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Washington Housing Limited Partnership Vs Jada Barnes

Case Last Refreshed: 2 months ago

Washington Housing Limited Partnership, filed a(n) Unlawful Detainer - Property case represented by Pro Se, against Barnes, Jada, represented by Pro Se, in the jurisdiction of Beaufort County. This case was filed in Beaufort County Superior Courts Beaufort District Court.

Case Details for Washington Housing Limited Partnership v. Barnes, Jada

Filing Date

April 29, 2024

Category

Civil Magistrate Summary Ejectment

Last Refreshed

May 09, 2024

Practice Area

Property

Filing Location

Beaufort County, NC

Matter Type

Unlawful Detainer

Filing Court House

Beaufort District Court

Case Complaint Summary

This complaint involves a summary ejectment case in Beaufort County, North Carolina. The defendant, a resident of the county, failed to pay rent of $923.00 on time, leading to the plaintiff demanding possession of the premises. The lease period ended...

Parties for Washington Housing Limited Partnership v. Barnes, Jada

Plaintiffs

Washington Housing Limited Partnership

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Pro Se

Defendants

Barnes, Jada

Attorneys for Defendants

Pro Se

Case Documents for Washington Housing Limited Partnership v. Barnes, Jada

Complaint

Date: April 29, 2024

Other/Miscellaneous

Date: April 29, 2024

Civil Summons

Date: April 29, 2024

Case Events for Washington Housing Limited Partnership v. Barnes, Jada

Type Description
Docket Event Complaint
Docket Event Other/Miscellaneous
Docket Event Civil Summons
Docket Event Servicemember Civil Relief Act
See all events

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Ruling

William Shaw vs Ruth Shaw
Jul 13, 2024 | 23CV02548
23CV02548 SHAW v. SHAW (UNOPPOSED) PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO APPOINT PARTITION REFEREE The unopposed motion is granted. Mr. Singer will be appointed as the partition referee. Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed. Case No. 19CV02702 RHOADS v. BECKLEY APPLICATION FOR ORDER FOR SALE OF DWELLING/OSC FOR SALE OF DWELLING This application is continued as discussed below. The original application, brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 704.740 through 704.850, was filed on January 26, 2023. For a variety of reasons, the application was continued and not ruled upon. When the application was filed, Mr. Beckley was without counsel and the court noted procedural as well as notice issues with the application, resulting in continuances. Mr. Beckley then retained counsel, Thornton Davidson, on June 29, 2023. Mr. Davidson sought to be relieved as counsel on May 8, 2024. The declaration in support of Mr. Davidson’s motion to be relieved noted the next court date as June 11, 2024. The court issued a tentative ruling the day before the June 11 hearing, tentatively granting the motion to be relieved and specifically continuing the application for sale of dwelling to allow defendant to either retain new counsel or participate in a pro per capacity. The parties were ordered to appear. At the June 11 hearing, attended by Mr. Davidson and plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. Eschen, Page 1 of 2 the court granted Mr. Davidson’s motion to be relieved and set July 11, 2024 as the next hearing date. Mr. Beckley did not attend the June 11, 2024 hearing, nor is there evidence before the court that he was notified of the July 11, 2024 date. The order prepared by Mr. Davidson after the hearing and served on Mr. Beckley stated that the tentative ruling became the order of the court. While the order attached the tentative ruling, there is no mention in either the order or the tentative ruling of the July 11, 2024 hearing date for the application. The tentative ruling specified that the application hearing would be set at the next court date. The court will issue an order to show cause pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 704.770, subdivision (a). “After the judgment creditor has filed an application for an order for sale, the court sets a time and place for hearing and must order the judgment debtor to show cause why an order for sale should not be made in accordance with the application. The hearing must be set no later than 45 days after the application is filed, or such later time as the court orders on a showing of good cause.” (2 MB Practice Guide: CA Debt Collection 17.36 (2024).) After the OSC is set, Mr. Rhoads must serve on the judgment debtor, Mr. Beckley, a copy of the OSC, a copy of the application, and a copy of the notice of hearing in the form required by the Judicial Council. (See Code of Civ. Proc. § 704.770, subd. (b).) Page 2 of 2

Ruling

IYANA JACKSON, ET AL. VS SAMUEL WELCH, IN HIS CAPACITY AS TRUSTEE OF THE GEORGILAS TRUST, ET AL.
Jul 16, 2024 | 22STCV33658
Case Number: 22STCV33658 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: 68 Dept. 68 Date: 7-16-24 Case #: 22STCV33658 Trial Date: 1-9-25 c/f 6-24-24 FURTHER INTERROGATORIES MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Samuel Welch RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Iyana Jackson RELIEF REQUESTED Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories (set one) SUMMARY OF ACTION Plaintiffs were tenants of a single family dwelling at 32270 Saticoy Street, West Hills, and allege unsanitary and/or unsafe conditions on the premises as a result of improper maintenance and upkeep. On October 17, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their complaint for Failure to Provide Habitable Dwellings, Breach of Covenant of Right to Quiet Enjoyment and Possession of the Property, Nuisance, and Negligence. Defendants answered the complaint on February 23, 2023. On June 10, 2024, Derrick Robinson filed a Request for Dismissal from the complaint. RULING : Granted. Defendant, Samuel Welch moves to compel further responses to form interrogatories (set one), numbers 2.6, 12.4, 12.7, and 13.1, from Plaintiff Iyana Jackson. The responses consist of incomplete replies, with assurances of later production upon entry into a protective order, admission of certain unspecified documents or media, or references to other parties and non-parties responsible for the provision of information. The responses are incomplete and fail to respond to all subcategories of the requests. The references to other persons constitutes an improper, factually incomplete answer. ( Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783784 [Answers must be complete and responsive. Thus, it is not proper to answer by stating, See my deposition, See my pleading, or See the financial statement].) The motion is therefore granted. Responding is ordered to serve responses in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.210-20310240. No sanctions requested. The court calendar shows nine remaining, scheduled motions to compel further responses through July 22, 2024. The motions appear as a continuation of discovery issues addressed by the court in the 23 motions to compel responses granted on November 22, 2023. The court does not conduct any informal discovery conferences. While the court understands the prior use and perhaps reliance on the IDC system, the court finds the number of items on the court calendar through the next three months presents a potentially inordinate burden. The court reserves the right to set an OSC re: Discovery Referee in lieu of a hearing on any given motion, and may take off any and all motions in lieu of the OSC hearing. The court invites the parties to continue meeting and conferring, including the provision of supplemental responses, when possible. Next set of motions to compel further responses begins with Noah Penn-El beginning on July 2, 2024. Defendant to give notice.

Ruling

NIKE USA INC VS 5860 WEST JEFFERSON LLC ET AL
Jul 12, 2024 | BC722308
Case Number: BC722308 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: 61 NIKE USA INC VS 5860 WEST JEFFERSON LLC ET AL TENTATIVE Plaintiff Nike USA, Inc.s Motion for New Trial is DENIED. Defendants to provide notice. DISCUSSION The authority of a trial court to grant a new trial is established and circumscribed by statute. Section 657 sets out seven grounds for such a motion: (1) [i]rregularity in the proceedings; (2) [m]isconduct of the jury; (3) [a]ccident or surprise; (4) [n]ewly discovered evidence; (5) [e]xcessive or inadequate damages; (6) [i]nsufficiency of the evidence; and (7) [e]rror in law. [Citation.] (Montoya v. Barragan (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1227.) When a new trial is granted, on all or part of the issues, the court shall specify the ground or grounds upon which it is granted and the court's reason or reasons for granting the new trial upon each ground stated. (Code Civ. Proc., § 657.) Plaintiff, Cross-Defendant, and Cross-Complainant Nike USA, Inc. (Nike) moves for a new trial on three of the above grounds: irregularity in the proceedings, insufficiency of the evidence, and errors of law. Nikes argument based on procedural irregularity is based on the courts purported lack of consideration of its objections to its statement of decision. (Motion at pp. 1213.) Nike argues for insufficiency of the evidence, based on purportedly contradictory findings that neither Nike nor Defendants and Cross-Complainants 5860 West Jefferson, LLC, 5860 West Jefferson I, LLC, and Samitaur Constructs (Defendants) had prevailed on their respective claims for damages based on construction delay, and on other issues. (Motion at pp. 1320.) Nike finally argues that the statement of decision contains errors of law in the application of the burden of proof under the lease agreement, and fails to adequately set forth any declaration of the parties rights under the lease. (Motion at pp. 2025.) Defendants in opposition argue that the present motion exceeds the page limit articulated in California Rules of Court (CRC) Rule 3.1113. (Opposition at p. 9.) They further contend that the present motions memorandum, declaration, and supporting evidence were filed and served tardily. (Opposition at pp. 89.) Defendant argues that Nikes objections to the statement of decision were late, and that the court in any event had notice of Nikes objections from its earlier-filed Request for Statement of Decision. (Opposition at pp. 1011.) Defendants argue that the courts statement of decision was based on substantial evidence and contains no errors of law. (Opposition at pp. 1118.) Plaintiffs memorandum exceeds the page limits prescribed by CRC Rule 3.1113. That rule states that no opening or responding memorandum except in summary judgment motions may exceed 15 pages, excluding the caption page, the notice of motion and motion, exhibits, declarations, attachments, the table of contents, the table of authorities, or the proof of service. (CRC Rule 3.1113, subd. (d).) Excluding these last matters, Plaintiffs memorandum here extends to 21 pages. A memorandum that exceeds the page limits of these rules must be filed and considered in the same manner as a late-filed paper. (CRC Rule 3.1113, subd. (g).) The memorandum and supporting materials are also actually late. Nikes notice of intent to move for new trial was filed on May 28, 2024. Per Code of Civil Procedure § 659a, the party seeking new trial shall serve upon all other parties and file any brief and accompanying documents, including affidavits in support of the motion within 10 days of filing the notice [of intention to move for a new trial]. (Code Civ. Proc. § 659a.) Although Nike filed the memorandum and supporting declaration by the June 7, 2024 deadline, it did not serve them until June 8 (Evans Decl. ¶ 8), and did not file or serve the supporting evidence until June 10. These timelines are not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense (Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hospital (2017) 2 Cal.5th 330, 342), and the statute provides courts the power, for good cause shown by affidavit or by written stipulation of the parties to extend the period for filing and serving materials for an additional period not to exceed 10 days. (Code Civ. Proc. § 659a.) A court may retroactively extend the deadline for filing to the full 30-day period even if the party did not seek an extension in advance. (Kabran, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 342.) Here, in the absence of prejudice shown by Defendants arising from the tardiness of service of the memorandum and supporting evidence, the court will exercise its discretion to assess the motion on its merits. Nike argues that the entry of judgment on the statement of decision evidenced irregularity in the proceedings, because the court entered judgment on May 14, 2024, in the erroneous belief that Nikes objections had not been timely filed, when in fact Nike had until May 16, 2024, to file such objections. Nikes argument as to the timing of the objections is persuasive. The proposed statement of decision not captioned proposed, but identified as such in its opening paragraph was filed and served on April 26, 2024. Per CRC Rule 3.1590, subd. (g), [a]ny party may, within 15 days after the proposed statement of decision and judgment have been served, serve and file objections to the proposed statement of decision or judgment. 15 days after service of the statement of decision would have been May 11, a Saturday, rendering the deadline for filing objections Monday, May 13, 2024. Yet because the statement of decision was served by mail, the time for filing of objections was extended by five calendar days, as provided in Code of Civil Procedure § 1013, subd. (a). Thus the deadline by which to serve objections was May 16, 2024. Nikes objections were served on May 14, 2024, the same day the court entered judgment on the proposed statement of decision in the belief that no objections had been timely filed. (See 5/14/2024 Minute Order.) However, Nike has suffered no prejudice resulting from the claimed irregularity. In granting a new trial based on judicial error, [p]rejudice is required . . . and there is no discretion to grant a new trial for harmless error. (Sherman v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1161.) Before Nike filed its objections to the statement of decision, it filed on May 8, 2024, a Request for Statement of Decision, taking issue with what Nike termed procedural ambiguities in the statement of decision and itemizing 87 issues, questions, and arguments for the court to consider. The court considered these issues in its order dated May 14, 2024, and found that its proposed statement of decision sufficiently addresses the evidence and legal and factual issues raised by Nike. (5/14/2024 Minute Order.) The issues raised in Nikes request for statement of decision parallel the objections it later offered, and were considered by the court. This is thus unlike the case in Raville v. Singh (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1130, cited by Nike, in which a different judge signed off on a statement of decision after the judge who had authored the tentative version had died. The same judge here held trial, prepared a proposed statement of decision, reviewed Nikes arguments, and entered judgment. As to insufficiency of the evidence, Nike contends that the courts decision does not support its conclusion that the premises were substantially complete on July 28, 2018. (Motion at pp. 1415.) However, the statement of decision notes that the City issued a temporary certificate of occupancy on July 28, 2018. (Statement of Decision (SOD) at p. 6.) The court noted that it was necessary to determine whether the BSC [base shell and core] or tenant improvements were completed to the extent that only punchlist items remained and whether any remaining uncompleted items adversely affected Nikes use of the property. (Ibid.) The court cited the myriad photos of the construction, and determined no items remained to be addressed which adversely affected Nikes occupancy. (Ibid.) The courts finding was supported by substantial evidence, as noted by Defendants in opposition. (Opposition at p.13.) Nike argues that this courts findings that neither Nike nor Defendants prevailed on their breach of contract claims as to who caused the delay are inherently contradictory, because one party must have caused the delay. (Motion at p. 16.) Yet this argument fails to reckon with the applicable burden of proof. The parties each bore the burden to prove their claims by a preponderance of the evidence, i.e. to present evidence, which when weighed with contrary evidence, has more convincing force and the greater probability of truth. (City of Long Beach v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 298, 314 .) But if two parties make conflicting showings of culpability for the same event, and both showings are equally persuasive, then neither has shown that theirs has the greater probability of truth, and neither has met their burden. The courts statement of decision on the causes of the delay addresses all material disputes and is supported by substantial evidence. Although Nike argues that the court was required to make findings as to the cause of each period of delay, it presents no authority holding that such detail is required. (Motion at pp. 1618.) The applicable authority suggests otherwise: A trial court rendering a statement of decision under Code of Civil Procedure section 632 is required only to state ultimate rather than evidentiary facts. A trial court is not required to make findings with regard to detailed evidentiary facts or to make minute findings as to individual items of evidence. Only where a trial court fails to make findings as to a material issue which would fairly disclose the determination by the trial court would reversible error result. Even though a court fails to make a finding on a particular matter, if the judgment is otherwise supported, the omission is harmless error unless the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding in favor of the complaining party which would have the effect of countervailing or destroying other findings. A failure to find on an immaterial issue is not error. [Citation.] In issuing a statement of decision, the trial court need not address each question listed in a party's request. All that is required is an explanation of the factual and legal basis for the court's decision regarding such principal controverted issues at trial as are listed in the request. (Ribakoff v. City of Long Beach (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 150, 163.) The statement of decision meets this standard. Nike further argues that the courts finding as to the tardiness of its request to rent parking spaces under the lease was erroneous. This argument is as follows: The lease provides that Nike could exercise an option to certain parking spaces by the commencement of the eighteenth (18th) month of the Lease term following the Commencement Date. (Motion Exh. 81, Addendum ¶ 54.1.) Nike cites evidence that it provided notice of its intent to rent 123 monthly parking passes in an email dated January 23, 2020. (Motion Exh. T.) And because Nike had 18 months to request the parking until February 1, 2020, given a commencement date of July 28, 2018 Nike argues that no substantial evidence supports the courts finding that Nikes request was untimely. (Motion at pp. 1819.) The lease, however, did not give Nike until the end of the eighteenth (18th) month of the Lease term following the Commencement Date to seek the parking spaces. The lease instead set the deadline at the commencement of the eighteenth month i.e., until January 1, 2020. Nike thus did not have until February 1, 2020,to rent the parking spaces, and by this reckoning, Nikes January 23, 2020 request was untimely, and the courts reasoning stands. Nikes argument as to the breach of warranty claim is also unpersuasive, as the courts findings as to the condition of the roof was supported by substantial evidence. The court found that the parties were aware of the susceptibility of the roof to leaks, yet requested the type of roof at issue anyway. (SOD at p. 7.) The court found no evidence of structural defects, and that the Defendants had maintained and addressed the leaks that Nike identified. (Ibid.) Nikes arguments as to errors of law, meanwhile, are similarly unavailing. Nike argues that the court misapplied the burden of proof, because under the lease, any delay was attributed to Defendants unless proven to be caused by Nike. (Motion at pp. 2025.) Yet Nike identifies no provision of the lease attributing delayed substantial completion to Defendants by default. It identifies a provision of an attached work letter stating that the date of substantial completion shall be deemed to be . . . the date on which the Tenant Improvements would have been Substantially completed if no such a . . . Delay had occurred, provided that the delay was caused by the lessee (Nike). (Motion at pp. 2021, citing Motion Exh. 81, at pp. 6465.) This provision does not purport to create a presumption of either partys default for the cause of delay, or to affect the ordinary burden of proof applicable to a breach of contract action. Nike further identifies provisions indicating that time was of the essence, and setting a date for completion of construction, but once more, these provisions do not purport to assign a presumption of fault for the delay to Defendants. (Motion at p. 22, citing Motion Exh. 81 at p. 65.) Finally, Nike argues that the statement of decision rendered judgment in favor of Defendants on their declaratory relief cause of action, without offering the actual declaration of rights requested, or a contrary declaration to what Nike requested in its Complaint. (Motion at p. 25.) Nike relies on the case Kroff v. Kroff (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 404, in which the court stated: A dispute existed as to the meaning of a document and the plaintiff was entitled to a judicial declaration of her rights. It was the duty of the court to set forth the meaning and effect of the clause in question. Here the court merely adjudged that plaintiff take nothing by her said cause of action, and that defendant have judgment against plaintiff. (Id. at p. 405.) The present case is distinguishable, as the court here did not merely adjudge that plaintiff take nothing and defendants prevail, but offered a statement of decision explaining the facts of the case and its reasoning. Nike sought a declaration that the property was not substantially complete as of the date of the complaint, that its obligation to pay rent had not begun, that Plaintiff was entitled to immediate correction and completion of all incomplete or defective aspects of the property, and it is entitled to free rent for a number of days determined by the court. (FAC ¶ 57.) Yet these prayers for relief were addressed by the courts determination that the property was substantially complete as of July 28, 2018. (SOD at p. 6.) The motion is therefore DENIED.

Ruling

REILAND vs CENLAR FSB, et al.
Jul 16, 2024 | Civil Unlimited (Other Real Property (not emin...) | 21CV000707
21CV000707: REILAND vs CENLAR FSB, et al. 07/16/2024 Hearing on Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint; filed by Harold P. Reiland, Jr. (Plaintiff) in Department 16 Tentative Ruling - 07/12/2024 Somnath Raj Chatterjee The plaintiff filed his Complaint on October 21, 2021, alleging a dispute over a repayment plan for a home equity line of credit that went into arrears. The relevant events occurred in and before 2020. After the parties engaged in substantial discovery, the Court ruled on cross motions for summary judgment on March 13, 2024. Trial is set for August 26, 2024. On June 14, 2024, Plaintiff filed this motion for leave to file the FAC. The FAC materially changes the factual allegations and factual theories. For example, the plaintiff alleged in the Complaint that he fell sick, that he was unable to make payments on the loan, that the loan became delinquent, and that he entered a repayment plan with the defendants that the defendants then failed to honor. Now, in the FAC, he omits allegations that the loan was delinquent and that he entered a repayment plan. He now alleges that the defendants advised him to stop making payments on the loan, that he continued to make loan repayments, that the defendants offered him a loan modification, and that the defendants made (newly alleged) oral promises regarding a loan modification. The FAC adds new causes of action for “no single point of contact,” “incorrect amount recorded on NOD,” a count of breach of oral contract based on the newly alleged oral promise, and violation of section 1788 of the Civil Code, California’s Rosenthal Act. Plaintiff offers no credible justification for changing the factual allegations regarding events that occurred before the Complaint was filed, almost three years ago. Nor does he explain the unreasonable delay. The new allegations and factual theories will require vacating the trial date and permitting additional discovery. The newly asserted causes of action will also likely require a new round of pleading challenges. All this results in unwarranted prejudice to the defendants. While the Court applies a policy of liberally permitting amendments to the pleading, this is the type of prejudice to the defendants where the rare decision to deny amending the pleadings is appropriate. See, e.g., P&D Consultants, Inc. v. City of Carlsbad, 190 Cal. App. 4th 1332, 1345 (2010); Magpali v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 48 Cal. App. 4th 471, 486–87 (1996) (“Where the trial date is set, the jury is about to be impaneled, counsel, the parties, the trial court, and the witnesses have blocked the time, and the only way to avoid prejudice to the opposing party is to continue the trial date to allow further discovery, refusal of leave to amend cannot be an abuse of discretion.”) Further, this is also a situation where the plaintiff modified central factual allegations after the Court ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment, essentially creating a moving target. See Melican v. Regents of Univ. of California, 151 Cal. App. 4th 168, 176 (2007) (“It would be patently unfair to allow plaintiffs to defeat UCI's summary judgment motion by allowing them to present a ‘moving target’ unbounded by the pleadings”). Based on the foregoing and the reasons set forth in the papers on file in this motion, including SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 21CV000707: REILAND vs CENLAR FSB, et al. 07/16/2024 Hearing on Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint; filed by Harold P. Reiland, Jr. (Plaintiff) in Department 16 the defendants’ July 2, 2024, Opposition, the plaintiff’s motion for leave to file the FAC is DENIED. PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT THE HEARING/CONFERENCE WILL BE IN-PERSON WITH THE OPTION TO APPEAR REMOTELY. COUNSEL AND PARTIES MAY APPEAR EITHER IN-PERSON IN DEPARTMENT 16 AT THE ADMINISTRATION BUILDING OR BY REMOTELY THROUGH THE ZOOM PLATFORM. ZOOM LOG-IN INFORMATION FOR DEPARTMENT 16 IS BELOW. Join ZoomGov Meeting https://alameda-courts-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16024053017 Meeting ID: 160 2405 3017 One tap mobile +16692545252,,16024053017# US (San Jose) +16692161590,,16024053017# US (San Jose) --- Dial by your location • +1 669 254 5252 US (San Jose) • +1 669 216 1590 US (San Jose) • +1 415 449 4000 US (US Spanish Line) • +1 646 828 7666 US (New York) • +1 646 964 1167 US (US Spanish Line) • +1 551 285 1373 US (New Jersey) • 833 568 8864 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 160 2405 3017 Find your local number: https://alameda-courts-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/u/afHtSjITt --- Join by SIP • 16024053017@sip.zoomgov.com --- Join by H.323 • 161.199.138.10 (US West) • 161.199.136.10 (US East) Meeting ID: 160 2405 3017

Ruling

Weinzinger, Robert D vs Baker, Dennis
Jul 17, 2024 | 24CV01737
24CV01737 Weinzinger, Robert D v. Baker, Dennis EVENT: Petition for Judgment of Abandonment (Civ. Code § 798.61) Petition for Judgment of Abandonment is GRANTED. The Court will sign the proposed order.

Ruling

JOSEPH FARZAM LAW FIRM VS KRA LEGAL, ET AL.
Jul 15, 2024 | 23TRCV00102
Case Number: 23TRCV00102 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: M LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHWEST DISTRICT Honorable Gary Y. Tanaka Monday, July 15, 2024 Department M Calendar No. 8 PROCEEDINGS Joseph Farzam Law Firm v. Pamela Hutchins, et al. 23TRCV00102 1. Pamela Hutchins, et al.s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings TENTATIVE RULING Pamela Hutchins, et al.s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is denied, in part, and granted with 20 days leave to amend, in part. Background Plaintiff filed the Complaint on January 12, 2023, and the Second Amended Complaint on October 16, 2023. Plaintiff alleges the following facts. Plaintiff law firm - represented Pamela Hutchins in another case Case No. BC682521. Plaintiff was substituted as counsel. Hutchins signed a contract with Plaintiff but she and her subsequent attorney in the underlying action failed to pay Plaintiffs attorney lien. Plaintiff alleges the following causes of action: 1. Breach of Contract; 2. Conversion; 3. Constructive Trust; 4. Common Count; 5. Unjust Enrichment. Meet and Confer Defendants filed a meet and confer declaration in sufficient compliance with CCP § 439. (Decl., Kenneth R. Agu, ¶¶ 6-8.) Request for Judicial Notice Defendants request for judicial notice is granted pursuant to Evidence Code § 452(d). Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings A motion for judgment on the pleadings has the same function as a general demurrer but is made after the time for demurrer has expired. Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (f). Except as provided by statute, the rules governing demurrers apply. Civic Partners Stockton, LLC v. Youssefi (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1005, 1012. Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendant. Rolfe v. Cal. Transp. Commn (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 239, 242; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(3)(B)(ii). Like a demurrer, the grounds for the motion [for judgment on the pleadings] must appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice. Civic Partners Stockton, LLC , supra , 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 1013. In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, [a]ll allegations in the complaint and matters upon which judicial notice may be taken are assumed to be true. Rippon v. Bowen (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1313. Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings. The Court notes that Defendants did not specify, in the notice of motion, the cause or causes of action to which the motion is directed. Defendants do, however, state the following: This motion is premised on the simple fact that Plaintiff failed to establish the existence, amount, and enforceability of his lien in an independent action against his client. (Notice of Motion, page 2, lines 3-5.) First Cause of Action for Breach of Contract The motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied. Plaintiff states facts sufficient to state a cause of action. The elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are: (1) the contract, (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damages to plaintiff. Coles v. Glaser (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 384, 391(internal quotations omitted). [T]he complaint must indicate on its face whether the contract is written, oral, or implied by conduct. [...] If the action is based on an alleged breach of a written contract, the terms must be set out verbatim in the body of the complaint or a copy of the written instrument must be attached and incorporated by reference. Otworth v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 452, 45859. Plaintiffs must either: (a) set forth the terms of the contract verbatim, (b) attach a copy of the contract and incorporate it by reference, or (c) plead its legal effect. McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1489. Plaintiff has alleged the existence of a written contract and attached the contract. Plaintiff alleges facts to meet the elements of the cause of action including Plaintiffs performance, Defendants breach, and resulting damages. (SAC, ¶¶ 9-25; Ex. 1.) Defendants argue that the contract is not valid or enforceable. Whether the contract is valid or not, and specifically as to the date of incident to which the contract is directed, are factual issues that cannot be adjudicated with a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the first cause of action is denied. Second Cause of Action for Conversion Fourth Cause of Action for Common Count Fifth Cause of Action for Unjust Enrichment The motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the second, fourth, and fifth causes of action is denied. Plaintiff states facts sufficient to state the causes of action. Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over the property of another. The elements of a conversion claim are: (1) the plaintiff's ownership or right to possession of the property; (2) the defendant's conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and (3) damages.... Hodges v. County of Placer (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 537, 551. Money cannot be the subject of a cause of action for conversion unless there is a specific, identifiable sum involved. PCO, Inc. v. Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro, LLP (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 384, 395. California has long permitted the pleading of common counts despite their divergence from the norms of code pleading. Jogani v. Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 901, 906. A common count may be used where the only thing that remains to be done is the payment of money. Oliver v. Campbell (1954) 43 Cal.2d 298, 305. Unjust Enrichment is not a cause of action. See, Hill v. Roll Int'l Corp . (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1307. The Court may, however, recognize a cause of action based on quasi-contract to obtain the remedy of restitution. See, McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1490. "The elements of an unjust enrichment claim are the receipt of a benefit and [the] unjust retention of the benefit at the expense of another." Peterson v. Cellco Partnership (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1593-94. Plaintiff has sufficiently stated facts to meet the elements of the cause of action, and, as to the fifth cause of action, the Court recognizes the cause of action as one based on quasi-contract. Defendants have not actually argued that Plaintiff failed to state the elements of the cause of action, but instead relies on the same arguments noted above contending that Plaintiff failed to establish a basis for a lien because Plaintiff cannot show an enforceable contract. As noted above, that would be a factual issue, and, regardless, the second and fifth causes of action are not specifically based on the existence of a contract. Third Cause of Action for Constructive Trust The motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted with 20 days leave to amend. Constructive Trust is a remedy and not a cause of action. GlueFold's complaint had a fourth cause of action seeking imposition of a constructive trust and an accounting. The former is not an independent cause of action but merely a type of remedy for some categories of underlying wrong. Glue-Fold, Inc. v. Slautterback Corp. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023. Leave to amend is provided to allow Plaintiff to omit this remedy as a specific cause of action but instead Plaintiff may allege the allegations of constructive trust and set forth the remedy of a constructive trust in the prayer for relief. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Ruling

GAETANI REAL ESTATE VS. ZACHARY HOWITT ET AL
Jul 15, 2024 | CUD23672769
Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 15, 2024 line 7. DEFENDANT ZACHARY HOWITT Notice Of Motion And Motion To Compel Plaintiffs Attendance At Deposition And Request For Sanctions Hearing Required to address the status of the deposition. =(501/HEK) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified, and the opposing party does not appear.

Ruling

TING FU LO VS. YUK YUNG LO ET AL
Jul 12, 2024 | CGC23608800
Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 12, 2024 line 3. PLAINTIFF TING LO MOTION / Notice Of Motion And Motion is denied as to the portions of the motion seeking monetary sanctions, a partition order and an order for fees and costs. No sanctions is awarded against defendant Vivian Yuk Yung Lo because plaintiff has not shown that Ms. Lo failed to comply with any applicable rules, which is required for sanctions per CRC 2.30. The portions of the motion seeking a partition order and an order for fees and costs are not available on a pre-trial motion absent the parties' stipulation. The statement in Ms. Lo's CMC statement that "All parties agree to sell the property" is insufficient to support any of the relief sought by this motion because it does not address the necessary terms and logistics of the sale, the disposition of the proceeds of the sale, or payment of fees and costs. The portion of the motion seeking a meet and confer is misguided because CRC 3.724 is intended to require meet and confer regarding case management issues before the initial case management conference. However, review of the parties filings shows that the parties appear to desire and clearly need the assistance of a person experienced in assisting parties reach a settlement and thus the Court treats the portion of the motion regarding meet and confer as a request for a mandatory settlement conference and grants that request. The parties are required to participate in a mandatory settlement conference before the Honorable Jeffrey Ross. To facilitate the scheduling of that conference, no later than July 15 counsel for each side must send an email to Judge Ross at jross@sftc.org stating the name and number of this case, who they represent, and their cell phone numbers. =(501/HEK) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified, and the opposing party does not appear.

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