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Darby Wilcox, Plaintiff(S) Vs. Farmers Insurance Exchange., Defendant(S)

Case Last Refreshed: 2 years ago

filed a(n) General Insurance - Insurance case in the jurisdiction of Clark County, NV, . Clark County, NV Superior Courts .

Case Details for Darby Wilcox, Plaintiff(S) Vs. Farmers Insurance Exchange., Defendant(S)

Filing Date

October 29, 2021

Category

Insurance Carrier

Last Refreshed

July 01, 2022

Practice Area

Insurance

Filing Location

Clark County, NV

Matter Type

General Insurance

Case Events for Darby Wilcox, Plaintiff(S) Vs. Farmers Insurance Exchange., Defendant(S)

Type Description
Docket Event Status Check: Status of Case
Status Check: Offer of Judgment came before the Court on the June 16, 2022 (Chambers) Calendar. COURT NOTES, Offer of Judgment has not been filed. COURT ORDERED, matter CONTINUED to the June 30, 2022 (Chambers) Calendar. Status Check will be vacated if Offer of Judgment is filed prior to the next hearing date. CLERK'S NOTE: This Minute Order was electronically served to all registered parties for Odyssey File & Serve/ og (06/16/22)

Judge: Villani, Michael

Docket Event Notice of Hearing Doc ID# 13
[13] NOTICE OF HEARING
Docket Event Clerk's Note
Unable to enter Judgment Disposition as no Offer attached/ filed with Acceptance Pursuant to NRCP 68
Docket Event Acceptance of Offer of Judgment Doc ID# 12
[12] Plaintiff's Acceptance of Defendant's Offer of Judgment
Docket Event Commissioners Decision on Request for Exemption - Granted Doc ID# 11
[11] Commissioner's Decision on Request for Exemption
Docket Event Request for Exemption From Arbitration Doc ID# 10
[10] Plaintiff's Request for Exemption From Arbitration
Docket Event Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure Doc ID# 8
[8] Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure
Docket Event Answer Doc ID# 9
[9] Defendants, FIE's Answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint
Docket Event Demand for Jury Trial Doc ID# 7
[7] Demand for Jury Trial
Docket Event Affidavit of Service Doc ID# 6
[6] Affidavit of Service - Farmers Insurance Group, Inc
See all events

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Ruling

LIEL LEVI VS KEYES HYUNDAI OF VAN NUYS, AN ENTITY, ET AL.
Jul 10, 2024 | 23VECV02505
Case Number: 23VECV02505 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: T Levi v Keyes 23VECV02505 Tentative rulings Defendants motion to strike First Amended Complaint-GRANT . The opposition was not considered because plaintiffs counsel was to provide a declaration from Saniel Sanft attaching a copy of the overnight mail receipt, and proof of delivery or status of delivery (he stated in his 5/10/2024 proof of service that it was served by overnight delivery.). He failed to do so, and defense denies receiving the opposition. By court order of 2/7/2024, the first amended complaint was to be served and filed no later than 20 days. Because notice was given by the court by mail, an additional 5 days were added, which would make the due date 3/4/2024. It was not served until 3/13/2024 and not filed until 3/14/2024 after the answer had been filed. Therefore, the First Amended Complaint was late, and it is disregarded. The ruling on the demurrer as to the original complaint stands: Defendants Hyundai Motor America and Van Nuys-H, Inc. dba Keyes Hyundai of Van Nuyss Demurrer to the Complaint is OVERRULED as to the eighth cause of action; SUSTAINED WITH 20 DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND as to the second cause of action; and SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as to the fourth, fifth, seventh, tenth, twelfth, and thirteenth causes of action. The Answer to the Complaint filed on 3/13/2024 stands. Plaintiffs Demurrer to Answer: SUSTAINED WITH 20 DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND THE ANSWER. Plaintiff may demur to an answer, particularly as to affirmative defenses. (Timberidge Enterps., Inc. v. City of Santa Rosa (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 873, 879; see Hejmadi v. Amfac, Inc. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 525, 535 [proper vehicle to test the sufficiency of an answer].) The affirmative defenses must do more than set forth bare legal conclusion. Affirmative defenses must specify supporting facts. (FPI Devel., Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 384.) Allegations stating a legal conclusion (rather than pleading facts) are inadequate. (Berger v. California Ins. Guar. Assn. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 989, 1006; Jones v. Grewe (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 950, 954.) Here, the court finds that the demurrer is justified because there are no factual allegations supporting the bare legal conclusions. The demurrer is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. The Second Affirmative Defense at page 19, lines 3-6, is uncertain in that it cannot be ascertained what was the improper conduct of Plaintiff, and what applicable statutes required notice: Sustained as to lack of facts which is alleged to have been improper conduct. The Sixth Affirmative Defense is uncertain in that on page 19, line 26, it cannot be ascertained who are the persons or entities other than Defendants, nor can it be ascertained how, when, or in what manner such persons or entitles were reckless, careless and/or negligent: Sustained. No facts identified. The Twelfth Affirmative Defense fails to allege facts sufficient to state a defense; Sustained. No facts alleged. The Twelfth Affirmative Defense is uncertain in that on page 21, line 18, it cannot be ascertained what the statutory requirements were: Sustained. No facts alleged. The Fourteenth Affirmative Defense fails to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; Sustained. No facts alleged. The Fourteenth Affirmative Defense is uncertain in that on page 21, lines 26-28, it cannot be ascertained how, when, or in what manner there was either a release or a settlement; Sustained. No facts alleged. The Twentieth Affirmative Defense fails to allege facts sufficient to state a defense: Sustained. No facts alleged. The Twenty-First Affirmative Defense fails to allege facts sufficient to state a defense: Sustained. No facts alleged. The Twenty-Second Affirmative Defense fails to allege facts sufficient to state a defense: Sustained. No facts alleged. The Twenty-Fifth Affirmative defense fails to allege facts sufficient to state a defense: Sustained. No facts alleged. The Thirty Second Affirmative Defense fails to allege facts sufficient to state a defense: Sustained. No facts alleged. The Thirty Third Affirmative Defense fails to allege facts sufficient to state a defense: Sustained. No facts alleged. The Thirty Fourth Affirmative Defense is uncertain in that on page 25 lines 24- 25, it cannot be ascertained in what action or proceeding was there a prior class action settlement, nor can it be ascertained how, when or in what manner, Plaintiff was given notice so as to prevent his being opted out: Sustained. No facts alleged. 14. The Thirty Sixth Affirmative Defense fails to allege facts sufficient to state a defense: Sustained. No facts alleged.

Ruling

MOISES CRUZ, ET AL. VS SAMO ENTERPIRSES, INC., ET AL.
Jul 11, 2024 | 23STLC02808
Case Number: 23STLC02808 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 25 Hearing Date: Thursday, July 11, 2024 Case Name: MOISES CRUZ; SANDY TORIBIO v. SAMO ENTERPRISES, INC. dba WESTERN MOTOR SPORT; JB FINANCIAL, a PARTNERSHIP CONSISTING OF SUSAN DEMIRCI AND IGYA DEMIRCI; HUDSON INSURANCE COMPANY; and DOES 1-40 Case No.: 23STLC02808 Motion: Motion to Compel Arbitration and for the Court to Pick Arbitration Forum and Request for a Stay of Proceedings Moving Party: Plaintiffs Moises Cruz and Sandy Toribio Responding Party: Unopposed Notice: OK Recommended Ruling: Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Arbitration and for the Court to Pick Arbitration Forum and Stay Proceedings is GRANTED. BACKGROUND On April 27, 2023, Plaintiffs Moises Cruz and Sandy Toribio (Plaintiffs) filed a Complaint against Defendants Samo Enterprises, Inc. dba Western Motor Sport (Samo Enterprises or Samo), JB Financial, a partnership consisting of Susan Demirci and Igya Demirci (JB), and Hudson Insurance Company (Hudson) (collectively, Defendants), alleging causes of action for: (1) violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) pursuant to California Civil Code section 1750 et seq .; (2) violation of California Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq .; (3) claim against dealer bond; and (4) violation of Code of Civil Procedure sections 1281.97 and 1281.99. The complaint arises from the sale of an allegedly defective used 2010 Chevrolet Silverado 1500 (the Subject Vehicle). On May 11, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration and for the Court to Pick Arbitration Forum and Request for Stay (the Motion), seeking an order compelling Defendants Samo Enterprises and JB to arbitrate the controversy pursuant to the Retail Installment Sale Contract (RISC). On June 23, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Proof of Service indicating that Defendant JB had been served with the summons, complaint, and Motion by substituted service. On June 23, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Non-Service Report as to Defendant Samo Enterprises which sets forth attempts to serve Defendant Samo Enterprises at 17477 Doric St., Los Angeles, CA 91344. On July 10, 2023, the Court issued a minute order noting that Plaintiffs had filed a defective Notice of Motion, which did not list the address of the Spring Street Courthouse, where the hearing on the Motion would take place. ( See July 10, 2023 Minute Order.) Plaintiffs also failed to file proof that the moving papers were served on Samo Enterprises or Hudson. ( Id .) The Court continued the hearing on the Motion to August 10, 2023 and ordered Plaintiffs to file and serve a corrected Notice of Motion and to serve all parties in the case. ( Id .) On July 7, 2023, Plaintiffs filed and served a Notice of Continued Motion, listing the Spring Street Courthouse Address. On July 7, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Proof of Service indicating that Defendant Hudson had been served with the summons, complaint, and Motion. On July 19, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the Declaration of Nima Heydari in response to the Courts July 10, 2023, Order. On July 25, 2023, Defendant Hudson filed an Answer to the Complaint. On August 1, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Non-Service Report as to Defendant Samo Enterprises. On August 10, 2023, the Court continued the hearing on the Motion to allow Plaintiffs additional time to serve Defendant Samo Enterprises with the Complaint and moving papers. ( See August 10, 2023 Minute Order.) The Court continued the hearing on the Motion to November 8, 2023 and ordered Plaintiffs to file supplemental papers addressing the issues discussed [in the Courts order] at least 16 court days before the next scheduled hearing. Failure to do so may result in the Motion being placed off calendar or denied. ( Id .) On September 27, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Non-Service Report as to Defendant Samo Enterprises. On September 28, 2023, Plaintiffs filed an Application to Serve Defendant Samo Enterprises through the California Secretary of State (the Application). On October 24, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a declaration from Nima Heydari re: an Order to Show Cause as to Service of Defendant Samo Enterprises. This declaration appears to be in response to the Courts August 10, 2023 Order. On November 8, 2023, the Court continued the hearing on the Motion to allow Plaintiffs additional time to serve Defendant Samo Enterprises with the summons, complaint, and Motion. (11/08/23 Minute Order at p. 5.) The Court also ordered Plaintiffs to file supplemental papers addressing any additional service efforts on Defendant Samo Enterprises. ( Id .) Additionally, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to reserve a hearing date for their application for service. ( Id .) On February 5, 2024, Plaintiffs counsel filed a supplemental declaration regarding the issue of service on Defendant Samo Enterprises. On February 8, 2024, the Court, on its own motion, continued the hearing on the Motion to April 4, 2024, and ordered Plaintiffs to serve and electronically file supplemental papers addressing the issue of service of the Motion on Defendant Samo Enterprises. (02/08/24 Minute order at pp. 5-6.) On March 8, 2024, the Court rejected Plaintiffs Application due to a defect in the proposed order. On March 11, 2024, Plaintiffs counsel filed a supplemental declaration regarding the issue of service on Defendant Samo Enterprises. On March 25, 2024, the Court, on its own motion, continued the hearing on the Motion to June 6, 2024 so that Plaintiff could cure the defects in the Application. (03/25/24 Minute Order at pp. 1-2.) On April 12, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an Application to Serve Defendant Samo Enterprises through the California Secretary of State (the 2d Application). On April 29, 2024, the 2d Application was granted. On May 24, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a proof of service showing that the summons, complaint, and the instant motion were served on Defendant Samo Enterprises on May 21, 2024 via the California Secretary of State. On May 28, 2024, Plaintiffs counsel filed a declaration in support of the Motion. In such declaration, counsel requested a 30-day continuance on the motion given that Defendant Samo was served by way of the California Secretary of State on May 21, 2024. On June 6, 2024, the Court continued the hearing on the Motion to July 11, 2024 so that Defendant Samo could be afforded the opportunity to file an opposition brief as the Motion was served on Defendant Samo with less than 16 court days notice. (06/06/24 Minute Order at pp. 5-6.) Also, on June 6, 2024, Plaintiffs filed and served a Notice of Continued Motion to Compel Arbitration Hearing. MOVING PARTY POSITION Plaintiffs contend that the controversy is covered by the arbitration provision in the RISC. Plaintiffs assert that the parties do not agree on the forum of arbitration. Plaintiffs indicate that they elect the American Arbitration Association (AAA) or, in the alternative, JAMS as the arbitration forum. OPPOSITION None filed as of July 8, 2024. ANALYSIS I. Compelling Arbitration A. Legal Standard A party who claims that there is a written agreement to arbitrate may petition the superior court for an order to compel arbitration pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2. Banner Entertainment, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 348, 356 . California law, like federal law, favors enforcement of valid arbitration agreements. Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 97 . On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist for rescission of the agreement. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2.) A party opposing a petition to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense. Banner Entertainment, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra , 62 Cal.App.4th 348, 356 . Where a petition to compel arbitration is granted, a court shall, upon motion of a party to such action or proceeding, stay the action or proceeding until an arbitration is had in accordance with the order to arbitrate or until such earlier time as the court specifies. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.4.) B. Discussion In support of the motion, Plaintiffs counsel, Kasra Sadr (Sadr), provides a declaration. Counsel attaches a copy of the RISC to her declaration. (Sadr Decl., ¶ 3; Exh. 1.) On or about March 7, 2022, counsels office sent a pre-filing CLRA demand letter to Defendants Samo and JBs respective places of business on behalf of Plaintiffs, and the demand included a demand for arbitration with the AAA. (Sadr Decl., ¶ 4; Exh. 2.) Counsel did not receive any agreement to arbitrate or pay for the AAA initial arbitration fees from Defendants Samo or JB before filing for arbitration. (Sadr Decl., ¶ 6.) On or around June 21, 2022, counsels office filed for arbitration with the AAA on behalf of the Plaintiff against Defendants Samo and JB. (Sadr Decl., ¶ 7.) On or around August 16, 2022, counsels office received a letter from the AAA which indicated that the AAA decided to close its file because there was a previous failure of Defendant Samo to comply with AAA policies. (Sadr Decl., ¶ 8; Exh. 3.) As such, counsels office informed the AAA by email that it would like to proceed solely against Defendant JB with the AAA. (Sadr Decl., ¶ 9.) On August 22, 2022, the AAA accepted arbitration of the dispute between Plaintiff and Defendant JB and demanded payment to be made by Defendant JB on or by September 4, 2022. (Sadr Decl., ¶ 10; Exh. 4.) Due to Defendant JB not making the required payments by the due date provided by the AAA, the AAA sent a letter indicating that it declines to administer the arbitration. (Sadr Decl., ¶¶ 11-12; Exh. 6.) Counsel states that the RISC, which was attached as Exhibit 1 to the Complaint, was authenticated by Plaintiffs by way of an affidavit. (Sadr Decl., ¶ 13; Exh. 7.) The Court has reviewed the RISC. (Sadr Decl., ¶ 3; Exh. 1.) The RISC was entered into between Plaintiffs and Defendant Samo. ( Id .) The RISC contains an arbitration provision therein which states that [a]ny claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise . . . which arises out of or relates to . . . [the] purchase or condition of this vehicle, this contract or any resulting transaction or relationship (including any such relationship with third parties who do not sign this contract) shall, at your or our election, be resolved by neutral binding arbitration and not by court action. (Sadr Decl., ¶ 3; Exh. 1 at p. 6.) The arbitration provision provides that Plaintiff may chose the American Arbitration Association . . . or any other organization to conduct the arbitration subject to our approval. ( Id .) The Court finds that there is a valid arbitration agreement between Defendant Samo and Plaintiffs, and that the arbitration agreement covers the claims alleged in the Complaint. The Court notes that the Court can compel Defendant JB to arbitrate as the Complaint alleges that Defendant JB was assigned the RISC and is the holder of the RISC. (Complaint, ¶¶ 39-40.) Defendant JB has failed to oppose the Motion and therefore the Court finds that Defendant JB has conceded to Plaintiffs argument that it can be compelled to arbitration as [c]ontentions are waived when a party fails to support them with reasoned argument and citations to authority. Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v. Colombo (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1215 . As to Defendant Hudson, the Court notes that Plaintiffs are not seeking to compel the arbitration of Defendant Hudson. Defendant Hudson is not a signatory to the RISC and Plaintiffs do not present any authority to compel Defendant Hudson to arbitrate this action. Plaintiffs indicate in the motion that the parties disagree on the arbitration forum, but Plaintiffs elect the AAA or, alternatively, JAMS as the arbitration forum. Given that the instant motion is unopposed, the Court finds that Defendants do not take issue with the AAA conducting the arbitration. II. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, the Court therefore GRANTS Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Arbitration and orders arbitration of this matter with the AAA. The Court STAYS this action pending the completion of arbitration. (CCP § 1281.4.) Moving party is ordered to give notice.

Ruling

GOLDRICH KEST, LLC VS CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD?S, LONDON, ET AL.
Jul 10, 2024 | 11/28/2022 | 23SMCV03537
Case Number: 23SMCV03537 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: N TENTATIVE RULING Plaintiff Goldrich Kest, LLCs Motion to Compel Further Responses from Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London, Ategrity Specialty Insurance Company and Axis Surplus Lines Insurance Company to Requests for Production (Set One) and Special Interrogatories (Set One) is GRANTED in part. Defendants Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London, Syndicate 4444; Ategrity Specialty Insurance Company; and Axis Surplus Insurance Company shall provide supplemental responses to Plaintiff Goldrich Kest, LLCs Special Interrogatories (Set One) Nos. 3, 16, 17, 18, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 57, and 59 within thirty (30) days of entry of this order. Defendants Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London, Syndicate 4444; Ategrity Specialty Insurance Company; and Axis Surplus Insurance Company shall provide supplemental responses to Plaintiff Goldrich Kest, LLCs Requests for Production (Set One) Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, and 16, insofar as Defendants have possession of, access to, or control of responsive documents, within thirty (30) days of entry of this order. Plaintiff Goldrich Kest, LLC to give notice. REASONING If a party that has propounded interrogatories or requests for production of documents believes that the responses received are evasive or incomplete, or that an objection to the interrogatories or requests for production of documents is without merit or too general, the propounding party may bring a motion to compel further responses to the interrogatories. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (a), 2031.310, subd. (a); see also Best Products, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1181, 1189-1190 [motion to compel proper to challenge boilerplate responses].) Unless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the propounding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the propounding party waives any right to compel a further response to the interrogatories or requests for production of documents. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (c), 2031.310, subd. (c).) This timeliness requirement is mandatory, and in some sense may even be considered a matter of jurisdiction, and the Court therefore [has] no power to make an order compelling further answers where the propounding party failed to serve this motion within the statutory time. (Profl Career Colls., Magna Inst., Inc. v. Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 490, 493; see also Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Superior Court (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 681 [same].) A motion to compel further responses must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Code of Civil Procedure section 2016.040. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (b)(1), 2031.310, subd. (b)(2).) A meet and confer declaration must state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040.) California Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(a) requires that any motion to compel further responses to discovery contain a separate statement with the text of each request, the response, and a statement of factual and legal reasons for compelling further. Plaintiff Goldrich Kest, LLC (Plaintiff) moves for further responses to its Requests for Production (Set One) Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, and 16 and Special Interrogatories (Set One) Nos. 3, 16, 17, 18, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 57, and 59 propounded on Defendants Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London, Syndicate 4444; Ategrity Specialty Insurance Company; and Axis Surplus Insurance Company (Defendants); for an order requiring Defendants to search for, collect, and produce all documents and electronically-stored information responsive to Requests for Production Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, and 16; and for an order requiring Defendants to provide privilege logs identifying all responsive documents that have been withheld or redacted. Insofar as Plaintiff asks for further responses to its Special Interrogatories (Set One) Nos. 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, and 85, the Court will not order any such responses because those requests were not identified in the notice of motion. The Court also will not consider a request for sanctions that is not stated in the notice of motion. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.040.) The Court has reviewed the requests at issue, as well as Defendants responses to the same, and hereby rules as follows: Defendants shall provide supplemental responses to Special Interrogatories (Set One) Nos. 3, 16, 17, 18, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 57, and 59. Each of the interrogatories seeks discoverable information, specifically, information relevant to Defendants basic business operations, Defendants identification of certain employees involved with the claim at issue, and Defendants process as to the claim at issue. As to Requests for Production (Set One) Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, and 16, Defendants must provide all documents responsive to these requests, as they, too, seek discoverable information. The Court cannot order Defendants to produce documents which do not exist. However, as to documents possessed by Defendants claims administrator, sub-consultants, and counsel, the Court will not order production of documents possessed by a third party which is not in Defendants possession and for which Defendants do not have access and control. The Court has not considered any supplemental responses here. Accordingly, Plaintiff Goldrich Kest, LLCs Motion to Compel Further Responses from Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London, Ategrity Specialty Insurance Company and Axis Surplus Lines Insurance Company to Requests for Production (Set One) and Special Interrogatories (Set One) is GRANTED in part. Defendants Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London, Syndicate 4444; Ategrity Specialty Insurance Company; and Axis Surplus Insurance Company shall provide supplemental responses to Plaintiff Goldrich Kest, LLCs Special Interrogatories (Set One) Nos. 3, 16, 17, 18, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 57, and 59 within thirty (30) days of entry of this order. Defendants Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London, Syndicate 4444; Ategrity Specialty Insurance Company; and Axis Surplus Insurance Company shall provide supplemental responses to Plaintiff Goldrich Kest, LLCs Requests for Production (Set One) Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, and 16, insofar as Defendants have possession of, access to, or control of responsive documents, within thirty (30) days of entry of this order.

Ruling

CHINYERE VALERIE IBE VS BAMBOO INSURANCE SERVICES, INC., A CORPORATION, ET AL.
Jul 10, 2024 | 24CHCV00588
Case Number: 24CHCV00588 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: F43 Dept. F43 Date: 7-10-24 Case #24CHCV00588 , Chinyere Valerie Ibe vs. Bamboo Insurance Services, Inc., et al. Trial Date: N/A DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH MOTION TO STRIKE MOVING PARTY: Defendant 818 Restoration and Construction, LLC RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Chinyere Valerie Ibe RELIEF REQUESTED Demurrer to the Complaint · 4 th Cause of Action for Intentional Misrepresentation · 5 th Cause of Action for Violation of California Business & Professional Code · 6 th Cause of Action for Unjust Enrichment · 7 th Cause of Action for Defamation Motion to Strike · Page 24, Paragraph 111 entitled Prayer for Relief, Lines 23-25 [claim for punitive damages] RULING : Defendants demurrer is sustained. Defendants motion to strike is granted. SUMMARY OF ACTION Plaintiff Chinyere Valerie Ibe (Plaintiff) filed her First Amended Complaint (FAC), in pro per, on March 25, 2024. Plaintiffs complaint alleges seven causes of action for (1) Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (2) Bad Faith Denial of Insurance Claim; (3) Breach of the Contractual Duty to Pay a Covered Insurance Claim; (4) Intentional Misrepresentation; (5) Violations of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et. seq.; (6) Unjust Enrichment; and (7) Defamation. The First through Third Causes of Action are only against Defendant Bamboo Insurance Services, Inc. The Fourth through Seventh Causes of Action are against all Defendants. Defendant 818 Restoration and Construction, LLC (818 Restoration) is the demurring Defendant in this instance. 818 Restoration demurs to the Fourth through Seventh Causes of Action. Plaintiffs FAC alleges that the water heater in the garage of her home burst. This caused the garage to flood, damaging the drywall and items that were stored in the garage. Plaintiffs FAC alleges that on Marh 24, 2023, Defendant Bamboo Insurance sent out a leak detector from 818 Restoration to take pictures of the damaged drywall in the garage. (FAC, ¶ 21.) She also alleges that water was still trickling out of the water heater when the leak detector from 818 Restoration came out. (FAC, ¶ 25.) She also alleges that 818 Restoration was working with Bamboo to create a story that Plaintiff falsely reported that the water heater flooded the garage. (FAC, ¶ 34.) Plaintiff also alleges that Bamboo, using its contractors, including 818 Restoration, found ways to deny her claim. (FAC, ¶ 61.) The last allegations in Plaintiffs FAC related to 818 Restoration is that it made one or more defamatory statements about Plaintiff to a person other than Plaintiff. (FAC, ¶¶ 100, 103.) There are no other specific allegations related to 818 Restoration. 818 Restoration filed its demurrer on May 28, 2024. Plaintiff filed an opposition on June 26, 2024, with proof of service by mail. On July 1, 2024, 818 Restoration filed a notice of non-opposition to its demurrer, as it apparently had no knowledge of the opposition that was filed by Plaintiff with the Court and had not yet received the opposition in the mail. Plaintiffs opposition only argues that she was not validly served with the demurrer because she had not consented to service of the demurrer via email, which is how she claimed she received the demurrer. However, the proof of service filed with Defendants demurrer indicates that Plaintiff was served via U.S. Mail, so it is unknown why she did not receive the demurrer in the mail. Plaintiff also argues that Defendant did not meet and confer, but Defendants demurrer indicates that it attempted to meet and confer with Plaintiff, but Plaintiff did not respond to attempts to meet and confer with her. Plaintiffs opposition contains no arguments regarding the merits of the demurrer and motion to strike. The Court will address the merits of the demurrer and the motion to strike. ANALYSIS A demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take judicial notice. (CCP § 430.30(a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading by raising questions of law. ( Postley v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties. (CCP § 452.) The court treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law& ( Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.) In applying these standards, the court liberally construes the complaint to determine whether a cause of action has been stated. ( Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.) Fourth Cause of Action for Intentional Misrepresentation Defendant 818 Restoration demurs to Plaintiffs cause of action for intentional misrepresentation on the basis that it fails to plead any specific allegations against 818 Restoration. The elements of intentional misrepresentation are (1) a misrepresentation, (2) knowledge of falsity, (3) intent to induce reliance, (4) actual and justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting damage. ( Aton Center, Inc. v. United Healthcare Ins. Co. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1214, 1245.) Notably, in California, fraud must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice. ( Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.) This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered. ( Id .) There are no specific allegations against 818 Restoration under this cause of action. Instead, Plaintiff just alleges that Defendants made misrepresentations regarding what would be covered by Plaintiffs insurance policy. (FAC, ¶ 78.) 818 Restoration was not Plaintiffs insurance provider. It was simply an inspector hired by Plaintiffs provider, Bamboo Insurance. There are no allegations under this cause of action for any misrepresentations made specifically by 818 Restoration. Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action is sustained with leave to amend. Fifth Cause of Action for Violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et. seq. 818 Restoration demurs to this cause of action on the basis that there are insufficient facts against 818 Restoration to support this cause of action. Cal. Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq. includes the California Unfair Competition Law and provides consumers with remedies when businesses engage in unfair or fraudulent practices. Plaintiffs FAC does not contain any allegations indicating that 818 Restoration violated the Business and Professions Code. The only specific allegation against 818 Restoration under this cause of action is that Bamboo used it to find ways to deny Plaintiffs claims. This is not sufficient to indicate that 818 Restoration itself engaged any acts that would constitute a violation of the Business and Professions Code. Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Fifth Cause of Action is sustained with leave to amend. Sixth Cause of Action for Unjust Enrichment 818 Restoration demurs to this cause of action on the basis that it does not allege sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action against 818 Restoration. The theory of unjust enrichment requires one who acquires a benefit at the expense of another to either return the thing or its equivalent to the aggrieved party so as not to be unjustly enriched. ( Lyles v. Sangadeo-Patel (2014) 255 Cal.App. 4th 759.) Though Defendant does not raise this argument, the Court will note that there is no cause of action for unjust enrichment in California. ( Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 779, 785, 793 (unjust enrichment is not a valid cause of action under California law).) Unjust enrichment is not a valid cause of action. Furthermore, Plaintiffs FAC contains no allegations indicating how 818 Restoration was unjustly enriched. Because unjust enrichment is not a valid cause of action, Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Sixth Cause of Action is sustained without leave to amend. Seventh Cause of Action for Defamation 818 Restoration demurs to this cause of action on the basis that it does not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for defamation. Defamation is an intentional tort that requires proof that the defendant intended to publish the defamatory statement. ( Stellar v. State Farm General Ins. Co. (2007) 157 Cal.App 4th 1498.) California law requires that any words constituting an alleged defamation must be specifically identified, if not pleaded verbatim, in the complaint. ( ZL Technologies, Inc. v Does 1 17 (2017) 13 Cal.App. 5th 603.) The only allegations that Plaintiff has against 818 Restoration under this cause of action is that it noted that a potential slab leak had occurred in the garage as the water did not reflect a failed water heater in the April 14, 2023, denial of benefits letter to Plaintiff, and that 818 Restoration made one or more of the states to a person other than Ms. Ibe. (FAC, ¶¶ 100, 103.) There is nothing in Plaintiffs FAC to indicate how 818 Restoration defamed Plaintiff, as the letter would have been issued by Plaintiffs insurance provider, nor does Plaintiff specifically identify the alleged defamation. Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Seventh Cause of Action is sustained with leave to amend. Motion to Strike Defendant had moved to strike Plaintiffs request for punitive damages. This Court may strike from the complaint any irrelevant, false, or improper matter. Under CCP § 435, [a]ny party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. Under CCP § 436(a), [t]he court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper . . . [s]trike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. Punitive damages are governed by Civ. Code § 3294: In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant. (Civ. Code § 3294(a).) To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in Civ. Code § 3294. ( Coll. Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.) Malice is defined in the statute as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. ( Id . at 725.) Oppression is despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that persons rights. (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(2).) Fraud is defined as an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(3).)¿ ¿ Plaintiff has requested punitive damages as part of her prayer for relief, but nowhere in her FAC does she allege that 818 Restoration acted with malice, fraud, or oppression. Because she has not alleged that it acted with malice, fraud, or oppression, she cannot maintain a claim for punitive damages against 818 Restoration. Defendants motion to strike Plaintiffs request for punitive damages is granted for 818 Restoration only. It could still apply to other Defendants. CONCLUSION Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Causes of Action is sustained with leave to amend. Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Sixth Cause of Action is sustained without leave to amend. Defendants motion to strike is granted. Moving party to give notice to all parties.

Ruling

PHILIP MARKOWITZ, AN INDIVIDUAL VS FOREMOST INSURANCE COMPANY GRAND RAPIDS, MICHIGAN, A MICHIGAN CORPORATION
Jul 11, 2024 | 24STCV07667
Case Number: 24STCV07667 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 45 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles PHILIP MARKOWITZ, Plaintiff, vs. FOREMOST INSURANCE COMPANY GRAND RAPIDS, MICHIGAN, et al., Defendants. Case No.: 24STCV07667 DEPARTMENT 45 [TENTATIVE] RULING Complaint Filed: 03/27/24 Trial Date: N/A Hearing date: July 11, 2024 Moving Party: Defendant Foremost Insurance Company Grand Rapids, Michigan Responding Party: Plaintiff Philip Markowitz Motion to Strike Punitive Damages Allegations The court has considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply. The motion is granted with 20 days leave to amend. Background This is an action arising from the alleged not providing coverage and unreasonably delaying in making a coverage determination on [a] claim. (Complaint, ¶ 29.) On March 27, 2024, Plaintiff Philip Markowitz (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendants Foremost Insurance Company Grand Rapids, Michigan (Defendant) and Does 1 to 10, alleging causes of action for: (1) Breach of Insurance Contract; and (2) Tortious Breach of Insurance Contract. On March 28, 2024, this action was reassigned to the Honorable Mel Red Recana sitting in Department 45 at the Stanley Mosk Courthouse. (03/28/24 Minute Order.) On May 8, 2024, Defendant filed and served the instant Motion to Strike Punitive Damages Allegations. Also, on such date, Plaintiff filed and served an opposition to the motion. Defendant filed and served a reply brief on July 2, 2024. Legal Standard Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof.¿ (Code of Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322, subd. (b).)¿ The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.)¿ Meet and Confer Before filing a motion to strike, the moving party must meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading to attempt to reach an agreement that would resolve the objections to the pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5, subd. (a).) A determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to grant or deny the motion to strike. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5, subd. (a)(4).) Counsel for Defendant, James P. Lemieux (Lemieux), provides a declaration in support of the motion. Counsel states the following: on April 30, 2024, he wrote to Plaintiffs counsel, Jeffrey A. Cohen, Esq., regarding Plaintiffs punitive damages allegations. (Lemieux Decl., ¶ 2; Ex. A.) He expressed his concern that the complaint did not allege sufficient facts to support the claim and that the claim was unsupported and defective as pleaded. ( Id .) He asked that Plaintiff agree to strike his punitive damages claim from the complaint without prejudice. ( Id .) Shortly after the letter was transmitted, Mr. Cohen responded by e-mail on April 30, 2024, and Mr. Cohen disagreed. ( Id ., ¶ 3; Ex. B.) Mr. Cohen argued that Plaintiff sufficiently alleged a bad faith claim and that bad faith allows for punitive damages awards. ( Id .) Given the impasse over the propriety of Plaintiffs punitive damage claim, the instant motion was necessary to resolve the issue. ( Id ., ¶ 4.) The Court finds that the meet and confer requirement has not been met as counsel did not meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference. The Court, however, will still assess the merits of the motion to strike. The Court reminds the parties of the need to comply with the requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure. Discussion Allegations of the Complaint The Complaint relevantly states the following: in 2018, Plaintiff obtained a marine insurance policy from Defendant that provided for insurance coverage to and for Plaintiffs watercraft vessel (the Vessel). (Complaint, ¶ 4.) In June 2022, Plaintiff renewed the policy, and the effective dates of the policy were from June 18, 2022, through June 18, 2023. (Complaint, ¶¶ 5-6.) The coverage amount for losses under the policy is $95,000.00. (Complaint, ¶ 7.) On January 23, 2023, heavy rains flooded the Vessel and damaged its engines, which resulted in an unforeseen, sudden, and accidental loss to the Vessel. (Complaint, ¶ 9.) Plaintiff reported the loss to Defendant in February 2023. (Complaint, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff submitted a claim to Defendant. (Complaint, ¶¶ 11-12.) Plaintiff then alleges that Defendant asked for additional information concerning the claim, which was provided, and to this day Defendant has failed to provide a coverage determination for the amount of the loss. (Complaint, ¶¶ 13-24.) Defendant has not paid Plaintiff any money on the claim, in whole or in part, to date, and has not made a coverage determination after over a year to review, analyze, and process the claim. (Complaint, ¶ 26.) Appropriateness of Striking Punitive Damages In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff. ( Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) Civil Code § 3294 authorizes punitive damages upon a showing of malice, fraud, or oppression. Malice is defined as either conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff, or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (Civil Code § 3294(c)(1).) Despicable conduct is conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. ( Mock v. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co. (1992) 4 Cal. App. 4th 306, 331.) Fraud under California Civil Code , Section 3294(c)(3) means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. California Civil Code, Section 3294(c)(2) defines oppression as despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that persons rights. Specific facts must be pled in support of punitive damages. ( Hillard v. A.H. Robins Co. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 374, 391-392.) Facts must be pled to show that a defendant act[ed] with the intent to vex, injure or annoy, or with a conscious disregard of the plaintiffs rights. ( Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co . (1974) 11 Cal.3d 452, 462.) Conduct that is merely negligent will not support a claim for punitive damages. ( Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1288.) The Court finds that Plaintiffs punitive damages allegations are insufficient. Plaintiff seeks punitive damages pursuant to its second cause of action. (Complaint, ¶ 33.) Such allegations, however, are set forth in a conclusory manner. Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to impose punitive damages against Defendant. Plaintiff has not made a showing of malice, fraud, or oppression. Moreover, the opposition to the motion to strike seems to argue as to the sufficiency of the second cause of action and does not make a reasoned argument as to the sufficiency of the punitive damages allegations in the complaint. The Court therefore finds it appropriate to strike punitive damages allegations from the complaint. Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the motion to strike with 20 days leave to amend. It is so ordered. Dated: July 11, 2024 _______________________ MEL RED RECANA Judge of the Superior Court

Ruling

['HERRERA, ADESS ET AL V. ANDERSON, ROB ET AL', 'C D V. COUNTY OF BUTTE ET AL']
Jul 10, 2024 | 21CV01931
21CV01931 HERRERA, ADESS ET AL V. ANDERSON, ROB ET AL EVENT: Defendants Nationwide Insurance Company and Allied Property and Casualty Insurance Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment or, Alternatively, Summary Adjudication The Court finds that there is no triable issue of material fact as to Plaintiffs’ Second Cause of Action for Breach of Contract as Plaintiffs failed to oppose the Motion in this regard. See, Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment or Alternatively Summary Adjudication at Pg. 1, Lines 4-5 [“Plaintiffs do not contend that payment of the drastically underinsured properties was bad faith...”]; and see, Undisputed Material Fact Nos. 1-4. As such, the Motion for Summary Adjudication is GRANTED as to the Second Cause of Action for Breach of Contract. Without a breach of contract, there can be no bad faith liability. See Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 36 [the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is “based upon” the contract and has no existence independent of such contract]; Everett v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 649, 663 [“Because there was no breach of contract, there was no breach of the implied covenant”; 823-24 [where homeowner claimed to be underinsured, but insurer paid full policy limits, there was no breach of contract and therefore no bad faith]; Vulk v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 243, 263 [underinsured homeowner had no bad faith claim where he was paid all benefits due under policy]; and see, Undisputed Material Fact Nos. 1-4. Based upon the Court’s ruling as to the Second Cause of Action for Breach of Contract, the First Cause of Action for Bad Faith likewise fails and the Motion for Summary Adjudication is GRANTED as to the First Cause of Action for Bad Faith. The evidence presented leads the Court to conclude that there is no triable issue of material fact in regard to the application of an exception to the general rule that an insurance agent has no duty to advise an insured on types of coverages or policy limits. Fitzpatrick v. Hayes (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 916, 927; Everett v. State Farm General Ins. Co. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 649, 660; Vulk v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 243, 254-255; see also Undisputed Material Fact Nos. 24-47. The Motion for Summary Adjudication is GRANTED as to the Third Cause of Action for Negligence and Fourth Cause of Action for Negligent Misrepresentation. Plaintiffs do not oppose the Motion as it relates to their punitive damages claim See, Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment or Alternatively Summary Adjudication at Pg. 1, Line 3 [“Plaintiffs withdraw the request for punitive damages.”] As such, the Motion for Summary Adjudication is GRANTED as to the Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages. Counsel for the Defendants shall submit a form of order consistent with this ruling within two weeks. 1 ||2. 22CV01639 C D V. COUNTY OF BUTTE ET AL EVENT: Defendant County of Butte’s Motion to Seal Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Adjudication, and Attached Exhibits The Motion is unopposed and is granted. The Court will sign the form of order submitted by counsel.

Ruling

CHINYERE VALERIE IBE VS BAMBOO INSURANCE SERVICES, INC., A CORPORATION, ET AL.
Jul 11, 2024 | 24CHCV00588
Case Number: 24CHCV00588 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: F43 Dept. F43 Date: 7-11-24 Case #24CHCV00588 , Chinyere Valerie Ibe vs. Bamboo Insurance Services, Inc., et al. Trial Date: N/A DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT MOVING PARTY: Defendant Sutton National Insurance Company RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Chinyere Valerie Ibe RELIEF REQUESTED Demurrer to the Complaint · 4 th Cause of Action for Intentional Misrepresentation · 5 th Cause of Action for Violation of California Business & Professional Code · 6 th Cause of Action for Unjust Enrichment · 7 th Cause of Action for Defamation RULING : Defendants demurrer is sustained. SUMMARY OF ACTION Plaintiff Chinyere Valerie Ibe (Plaintiff) filed her First Amended Complaint (FAC), in pro per, on March 25, 2024. Plaintiffs complaint alleges seven causes of action for (1) Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (2) Bad Faith Denial of Insurance Claim; (3) Breach of the Contractual Duty to Pay a Covered Insurance Claim; (4) Intentional Misrepresentation; (5) Violations of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et. seq.; (6) Unjust Enrichment; and (7) Defamation. The First through Third Causes of Action are only against Defendant Bamboo Insurance Services, Inc. The Fourth through Seventh Causes of Action are against all Defendants. Defendant Sutton National Insurance Company (Sutton) is the demurring Defendant in this instance. Sutton demurs to the Fourth through Seventh Causes of Action. Plaintiffs FAC alleges that the water heater in the garage of her home burst. This caused the garage to flood, damaging the drywall and items that were stored in the garage. Sutton indicates in its demurrer that it is Plaintiffs homeowners insurer, and Bamboo IDE8 Insurance Services, LLC (Bamboo) is Suttons claims administrator, but there is nothing in Plaintiffs FAC that indicates what the relationship is between Bamboo and Sutton. While Bamboo is mentioned throughout Plaintiffs FAC, Sutton is only mentioned by name once, under the parties section of Plaintiffs FAC. (FAC, ¶ 4.) It is unclear from Plaintiffs FAC what allegations, if any, are directed at Sutton. Sutton filed its demurrer on May 28, 2024. Plaintiff filed an opposition on June 26, 2024. On July 3, 2024, Sutton filed its reply. Plaintiffs opposition argues that she was not validly served with the demurrer because she had not consented to service of the demurrer via email, which is how she claimed she received the demurrer. However, the proof of service filed with Defendants demurrer indicates that Plaintiff was served via U.S. Mail, so it is unknown why she did not receive the demurrer in the mail. Plaintiff also argues that Defendant did not meet and confer, but Defendants demurrer indicates that it attempted to meet and confer with Plaintiff, but Plaintiff did not respond to attempts to meet and confer with her. The Court will address the merits of the demurrer. Request for Judicial Notice: Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of Plaintiffs FAC. The Court takes judicial notice of this document. ANALYSIS A demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take judicial notice. (CCP § 430.30(a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading by raising questions of law. ( Postley v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties. (CCP § 452.) The court treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law& ( Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.) In applying these standards, the court liberally construes the complaint to determine whether a cause of action has been stated. ( Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.) Fourth Cause of Action for Intentional Misrepresentation Defendant Sutton demurs to Plaintiffs cause of action for intentional misrepresentation on the basis that it fails to plead any specific allegations against Sutton. The elements of intentional misrepresentation are (1) a misrepresentation, (2) knowledge of falsity, (3) intent to induce reliance, (4) actual and justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting damage. ( Aton Center, Inc. v. United Healthcare Ins. Co. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1214, 1245.) Notably, in California, fraud must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice. ( Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.) This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered. ( Id .) There are no specific allegations against Sutton under this cause of action. Instead, Plaintiff just alleges that Defendants made misrepresentations regarding what would be covered by Plaintiffs insurance policy. (FAC, ¶ 78.) There are no allegations under this cause of action for any misrepresentations made specifically by Sutton. Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action is sustained with leave to amend. Fifth Cause of Action for Violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et. seq. Sutton demurs to this cause of action on the basis that there are insufficient facts against Sutton to support this cause of action. Cal. Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq. includes the California Unfair Competition Law and provides consumers with remedies when businesses engage in unfair or fraudulent practices. The Unfair Competition Law (UCL) is an equitable action by means of which a plaintiff may recover money or property obtained from the plaintiff or persons represented by the plaintiff through unfair or unlawful business practices. ( Troyk v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1338.) The UCL does not permit recovery of damages but is limited to injunctive relief and restitution. ( Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1995) 20 Cal.4th 163, 179.) Thus, through the UCL, a plaintiff may seek restitution in money or property taken by means of unfair competition or may seek injunctive relief. ( Troyk , 171 Cal.App.4th at 1339.) Plaintiffs FAC does not contain any allegations indicating that Sutton violated the Business and Professions Code. Furthermore, Plaintiff is not seeking restitution under this cause of action but is instead seeking damages. Damages are not a permitted form of relief under the UCL. For these reasons, Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Fifth Cause of Action is sustained with leave to amend. Sixth Cause of Action for Unjust Enrichment Sutton demurs to this case of action on the basis that Plaintiff cannot assert a cause of action for unjust enrichment. The theory of unjust enrichment requires one who acquires a benefit at the expense of another to either return the thing or its equivalent to the aggrieved party so as not to be unjustly enriched. ( Lyles v. Sangadeo-Patel (2014) 255 Cal.App. 4th 759.) There is also no cause of action for unjust enrichment in California. ( Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 779, 785, 793 (unjust enrichment is not a valid cause of action under California law).) Unjust enrichment is not a valid cause of action. Furthermore, Plaintiffs FAC contains no allegations indicating how Sutton was unjustly enriched separate from any breach of contract. Because unjust enrichment is not a valid cause of action, Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Sixth Cause of Action is sustained without leave to amend. Seventh Cause of Action for Defamation Sutton demurs to this cause of action on the basis that it does not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for defamation. Defamation is an intentional tort that requires proof that the defendant intended to publish the defamatory statement. ( Stellar v. State Farm General Ins. Co. (2007) 157 Cal.App 4th 1498.) California law requires that any words constituting an alleged defamation must be specifically identified, if not pleaded verbatim, in the complaint. ( ZL Technologies, Inc. v Does 1 17 (2017) 13 Cal.App. 5th 603.) There are no specific allegations against Sutton under this cause of action. There is nothing in Plaintiffs FAC to indicate how Sutton defamed Plaintiff, nor does Plaintiff specifically identify the alleged defamation. Plaintiff also does not attach the alleged defamatory letter to her FAC, despite identifying the denial letters as Exhibits A, B, and C. Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Seventh Cause of Action is sustained with leave to amend. CONCLUSION Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Causes of Action is sustained with leave to amend. Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Sixth Cause of Action is sustained without leave to amend. Moving party to give notice to all parties.

Ruling

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO. VS. MICAHEL Y. HUANG et al
Jul 09, 2024 | CGC11509296
Matter on the Law & Motion Calendar for Tuesday, July 9, 2024, Line 1. PLAINTIFF STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO.'s HEARING ON CLAIM OF EXEMPTION. The judgment debtor's claim of exemption is denied. The levying officer is directed to release all sums held to the judgment creditor for payment on the judgment. The levying officer shall withhold $220 per pay period ($440 per month) from debtor's earnings and pay that sum to the judgment creditor. For the 9:30 a.m. Law & Motion calendar, all attorneys and parties may appear in Department 302 remotely. Remote hearings will be conducted by videoconference using Zoom. To appear remotely at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link, or dial the corresponding phone number. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. The text of the email shall include the name and contact information, including email address, of the attorney or party who will appear at the hearing. The court will execute a judicial council form of order repeating the tentative if it adopts the tentative ruling. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Law & Motion Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear in the courtroom or remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. =(302/RBU)

Ruling

GOLDRICH KEST, LLC VS CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD?S, LONDON, ET AL.
Jul 12, 2024 | 11/28/2022 | 23SMCV03537
Case Number: 23SMCV03537 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: N TENTATIVE RULING Defendant Homeland Insurance Company of New Yorks Application for Admission of Christian P. Jones for Homeland Insurance Company of New York as Counsel Pro Hac Vice is GRANTED. Defendant Homeland Insurance Company of New York to give notice. REASONING Counsel who are not active members of the California State Bar and have not been granted permission to appear pro hac vice are prohibited from representing a party in California courts. (Gentis v. Safeguard Bus. Systems, Inc. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1308.) Counsel licensed in another state may, in the courts discretion, be permitted to appear as counsel pro hac vice if counsel is associated with an attorney of record who is an active member of the California bar. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.40(a).) Appearance pro hac vice is a privilege and not a right under the United States Constitution. (Leis v. Flynt (1979) 439 U.S. 438, 441.) An application to appear in California as counsel pro hac vice must state: (1) The applicants residence and office address; (2) The courts to which the applicant has been admitted to practice and the dates of admission; (3) That the applicant is a member in good standing in those courts; (4) That the applicant is not currently suspended or disbarred in any court; (5) The title of court and cause in which the applicant has filed an application to appear as counsel pro hac vice in this state in the preceding two years, the date of each application, and whether or not it was granted; and (6) The name, address, and telephone number of the active member of the State Bar of California who is attorney of record. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.40(d).) Christian P. Jones represents that he is a member in good standing of all bars and with all courts in which he is admitted to practice, and while he has appeared in three other actions in California in the preceding two years, this is not a significantly high number so as to warrant denial of an application to appear pro hac vice here. He has met the requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 9.40(d), he appears qualified and ready to appear pro hac vice, and there are no other facts or circumstances to show that his appearance in this action would cause a significant disruption of orderly justice. Accordingly, Defendant Homeland Insurance Company of New Yorks Application for Admission of Christian P. Jones for Homeland Insurance Company of New York as Counsel Pro Hac Vice is GRANTED.

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