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Time Investment Corporation T/A Time Financing Service Vs Jermaine M. Doughty

Case Last Refreshed: 2 months ago

Time Investment Corporation T A Time Financing Service, filed a(n) Unlawful Detainer - Property case against Doughty, Jermaine M., in the jurisdiction of Martin County. This case was filed in Martin County Superior Courts Martin District Court.

Case Details for Time Investment Corporation T A Time Financing Service v. Doughty, Jermaine M.

Filing Date

April 19, 2024

Category

Civil Magistrate Small Claim Action (Not Summary Ejectment)

Last Refreshed

May 04, 2024

Practice Area

Property

Filing Location

Martin County, NC

Matter Type

Unlawful Detainer

Filing Court House

Martin District Court

Case Complaint Summary

This complaint involves a resident of the county with a security interest in personal property listed in a security agreement. The defendant has defaulted on payment or breached the agreement, leading to a demand for immediate possession of the prope...

Parties for Time Investment Corporation T A Time Financing Service v. Doughty, Jermaine M.

Plaintiffs

Time Investment Corporation T A Time Financing Service

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Defendants

Doughty, Jermaine M.

Case Documents for Time Investment Corporation T A Time Financing Service v. Doughty, Jermaine M.

Civil Summons

Date: April 19, 2024

Complaint

Date: April 19, 2024

Case Events for Time Investment Corporation T A Time Financing Service v. Doughty, Jermaine M.

Type Description
Docket Event Servicemember Civil Relief Act
Docket Event Civil Summons
Docket Event Complaint
See all events

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Ruling

JENNIFER ROTH, ET AL. VS 818 NORTH ALFRED STREET, LLC, ET AL.
Jul 16, 2024 | 20STCV39725
Case Number: 20STCV39725 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: 20 Tentative Ruling Judge Kevin C. Brazile Department 20 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Case Name: Roth, et al. v. 818 North Alfred Street LLC, et al. Case No.: 20STCV39725 Matter: Motion to Augment Expert Designation Moving Party: Plaintiffs Jennifer Roth and Matthew Lifson Responding Party: Defendant D&A Endeavors, Inc., joined by Defendants 818 North Alfred Street LLC and Edward Markley Notice: OK Ruling: The Motion is granted. Moving party to give notice. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic. This is a habitability matter. On June 3, 2024, the Court granted a motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiffs expert, Shilpa Sayana, M.D, on ground that her opinion was unsubstantiated. Plaintiffs Jennifer Roth and Matthew Lifson now seek leave to augment their expert designation to include Dr. Nachman Brautbar. Plaintiffs argue that because of the Courts ruling and because the deadline to designate expert witnesses has passed, Plaintiffs are left without a medical expert witness and cannot designate one. Code Civ. Proc. § 2034.620 states, The court shall grant leave to augment or amend an expert witness list or declaration only if all of the following conditions are satisfied: (a) The court has taken into account the extent to which the opposing party has relied on the list of expert witnesses. (b) The court has determined that any party opposing the motion will not be prejudiced in maintaining that party's action or defense on the merits. (c) The court has determined either of the following: (1) The moving party would not in the exercise of reasonable diligence have determined to call that expert witness or have decided to offer the different or additional testimony of that expert witness. (2) The moving party failed to determine to call that expert witness, or to offer the different or additional testimony of that expert witness as a result of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, and the moving party has done both of the following: (A) Sought leave to augment or amend promptly after deciding to call the expert witness or to offer the different or additional testimony. (B) Promptly thereafter served a copy of the proposed expert witness information concerning the expert or the testimony described in Section 2034.260 on all other parties who have appeared in the action. (d) Leave to augment or amend is conditioned on the moving party making the expert available immediately for a deposition under Article 3 (commencing with Section 2034.410 ), and on any other terms as may be just, including, but not limited to, leave to any party opposing the motion to designate additional expert witnesses or to elicit additional opinions from those previously designated, a continuance of the trial for a reasonable period of time, and the awarding of costs and litigation expenses to any party opposing the motion. A motion to augment shall be made at a sufficient time in advance of the time limit for the completion of discovery under Chapter 8 (commencing with Section 2024.010) to permit the deposition of any expert to whom the motion relates to be taken within that time limit. Under exceptional circumstances, the court may permit the motion to be made at a later time. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2034.610.) T he cutoff for expert discovery is 15 days before the initial trial date. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2024.030.) Prior to the Courts ruling that excluded Plaintiffs former expert, it was not foreseeable that an additional expert would be necessary. Further, Plaintiffs moved promptly within 10 days to augment their expert designation. The Court will allow the expert discovery cutoff to relate to the current trial date of September 9, 2024, such that (a) the new expert can be available for deposition within the next 14 days and (b) any prejudice to Defendants would be minimized. A trial continuance can be discussed if necessary. For these reasons, the Motion is granted. Moving party to give notice. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Ruling

GLADSTONE, et al. vs. MEISSNER, et al.
Jul 18, 2024 | CVCV21-0197823
GLADSTONE, ET AL. VS. MEISSNER, ET AL. Case Number: CVCV21-0197823 This matter is on calendar for review regarding trial setting. The previous trial date was vacated by the Court’s order dated April 18, 2024. The Court previously designated this matter exempt from case disposition time standards. It appears that neither side has posted jury fees, which as previously noted in the Court’s October 23, 2023 Order, is deemed a waiver of the right to a jury. The parties are ordered to appear to provide the Court with available trial dates. J.D. VS. THE GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE ASSEMBLIES OF

Ruling

A. DOUGLAS MASTROIANNI VS KRISTINA KUTSINA, ET AL.
Jul 17, 2024 | 23STCV10570
Case Number: 23STCV10570 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: 61 A. DOUGLAS MASTROIANNI vs KRISTINA KUTSINA, et al. TENTATIVE Defendants Kristina Kutsina and Natalia Teacas Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoena is GRANTED. Sanctions are awarded against Plaintiff and Gary E. Mastin, jointly and severally, in the amount of $1,600.00, payable within 30 days. Defendants to give notice. DISCUSSION I. MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITION SUBPOENA If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court's own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1987.1, subd. (a).) A party may bring a motion under this section. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1987.1, subd. (b)(1).) Defendants Kristina Kutsina and Natalia Teaca (Defendants) move to quash two subpoenas duces tecum issued by Plaintiff A. Douglas Mastroianni (Plaintiff) to Bank of America, N.A. seeking all banking records of Defendants from 2009 onward. (Motion Exhs. K, L.) Defendants argue that the subpoenas are defective because they were issued by someone who is not Plaintiffs attorney of record in this case, Gary E. Mastin. Defendants note that statute allows an attorney of record for any party to issue a deposition subpoena. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2020.210, subd. (b).) It is settled that the attorney of record has the exclusive right to appear in court for his client and to control the court proceedings, so that neither the party himself nor another attorney can be recognized by the court in the conduct or disposition of the case. If the attorney of record, however, associates another attorney with him, it rests with them to divide the duties concerning the conduct of the cause. The requirements of a substitution as prescribed in sections 284 and 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable unless the associated attorney attempts to act as the sole attorney rather than as an associated attorney and to convert his association into a substitution for the attorney of record. In the present case Sweeney did not claim to act as sole attorney for plaintiff, but applied for the judgments as one of the attorneys for plaintiff referring to his association with the attorneys of record from whom he derived his authority, and thus did not depart from the proper course for an associated attorney. (Wells Fargo & Co. v. City and County of San Francisco (1944) 25 Cal.2d 37, 4243.) The subpoenas here were issued by Gary E. Mastin on behalf of Plaintiff. (Motion Exhs. K, L.) Plaintiff, however, has been representing himself since the inception of this case. (See Complaint.) Mastin was purportedly brought into this case by Plaintiffs notice of association of counsel, filed on January 29, 2024. But Plaintiff could not associate with any counsel by virtue of his disbarment from the practice of law in California as of August 19, 2020. (Motion Exh. D.) Mastin was never substituted in as counsel of record for Plaintiff, and per Code of Civil Procedure § 2020.210, subd. (b), he was not attorney of record with authority to issue the subpoenas. Defendants argument based on the above authority and evidence is persuasive. Plaintiff, meanwhile, has filed no opposition. The subpoenas were improperly issued and are properly quashed. The motion to quash is therefore GRANTED. II. SANCTIONS Except as specified in subdivision (c), in making an order pursuant to motion made under subdivision (c) of Section 1987 or under Section 1987.1, the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney's fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1987.2, subd. (a).) Defendants seek $1,600.00 in sanctions, representing four hours of attorney work at $385 per hour, plus a $60 filing fee. (Vanarelli Decl. ¶¶ 78.) The motion was unopposed, but under court rules in the analogous motion to compel context, The court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed. (CRC Rule 3.1348, subd. (a).) At the same time, [t]he failure to file a written opposition or to appear at a hearing or the voluntary provision of discovery shall not be deemed an admission that the motion was proper or that sanctions should be awarded. (CRC Rule 3.1348, subd. (b).) Plaintiff was warned of the present motion and the authority upon which it would be based in Defendants prior meet-and-confer correspondence. (Motion Exh. L.) Plaintiff responded to the authority presented with the simple response, Make your motion. (Ibid.) The correspondence presented by Defendants shows Plaintiff did not attempt to justify the subpoenas with contrary authority, and Plaintiff has presented no authority for their validity in opposition, despite inviting the present motion. Accordingly, sanctions in the amount of $1,600.00 are ordered against Plaintiff and Mastin.

Ruling

MALIBU ROAD HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, A CALIFORNIA NON-PROFIT MUTUAL BENEFIT CORPORATION VS ELISA PERLMAN
Jul 16, 2024 | 23SMCV02555
Case Number: 23SMCV02555 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: 207 TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT 207 HEARING DATE July 16, 2024 CASE NUMBER 23SMCV02555 (c/w 23SMCV03059) MOTION Motion for a Preliminary Injunction MOVING PARTY Defendant and Cross-Complainant Elisa Perlman OPPOSING PARTY Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Malibu Road Homeowners Association BACKGROUND The consolidated actions arise from a dispute between Defendant and Cross-Complainant Elisa Perlman (Perlman), and her neighbors, Andrea and Gelly Valero (collectively, the Valeros). Cross-Defendant Andrea Valero (Valero) was also the sole member of the board of directors for the Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Malibu Road Homeowners Association (HOA) that governs the property during most of the events giving rise to the consolidated actions. The Valeros and the HOA brought two separate lawsuits against Perlman stemming from the same factual dispute concerning water leaks into the Valeros unit, allegedly caused by Perlman. Perlman filed a Cross-Complaint against the HOA and Valero, alleging nineteen causes of action for breach of the CC&Rs; breach of other governing documents; violations of Civil Code sections 5210; 4950; 4910; 4920; 4765; 5600; 4923; 4930; 5605; 4925; 4935; 5610; 5615; and 4040; two causes of action for breach of fiduciary duties; and declaratory relief. Perlman now move for a preliminary injunction enjoining the HOA from collecting special assessments, including any late fees or interest, by foreclosing on Perlmans home for the duration of the consolidated actions. The HOA opposes the motion and Perlman replies. REQEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE Perlman requests Judicial Notice of: 1. Restated Declaration of Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions for 25366 Malibu Road recorded on July 30, 2018, in the Official Records of Los Angeles County as Document No. 20180761460 (a true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit 1.) 2. Certificate of Amendment to Restated Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for the Malibu Road Homeowners Association recorded on March 19, 2024, in the Official Records of Los Angeles County as Document No. 20240180312 (a true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit 2.) Courts can take judicial notice of the existence and recordation of real property records, including deeds, if authenticity is not reasonably disputed. ( Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 264-265.) The official act of recordation and the common use of a notary public in the execution of such documents assure their reliability, and the maintenance of the documents in the recorders office makes their existence and text capable of ready confirmation, thereby placing such documents beyond reasonable dispute. ( Ibid. ) Moreover, courts can take judicial notice not only of the existence and recordation of recorded documents but also matters that can be deduced from the documents, including the parties, dates, and legal consequences of recorded documents relating to real estate transactions. ( Ibid. ) Therefore, the Court takes judicial notice of the existence, recordation, and legal consequences of Exhibits 1 and 2. LEGAL STANDARD Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527, subdivision (a), [a] preliminary injunction may be granted at any time before judgment upon a verified complaint, or upon affidavits if the complaint in the one case, or the affidavits in the other, show satisfactorily that sufficient grounds exist therefor. (Code Civ. Proc., § 527, subd. (a).) The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending final resolution upon a trial. ( Grothe v. Cortlandt Corp. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1316.) The status quo has been defined to mean the last actual peaceable, uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy. ( 14859 Moorpark Homeowners Assn. v. VRT Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1396. 1402.) Preliminary injunctive relief requires the use of competent evidence to create a sufficient factual showing on the grounds for relief. (See, e.g., ReadyLink Healthcare v. Cotton (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1016; Ancora-Citronelle Corp. v. Green (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 146, 150.) The trial court considers two factors in determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction: (1) the likelihood the plaintiff will prevail on the merits of its case at trial, and (2) the interim harm the plaintiff is likely to sustain if the injunction is denied as compared to the harm the defendant is likely to suffer if the court grants a preliminary injunction. (Code Civ. Proc., § 526, subd. (a); Husain v. McDonalds Corp. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 860, 866-867 (hereafter Husain ).) The balancing of harm between the parties involves consideration of such things as the inadequacy of other remedies, the degree of irreparable harm, and the necessity of preserving the status quo. ( Husain , supra , 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 867.) The decision to grant a preliminary injunction rests in the sound discretion of the trial court . . . before the trial court can exercise its discretion the applicant must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to injunctive relief. The applicant must demonstrate a real threat of immediate and irreparable injury. ( Triple A Machine Shop, Inc. v. State of Cal. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 131, 138.) [A]n injunction is an unusual or extraordinary equitable remedy which will not be granted if the remedy at law (usually damages) will adequately compensate the injured plaintiff, and the party seeking injunctive relief bears the burden to prove its absence. ( Department of Fish & Game v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation Dist. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1564-1565.) ANALYSIS The trial courts consider two interrelated questions in deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction: 1) are the plaintiffs likely to suffer greater injury from a denial of the injunction than the defendants are likely to suffer from its grant; and 2) is there a reasonable probability that the plaintiffs will prevail on the merits. ( Robbins v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 199, 206.) 1. IMMEDIATE AND IRREPARABLE HARM Under Code of Civil Procedure section 526, an injunction may be granted [w]hen it appears by the complaint or affidavits that the commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would produce waste, or great or irreparable injury, to a party to the action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 526, subd. (a)(2).) The threat of irreparable harm must be imminent as opposed to a mere possibility of harm sometime in the future. An injunction cannot issue in a vacuum based on the proponents fears about something that may happen in the future. It must be supported by actual evidence that there is a realistic prospect that the party enjoined intends to engage in the prohibited activity. ( Korean Philadelphia Presbyterian Church v. California Presbytery (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1084.) Plaintiffs need not wait until they have suffered actual harm before applying for an injunction, however, they may seek injunctive relief against threatened infringement of their rights. ( Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1292.) Perlman contends that already during the pendency of this lawsuit, the HOA has twice attempted special assessments against Perlman, and continues to assess late fees thereon, in order to raise money for its legal fees to prosecute the instant lawsuits against Perlman. (Galal Decl. ¶¶ 2-10 and Exs. AA, BB, CC, DD, EE, FF, GG, and HH thereto; Perlman Decl. ¶¶ 11-31 and Exhibits A through P attached thereto.) As a result, the HOA can now record a lien and start foreclosure proceeding whenever it wants. (Perlman Decl. ¶ 30.) Indeed, three days after the Motion was filed, Perlman received a pre-lien notice letter from the HOAs counsel, threatening to record a lien and commence foreclosure proceedings thereafter. (Supp. Galal Decl. ¶ 2-3 and Ex. II thereto.) Thus, Perlman has demonstrated that if the requested injunction does not issue, she will suffer irreparable harm (losing her home to foreclosure) that far exceeds the potential pecuniary harm to the HOA (delay in obtaining the special assessment amounts owed until after the litigation). 2. REASONABLE PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS A preliminary injunction may not issue unless it is reasonably probable that the moving party will prevail on the merits. ( San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co., Inc. v. Superior Court (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 438, 442; see Costa Mesa City Employees Association v. City of Costa Mesa (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 298, 309 [no injunction may issue unless there is at least some possibility of success].) The first special assessment appears no longer at issue because the HOA withdrew it. (Perlman Decl. ¶ 16; Opp. at p. 13:16-21.) Plaintiff contends the second assessment is invalid because it is based on an unrecorded amendment to the operative Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions (CC&R). Specifically, the CC&Rs requires that modifications or amendments to the CC&Rs can only be effectuated by the affirmative vote or written approval of at (sic) majority of the Owners entitled to vote and Said amendments shall be effective upon recordation in the Office of the Recorder of Los Angeles County. (RJN Ex. 1 at p. 67, Art. XIV, Section 14.2.) At the March 8, 2024 special meeting of members, the membership voted on two changes relevant to this motion: (1) to modify the original uniform rate of assessments to a variable rate of assessment based on percentage interest for each unit; and (2) to issue the second special assessment for $50,000, to be allocated based upon each owners percentage interest in the assessment. (Perlman Decl. ¶ 22-24 and Exs. K-L thereto.) However, because both issues were passed in the same meeting, the first resolution had not yet been recorded, such that the allocation of the second special assessment could not properly be based on that amendment. Further, Perlman argues that the assessment itself is an abuse of the Valeros majority stake in the HOA to improperly shift the Valeros and HOAs legal expenses to Perlman, in violation of their fiduciary duties to her. In support, Perlman provides the various inconsistent and changing grounds the HOA has provided ,for the assessments, including the statement that the second assessment is to pay the HOAs legal expenses. (Perlman Decl. ¶¶ 11-12, 22, 26 and Exs. K & M thereto.) In Opposition, the HOA argues that the Lamden rule (which it contends is akin to the business judgment rule for homeowners associations) requires that the Court defer to the HOAs judgment in assessing the second special assessment. Specifically, Lamden explains: Where a duly constituted community association board, upon reasonable investigation, in good faith and with regard for the best interests of the community association and its members, exercises discretion within the scope of its authority under relevant statutes, covenants and restrictions to select among means for discharging an obligation to maintain and repair a development's common areas, courts should defer to the board's authority and presumed expertise. ( Lamden v. La Jolla Shores Clubdominium Homeowners Assn. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 249, 253.) The HOA also argues that it owes its members no fiduciary duties except those required by statute or the CC&Rs, and is not otherwise required to deal fairly with its members in good faith. Here, the Court finds that Perlman has established a probability of establishing that the HOA violated the CC&Rs by issuing the second special assessment allocated according to the unrecorded (and therefore invalid) amendment it had just passed in the same meeting, an issue the Opposition does not squarely address. Similarly, even if it were procedurally proper, the HOAs disproportionate allocation of the second special assessment for legal fees to Perlman appears to violate the American Rule that each party must generally pay its own attorneys fees, unless otherwise provided by statute or agreement. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1033.5, subd. (a)(10); 1021; 1717.) 3. UNDERTAKING Section 529 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides, On granting an injunction, the court or judge must require an undertaking on the part of the applicant to the effect that the applicant will pay to the party enjoined any damages, not exceeding an amount to be specified , the party may sustain by reason of the injunction , if the court finally decides that the applicant was not entitled to the injunction. (Emphases added.) However, an undertaking is not required if the party to be enjoined either waives or forfeits the right to an undertaking. ( Smith v. Adventist Health System/West (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 729, 739.) Here, neither party has specified what the amount of the undertaking should be, and it is unclear what, if any damages the HOA will incur by reason of the injunction, which merely delays the HOAs ability to collect on Perlmans special assessment by foreclosing on Perlmans home during the pendency of this lawsuit. Should the HOA ultimately prevail in the lawsuit, it may simply foreclose on Perlmans property at that point to collect the assessment Perlman owes. Thus, there is no indication that the HOA will suffer any damages by reason of this delay, and the HOA has not specified any. As such, the Court finds that the HOA has forfeited its right to an undertaking by failing to specify what damages it would incur by reason of the injunctions delay. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Therefore, the Court grants Perlmans motion for a preliminary injunction, in part, and enjoins the HOA from foreclosing on Perlmans property to collect special assessments during the pendency of the consolidated actions. Further, because the Court cannot discern any damages that the HOA will suffer by reason of the delay, and the HOA has not specified any, the Court finds the HOA has forfeited its right to an undertaking. Perlman shall prepare and lodge a proposed Order in conformance with the Courts ruling on or before July 30, 2024. Further, the Court orders Perlman to provide notice of the Courts ruling and file the notice with a proof of service forthwith. DATED: July 16, 2024 ___________________________ Michael E. Whitaker Judge of the Superior Court

Ruling

WAGNER VS. LLOYD
Jul 16, 2024 | CVCV21-0198602
WAGNER VS. LLOYD Case Number: CVCV21-0198602 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of counsel. At the last hearing on May 20, 2024, both parties represented that they were trying to obtain counsel. There was also a question of whether Plaintiff was acting in her capacity as a Trustee. An appearance by both parties is required on today’s calendar. Plaintiff should be prepared to address whether the property is held by a trust or as individuals.

Ruling

NIVO 1 LLC, ET AL. VS LIN DEE LU SERVICES, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, ET AL.
Jul 16, 2024 | 21STCV17195
Case Number: 21STCV17195 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: 50 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 50 NIVO 1, LLC , et al ., Plaintiffs, vs. LIN DEE LU SERVICES , et al ., Defendants. Case No.: 21STCV17195 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Hearing Time: 10:00 a.m. [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL Steven J. Barkin of the Law Offices of Steven J. Barkin (Counsel) moves to be relieved as counsel of record for Plaintiffs Nivo 1, LLC, D.A. Beec-007, LLC, and Anne Kihagi. The Court finds that Counsel has provided sufficient reason for withdrawal. However, the Court notes that after the instant motion was filed, a Trial Setting Conference was held in which a Final Status Conference (FSC) was scheduled for August 9, 2024, and a Non-Jury Trial was scheduled for August 28, 2024. ( See July 9, 2024 Minute Order.) Thus, the proposed order (Form MC-053) do not list the August 9, 2024 FSC or the August 28, 2024 trial date. In addition, Item 6 of the proposed order does not list Counsels clients telephone number(s). If Counsel provides the Court with a revised order correcting the foregoing defects prior to the hearing, the Court will grant the motion.¿ Counsel is ordered to give notice of this order. DATED: July 16, 2024 ________________________________ Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court

Ruling

Contra Costa County Fire Protection District vs. The heirs and devisees of P.J. Moody, deceased, and all persons claiming by, through, or under the decedent
Jul 11, 2024 | C24-00316
C24-00316 CASE NAME: CONTRA COSTA COUNTY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT VS. THE HEIRS AND DEVISEES OF P.J. MOODY, DECEASED, AND ALL PERSONS CLAIMING BY, THROUGH, OR UNDER THE DECEDENT *HEARING ON MOTION IN RE: FOR PREJUDGMENT POSSESSION OF PROPERTY FILED BY: CONTRA COSTA COUNTY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT *TENTATIVE RULING:* This motion for prejudgment possession is expressly unopposed, and it is granted.

Ruling

FCS057009 - DMP MANAGEMENT, LLC V. CORNERSTONE LAND CO(DMS)
Jul 16, 2024 | FCS057009
FCS057009 Motion by Plaintiff DMP MANAGEMENT, LLC to Compel Compliance with Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records and for Sanctions TENTATIVE RULING Evidence Code §1563(b)(1) authorizes a nonparty witness to charge the subpoenaing party “reasonable costs” with respect to the production of business records pursuant to a records subpoena, with those costs generally limited to $24/hour per person for the reasonable clerical costs to locate and produce the records responsive to the subpoena. All reasonable costs incurred in a civil proceeding by a witness who is not a party with respect to the production of all or any part of business records requested pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum shall be charged against the party serving the subpoena duces tecum. (1) “Reasonable costs,” as used in this section, includes, but is not limited to, the following specific costs: ten cents ($0.10) per page for standard reproduction of documents of a size 8½ by 14 inches or less; twenty cents ($0.20) per page for copying of documents from microfilm; actual costs for the reproduction of oversize documents or the reproduction of documents requiring special processing which are made in response to a subpoena; reasonable clerical costs incurred in locating and making the records available to be billed at the maximum rate of twenty-four dollars ($24) per hour per person, computed on the basis of six dollars ($6) per quarter hour or fraction thereof; actual postage charges; and the actual cost, if any, charged to the witness by a third person for the retrieval and return of records held offsite by that third person. After the original enactment of this statute, the Legislature amended it, to add the “including but not limited to” language. Nevertheless, a nonparty receiving a records subpoena should produce responsive documents subject to the clerical hourly rate limitation, absent the providing of sufficient evidence to establish that the document search cannot reasonably be performed by a clerical, non-professional person. The only evidence AMS has presented is the declaration of its founder/chief engineer. All he claims in his declaration is that nearly all work and communications are in electronic form, stored on computers, and not stored yet in separate folders per project. While his declaration reported directing “an associate in my office, Marie Thompson”, to contact AMS’s attorney, he also claimed that “AMS does not employ any clerical persons or secretaries or persons who are compensated at the rate of $24/hour”. That latter statement does not rule out that AMS employs or could employ any clerks or secretaries (only that if AMS does so employ, none are paid at the hourly rate of $24). And it does not seem likely that an engineering firm of even small size lacks any support staff (secretary, clerk, receptionist or even bookkeeper) who at relatively low hourly rates could not be tasked with the job of sorting through computer records. The court therefore grants DMP’s motion, and orders AMS to produce documents (electronic or otherwise) responsive to the business records deposition subpoena. The court also imposes sanctions against AMS, in the amount of $1,460.00, payable to DMP by 5:00 p.m. within 30 days from issuance of this Order. Compliance with all terms of this order is due within 20 days of service of the signed order. Join ZoomGov Meeting https://www.zoomgov.com/j/1602210102?pwd=emlhR29SczExam56NFFqWHFvSitmZz09 Meeting ID: 160 221 0102 Passcode: 650928 One tap mobile +16692545252,,1602210102#,,,,*650928# US (San Jose) +16692161590,,1602210102#,,,,*650928# US (San Jose)

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