $275,000. (¶15.) Plaintiff asserts Defendants agreed to the loan if Plaintiff met three conditions: (1) an appraisal of the property; (2) Plaintiff obtain a dismissal of a recorded abstract of judgment from a Family Law matter; and (3) Plaintiff acquire title insurance for the new loan. (¶16.) The FAC alleges all of these conditions were met. (¶16.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “breached their promise and commitment to give Plaintiff the additional funding and denied the loan.” (¶16.) Defendants argue this claim fails for five distinct reasons. First, Defendants assert it is undisputed that no lender ever spoke a word to Plaintiff, either before or after the $500,000 loan was funded, during the foreclosure process, or after the 1 “Each moving party shall support [the] motion for summary judgment with a separate statement.” Frazee v. Seely (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 627, 636. Here, Crawford and Shoshone filed their own separate statement and evidence so this was complied with. foreclosure process. Thus, there was no agreement between Plaintiff and lenders for an additional $275,000 loan. (SUMF No. 11.) The evidence Defendants provide in support of this material fact is sufficient to meet Defendants’ initial burden. As noted above, Plaintiff has not provided any admissible evidence in support of the Opposition. As a result, the motion is properly granted. Second, Defendants assert Plaintiff did not meet the second requirement to obtain the additional loan because he failed to obtain a dismissal or release of the abstract of judgment in the family law case. Defendants provide evidence in support of this material fact which, again, is not rebutted by Plaintiff. Third, Defendants argue the alleged oral agreement to loan money is not enforceable under the Statute of Frauds. Civil Code §1624(a)(7) states: “The following contracts are invalid, unless they, or some note or memorandum thereof, are in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by the party’s agent… A contract, promise, undertaking, or commitment to loan money or to grant or extend credit, in an amount greater than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000), not primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, made by a person engaged in the business of lending or arranging for the lending of money or extending credit. For purposes of this section, a contract, promise, undertaking, or commitment to loan money secured solely by residential property consisting of one to four dwelling units shall be deemed to be for personal, family, or household purposes.” The FAC notes the property was undeveloped and not residential in nature. (¶8.) Thus, the statute of frauds applies and any alleged oral agreement to the purported loan is unenforceable. Fourth, Defendants argue the alleged loan for $275,000 is not specific enough to be an enforceable agreement. Defendants note there is no allegation as to the terms of repayment, making it too uncertain to enforce under Peterson Development Co. v. Torrey Pines Bank (1991) 233 CalApp.3d 103, 115. 2 There is no evidence before the court of any terms of repayment of the alleged $275,000 loan, making it unenforceable. Fifth, Defendants argue the claim is outside the applicable two-year statute of limitations for a breach of oral contract under CCP §339(1). The FAC alleges Defendants breached their promise to loan Plaintiff the additional $275,000 on May 3, 2017. The initial Complaint was not filed under October 29, 2019. This is outside the statute of limitations and makes the claim improper. For all of these reasons, the motion is granted as to the breach of contract claim. V. Second Cause of Action – Promissory Estoppel Promissory estoppel is a doctrine that employs equitable principles to satisfy the requirement that consideration must be given in exchange for the promise sought to be enforced. (Kajima/Ray Wilson v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2000) 23 Cal.4th 305, 310.) A promissory estoppel claim requires proof of the same elements as a cause of action for breach of contract, except for consideration. (US Ecology, Inc. v. State of California (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 887, 903.) The elements of a promissory estoppel claim are: (1) a promise clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise is made; (3) reliance must be both reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must be injured by his reliance.” (Advanced Choices, Inc. v. State Dept. of Health Services (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1661, 1672.) 2 “’[a] loan commitment is not binding on the lender unless it contains all of the material terms of the loan, and either the lender's obligation is unconditional or the stated conditions have been satisfied. When the commitment does not contain all of the essential terms ... the prospective borrower cannot rely reasonably on the commitment, and the lender is not liable for either a breach of the contract or promissory estoppel.’ (9 Miller & Starr, op. cit. supra, § 28.4, at p. 8, fn. omitted.) The material terms of a loan include the identity of the lender and borrower, the amount of the loan, and the terms for repayment.” This claim also fails for many of the same reasons stated above. The terms of the alleged loan agreement are uncertain as there are no specified repayment terms. There is evidence no lender ever communicated with Plaintiff in making this alleged loan agreement. This claim also falls outside the two-year statute of limitations. Since the claim for breach of contract fails, the claim for promissory estoppel also fails. VI. Third Cause of Action – Tortious Interference with Contract The elements of a cause of action for the intentional interference contractual relations are: (1) a valid contract between plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendant’s knowledge of this contract; (3) defendant’s intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) resulting damage. (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 55.) “To establish the claim, the plaintiff need not prove that a defendant acted with the primary purpose of disrupting the contract, but must show the defendant's knowledge that the interference was certain or substantially certain to occur as a result of his or her action.” (Reeves v. Hanlon (2004) 33 Cal. 4th 1140, 1148.) It is well established that corporate agents and employees acting for and on behalf of a corporation cannot be held liable for inducing a breach of the corporation’s contract. (Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 24.) “The tort duty not to interfere with the contract falls only on strangers – interlopers who have no legitimate interest in the scope or course of the contract’s performance.” (Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503, 513.) Plaintiff alleges he entered into a valid purchase agreement with Robert S. Dickens for the purchase of the lots on September 4, 2019, for a purchase price of $675,000. (FAC ¶46.) Plaintiff alleges he gave actual notice of the opened escrow and purchase agreement to Defendants on September 10, 2019. (¶47.) Plaintiff then alleges that Defendants intentionally submitted excessive payment demands to escrow to thwart the closing of escrow and effectuate a non- judicial foreclosure of Plaintiff’s property. (¶48.) Defendants present evidence that escrow’s closing date was set for December 4, 2019, which was after the scheduled Trustee’s sale on November 1, 2019. Defendants present evidence that the lenders did not agree to accept the purchase price of $675,000 as payment of the balance due under the loan which was in excess of $713,000. (Hermansen Decl. ¶22.) The evidence before the court shows the lenders carried out the Trustee’s sale as planned, which was lawful. This is evidence that Defendants’ actions were not designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship between Plaintiff and the alleged buyer. Defendants have met their initial burden and Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to show a triable issue of material fact. VII. Fourth Cause of Action – Quiet Title A quiet title action seeks to establish an interest in real property as between adverse claimants. (Deutsche Bank National Trust v. McGurk (2012) 206 Cal. App. 4th 201) The elements are: (1) the plaintiff is the owner and in possession of the land; and (2) defendant claims an interest adverse to the plaintiff. (South Shore Land Co. v. Peterson (1964) 226 Cal. App. 2d 725, 740- 741.) A quiet title complaint must be verified and must include: (a) a description of the property; (b) the title of the plaintiff as which a determination is sought and the basis of the title; (c) the adverse claims to the title of plaintiff against which a determination is sought; (d) the date as of which the determination is sought; and (e) a prayer for the determination of the title of the plaintiff against adverse claims. (Cal. Code Civ. Pro. §761.020.) Tender is generally a necessary element for a mortgagor to maintain a cause of action to quiet title against the mortgagee. (See Fonteno v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1372; Lueras v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 49, 86-87.) The FAC seeks a declaration that Plaintiff is the title owner of record for the property as to the effective date of November 4, 2019. (¶53.) The FAC asserts Plaintiff is willing and able to tender the amount owed to Defendants. (¶54.) “The Legislature has not established a specific statute of limitations for actions to quiet title. [Citation.] Therefore, courts refer to the underlying theory of relief to determine the applicable period of limitations. [Citations.] An inquiry into the underlying theory requires the court to identify the nature (i.e., the ‘gravamen’) of the cause of action. [Citation.]” (Walters v. Boosinger (2016) 2 Cal. App. 5th 421, 428.) As discussed above, the underlying theory of Plaintiff’s case (breach of contract/promissory estoppel) violates the two-year statute of limitations for an oral agreement. Thus, this claim also is barred by the statute of limitations. VIII. Fifth Cause of Action – Wrongful Foreclosure The elements of a wrongful foreclosure claim are: (1) the trustee or mortgagee caused an illegal, fraudulent, or willfully oppressive sale of real property pursuant to a power of sale in a mortgage or deed of trust; (2) the party attacking the sale (usually but not always the trustor or mortgagor) was prejudiced or harmed; and (3) in cases where the trustor or mortgagor challenges the sale, the trustor or mortgagor tendered the amount of the secured indebtedness or was excused from tendering. (Lona v.Citibank, N.A. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 89, 104.) A party challenging a foreclosure must make full tender to establish his or her ability to purchase the property. (United States Cold Storage v. Greater Western Savings & Loan (1985) 165 Cal. App. 3d 1214, 1225.) While it is not always necessary to establish tender to prevent a foreclosure, the borrower must show that he or she tendered the full amount of indebtedness in order to set aside a foreclosure sale that has already occurred. (Intengan v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP (2013) 214 Cal. App. 4th 1047, 1053-1054.) Plaintiff’s claim that the foreclosure was improper is rooted in the purported $275,000 loan commitment. As discussed, any alleged agreement of this loan is not enforceable. Accordingly, the unfounded allegation of breach of contract cannot be the basis for the wrongful foreclosure claim. The evidence before the court shows the foreclosure was properly executed. (SUMF 54- 59.) There is no admissible evidence included with the Opposition, so Plaintiff has not rebutted the presumption.

Ruling

Ann Drake, Trustee of the Tecklenburg Revocable Trust, a trust entity vs Lee Tecklenburg, individually, and as trustee of the Tecklenburg-Missaelides Revocable Trust et al.
Feb 14, 2024 | STK-CV-URP-2023-0001246
Drake v. Tecklenburg, et al. – Case No. 2023-1246 2/14/24 – Plaintiff’s Motion for an Order to Show Cause Defendant LEE TECKLENBURG, individually and acting as trustee of the TECKLENBURG-MISSAELIDES REVOCABLE TRUST filed a Motion for an Order to Show Cause Re: Contempt as to Plaintiff ANN DRAKE. Plaintiff filed an Opposition. Defendant filed a Reply. Having read all the paper, the court issues the following tentative ruling: Defendant’s Motion is MOOT. Defendant’s request for the court to issue an Order to Show Cause Hearing and impose sanctions is DENIED. Pursuant to Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a) and CCP §1019.5(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order Blanca A. Bañuelos Judge of the Superior Court of California Directions for Contesting or Arguing the Tentative Ruling Tentative rulings for Law and Motion will be posted electronically by 1:30 p.m. the day before the hearing. Any party wishing to contest or argue the tentative ruling must email the court at civilcourtclerks@sjcourts.org that they intend to appear remotely or in person in Dept. 10B no later than 4:00 PM on the day before the scheduled hearing. The Department, Case number, Case Name, and party’s name must be in the header of the email. The email must include the Department, Case number, Case Name, Motion, party’s name and email, date and time of the hearing, issues they plan to argue, and that they have informed the opposing party. The party must also notify affected counsel, or unrepresented parties that they intend to appear, no later than 4:00 PM on the day before the scheduled hearing. Unless the Court and opposing counsel have been notified, the tentative ruling shall become the ruling of the Court without oral argument. Department 10B is open for in person appearances. For remote appearances, please call into the dedicated conference bridge line for Department 10B at the time set for the hearing. The conference bridge phone number is (209) 992-5590. Follow the prompts and dial 6939 (4-digit bridge line) and 3892 (4-digit pin number).

Ruling

PACIFIC WESTERN BANK, A CALIFORNIA STATE-CHARTERED BANK VS ARMAN ARSHAKYAN, AN INDIVIDUAL, ET AL.
Jul 12, 2024 | 23GDCV02198
Case Number: 23GDCV02198 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: D TENTATIVE RULING Calendar: 11 Date: 7/12/2024 Case No: 23 GDCV02198 Case Name: Pacific Western Bank v. Arshakyan, et al. MOTION FOR ORDER CHANGING NAME Moving Party: Banc of California formerly known as Pacific Western Bank Responding Party: Defendants Arman Arshakyan and Libre Express, Inc. (No Opposition) RELIEF REQUESTED: Order changing Plaintiff/Judgment Creditors name and that all further pleadings reflect Plaintiff/Judgment Creditors new name Banc of California FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND: This action was filed by plaintiff Pacific Western Bank to collect sums allegedly owed to plaintiff by defendant Libre Express, Inc. pursuant to two loan agreements evidenced by promissory notes in favor of plaintiff, which agreements were guaranteed by defendant and Arman Arshakyan. The file shows on December 18, 2023, plaintiff filed a Request for Entry of Default as to defendants, which default was entered as requested the same date. On February 15, 2024, a Judgment by Default by the court was entered, based on plaintiffs written declaration, entering judgment for plaintiff and against defendants in the total sum of $59,869.03. ANALYSIS: The motion is brought by Banc of California, formerly known as Pacific Western Bank, seeking an order changing plaintiff/judgment creditors name and that all further pleadings reflect the new name. It is not stated how this third party has standing to pursue this relief, when it is not a named party to this action. It would appear that in the absence of legal authority permitting a third party to seek this relief in this action, the motion should be brought by plaintiff/judgment creditor Pacific Western Bank. The motion argues that the order changing name is necessary, so the record reflects the correct name of judgment creditor going forward. There is no legal authority cited in the moving papers. Ordinarily in such a situation, the judgment creditor would proceed pursuant to CCP section 673, which provides: (a) An assignee of a right represented by a judgment may become an assignee of record by filing with the clerk of the court which entered the judgment an acknowledgment of assignment of judgment. (b) An acknowledgment of assignment of judgment shall contain all of the following: (1) The title of the court where the judgment is entered and the cause and number of the action. (2) The date of entry of the judgment and of any renewals of the judgment and where entered in the records of the court. (3) The name and address of the judgment creditor and name and last known address of the judgment debtor. (4) A statement describing the right represented by the judgment that is assigned to the assignee. (5) The name and address of the assignee. (c) The acknowledgment of assignment of judgment shall be: (1) Made in the manner of an acknowledgment of a conveyance of real property. (2) Executed and acknowledged by the judgment creditor or by the prior assignee of record if there is one. (d)(1) If an acknowledgment of assignment of judgment purports to be executed or acknowledged by an authorized agent of the judgment creditor or an authorized agent of a prior assignee of record, then documentation sufficient to evidence that authorization shall be filed together with the acknowledgment of assignment of judgment. (2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), an assignee of a right represented by a judgment may also become an assignee of record by filing with the clerk of the court that entered judgment a court order or other documentation that evidences assignment of judgment by operation of law. There has been no acknowledgment of assignment filed by the moving party, and certainly no document complying with the provisions of subdivisions (b) or (c). No document including the required information has been filed, and no document is submitted which is executed and acknowledged by the judgment creditor or any prior assignee of record. Moving party submits a declaration of counsel, who is not the judgment creditor, and cannot authenticate or testify to any current status or relationship of plaintiff, which does not include the required information, but states that effective December 1, 2023, Banc of California, N.A. merged into Pacific Western Bank, with the surviving banks name changed to Banc of California, and attaches what purports to be a State of California Department of Financial Protection and Innovation Certificate of Merger. [Khatchadourian Decl., para. 3]. This is not an appropriate acknowledgment of assignment. In addition, the Certificate of Merger is not properly authenticated by an attorney for the judgment creditor with no facts which would indicate that the attorney has personal knowledge concerning the matters in which the judgment creditor is involved. This documentation in any case fails to constitute an acknowledgment of assignment or the filing of a court order or other documentation that evidences assignment of judgment by operation of law. The relief cannot be granted on this showing. The motion is denied. RULING: [No Opposition] Motion for Order Changing Plaintiffs Name is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. DEPARTMENT D IS CONTINUING TO CONDUCT AND ENCOURAGE AUDIO OR VIDEO APPEARANCES Please make arrangement in advance if you wish to appear via LACourtConnect by visiting www.lacourt.org to schedule a remote appearance. Please note that LACourtConnect offers free audio and video appearances. However, ADVANCE REGISTRATION IS REQUIRED. If no appearance is set up through LACourtConnect, or no appearance is otherwise made, then the Court will assume the parties are submitting on the tentative.

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