“Judicial review of most public agency decisions is obtained by a proceeding for a writ of ordinary or administrative mandate. The applicable type of mandate is determined by the nature of the administrative action or decision. Usually, quasi-legislative acts are reviewed by ordinary mandate and quasi-judicial acts are reviewed by administrative mandate.” (McGill v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1776, 1785.)

“The appropriate type of mandate is determined by the nature of the administrative action or decision under review.” (Beach & Bluff Conservancy v. City of Solana Beach (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 244, 258.) Ordinary mandamus applies to quasi-legislative decisions, defined as those involving “the formulation of a rule to be applied to all future cases,” while administrative mandamus applies to quasi-judicial decisions, which involve “the actual application of such a rule to a specific set of existing facts.” (Id. at 259.)

“A writ of (ordinary) mandate may be issued by any court to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or to compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the party is entitled, and from which the party is unlawfully precluded by that inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person.” (Code of Civ. Proc., § 1085.) “The trial court that issues a writ of mandate retains continuing jurisdiction to make any orders necessary for complete enforcement of the writ.” (Los Angeles Int'l Charter High Sch. v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1348, 1355.)

Legal Standard

“Mandamus has long been recognized as the appropriate means by which to challenge a government official’s refusal to implement a duly enacted legislative measure.” (Morris v. Harper (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 52, 58.) A petitioner may seek a writ of mandate to compel a public agency to perform acts required by law. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 1085; Santa Clara County Counsel Attys. Assn. v. Woodside (1994) 7 Cal.4th 525, 539.) There are two essential requirements to the issuance of an ordinary writ of mandate:

1. a clear, present and ministerial duty on the part of the respondent, and
2. a clear, present and beneficial right on the part of the petitioner to the performance of that duty.

(California Ass’n for Health Services at Home v. Department of Health Services (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 696, 704.)

A “ministerial act,” for purposes of a writ mandate, “is an act that a public officer is required to perform in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority and without regard to his own judgment or opinion concerning such act’s propriety or impropriety, when a given state of facts exists.... Thus, [w]here a statute or ordinance clearly defines the specific duties or course of conduct that a governing body must take, that course of conduct becomes mandatory and eliminates any element of discretion.” (Schwartz v. Poizner (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 592, 596-597.) “Discretion... is the power conferred on public functionaries to act officially according to the dictates of their own judgment.” (AIDS Healthcare Foundation v. Los Angeles County Dep't of Pub. Health (2011) 197 Cal. App. 4th 693, 700.)

“There are two prongs to the test for the beneficial interest required to pursue an action in mandamus. The first, as noted in Parker v. Bowron [40 Cal.2d 344, 351] is whether the plaintiff will obtain some benefit from issuance of the writ or suffer some detriment from its denial. The plaintiff’s interest must be direct, and it must be substantial. Also, it generally must be special in the sense that it is over and above the interest held in common by the public at large. The second prong of the beneficial interest test is whether the interest the plaintiff seeks to advance is within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the legal duty asserted.” (Waste Management of Alameda County, Inc. v. County of Alameda (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1233-1234.)

Further, the controversy must not be moot. (Rust v. Roberts (1959) 171 Cal.App.2d 772, 776.) “A writ of mandate will not issue to enforce an abstract right, when the occurrence of an event subsequent to the commencement of the proceeding makes the issuance of the writ of no practical benefit to the petitioner.” (Clementine v. Board of Civil Service Comm’rs (1941) 47 Cal.App.2d 112, 114.)

The petitioner always bears the burden of proof in an ordinary mandate proceeding. (California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1154.)

Special Proceedings

Proceedings on a petition for writ of mandate are special proceedings rather than civil actions. (California Employment Com. v. Sutton (1945) 69 Cal.App.2d 181, 184.) “[A] writ of mandate may not be issued where the petitioner's rights are otherwise adequately protected.” (Code of Civ. Proc, § 1086; County of San Diego v. State of Califomia (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 580, 596.) “Therefore, if the petitioner has an adequate remedy in the form of an ordinary cause of action... a writ of mandate must be denied.” (Agosto V. Board of Trustees of the Grossmont-Cuyamaca Community College District (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 330, 345.)

To obtain writ review, a petitioner must show not only the presence of a ministerial duty, but that “his or her remedy in the ordinary course of law is inadequate or that petitioner would suffer irreparable injury were the writ not granted.” (Interinsurance Exchange of Automobile Club v. Super. Ct. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1225.) “Although the statute does not expressly forbid the issuance of the writ if another adequate remedy exists, it has long been established as a general rule that the writ will not be issued if another such remedy was available to the petitioner.” (Phelan v. Super. Ct. (1950) 35 Cal.2d 363, 366.) It is Plaintiff’s burden to show that he does not have such a remedy. (Id.) “[G]eneral allegations, without reference to any facts, are not sufficient to sustain [the] burden of showing that [an alternative] remedy... would be inadequate.” (Phelan v. Super. Ct. (1950) 35 Cal.2d 363, 370.)

“[W]hen review is sought by means of ordinary mandate the inquiry is limited to whether the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support.” (Bunnett v. Regents of University of California (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 843, 849.) “Mandate will not issue to compel action unless it is shown the duty to do the thing asked for is plain and unmixed with discretionary power or the exercise of judgment.” (Unnamed Physician v. Board of Trustees of Saint Agnes Medical Center (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 607, 618.)