What is a Motion to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction?

“[A] preliminary injunction is an order that is sought by a plaintiff prior to a full adjudication of the merits of its claim.” (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 554.) It requires a person to refrain from a particular act; it may be granted by the court in which the action is brought, or by a judge thereof; and when granted by a judge, it may be enforced as an order of the court. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 525; Comfort v. Comfort, (1941) 17 Cal.2d 736, 741.)

“[A]n order granting or denying a preliminary injunction does not amount to an adjudication of the ultimate rights in controversy. Its purpose is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the action can be determined.” (Socialist Workers etc. Committee v. Brown (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 879, 890-91.) The status quo has been defined to mean the last actual peaceable, uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy. (14859 Moorpark Homeowner’s Assn. v. VRT Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1396. 1402.)

Legal Standard

In any action, the court may on notice modify or dissolve an injunction or temporary restraining order upon a showing that there has been a material change in the facts upon which the injunction or temporary restraining order was granted, that the law upon which the injunction or temporary restraining order was granted has changed, or that the ends of justice would be served by the modification or dissolution of the injunction or temporary restraining order. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 533; Luckett v. Panos (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 77, 85.)

Burden of Proof

The restrained party has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that one of these circumstances is present and justifies a termination of the injunction. (Loeffler v. Medina (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1504.) The trial court may determine that the changed circumstances alleged by the restrained party are not material and, therefore, do not present a reason for terminating the injunction. (Id. at 1506.)

Ultimately, “granting, denying, dissolving, or refusing to dissolve a permanent or preliminary injunction rests in the sound discretion of the trial court upon a consideration of all the particular circumstances of each individual case.” (Prof'l Engineers v. Dep't of Transp. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 543, 562.) Although the court has broad discretion, it “must exercise its discretion ‘in favor of the party most likely to be injured.’” (Robbins v. Super. Ct. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 199, 205.) The ultimate goal is to minimize the harm which an erroneous interim decision may cause. (American Credit Indemnity Co. v. Sacks (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 622, 637.)

Useful Rulings on Motion to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction

Recent Rulings on Motion to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction

1-25 of 10000 results

PRICE VS THE CITY OF ANAHEIM

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction Provided that the City will stipulate to a preliminary injunction with respect to the provisions of Ordinance No. 6374 relating to immediate warrantless access to the short-term rental (STR) units, the Court DENIES the application for a preliminary injunction in all other respects, WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

  • Hearing

    Sep 29, 2030

CITRUS OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLGY VS CITRUS VALLEY HEALTH

Unless there is a showing that the challenged action is being continued or repeated, an injunction should be denied.” (Gafcon, Inc. v. Ponsor & Associates (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1403, fn. 6 [citations omitted].) “Injunctive relief will be denied if, at the time of the order of judgment, there is no reasonable probability that the past acts complained of will recur.” (California Service Station etc. Assn. v. Union Oil Co. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 44, 57.)

  • Hearing

    Aug 06, 2020

  • Type

    Business

  • Sub Type

    Intellectual Property

CITRUS OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLGY VS CITRUS VALLEY HEALTH

Unless there is a showing that the challenged action is being continued or repeated, an injunction should be denied.” (Gafcon, Inc. v. Ponsor & Associates (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1403, fn. 6 [citations omitted].) “Injunctive relief will be denied if, at the time of the order of judgment, there is no reasonable probability that the past acts complained of will recur.” (California Service Station etc. Assn. v. Union Oil Co. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 44, 57.)

  • Hearing

    Aug 06, 2020

  • Type

    Business

  • Sub Type

    Intellectual Property

JOHN LOPEZ, VS GENERAL MOTORS, LLC

PRELIMINARY COMMENTS: As indicated below, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s request for attorney's fees is unreasonable, and is therefore reducing the costs and fees requested from $42,306.55 by slightly more than 50%, to $20,144.42.

  • Hearing

    Aug 05, 2020

ANTONIA SALAZAR, ET AL. VS HENG LU, ET AL.

Analysis “Attachment is a prejudgment remedy which requires a court to make a preliminary determination of the merits of a dispute. It allows a creditor who has applied for an attachment following the statutory guidelines and established a prima facie claim to have a debtor's assets seized and held until final adjudication at trial.” (Lorber Industries, Inc. v. Turbulence, Inc. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 532, 535.)

  • Hearing

    Aug 03, 2020

  • Type

    Real Property

  • Sub Type

    other

ZHENG V GOALAND ENERGY CONSERVATION TECH USA LIMITED

The FACC alleges that on “November 5, 2019, GOALAND CHINA decided to dissolve GOALAND. (FACC, ¶ 10.) The FACC further alleges that “[o]n or about November 11, 2019, the corporate counsel of GOALAND CHINA, Yangyang Wang (“Ms. Wang”), sent ZHENG an email, telling ZHENG of GOALAND CHINA’s decision to dissolve GOALAND, and its resolutions to remove ZHENG’s positions as the Chief Financial Officer and General Manager of GOALAND. (FACC ¶ 11.)

  • Hearing

    Aug 01, 2020

DANIEL ARAIZA V. HEWLETT PACKARD ENTERPRISE COMPANY, ET AL.

If preliminary approval is granted, the final approval hearing shall take place on December 4, 2020 at 9:00 a.m. in Dept. 1.

  • Hearing

    Jul 31, 2020

SMITH V. THE SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION (SEIU), LOCAL 521

(Complaint, ¶ 16.) 1 The Complaint, filed on February 19, 2016, sets forth the following causes of action: 2 (1) Failure to Pay Overtime Wages; (2) Failure to Provide Off-Duty Meal Periods; (3) Failure to 3 pay Overtime Wages: Meal Periods; (4) Failure to Furnish Accurate Wage Statements; 4 (5) Waiting Time Penalties; (6) Unfair Competition; (8) 1 Failure to Provide Breaks or 5 Compensate for Break Time; (9) Preliminary and Permanent Injunction; and (10) Declaratory 6 Relief. 7 On November 30, 2018, the court

  • Hearing

    Jul 31, 2020

SINCO TECHNOLOGIES PTE LTD V. SOON, ET AL.

Seaquist (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1, 10.) 25 It has been held that a preliminary injunction does not become operative until a bond is 26 furnished; without the bond a preliminary injunction is a nullity. (Condor Enterprises, Ltd. v. 27 Valley View State Bank (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 734, 741.) Therefore, a court “may not punish 28 1 with contempt disobedience to a preliminary injunction which is invalid because a bond was not 2 posted.”

  • Hearing

    Jul 31, 2020

DEWAYNE CASSEL V. GOOGLE LLC, ET AL.

Plaintiff’s allegations are summarized in more detail in the Court’s March 9th, 2020 order addressing his motion for a temporary injunction and Google’s demurrer to the operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). Before the Court are plaintiff’s (1) demurrer to Google’s answer to the SAC and (2) motion to lift the stay of proceedings on certain claims, styled his fourteenth cause of action. Google opposes both motions. I.

  • Hearing

    Jul 31, 2020

LEWIS VS. CENLAR AGENCY

In the meantime, neither side has filed any briefs or other papers in opposition to or support of a preliminary injunction. The Court takes that as indicating that the parties have probably resolved the dispute on their own. It therefore takes the motion for preliminary injunction off calendar. The Court will inquire further at the CMC now calendared for August 24.

  • Hearing

    Jul 31, 2020

GARY LEFKOWITZ VS KHALED A. TAWNSEY, ET AL.

Plaintiff’s Cross-Complaint As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s cross-complaint filed on December 6, 2019 is an unauthorized and improper pleading. “The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: … (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of the state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (CCP §436.)

  • Hearing

    Jul 31, 2020

  • County

    Los Angeles County, CA

SALVADOR JUNIOR COSSIO VS JAVIER MALESPIN

Welch administered a preliminary alcohol screening test to Mr. Malespin at the scene of the accident and the test reported Mr. Malespin’s blood alcohol level to be .072 and .082 per cent. At the scene of the accident, Officer Welch detected a strong odor of alcohol coming from Mr. Malespin and observed that he had bloodshot eyes and slurred speech. Based on his observations and training in the field, there was no doubt in his mind that Mr.

  • Hearing

    Jul 31, 2020

EDWIN H BURNS, JR VS AMERICA'S WHOLESALE LENDER

The Court also informed the parties that before proceeding with the quiet title action, the Court would require a preliminary title report to assure that all adverse parties had been served. On January 29, 2020, the Court held an Order to Show Cause Re: Dismissal for Failure to Appear and Prosecute. The Court noted that Plaintiff failed to appear to the OSC and several other hearings, and that no action had been taken in the case since March 26, 2019.

  • Hearing

    Jul 31, 2020

  • Type

    Real Property

  • Sub Type

    Quiet Title

  • County

    Los Angeles County, CA

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA VS DORIAN ORLANDO MURRAY

(b) Post-Closure Injunction Plaintiff proposes that, even after the one-year closure, the Court prohibit Defendant from being at the Property and enforce installing motion lights, implementing strict tenant/occupant and visitor screening procedures, and more.

  • Hearing

    Jul 31, 2020

  • Type

    Real Property

  • Sub Type

    other

TRINH VS. GOLDEN STATE OVERNIGHT DELIVERY SERVICE, INC.

Furthermore, per the preliminary approval declaration in Kostyuk (RJN, Ex. B, at paragraph 18), counsel valued the claim based on failure to separately pay for rest breaks. The exact conduct alleged in the present Trinh case was considered when settling Kostyuk. As to being released, the settlement defines the “Released Claims” as “all claims and remedies . . . that were pled or could have been pled based on the factual allegations in the Litigation.” (RJN, Ex. B, at Sub.-Ex. 1, paragraph 26.)

  • Hearing

    Jul 31, 2020

TRINH VS. GOLDEN STATE OVERNIGHT DELIVERY SERVICE, INC.

Furthermore, per the preliminary approval declaration in Kostyuk (RJN, Ex. B, at paragraph 18), counsel valued the claim based on failure to separately pay for rest breaks. The exact conduct alleged in the present Trinh case was considered when settling Kostyuk. As to being released, the settlement defines the “Released Claims” as “all claims and remedies . . . that were pled or could have been pled based on the factual allegations in the Litigation.” (RJN, Ex. B, at Sub.-Ex. 1, paragraph 26.)

  • Hearing

    Jul 31, 2020

BARRAGAN VS. TAILGATE PRINTING INC.

Plaintiff Gabriela Barragan and Victoria Hernandez Ortega's Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement is CONTINUED to September 4, 2020 at 9:00 a.m. in Department CX104 to permit the parties to respond to the following items of concern. Any supplemental briefing shall be filed on or before August 25, 2020.

  • Hearing

    Jul 31, 2020

VELEZ VS. ENCORE INTERIORS, INC.

The tentative ruling is to continue the hearing on plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement to September 18, 2020 at 10:00 a.m. Counsel must file supplemental papers addressing the court’s concerns (not fully revised papers that would have to be re-read) at least 16 days before the next hearing date. Counsel must submit an amendment to the settlement agreement rather than any amended settlement agreement.

  • Hearing

    Jul 31, 2020

BARRAGAN VS. TAILGATE PRINTING INC.

Plaintiff Gabriela Barragan and Victoria Hernandez Ortega's Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement is CONTINUED to September 4, 2020 at 9:00 a.m. in Department CX104 to permit the parties to respond to the following items of concern. Any supplemental briefing shall be filed on or before August 25, 2020.

  • Hearing

    Jul 31, 2020

MOHAMMED KHODABAKHSH VS TERRY L VECHICK, ET AL.

In light of the court’s rulings on Moving Defendants’ motion to quash and Vechik’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction is moot.

  • Hearing

    Jul 31, 2020

  • Type

    Personal Injury/ Tort

  • Sub Type

    other

GUERRERO VS. ACCURATE BACKGROUND, INC.

As set forth in Plaintiff’s supplemental preliminary approval papers (ROA 67), she agreed to terminate her employment with Defendant in exchange for a $10,000 payment. Having terminated her employment, she acquired standing to pursue (and Defendant acquired the ability to settle) the waiting time claim whose value drives this settlement.

  • Hearing

    Jul 31, 2020

GARCIA VS. LEE

Plaintiffs’ Amended Application for Preliminary Approval of Partial Settlement with Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company is granted as to the matters that plaintiffs ask to be granted, i.e., the $217,019.18 amount of Philadelphia’s settlement payment, the terms of the proposed release, the timing of Philadelphia’s payment into the Common Fund already established with Phoenix Settlement Administrators, appointment of Phoenix Settlement Administrators as the administrator, and an Administrator Fee not to exceed

  • Hearing

    Jul 31, 2020

GUERRERO VS. ACCURATE BACKGROUND, INC.

As set forth in Plaintiff’s supplemental preliminary approval papers (ROA 67), she agreed to terminate her employment with Defendant in exchange for a $10,000 payment. Having terminated her employment, she acquired standing to pursue (and Defendant acquired the ability to settle) the waiting time claim whose value drives this settlement.

  • Hearing

    Jul 31, 2020

ANDREA BLYTHE COLLINS VS ABOTALEB HAKHAMANESH, ET AL.

Without waiving said objections, and those contained in the preliminary statement, responding responds: Yes. Please see the attached medical, records and itemized billing statements and documentation produced in this matter, as well as my responses to these Form Interrogatories and other written discovery responses.

  • Hearing

    Jul 31, 2020

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