What is a Motion to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction?

“[A] preliminary injunction is an order that is sought by a plaintiff prior to a full adjudication of the merits of its claim.” (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 554.) It requires a person to refrain from a particular act; it may be granted by the court in which the action is brought, or by a judge thereof; and when granted by a judge, it may be enforced as an order of the court. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 525; Comfort v. Comfort, (1941) 17 Cal.2d 736, 741.)

“[A]n order granting or denying a preliminary injunction does not amount to an adjudication of the ultimate rights in controversy. Its purpose is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the action can be determined.” (Socialist Workers etc. Committee v. Brown (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 879, 890-91.) The status quo has been defined to mean the last actual peaceable, uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy. (14859 Moorpark Homeowner’s Assn. v. VRT Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1396. 1402.)

Legal Standard

In any action, the court may on notice modify or dissolve an injunction or temporary restraining order upon a showing that there has been a material change in the facts upon which the injunction or temporary restraining order was granted, that the law upon which the injunction or temporary restraining order was granted has changed, or that the ends of justice would be served by the modification or dissolution of the injunction or temporary restraining order. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 533; Luckett v. Panos (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 77, 85.)

Burden of Proof

The restrained party has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that one of these circumstances is present and justifies a termination of the injunction. (Loeffler v. Medina (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1504.) The trial court may determine that the changed circumstances alleged by the restrained party are not material and, therefore, do not present a reason for terminating the injunction. (Id. at 1506.)

Ultimately, “granting, denying, dissolving, or refusing to dissolve a permanent or preliminary injunction rests in the sound discretion of the trial court upon a consideration of all the particular circumstances of each individual case.” (Prof'l Engineers v. Dep't of Transp. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 543, 562.) Although the court has broad discretion, it “must exercise its discretion ‘in favor of the party most likely to be injured.’” (Robbins v. Super. Ct. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 199, 205.) The ultimate goal is to minimize the harm which an erroneous interim decision may cause. (American Credit Indemnity Co. v. Sacks (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 622, 637.)

Useful Rulings on Motion to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction

Recent Rulings on Motion to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction

9976-10000 of 10000 results

IMMIGRANT RIGHTS DEFENSE COUNCIL LLC VS WENDY TEJEDA

In each case, plaintiff pleads a sole cause of action for injunctive relief against the defendants based on plaintiff’s information and belief that the defendants have violated each and every enumerated provision of the ICA, and plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction and recovery of attorney fees and costs. Based on this, the court had found that judicial economy would be promoted, and the potential for inconsistent rulings minimized, if the cases were heard by a single judicial officer.

  • Hearing

    Feb 22, 2018

IMMIGRANT RIGHTS DEFENSE COUNCIL LLC VS FILIBERTA TIRADO

In each case, plaintiff pleads a sole cause of action for injunctive relief against the defendants based on plaintiff’s information and belief that the defendants have violated each and every enumerated provision of the ICA, and plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction and recovery of attorney fees and costs. Based on this, the court had found that judicial economy would be promoted, and the potential for inconsistent rulings minimized, if the cases were heard by a single judicial officer.

  • Hearing

    Feb 22, 2018

IMMIGRANT RIGHTS DEFENSE COUNCIL LLC VS LOURDES C MARTINEZ

In each case, plaintiff pleads a sole cause of action for injunctive relief against the defendants based on plaintiff’s information and belief that the defendants have violated each and every enumerated provision of the ICA, and plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction and recovery of attorney fees and costs. Based on this, the court had found that judicial economy would be promoted, and the potential for inconsistent rulings minimized, if the cases were heard by a single judicial officer.

  • Hearing

    Feb 22, 2018

IMMIGRANT RIGHTS DEFENSE COUNCIL LLC VS CARMEN ONCHI

In each case, plaintiff pleads a sole cause of action for injunctive relief against the defendants based on plaintiff’s information and belief that the defendants have violated each and every enumerated provision of the ICA, and plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction and recovery of attorney fees and costs. Based on this, the court had found that judicial economy would be promoted, and the potential for inconsistent rulings minimized, if the cases were heard by a single judicial officer.

  • Hearing

    Feb 22, 2018

IMMIGRANT RIGHTS DEFENSE COUNCIL LLC VS ELBA C CASTILLO

In each case, plaintiff pleads a sole cause of action for injunctive relief against the defendants based on plaintiff’s information and belief that the defendants have violated each and every enumerated provision of the ICA, and plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction and recovery of attorney fees and costs. Based on this, the court had found that judicial economy would be promoted, and the potential for inconsistent rulings minimized, if the cases were heard by a single judicial officer.

  • Hearing

    Feb 22, 2018

SCOTT BECKER VS. KENNETH TONG

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION by plaintiffs Scott Becker and Stacey Becker is GRANTED. Request for Judicial Notice is granted. Objections are overruled. In deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, a court must weigh two "interrelated" factors: (1) the likelihood that the moving party will ultimately prevail on the merits and (2) the relative interim harm to the parties from issuance or nonissuance of the injunction. (Langford v.

  • Hearing

    Feb 22, 2018

  • Type

    Contract

  • Sub Type

    Breach

IMMIGRANT RIGHTS DEFENSE COUNCIL LLC VS TERESA GARCIA-RUBIO

In each case, plaintiff pleads a sole cause of action for injunctive relief against the defendants based on plaintiff’s information and belief that the defendants have violated each and every enumerated provision of the ICA, and plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction and recovery of attorney fees and costs. Based on this, the court had found that judicial economy would be promoted, and the potential for inconsistent rulings minimized, if the cases were heard by a single judicial officer.

  • Hearing

    Feb 22, 2018

JOHNSON, ELAN VS GRAND AVENUE IMAGING INC.

. § 524 provides (a) A discharge in a case under this title-- (1) voids any judgment at any time obtained, to the extent that such judgment is a determination of the personal liability of the debtor with respect to any debt discharged under section 727, 944, 1141, 1228, or 1328 of this title, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived; (2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any

  • Hearing

    Feb 21, 2018

  • Judge

    Georgina Torres Rizk or Jon R. Takasugi

  • County

    Los Angeles County, CA

IVAN RENE MOORE VS KIMBERLY MARTIN-BRAGG

. § 524 provides (a) A discharge in a case under this title-- (1) voids any judgment at any time obtained, to the extent that such judgment is a determination of the personal liability of the debtor with respect to any debt discharged under section 727, 944, 1141, 1228, or 1328 of this title, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived; (2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt

  • Hearing

    Feb 21, 2018

  • Judge

    Georgina Torres Rizk or Jon R. Takasugi

  • County

    Los Angeles County, CA

JANA LEIGH THOMAS-ORTEGA VS. MERIWEST CREDIT UNION

The Court's order granting preliminary approval also preliminary appointed Richard McCune of McCune Write Arevalo, LLP and Taras Kick of The Kick Law Firm, APC as class counsel for purposes of settlement only ("Class Counsel"). Plaintiff David Santiago ("Class Representative") was preliminarily appointed as class representatives. The parties selected Garden City Group, LLC ("Claims Administrator") to act as the Claims Administrator.

  • Hearing

    Feb 21, 2018

  • Type

    Contract

  • Sub Type

    Breach

3123 SMB LLC ET AL VS STEVEN J HORN

A trial court has broad discretionary powers to grant or deny a request for a preliminary injunction so long as it does not act capriciously. The court should exercise its judgment in favor of the party most likely to be injured. Robbins v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 199, 205. If the denial of an injunction would result in great harm to the plaintiff, and the defendant would suffer little harm if it were granted, then it is an abuse of discretion to fail to grant the preliminary injunction. Ibid.

  • Hearing

    Feb 21, 2018

CITY OF PERRIS VS MED LOGIC INC

A Preliminary Injunction will be issued by the Court. Please submit a proposed Preliminary Injunction to the Court.

  • Hearing

    Feb 21, 2018

HERBERTH RIVERA ET AL VS MABRY MANAGEMENT COMPANY INC ET AL

Before the hearing the court should make a preliminary determination of whether the proposed settlement and the method of payment appear reasonable in relation to the potential liability and the nature and extent of the injuries. It is especially important to determine whether the minor’s condition is permanent, and whether it is stable or likely to worsen. Ibid. The court should also make a preliminary determination of whether the costs, expense and attorney’s fees requested appear reasonable. Ibid.

  • Hearing

    Feb 21, 2018

JOHNSON, ELAN VS GRAND AVENUE IMAGING INC.

. § 524 provides (a) A discharge in a case under this title-- (1) voids any judgment at any time obtained, to the extent that such judgment is a determination of the personal liability of the debtor with respect to any debt discharged under section 727, 944, 1141, 1228, or 1328 of this title, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived; (2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any

  • Hearing

    Feb 21, 2018

  • Judge

    Georgina Torres Rizk or Jon R. Takasugi

  • County

    Los Angeles County, CA

JOHNSON, ELAN VS GRAND AVENUE IMAGING INC.

. § 524 provides (a) A discharge in a case under this title-- (1) voids any judgment at any time obtained, to the extent that such judgment is a determination of the personal liability of the debtor with respect to any debt discharged under section 727, 944, 1141, 1228, or 1328 of this title, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived; (2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any

  • Hearing

    Feb 21, 2018

  • Judge

    Georgina Torres Rizk or Jon R. Takasugi

  • County

    Los Angeles County, CA

JOHNSON, ELAN VS GRAND AVENUE IMAGING INC.

. § 524 provides (a) A discharge in a case under this title-- (1) voids any judgment at any time obtained, to the extent that such judgment is a determination of the personal liability of the debtor with respect to any debt discharged under section 727, 944, 1141, 1228, or 1328 of this title, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived; (2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any

  • Hearing

    Feb 21, 2018

  • Judge

    Georgina Torres Rizk or Jon R. Takasugi

  • County

    Los Angeles County, CA

JANA LEIGH THOMAS-ORTEGA VS. MERIWEST CREDIT UNION

The Court's order granting preliminary approval also preliminary appointed Richard McCune of McCune Write Arevalo, LLP and Taras Kick of The Kick Law Firm, APC as class counsel for purposes of settlement only ("Class Counsel"). Plaintiff David Santiago ("Class Representative") was preliminarily appointed as class representatives. The parties selected Garden City Group, LLC ("Claims Administrator") to act as the Claims Administrator.

  • Hearing

    Feb 21, 2018

  • Type

    Contract

  • Sub Type

    Breach

AMEE LEONG, ET AL. V. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON, MONTECITO WATER DISTRICT, ET AL.

Plaintiffs’ request that this Court issue an Order to Show Cause why a Preliminary Injunction should not be issued granting the requested relief [within 15 days]. A. Plaintiffs’ OSC, points and authorities, supported by declarations seeking a preliminary injunctions to be filed by Friday 2/23/18; B. SCE’s response to a preliminary injunction is due Friday 3/2/18; C. Plaintiffs’ reply is due Wednesday 3/7/18; D. The hearing is Tuesday 3/13/18 at 9:30 am.

  • Hearing

    Feb 20, 2018

RHONDA MERRITT-TINSLEY V. DAVID MERRITT

As a preliminary matter, Defendant’s argument there is a lack of personal jurisdiction based on failure to state a claim is improper. Personal jurisdiction relates to the ability of the Court to render a judgment effecting the rights of an individual, and is unrelated to the issue of whether the Defendant has stated any cause of action. (See Borsuk v. Appellate Division of the Superior Court (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 607, 613–614.)

  • Hearing

    Feb 20, 2018

ROBERT HAYS V. WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL.

As a preliminary matter, the court notes that plaintiff Hays’ opposition is untimely filed. Code of Civil Procedure section 1005, subdivision (b) states, “All papers opposing a motion … shall be filed with the court and a copy served on each party at least nine court days … before the hearing.” Based on a hearing date of February 20, 2018 and two interim holidays, plaintiff’s opposition was due on February 5, 2018. Plaintiff did not file his opposition until February 13, 2018, five court days late.

  • Hearing

    Feb 20, 2018

HAAS VS. VOORWOOD COMPANY

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that 1) Plaintiff’s Response to Voorwood’s Separate Statement and 2) Plaintiff’s Objections to Voorwood’s Evidence do not comply with the California Rules of Court. Failure to strictly adhere to these procedural format rules increased the time required by the Court to review this motion, however, the Court was ultimately able to discern what evidence was offered by each party and what objections were being asserted as to that evidence.

  • Hearing

    Feb 20, 2018

REDDING GASTRO VS. SINGH, ET AL

As a preliminary matter, the Court acknowledges that defendants’ opposition was untimely filed but elects to consider it in ruling upon this motion for attorney’s fees, particularly in light of the fact that plaintiff filed the instant motion before judgment had been entered and therefore prematurely. Plaintiff is seeking to recover attorney’s fees in the amount of $94,292.50.

  • Hearing

    Feb 20, 2018

CHHIENG, ANGKHAN VS GOLESORKHI, ARIANA

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff has failed to specifically identify the Agreement that forms the basis of this cause of action.

  • Hearing

    Feb 20, 2018

  • Judge

    Yolanda Orozco or Georgina Torres Rizk

  • County

    Los Angeles County, CA

CHHIENG, ANGKHAN VS GOLESORKHI, ARIANA

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff has failed to specifically identify the Agreement that forms the basis of this cause of action.

  • Hearing

    Feb 20, 2018

  • Judge

    Georgina Torres Rizk or Jon R. Takasugi

  • County

    Los Angeles County, CA

HOPPER-PORTER VS DESERT REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER

Additionally, if plaintiff files a new motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement, plaintiff shall also discuss any agreement about how attorney fees will be paid, including fee splitting and whether the client(s) has given written notice. The case management conference is continued to April 4, 2018, at 8:30 a.m. in Dept. 10.

  • Hearing

    Feb 20, 2018

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