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Grand View Mhp Vs All Others Et Al

Case Last Refreshed: 11 months ago

Grand View Mhp, filed a(n) Landlord-Tenant - Property case against All Others, Mccune, Katrina, in the jurisdiction of Benton County, OR, . Benton County, OR Superior Courts with Matthew J. Donohue presiding.

Case Details for Grand View Mhp v. All Others , et al.

Judge

Matthew J. Donohue

Filing Date

October 27, 2022

Category

Landlord/Tenant - Residential Or Return Of Personal Property

Last Refreshed

August 10, 2023

Practice Area

Property

Filing Location

Benton County, OR

Matter Type

Landlord-Tenant

Parties for Grand View Mhp v. All Others , et al.

Plaintiffs

Grand View Mhp

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Defendants

All Others

Mccune, Katrina

Case Events for Grand View Mhp v. All Others , et al.

Type Description
Docket Event Trial - Court
IN PERSON; 1 hour

Judge: Donohue, Matthew

Docket Event Return - Mail
unable to forward
Docket Event Order - Fee Waiver

Judge: Donohue, Matthew

Docket Event Hearing - Landlord/Tenant
First Appearance

Judge: Donohue, Matthew

Docket Event Closed
Docket Event Digitized Judgment Document
General Judgment Dismissal

Judge: Donohue, Matthew

Docket Event Application - Fee Deferral Waiver
Docket Event Answer
Docket Event Order
APPEARANCE ORDER

Judge: Donohue, Matthew

Docket Event Motion - Dismissal
See all events

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Ruling

U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. vs. Sells
Jul 14, 2024 | 22CV-0200669
U.S. BANK TRUST, N.A. VS. SELLS Case Number: 22CV-0200669 Tentative Ruling on Order to Show Cause Re Dismissal: An Order to Show Cause Re Dismissal (hereinafter “OSC”) issued May 31, 2024, to Plaintiff’s Counsel for failure to submit a proposed judgment as ordered on September 25, 2023. Counsel has submitted a response to the OSC Re: Dismissal, and a Request to Vacate an Order of Sanctions that was made by Judge Boeckman on May 28, 2024. The Court declines to vacate its May 31, 2024 Order imposing sanctions. That issue is not properly before the Court. That order was issued by another judge and Counsel failed to appear at the hearing on that matter. A proposed judgment was lodged with the Court on June 24, 2024. However, the Court notes that the proposed judgment identifies two street addresses for the subject property, each of which are different from the street address identified in the Request for Court Judgment by Default. The Court needs further clarification as to the correct address. The ‘correctness’ of the judgment is not at issue in the instant OSC. Only the failure to timely provide the Court with a proposed judgment is at issue in this hearing. Having reviewed counsel’s declaration, the Court finds good cause to vacate the instant OSCThe Court confirms today’s review hearing set for 9:00 a.m. ****************************************************************************** 9:00 a.m. Review Hearings ******************************************************************************

Ruling

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ACTING BY AND THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION VS APEX DEVELOPMENT, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, ET AL.
Jul 12, 2024 | 23BBCV02207
Case Number: 23BBCV02207 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: A LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT NORTH CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK DEPARTMENT A TENTATIVE RULING JULY 12, 2024 MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 23BBCV02207 MP: The People of the State of California acting by and through the Department of Transportation (Plaintiff) RP: Apex Development, Inc. & Anthony Nowaid (Defendants) [No Response Rendered] NOTICE: The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter. The Court is guided by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) whereby notice of intent to appear is requested. Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument is requested and any party seeking argument should notify all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the partys intention to appear and argue. The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no argument is received. Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412. ALLEGATIONS: On September 25, 2023, The People of the State of California, acting by and through the Department of Transportation (Caltrans) brought this action against Apex Development, Inc. (Apex), Anthony Nowaid (Nowaid), Eriks Towing, The Habibi Shack, Challenger Trucking Express, Stone Concrete Mix, and Valley Green Tree Services. This was an unlawful detainer matter in which Caltrans sought possession from Apex and Nowaid (Defendants) of the property located at 12398 Sheldon Street, Sun Valley, CA 91352 (Subject Property). On May 30, 2024, the parties stipulated to the entry of judgment as against Apex. The stipulated judgment was for possession of the property and for $189,853.44 in damages assessed against Apex. The stipulation did not include a judgment of damages as against Nowaid. Caltrans now moves for an award of attorneys fees based on a corresponding provision of the parties written lease agreement. Apex has submitted no opposition to the motion. LEGAL STANDARD: The prevailing party in any action on a contract shall be awarded reasonable attorneys fees incurred to enforce that contract where the contract specifically provides for attorney's fees. (Civ. Code § 1717(a).) The Court begins the attorney fee inquiry with the lodestar, i.e. , the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. ( PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) From there, the lodestar figure may then be adjusted [according to a multiplier enhancement] based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. ( Id .) Relevant multiplier factors include (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. ( Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.) No specific findings reflecting the courts calculations for attorneys fees are required; the record need only show that the attorneys fees were awarded according to the lodestar or touchstone approach. ( Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1344, 1349.) A trial court has broad discretion to award attorney fees in an amount that is less than the lodestar amount and, to discourage claimants from making an unreasonable demand, may deny altogether a fee request that appears unreasonably inflated. ( Id . at 1321-1322; see Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635.) The basis for the trial court's calculation must be the actual hours counsel has devoted to the case, less those that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time. ( Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395.) The law is clear, however, that an award of attorney fees may be based on counsel's declarations, without production of detailed time records. ( Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.) In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice. Failure to raise specific challenges in the trial court forfeits the claim on appeal. ( Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488.) MERITS: Caltrans moves for attorneys fees to be awarded in the amount of $42,075.00. This amount reflects a total of 153.8 hours of attorney work at a rate of $250 per hour. Caltrans requests that this amount, in addition to $12,198.55 of undisputed costs (reflected in a separately filed Memorandum of Costs) be added to the judgment. As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that Caltrans is the prevailing party in the matter. C.C.P. § 1032(a)(4) defines a prevailing party as one with a net monetary recovery. There is no doubt that Caltrans is the prevailing party in this litigation under that definition. The Court also finds that the written lease agreement between the parties allows Caltrans to seek attorneys fees in this unlawful detainer matter. The attorney fees provision of the lease agreement is as follows: If Tenant or Landlord shall bring any action for any relief against the other, declaratory or otherwise, arising out of this Lease, including any suit by Landlord for the recovery of rent or possession of the premises, the losing party shall pay the successful party a reasonable sum for attorneys fees which shall be deemed to have accrued on the commencement of such action and shall be paid whether or not such action is prosecuted to judgment. Should Landlord, without fault on Landlords part, be made a party to any litigation instituted by Tenant or by any third party against Tenant, or by or against any person holding under or using the premises by license of Tenant, or for the foreclosure of any lien for labor or materials furnished to or for Tenant or any such other person or otherwise arising out of or resulting from any act or transaction of Tenant or of any such other person, Tenant shall save and hold Landlord harmless from any judgment rendered against Landlord or the premises or any part thereof, and all costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys fees, incurred by Landlord in connection with such litigation. (Choi Decl. ¶ 39, Ex. 1 at Article 19.5, p. 40.) Given this suit was for the recovery of possession and past due rent, the attorneys fee provision is clearly triggered. As concerns the amount of fees requested, the Court finds them to be reasonable. [T]he verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous. ( Horsford, supra at 396; City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 785.) The underlying matter was vigorously contested which resulted in significant litigation. Here, Caltrans presents uncontested records as to the number of hours spent on the case. The billable hours timesheets, submitted as Exhibits 6 and 7 to the declaration of Daniel Choi (Choi), reflect a total of 153.8 hours spent litigating this matter. In the Courts experience this number of hours is commensurate with the complexity of a commercial unlawful detainer case. Further, the Court does not find anything about the billable hours entries to be clearly erroneous. In short, the number of hours billed is reasonably supported by Caltrans uncontested declarations and documentary evidence. As concerns the rate of Caltrans attorneys, the Court finds this to is reasonable. Caltrans states that, although it does not bill hourly, it could reasonably bill $250 per hour. (Choi Decl. ¶ 45.) Choi states that he is a practicing attorney with roughly eleven years of experience and that his rate in private practice prior to joining Caltrans was $400 an hour. (Choi Decl. ¶¶ 41, 42.) Choi additionally supports his rate by providing copies of the United States Attorneys Office Fee Matrix and the Laffey Matrix. (Choi Decl. Exhs. 4, 5.) Both matrices indicate a rate higher than $250 per hour for an attorney of Chois experience. As such, the Court finds Chois rates reasonable. The Court notes that Caltrans does not request a multiplier of the lodestar amount. The Court also notes that there is a slight discrepancy in Caltrans accounting and their requested fee amount. Although Caltrans requests fees of $42,075, their billing entries show a total of $41,075 (38,450 + 2,625 = 41,075). (See Choi Decl. Exh. 6, 7.) The Court finds that $41,075 is the proper amount supported by Caltrans declaration and evidence. As concerns Caltrans memorandum of costs, the Court finds it too is appropriate. If items on their face appear to be proper charges, the verified memorandum of costs is prima facie evidence of their propriety, and the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. ( Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 774.) Here, Caltrans submitted a separate Memorandum of Costs within 15 days of entry of judgment as required by Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1700(a)(1). Upon review the Court finds the charges to be proper. Further, Apex did not bring a corresponding motion to tax any of these costs within the 15-day time limit proscribed by Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1700(b)(1). As such, the cost award of $12,198.55 is appropriate. In sum, the Court finds Caltrans has shown it is entitled to attorneys fees in the amount of $41,075 and costs in the amount of $12,198.55. Caltrans has adequately demonstrated the reasonableness of these fees and costs, while Apex has submitted no opposition. Accordingly, Caltrans motion for attorneys fees is GRANTED. --- RULING : In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the courts records. ORDER The People of the State of California acting by and through the Department of Transportation s Motion for Attorneys Fees came on regularly for hearing on July 12, 2024, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: THE MOTION IS GRANTED. ATTORNEYS FEES ARE AWARDED IN THE AMOUNT OF $41,075. COSTS ARE AWARDED IN THE AMOUNT OF $12,198.55. UNLESS ALL PARTIES WAIVE NOTICE, CALTRANS TO GIVE NOTICE. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATE: July 12, 2024 _______________________________ F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles

Ruling

CARL BARNEY VS SIENNA CHARLES LLC, A FLORIDA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, ET AL.
Jul 09, 2024 | 23SMCV05304
Case Number: 23SMCV05304 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 205 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles West District Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 20 5 CARL BARNEY , Plaintiff, v. SIENNA CHARLES, LLC, et al., Defendant s . Case No.: 2 3 S M CV 0 5 304 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 [ TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS DEMURRER TO AND MOTION TO STRIKE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT BACKGROUND Th is is a breach of contract and fraud case . Defendants Sienna Charles LLC and Jaclyn Sienna India-Reinert (Ms. India) provide bespoke travel services for high-wealth individuals . (First Amended Complaint (FAC ) ¶8.) In mid-2021, Plaintiff Carl Barney desired to obtain the services of a high level, full service VIP travel agency to arrange all of the details f or his three-week trip to Europe. ( Id. ¶9.) He therefore spoke with Defendants about their services . ( Id. ¶10.) Ms. India assured Plaintiff that she knew how to get her clients access to exclusive experiences that would otherwise be unavailable to them . She claimed, in writing and orally, to be able to provide extraordinary private travel and the ability for Plaintiff to access top experts for his vacations. ( Id. ¶10.) Relying on these oral representations, Plaintiff paid $75,000 for the Europe trip and multiple additional trips he desired to have planned over a one year period (July 1 st Agreement) . H e describes the July 1 st A greement as a partially oral and partially written agreement to provide full service planning and implementation of travel itineraries over the course of one year from July 1, 2021 through June 20, 2022. ( Id. ¶ 22.) Under the July 1 st Agreement, Defendants were to provide Plaintiff access to the most exclusive luxury travel and lifestyle services available in the world and to comb[ ] the globe consistently procuring only the best in ultra-luxury living. ( Id. ¶20.) Plaintiff claims Defendants breached the July 1 st Agreement by their poor planning and lack of communication, an d Plaintiffs staff was forced to clean up their messes . ( Id. ¶13.) Specif i cally, Plaintiffs staff was forced to book VIP suites, arrange last minute flights that could have been scheduled weeks in advance and book other appointments for things such as required Covid-19 testing . ( Id. ) Pursuant to the July 1 st Agreement, Plaintiff then sought to use Defendants services for a three - week trip to the Middle East . ( Id. ¶14.) Plaintiff asked Defendants to prepare a proposed itinerary by September 7, 2021 . ( Id. ¶ 16.) Defendants ignored the re quest , instead providing a proposed agenda on September 14, 2021 which failed to include any specific dates (or even number of days) for visiting any of the countries and no details of available a ctivities that Defendants could curate . ( Id. ) This action ensued . The operative first amended complaint (FAC) alleges claims for (1) breach of contract, (2) fraud, (3) unjust enrichment and imposition of constructive trust and (4) unfair business practices . This hearing is on Defendants demurrer to and motion to strike the complaint . Defendant s demurrer is based on the grounds that (1) the FAC does not allege any actual contract or contractual terms; (2) Defendants alleged breach of contract doesnt equal fraud , and Plaintiff has not plead fraud with specificity ; (3) unjust enrichment is a mere remedy, not a valid cause of action; (4) the FAC doesnt identify any specific funds on which to impose a constructive trust, and (5) Plaintiff has no valid claim for unfair business practices . Defendants also move to strike (1) Plaintiffs punitive damages allegations because Plaintiffs fraud claim fails, and (2) any claim for money damages in connection with Plaintiffs claim for unfair business practices because under the unfair competition law, a plaintiff is entitled only to restitution and injunctive relief . LEGAL STANDARD [A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint. ( Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable . (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 (in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents).) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. ( Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) Further, the court may, upon motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading . (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subd. (a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subd. (b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437.) Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. ( See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 (court shall not sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment); Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1037 (A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment.).) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. ( Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) MEET AND CONFER Code Civ. Proc. §§ 430.41 and 435.5 requires that before the filing of a demurrer or motion to strike, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer or motion to strike for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer or motion to strike. (C ode C iv. P roc. §§ 430.41(a), 435.5(a).) The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (C ode C iv. P roc. §§ 430.41(a)(2), 435.5(a)(2).) Thereafter, the moving party shall file and serve a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (C ode C iv. P roc. §§ 430.41(a)(3) , 435.5(a)(3) .) Defendant s submit the Declaration of Kenneth Ruttenberg which attests the parties met and conferred by telephone on May 2 2 , 2024 , more than five days before the demurrer and motion to strike was filed (on May 28, 2024 ) . This satisfies the meet and confer requirements of Code Civ. Proc. §§430.41 and 435.5. Plaintiff argues that Defendants have not complied with the meet and confer requirements . Plaintiff, however, fails to explain why that is so . In any event, the Court cannot overrule a demurrer or deny a motion to strike based on an insufficient meet and confer . ( Code Civ. Proc. §§430.41 (a)(4) and 435.5 (a)(4) . ) DISCUSSION Breach of Contract Defendant s demur to the breach of contract claim on the ground that the contract terms are so vague that no one could judge whether Defendants supposedly breach those terms . The Court agrees . The Complaint alleges that i n exchange for $75,000, Defendants were to provide full service planning and implementation of travel itineraries over the course of one year from July 1, 2021 through June 20, 2022. ( FAC ¶ 22.) Defendants promised to provide access to the most exclusive luxury travel and lifestyle services available in the world and to comb the globe consistently, procuring only the best in ultra-luxury living for Plaintiff for one year . ( Id. ¶ 22.) These terms are too vague to determine whether a breach has occurred . It is not clear what full service planning entails . And t here is no basis to judge whether the luxury travel Defendants provided were the most exclusive or constituted the best in ultra luxury living. These promises are not definite enough to determine the scope of Defendants obligations or the limits of their performance . Accordingly , the Court sustains the demurrer to the breach of contract claim with leave to amend . Fraud Defendant s demur to Plaintiffs fraud claim as duplicative of the contract claim, as insufficiently plead and as failing to allege an intent not to perform . The Court agrees on the last ground . To allege promissory fraud, Plaintiff must plead Defendants made promises that they had no intention of performing . ( Lazar v. Super. Court (1996) 12 Cal.4 th 631, 638.) The fact that a promise was made and not fulfilled is insufficient to establish fraud by false promise . ( Tenzer v. Superscope (1985) 39 Cal.3d 18, 31.) Rather, something more than nonperformance is required to prove the defendants intent not to perform his promise. ( Id. ) Making a promise with an honest but unreasonable intent to perform is wholly different from making one with no intent to perform and, therefore, does not constitute a false promise. ( Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4 th 153, 159.) Here, Plaintiff has not alleged facts to support a showing that Defendants did not intend to perform on their promises at the time they made them . In fact, the FAC alleges partial performance by Defendants . (FAC ¶¶ 16, 18.) The fact that Defendants partially performed undercut s any claim they did not intend to perform at the time they made their promises . ( Castaic Vil lage Ctr . LLC v. Gymcheer USA, Inc. , 2021 Cal. Super. LEXIS 6377 at *5 (partial performance negate s an intent not to perform). ) Accordingly , the Court sustains the demurrer to Plaintiffs fraud claim withoug leave to amend . Unjust Enrichment Defendant demurs to the unjust enrichment claim on the ground it is a remedy and not a cause of action . Plaintiff argues it has not asserted an unjust enrichment claim . The caption to its complaint, however, characterizes its third cause of action as an unjust enrichment claim and imposition of constructive trust . This may have been a clerical error and a holdover from the prior complaint . A s Plaintiff maintains he is not asserting an unjust enrichment claim, the demurrer to the unjust enrichment claim is moot . Constructive Trust Defendant demurs to the constructive trust claim on the ground Plaintiff does not allege a specific identifiable property interest because money is fungible . The Court agrees . A prerequisite to the imposition of a constructive trust is the identification of a specific property belonging to the claimant . ( Korea Supply Co. V. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4 th 1134, 1150.) A constructive trust requires money or property identified as belonging in good conscience to the plaintiff [which can] clearly be traced to particular funds or property in the defendant s possession. ( Id. ) A constructive trust is available where the specific res or funds can be identified and attached, but not where the plaintiff seeks to impose general personal liability as a remedy for the defendant s monetary obligations. ( Honolulu Joint Apprenticeship and Training Committee of United Ass'n Local Union No. 675 v. Foster (9 th Cir. 2003) 332 F.3d 1234, 1238 . ) In other words, a constructive trust is not an appropriate remedy for a claim that is essentially one for money damages , as is the case here . Further, constructive trust is not a cause of action per se, but an equitable remedy . ( Batt v. City and County of San Francisco (2007) 155 Cal. App. 4th 65, 82; see also Habitat Trust for Wildlife, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cucamonga (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1306, 1332 (constructive trust is an equitable remedy); PCO, Inc. v. Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro, LLP (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 384, 398 (constructive trust is a remedy); Glue-Fold, Inc. v. Slautterback Corp. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023 (constructive trust is a remedy). Accordingly , the Court sustains the demurrer to the constructive trust claim without leave to amend . Unfair Business Practices Defendants argue that Plaintiffs claim under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17200 (UCL) fails because Plaintiff has not alleged the violation of any law . The Court agrees . UCL prohibits unfair competition, which is defined as any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice. Here, t he FAC alleges that Defendants violated the UCL prohibition against engaging in an unlawful act or practice by the conduct described above. (FAC ¶ 41.) To state a cause of action based on an unlawful business act or practice under the UCL, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show a violation of some underlying law . ( People v. McKale (1979) 25 Cal.3d 626, 635; Olsen v. Breeze, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 608, 618.) Plaintiff has not identified any underlying law that was violated . In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendants conduct also constituted unfair and fraudulent business practices . While Plaintiff did not allege this theory in his Complaint, the C ourt is not¿limited to plaintiff s theory of recovery in testing the sufficiency of their¿complain t against a¿demurrer, but instead must determine if the¿ factual ¿allegations of the complaint are¿adequate to state a cause of action under any legal theory. (¿ Barquis¿ v. ¿Merchants Collection Assn . (1972) 7 Cal.3d 94, 103 .)¿ Mistaken labels and confusion of legal theory are not fatal; if appellant s complaint states a cause of action on any theory, he is entitled to introduce evidence thereon. ( Porten¿ v. ¿University of San Francisco ¿(1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 825, 833 .) California courts have not uniformly settled on a single approach to defining 'unfair' business practices in a consumer action under the UCL . Prior to 1999, California courts applied what is known as the balancing test. Courts defined unfair business practices as those offend[ ing ] an established public policy or when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers, or where the utility of the defendant s conduct does not outweigh the gravity of the harm to the victim . ( Cel-Tech Commc ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co. (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 163, 18 4 .) Under the balancing test, a determination of unfairness involves an examination of [the practice s] impact on its alleged victim, balanced against the reasons, justifications and motives of the alleged wrongdoer. ( McKell v. Washington Mut., Inc. (2006) 142 Cal. App. 4th 1457, 1473¿(internal citations omitted) .) In 1999, the California Supreme Court rejected that test and held that a finding of unfairness must instead be tethered to some legislatively declared policy or proof of some actual or threatened impact on competition. ¿ ( Cel-Tech , 20 Cal. 4th at 186-87 . ) The¿ Cel-Tech ¿court, however, expressly declined to extend this¿standard to consumer actions.¿ ( Id. ¿at 187 n.12 .) Here, Plaintiff has not alleged a threatened impact on competition and has not alleged facts that would meet the balancing test . For example, Plaintiff does not allege that D efendants conduct was not motivated by legitimate business or economic need or that the harm and adverse impact of Defendants conduct outweighed these needs . Accordingly , P laintiff has not stated a UCL claim based on either test for unfairness . To state a claim under the fraudulent prong of the¿UCL, a plaintiff must show that members of the public are likely to be¿deceived.¿( Bank of the W. v. Superior Ct. (1992) 2 Cal. 4th 1254, 1267.) The determination as to whether a business practice is deceptive is based on the likely effect such [a] practice would have on a reasonable¿consumer. ( McKell, 142 Cal.App.4th at 1471 .) Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that members of the public were likely to be deceived by Defendants conduct . Accordingly , Plaintiff has not met the fraudulent prong of the UCL. Accordingly , the Court sustains the demurrer to Plaintiffs UCL claim with leave to amend . Punitive Damages Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not alleged fraud and therefore cannot seek punitive damages . As the Court concludes Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a fraud claim, punitive damages are unavailable . Money Damages for UCL Claim Defendant argues Plaintiff cannot recover damages for his UCL claim . The Court agrees. Under the UCL, a plaintiff is entitled only to restitution and injunctive relief; he may not recover damages . ( Korea Supply Co., 29 Cal.4 th at 1144.) Plaintiff seeks money damages for his UCL claim . ( FAC at p.10 lines 16-19.) Accordingly , the Court will strike the prayer for money damages as to the UCL claim . CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the Court SUSTAINS IN PART and OVERRULES IN PART Defendant s demurrer with 20 days leave to amend and DENIES IN PART and GRANTS IN PART their motion to strike with out leave to amend . IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: July 9 , 202 4 ___________________________ Edward B. Moreton, Jr. Judge of the Superior Court

Ruling

ANNIE LIN VS FABIAN PONCE, ET AL.
Jul 11, 2024 | 23STCV12218
Case Number: 23STCV12218 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 45 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles ANNIE LIN, Plaintiff, vs. FABIAN PONCE, et al. Defendants. Case No.: 23STCV12218 DEPARTMENT 45 [TENTATIVE] RULING Action Filed: 05/30/2023 Trial Date: None set. Hearing date: 07/11/2024 Moving Party: Plaintiff Annie Lin Responding Party: None OSC Re: Default Judgment The Court considered the moving papers. The motion is CONTINUED to allow Plaintiff to resubmit the correct Judicial Council CIV-100 and JUD-100 forms. The Court notes that Plaintiff failed to comply with California Rules of Court Rule 3.1800 because she filed outdated CIV-100 and JUD-100 forms. The application was submitted on January 3, 2024, but Plaintiff filed the CIV-100 form dated January 1, 2007, and the JUD-100 form dated January 1, 2002. The current CIV-100 form is dated January 1, 2023 and the JUD-100 form is dated January 1, 2024. It is so ordered. Dated: July 11, 2024 _______________________ MEL RED RECANA Judge of the Superior Court

Ruling

CHROMIAK vs WILTSE
Jul 10, 2024 | CVPS2402121
Motion to Strike Answer on Complaint for CVPS2402121 CHROMIAK vs WILTSE Quiet Title of GEORGE THOMAS CHROMIAK Tentative Ruling: No tentative ruling. A hearing will be conducted.

Ruling

MOJGAN YAMINI VS OPERATION BOOTSTRAP, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION
Jul 15, 2024 | 23STCV08814
Case Number: 23STCV08814 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: 55 NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS : Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees BACKGROUND Plaintiff Mojgan Yamini sued defendant Operation Bootstrap on April 20, 2023 for breach of written contract and specific performance. On May 11, 2023, Plaintiff filed a proof of personal service on Defendant that same date. Defendant filed no answer. On June 13, 2023, the clerk entered Defendants default. On June 21, 2023, Plaintiff submitted his default prove-up materials. The request for entry of default judgment did not include a request for attorneys fees. On November 28, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiffs request for judgment and entered default judgment against Defendant. On June 7, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for attorneys fees. DISCUSSION A plaintiff who obtains default judgment cannot thereafter obtain fees by post-judgment motion. (See Garcia v. Politis (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1479 [[A] party seeking entry of a default judgment must apply for all of the relief sought including attorney fees when application is made for entry of default..] (emphasis in original).) Plaintiff obtained default judgment. He did not request his fees at the time of default, and the Court cannot award them now, months after entry of default judgment. The motion is denied.

Ruling

In the Matter of: Inspection of: Assessor's Parcel Nos. 045-190-075 and 045-190-076 (23570 Geer Ave., Hilmar CA 95324)
Jul 10, 2024 | 23CV-02212
23CV-02212 In the Matter of Inspection of Assessor’s Parcel 045-190-075 & 045-190- Mandatory Settlement Conference Appearance required. Remote appearances are permitted. Parties who wish to appear remotely must contact the clerk of the court at (209) 725-4111 to arrange for a remote appearance. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF MERCED Limited Civil Calendar Judge Pro Tem Peter MacLaren Courtroom 9 627 W. 21st Street, Merced Wednesday, July 10, 2024 10:00 a.m. The following tentative rulings shall become the ruling of the court unless a party gives notice of intention to appear as follows: 1. You must call (209) 725-4111 to notify the court of your intent to appear. 2. You must give notice to all other parties before 4:00 p.m. of your intent to appear. Per California Rules of Court, rule 3.1308(a)(1), failure to do both items 1 and 2 will result in no oral argument. Note: Notifying Court Call (the court’s telephonic appearance provider) of your intent to appear does not satisfy the requirement of notifying the court. IMPORTANT: Court Reporters will NOT be provided; parties wanting a hearing transcript must make their own arrangements. Case No. Title / Description

Ruling

GLADSTONE, et al. vs. MEISSNER, et al.
Jul 14, 2024 | CVCV21-0197823
GLADSTONE, ET AL. VS. MEISSNER, ET AL. Case Number: CVCV21-0197823 This matter is on calendar for review regarding trial setting. The previous trial date was vacated by the Court’s order dated April 18, 2024. The Court previously designated this matter exempt from case disposition time standards. It appears that neither side has posted jury fees, which as previously noted in the Court’s October 23, 2023 Order, is deemed a waiver of the right to a jury. The parties are ordered to appear to provide the Court with available trial dates. J.D. VS. THE GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE ASSEMBLIES OF

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