We are checking for the latest updates in this case. We will email you when the process is complete.

James Maxwell Vs Lorrie Moore

Case Last Refreshed: 2 months ago

Maxwell, James, filed a(n) Unlawful Detainer - Property case against Moore, Lorrie, in the jurisdiction of Beaufort County. This case was filed in Beaufort County Superior Courts Beaufort District Court.

Case Details for Maxwell, James v. Moore, Lorrie

Filing Date

May 02, 2024

Category

Civil Magistrate Summary Ejectment

Last Refreshed

May 09, 2024

Practice Area

Property

Filing Location

Beaufort County, NC

Matter Type

Unlawful Detainer

Filing Court House

Beaufort District Court

Case Complaint Summary

This complaint is a summary ejectment case in the State of North Carolina, involving a defendant who failed to pay rent and is holding over after the lease period ended. The plaintiff has demanded possession of the premises and is seeking the total a...

Parties for Maxwell, James v. Moore, Lorrie

Plaintiffs

Maxwell, James

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Defendants

Moore, Lorrie

Case Documents for Maxwell, James v. Moore, Lorrie

Complaint

Date: May 02, 2024

Civil Summons

Date: May 02, 2024

Case Events for Maxwell, James v. Moore, Lorrie

Type Description
Docket Event Summons - Returned Served
Docket Event Servicemember Civil Relief Act
Docket Event Complaint
Docket Event Civil Summons
See all events

Related Content in Beaufort County

Case

Remanda St. Clair VS Estate of Ned Eugene Batts
Jul 08, 2024 | General Civil Action | General Civil Action | 24CV001569-060

Case

DEWARD BRAXTON SMITH VS RHODA LEANNE MIXON SMITH
Dec 08, 2022 | Civil Domestic with Absolute Divorce | Civil Domestic with Absolute Divorce | 22CVD000873-060

Case

James Luther Linton, III VS Debra Mayeaux Linton
Jul 03, 2024 | Civil Domestic with Absolute Divorce | Civil Domestic with Absolute Divorce | 24CV001563-060

Case

Time Investment Corporation T/A Time Financing Service VS Donniel E Johnson
Jul 03, 2024 | Civil Magistrate Small Claim Action (Not Summary Ejectment) | Civil Magistrate Small Claim Action (Not Summary Ejectment) | 24CV001564-060

Case

BRANDON EDWARDS VS ERICA ELLISON
Sep 02, 2022 | Civil Domestic without Claim for absolute divorce | Civil Domestic without Claim for absolute divorce | 22CVD000637-060

Case

NATIONAL FINANCE COMPANY INC VS FALISHA LYNN STRADER
Jul 05, 2024 | Civil Magistrate Small Claim Action (Not Summary Ejectment) | Civil Magistrate Small Claim Action (Not Summary Ejectment) | 24CV001568-060

Case

Stacy Jones VS Rhonda Jones
Jul 08, 2024 | Civil Domestic with Absolute Divorce | Civil Domestic with Absolute Divorce | 24CV001575-060

Case

Curtis Mitchell Bell VS Victoria Hamilton Bell
Jul 09, 2024 | Civil Domestic with Absolute Divorce | Civil Domestic with Absolute Divorce | 24CV001580-060

Case

Cornelius Eugene Keech, Jr. VS Sharon Harris Mackey
Jul 05, 2024 | General Civil Action | General Civil Action | 24CV001565-060

Ruling

Jensen vs. Wells Fargo Realty Services Inc
Jul 10, 2024 | 22CV-0200623
JENSEN VS. WELLS FARGO REALTY SERVICES INC Case Number: 22CV-0200623 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of the case. Defendant has been defaulted in this case. A default prove-up hearing has not occurred. At the prior hearing on April 8, 2024, Plaintiff’s Counsel appeared to inform the Court she was speaking with a bond company and to request a continuance. The matter was continued to today but no status report has been filed. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar to discuss the status of the case and, if appropriate, to re-set this mater for a default prove-up hearing.

Ruling

GEOFFREY LYNCH VS. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. ET AL
Jul 09, 2024 | CGC24613682
Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 9, 2024 line 1. DEFENDANT JUSTIN LUU, XIAO WU DEMURRER TO 1ST AMENDED COMPLAINT is SUSTAINED with leave to amend to allege facts in support of each element of each cause of action as to the moving defendants. Plaintiff must also allege tender or facts supporting an exception from the tender rule. =(501/HEK) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified and the opposing party does not appear.

Ruling

ANDERSON vs SUPERIOR LOAN SERVICING
Jul 11, 2024 | CVRI2304826
Motion to Vacate and Set Aside Default ANDERSON vs SUPERIOR CVRI2304826 and for Leave to File Responsive LOAN SERVICING Pleading by SERGEI SHARAPOV Tentative Ruling: The Motion to Set Aside the Default was filed on 5/13/2024. The attached proof of service indicates service by regular mail on 5/8/2024. No timely opposition has been filed (CCP 1005). Accordingly, the Motion to Set Aside the Default entered on 11/30/2023 as to Defendant Sergei Sharapov is set aside. The Court sets the matter for a Case Management Conference on 9/12/2024 at 8:30 in Department 6. Defendant to file a responsive pleading. The OSC re: Failure to file a Default Judgment per CRC 3.110(h) is vacated.

Ruling

TARZANA PROPERTY LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY VS VINCE WORK
Jul 10, 2024 | 23VECV00647
Case Number: 23VECV00647 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: T Tarzana Property LLC v Work 23VECV00647 Tentative ruling: Ex parte application to advance hearing on motion to intervene-Denied. Moving party Reinsdorf has failed to comply with California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1202 which states: An applicant must make an affirmative factual showing in a declaration containing competent testimony based on personal knowledge of irreparable harm, immediate danger, or any other statutory basis for granting relief ex parte . There is no pending emergency to have this motion advanced in front of other AT LEAST 65 OTHER MOTIONS which have been waiting weeks to be heard . The court will hear the motion as currently scheduled.

Ruling

CHARLES D SHEA VS LITO VALES, ET AL.
Jul 09, 2024 | 23AVCV00526
Case Number: 23AVCV00526 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: A14 Background This is a quiet action. Plaintiff Charles D. Shea (Plaintiff) presents that the real property at issue is commonly known as 43827 Chaparral Drive, Lancaster, CA 93536 (the Subject Property). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Lito Vales (Lito) [1] and Vicki Vales (Vicki and collectively the Vales) took title to the Subject Property from Lancaster Palms, LLC by as joint tenants by way of a Grant Deed recorded on August 18, 2006, as Document No. 06-1842986, that the Vales refinanced the Subject Property numerous times, and the Vales deeded their interest in the Subject Property to Plaintiff as his sole and separate property, by way of a Grant Deed which recorded in on April 16, 2018 as Document No. 20180363739. Plaintiff presents that his spouse, Kim Marie Rosas-Shea, deeded her interest in the Property to Plaintiff by way of an Interspousal Transfer Grant Deed (IGD) which recorded in on April 16, 2018 as Document No. 20180363738. Plaintiff further alleges that he obtained a loan in the amount of $244,000.00 from CrossCountry Mortgage, Inc. with MERS as nominee for Lender and Lenders successors and assigns, secured by 43827 Chaparral Drive, Lancaster CA 93536 by way of a deed of trust recorded on April 16, 2018 as Document No. 20180363740. Plaintiff contends that the Vales did not disclose that there was any other prior deed of trust encumbering the Subject Property, but Defendant Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (SLS) and its predecessors-in-interest contend that here is a prior deed of trust securing a loan to the Vales in the amount of $58,000.00 from lender Countrywide Bank, N.A. with MERS as nominee for Lender and Lenders successors and assigns, which was recorded on October 23, 2006, as Document No. 06-2340701 with the correct common description of the Subject Property, but incorrect Assessor Parcel Number (APN). Hereinafter, this deed of trust will be addressed as the 2006 DOT. Plaintiff believes that the deed of trust at issue is related to the Vales other property, commonly known as 3523 W Avenue K4, Lancaster, CA 93536. From this deed of trust, Plaintiff alleges that (1) an Assignment of Deed of Trust (as to the 2006 DOT) was recorded on July 18, 2019 as Document No. 20190699535 containing the common property address with the incorrect APN; (2) a second Assignment of Deed of Trust was recorded on August 11, 2022 as Document No. 20220810290 containing the common property address with the incorrect APN; (3) on or about January 25, 2023, a Notice of Default pertaining to the Prior DOT was recorded as Document No. 20230050193, containing the correct common address and APN; and (4) on April 28, 2023, a Notice of Trustee Sale pertaining to the Prior DOT was recorded as Document No. 20230276620, containing the correct common address and APN, subsequently occurred, affecting the Subject Property. Plaintiff contends that he is a bone fide purchaser. Plaintiff seeks to quiet title, cancel the 2006 DOT, and declaratory relief. On May 17, 2023, Plaintiff filed his Complaint alleging three causes of action for: (1) Quiet Title, (2) Cancellation of Instrument; and (3) Declaratory Relief. On May 23, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Lis Pendens. On June 30, 2023, Plaintiff filed an Amendment to Complaint, amending the fictitious name of Doe 1 to MEB Loan Trust VI (MEB). On July 24, 2023, SLS filed its Answer. On October 20, 2023, MEB filed its Answer. On October 17, 2023, Vicki was placed into default. On November 14, 2023, Lito was placed into default. On February 02, 2024, Plaintiff filed this Motion for Summary Judgment. On February 07, 2024, the parties entered a stipulation to continue the trial date and all discovery deadlines, granted by the Court. On February 08, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Ex Parte Application to Continue Trial and Related Dates, set for hearing on February 13, 2024. On February 13, 2024, the Court informed the parties that the stipulation was previously granted on February 07, 2024. The Court did not rule on the Ex Parte Application which appeared to be based on the previously filed stipulation. On June 25, 2025, SLS filed its Opposition. On July 02, 2024, Plaintiff filed his Reply. ----- Legal Standard Standard for Summary Judgment The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. ( Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.¿ (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Cal. Code Civ. Proc.¿§437c(c) requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to¿any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.¿ ( Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp . (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)¿The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.¿ ( Juge¿v. County of Sacramento¿ (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67 ( Juge ), citing¿ FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima ¿(1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿ ¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿ As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the party moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (Cal.¿Code Civ.¿Proc.¿§437c(p)(2);¿ Scalf¿v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc.¿ (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Courts liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party. ( Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. ¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿ ¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿ Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. ( Sangster v.¿Paetkau ¿(1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)¿¿¿ ----- Discussion Application At the crux of Plaintiffs arguments related to the First Cause of Action (Quiet Title) and Second Cause of Action (Cancellation of Instrument) is Plaintiffs assertion that he is a bona fide purchaser. A buyer is a bona fide purchaser if it bought property in good faith, for value, and had no knowledge or notice of the asserted rights of another. ( 612 South LLC v. Laconic Limited Partnership (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1278; Melendrez v. D & I Investment, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1251.) The first element does not require that the buyer's consideration be the fair market value of the property (or anything approaching it). (Citation.) Instead, the buyer need only part with something of value in exchange for the property. (Citation.) ( Melendrez v. D & I Investment, Inc. , supra , 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 1251.) The determination whether a party is a good faith purchaser or encumbrancer for value ordinarily is a question of fact; on appeal, that determination will not be reversed unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence. ( Triple A Management Co., Inc. v. Frisone (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 520, 536.) The general rule places the burden of proof upon a person claiming bona fide purchaser status to present evidence that he or she acquired interest in the property without notice of the prior interest. [Citations.] ( First Fidelity Thrift & Loan Assn. v. Alliance Bank (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1442.) Here, there is no presentation of what Plaintiff parted with for the Subject Property. Rather, Plaintiff has not only alleged that he was deeded the Subject Property in the Complaint (see Complaint ¶ 11) [2] , but also evidenced that it was deeded to him through his attached declaration (see Compendium of Evidence, Tab 11, Decl. of Plaintiff ¶ 3[Defendants Lito Vales and Vicki Vales (collectively, the Vales) transferred the real property commonly known as 43827 Chaparral Drive, Lancaster CA 93536 (the Chaparral Property) to me by way of a Grant Deed which recorded on April 16, 2018 bearing Document No. 20180363739. I am the current owner of the Chaparral Property. A true and correct copy of the Grant Deed is incorporated herein by reference and attached to Compendium of Evidence as Tab 2].) While Plaintiff presents that he paid value for the Subject Property, Plaintiff relies only on: (1) the Grant Deed, and (2) a subsequent loan in the amount of $244,000.00 from CrossCountry Mortgage, Inc. secured by a Deed of Trust. (See Motion for Summary Judgment 6:22-26; Compendium of Evidence, Tab 11, Decl. of Plaintiff ¶ 5.) While Plaintiff states that he pai value for the Subject Property in his declaration (see Compendium of Evidence, Tab 11, Decl. of Plaintiff ¶ 5), what has been presented to the Court is that (1) the Subject Property was deeded to Plaintiff by the Vales ( id . at ¶ 3, and Tab 2); (2) Plaintiffs spouse deeded any interest in the Subject Property to him through an Interspousal Transfer Grant Deed ( id . at ¶ 4, and Tab 3); and (3) a subsequent loan in the amount of $244,000.00 was obtained from CrossCountry Mortgage, Inc. and secured by the Subject Property (id. at ¶ 5, and Tab 4). There has been neither a presentation of evidence that value was exchanged for the Subject Property between the Plaintiff and the previous owners, the Vales nor a foundation laid for a grant deed to qualify as a purchase or exchange of value. Thus, Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that he is a bona fide purchaser and so his arguments for the First Cause of Action (Quiet Title) and Second Cause of Action (Cancellation of Instrument) fail. Plaintiffs argument for the Third Cause of Action (Declaratory Relief) is that it is undisputed that the 2006 DOT was not recorded in the Subject Propertys chain of title giving Plaintiff constructive notice; and (2) Plaintiff purchased the Subject Property without any notice of the existence of the Prior DOT or Defendants claimed interest in the Prior DOT. As discussed, ante , there is an issue as to whether Plaintiff purchased the Subject Property. The Third Cause of Action (Declaratory Relieve) is derivative of Plaintiffs other claims. As Plaintiff has not met his burden for both the First Cause of Action (Quiet Title) and Second Cause of Action (Cancellation of Instrument), the derivative Third Cause of Action (Declaratory Relief) fails. Accordingly, the Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. The Motion for Summary Adjudication is DENIED. ----- Conclusion Plaintiff Charles D. Sheas Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. Plaintiff Charles D. Sheas Motion for Summary Adjudication is DENIED. [1] Defendants Lito Vales and Vicki Vales share the same surname. The Court address each individually by their first name for the purpose of clarity. No disrespect is intended. [2] The Complaint itself alleges both that Plaintiff was deeded the Subject Property and that Plaintiff is a bona fide purchaser. (Compare Complaint ¶ 11 with Complaint ¶¶ 22, 28, 39, 41 and Prayer ¶ 2.)

Ruling

William Shaw vs Ruth Shaw
Jul 11, 2024 | 23CV02548
23CV02548 SHAW v. SHAW (UNOPPOSED) PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO APPOINT PARTITION REFEREE The unopposed motion is granted. Mr. Singer will be appointed as the partition referee. Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed. Case No. 19CV02702 RHOADS v. BECKLEY APPLICATION FOR ORDER FOR SALE OF DWELLING/OSC FOR SALE OF DWELLING This application is continued as discussed below. The original application, brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 704.740 through 704.850, was filed on January 26, 2023. For a variety of reasons, the application was continued and not ruled upon. When the application was filed, Mr. Beckley was without counsel and the court noted procedural as well as notice issues with the application, resulting in continuances. Mr. Beckley then retained counsel, Thornton Davidson, on June 29, 2023. Mr. Davidson sought to be relieved as counsel on May 8, 2024. The declaration in support of Mr. Davidson’s motion to be relieved noted the next court date as June 11, 2024. The court issued a tentative ruling the day before the June 11 hearing, tentatively granting the motion to be relieved and specifically continuing the application for sale of dwelling to allow defendant to either retain new counsel or participate in a pro per capacity. The parties were ordered to appear. At the June 11 hearing, attended by Mr. Davidson and plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. Eschen, Page 1 of 2 the court granted Mr. Davidson’s motion to be relieved and set July 11, 2024 as the next hearing date. Mr. Beckley did not attend the June 11, 2024 hearing, nor is there evidence before the court that he was notified of the July 11, 2024 date. The order prepared by Mr. Davidson after the hearing and served on Mr. Beckley stated that the tentative ruling became the order of the court. While the order attached the tentative ruling, there is no mention in either the order or the tentative ruling of the July 11, 2024 hearing date for the application. The tentative ruling specified that the application hearing would be set at the next court date. The court will issue an order to show cause pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 704.770, subdivision (a). “After the judgment creditor has filed an application for an order for sale, the court sets a time and place for hearing and must order the judgment debtor to show cause why an order for sale should not be made in accordance with the application. The hearing must be set no later than 45 days after the application is filed, or such later time as the court orders on a showing of good cause.” (2 MB Practice Guide: CA Debt Collection 17.36 (2024).) After the OSC is set, Mr. Rhoads must serve on the judgment debtor, Mr. Beckley, a copy of the OSC, a copy of the application, and a copy of the notice of hearing in the form required by the Judicial Council. (See Code of Civ. Proc. § 704.770, subd. (b).) Page 2 of 2

Ruling

ADMIRE 3377 FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP VS KI JONG OH, ET AL.
Jul 09, 2024 | 22STCV33738
Case Number: 22STCV33738 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 61 ADMIRE 3377 FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP vs KI JONG OH, et al. TENTATIVE Plaintiff Admire 3377 Family Limited Partnerships Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendant Ki Jong Oh is GRANTED. Plaintiff to give notice. DISCUSSION A party may move for summary judgment if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (a).) [I]f all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the moving party will be entitled to summary judgment. (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) A motion for summary adjudication may be made by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (f)(2).) The moving party bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact, and if he does so, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; accord Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Plaintiffs moving for summary judgment may meet their initial burden by prov[ing] each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(1).) Once the plaintiff has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(1).) The defendant may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(1).) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) Plaintiff Admire 3377 Family Limited Partnership (Plaintiff) moves for summary judgment on their sole cause of action for breach of lease against Defendant Ki Jong Oh (Defendant). [T]he elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are (1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff. (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 820.) Plaintiff presents Defendants responses to requests for admission, admitting the existence of the lease agreement in this action, admitting that Defendant vacated the premises in September 2022, admitting that Defendant at the time of vacating had failed to pay contract rent through the lease term, and that the record of payments attached to the requests for admission are an accurate reflection of the payments. (Robison Exh. 2.) Plaintiffs property manager testifies that Defendant vacated the premises with $976,085.96 due in unpaid rent, which after application of the security deposition, yields $940,805.96 due in unpaid rent. (Kim Decl. ¶¶ 57.) Plaintiff has satisfied its initial burden to show the absence of triable issues as to each element of its breach of lease claim. The burden now shifts to Defendant show triable issues exist as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. Defendant in opposition argues that Plaintiff has failed to address any of the affirmative defenses raised in his answer. (Opposition at pp. 6, 1011.) But a plaintiff moving for summary judgment on their claims has no burden to disprove the listed defenses in the defendants answer to satisfy their initial burden. (Los Angeles Unified School District v. Torres Construction Corp. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 480, 508.) These defenses furnish no basis to deny the motion except insofar as Defendant presents admissible evidence to show triable issues of fact exist as to his defenses. Defendant relies upon the defenses of contractual impossibility and Civil Code § 1511 as defenses to the present motion. (Opposition at p. 12.) Specifically, Defendant argues that the government-ordered closure of the premises during the COVID-19 pandemic constituted an irresistible superhuman cause excusing performance of the lease. (Opposition at pp. 1217.) Defendant also argues that performance was excused by the defense of frustration of purpose. (Ibid.) The doctrine of frustration excuses contractual obligations where performance remains entirely possible, but the whole value of the performance to one of the parties at least, and the basic reason recognized as such by both parties, for entering into the contract has been destroyed by a supervening and unforeseen event. A party seeking to escape the obligations of its lease under the doctrine of frustration must show: (1) the purpose of the contract that has been frustrated was contemplated by both parties in entering the contract; (2) the risk of the event was not reasonably foreseeable and the party claiming frustration did not assume the risk under the contract; and (3) the value of counter-performance is totally or nearly totally destroyed. Governmental acts that merely make performance unprofitable or more difficult or expensive do not suffice to excuse a contractual obligation. (SVAP III Poway Crossings, LLC v. Fitness International, LLC (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 882, 895, internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted.) [W]here commercial frustration does apply, the legal effect ... is the immediate termination of the contract. . . . [T]he application of the doctrine of frustration under California law compels the termination of the contract, the law does not recognize the temporary frustration defense. (Id. at p. 896.) Simultaneously, Civil Code § 1511 states that performance of an obligation is excused [w]hen such performance or offer is prevented or delayed by the act of the creditor, or by the operation of law, and [w]hen it is prevented or delayed by an irresistible, superhuman cause, or by the act of public enemies of this state or of the United States, unless the parties have expressly agreed to the contrary. (Civ. Code § 1511, sudb. (1), (2).) As an initial matter, it should be noted that Defendant submits no evidence in support of its affirmative defenses. Defendant provides links to a March 2020 Los Angeles County order in its separate statement directing the pandemic closure of [g]yms and fitness centers. (Defendants Separate Statement No. 2.) Another entry on the separate statement states that Defendants business was negatively affected not as a result of its own actions, but because of the supervening causes of the Pandemic and applicable regulations, citing for this purpose on Defendants unverified answer. (Defendants Separate Statement No. 4.) Defendant thus presents no actual evidence of negative effects resulting from the pandemic or closure orders. But assuming the truth of these assertions, Defendants affirmative defenses remain unsupported. The defense of impossibility under Civil Code § 1511 does not apply, because the doctrine of impossibility or impracticability applies to the partys obligations under the contract in this case to pay rent. (See SVAP III Poway Crossings, LLC, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 893.) As such, impossibility does not apply, because [t]he government closure orders did not make it illegal for [Defendant] to pay rent. (Ibid.) Nor is there any basis for application of the doctrine of frustration of purpose, although this doctrine might excuse the performance of a rental contract based on the government-ordered closure of a business. This is because the effect of frustration of purpose is the immediate termination of the contract. (Id. at p. 896.) There is no such thing as temporary frustration of purpose in California. (Ibid.) Here, it is undisputed that Defendant remained in possession of the premises for the full duration of the lease term, even as the closure orders went into effect. (Robinson Decl. Exh. 2.) The frustration of purpose doctrine therefore did not excuse [Defendant] from its obligation to pay rent (even if the lease was an installment contract) because [Defendant] did not attempt to rescind the lease and instead remained in possession of the premises. (KB Salt Lake III, LLC v. Fitness Intern., LLC (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1057.) There are therefore no triable issues as to the elements of Plaintiffs claims, or Defendants affirmative defenses. The motion is therefore GRANTED.

Ruling

HAISH CONTRUCTION CO, INC. V. NATIONAL BUILDERS, INC ET AL
Jul 10, 2024 | 23CV01783
23CV01783 HAISH CONTRUCTION CO, INC. V. NATIONAL BUILDERS, INC ET AL EVENT: Default Prove-Up Hearing The Court will execute the proposed Court Judgment by Default, submitted on June 7, 2024. No appearances are required.

Document

Soisette Bailey Judge VS Adrienne W Peartree
Jun 25, 2024 | Civil Magistrate Summary Ejectment | Civil Magistrate Summary Ejectment | 24CV001535-060

Document

David Bell VS Danielle Bunn
Jun 27, 2024 | Civil Magistrate Summary Ejectment | Civil Magistrate Summary Ejectment | 24CV001543-060

Document

Daniel Midgette VS Marcus Pretlow
May 30, 2024 | Civil Magistrate Summary Ejectment | Civil Magistrate Summary Ejectment | 24CV001463-060

Document

William Winston Watts VS Nadia Swain Ybarra-Moore
May 13, 2024 | Civil Magistrate Summary Ejectment | Civil Magistrate Summary Ejectment | 24CV001408-060

Document

Daniel Midgette VS Marcus Pretlow
May 30, 2024 | Civil Magistrate Summary Ejectment | Civil Magistrate Summary Ejectment | 24CV001463-060

Document

RWW Enterprises VS Cynthia Brown
Jun 03, 2024 | Civil Magistrate Summary Ejectment | Civil Magistrate Summary Ejectment | 24CV001472-060

Document

William Winston Watts VS Nadia Swain Ybarra-Moore
May 13, 2024 | Civil Magistrate Summary Ejectment | Civil Magistrate Summary Ejectment | 24CV001408-060

Document

NATIONAL FINANCE COMPANY INC VS SOLEESA RENE MORGAN
Jun 18, 2024 | Civil Magistrate Small Claim Action (Not Summary Ejectment) | Civil Magistrate Small Claim Action (Not Summary Ejectment) | 24CV001518-060