A trial court has the authority to quash a subpoena. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 1987.1)

Background

“[I]nformation is relevant if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement.” (Gonzalez v. Super. Ct. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.) Discovery is liberalized “in favor of disclosure unless the request is clearly improper by virtue of well-established causes for denial.” (Williams v. Super. Ct. (2017) 3 Cal. 5th 531, 541.) Where a nonparty is involved, discovery must not be unduly burdensome nor merely a fishing expedition. (Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225.)

Although relevance is typically construed liberally (see Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Super. Ct. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 169), the standard is more stringent when a party is attempting to discover documents which are constitutionally protected by the right to privacy. (Lantz v. Super. Ct. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1839, 1854-1855.) “[E]ven when discovery of private information is found directly relevant to the issues of ongoing litigation, it will not be automatically allowed.... [I]f an intrusion on the right of privacy is deemed necessary under the circumstances of a particular case, any such intrusion should be the minimum intrusion necessary to achieve its objective...[meaning] the least intrusive means to satisfy the interest. Mere convenience of means or cost will not satisfy that test for that would make expediency and not the compelling interest the overriding value.” (Lantz v. Super. Ct. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1839, 1854-1855.) “The proponent of discovery of constitutionally protected material has the burden of making a threshold showing that the evidence sought is ‘directly relevant’ to the claim or defense.” (Harris v. Super. Ct. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 661, 665; Davis v. Super. Ct. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1017.)

In other words, “the right to discovery is not absolute, particularly where issues of privacy are involved.” (Puerto v. Super. Ct. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1250.) “Information that is not protected by statutory privilege may nonetheless be shielded from discovery, despite its relevance, where its disclosure would invade an individual's right of privacy.” (Hooser v. Super. Ct. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 997, 1003–04.)

“[T]he California Constitution recognizes a number of inalienable rights, including the right to privacy.” (John B. v. Super. Ct. (2006) 38 Cal. 4th 1177, 1198–99.) “It protects against the unwarranted, compelled disclosure of various private or sensitive information regarding one's personal life, including his or her financial affairs, political affiliations, medical history, sexual relationships, and confidential personnel information.” (Hooser v. Super. Ct. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 997, 1003–04.) This right “protects an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy against a serious invasion.” (Faunce v. Cate (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 166, 171.) “[A] litigant may invoke the constitutional right to privacy as justification for refusing to answer questions that unreasonably intrude on that right.” (John B. v. Super. Ct. (2006) 38 Cal. 4th 1177, 1198–99.) As such, even highly relevant, nonprivileged information may be shielded from discovery if its disclosure would impair a person’s inalienable right to privacy. (Britt v. Super. Ct. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 855–56.)

“The right to privacy, however, is not absolute.” (Grafilo v. Wolfsohn (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1024, 1034.) “The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy.” (Williams v. Super. Ct. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 552.)

How to Structure the Motion

The following persons may make a motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1(a):

1. A party.
2. A witness.
3. A consumer described in Section 1985.3.
4. An employee described in Section 1985.6.
5. A person whose personally identifying information, as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 1798.79.8 of the Civil Code, is sought in connection with an underlying action involving that person’s exercise of free speech rights.

“[A] civil litigant’s right to discovery is broad.” (Williams v. Super. Ct. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 541.) Discovery “may be obtain[ed]...regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action...if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Williams v. Super. Ct. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 541.)

(Code of Civ. Proc. § 1987.1(b).)

The Court’s Decision

“If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made...may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.” (Code of Civ. Proc., § 1987.1(a); Lee v. Swansboro Country Property Owners Assoc. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 575, 582-583.)

“In appropriate circumstances, [the] right [to privacy] must be balanced against other important interests. ‘On occasion [a party’s] privacy interests may have to give way to [the] opponent’s right to a fair trial. Thus courts must balance the right of civil litigants to discover relevant facts against the privacy interests of persons subject to discovery.’” (John B. v. Super. Ct. (2006) 38 Cal. 4th 1177, 1198–99; Britt v. Super. Ct. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 855–56.)

“The court must consider the purpose of the information sought, the effect that disclosure will have on the affected persons and parties, the nature of the objections urged by the party resisting disclosure and availability of alternative, less intrusive means for obtaining the requested information. Based on an application of these factors, the more sensitive the nature of the personal information that is sought to be discovered, the more substantial the showing of the need for the discovery that will be required before disclosure will be permitted.” (Hooser v. Super. Ct. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 997, 1004.)

Meet and Confer

There is no requirement that the motion to quash a subpoena contain a meet and confer declaration. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 1987.1.)