“Claims alleging that a uniform policy consistently applied to a group of employees is in violation of the wage and hour laws are of the sort routinely, and properly, found suitable for class treatment.” (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Super. Ct. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1033.)

“The plaintiffs may not simply allege such a policy or practice, however. They must present substantial evidence that proving both the existence of the defendant’s uniform policy or practice and the alleged illegal effects of that policy or practice could be accomplished efficiently and manageably within a class setting.” (Cruz v. Sun World International, LLC (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 367, 384; Dailey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 974, 989. see also Morgan v. Wet Seal, Inc. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1368-1369.)

“[W]hen the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 382.) As appropriate, a plaintiff may initiate the class certification process by filing a motion to certify a wage-hour class. (Rules of Court 3.764.)

“By establishing a technique whereby the claims of many individuals can be resolved at the same time, the class suit both eliminates the possibility of repetitious litigation and provides small claimants with a method of obtaining redress for claims which would otherwise be too small to warrant individual litigation.” (Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 340.)

The trial court is vested with broad discretion to determine whether a class should be certified. (Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th at 435.) “Trial courts ‘are ideally situated to evaluate the efficiencies and practicalities of permitting group action’ and therefore are ‘afforded great discretion’ in evaluating the relevant factors and in ruling on a class certification motion.” (Lampe v. Queen of the Valley Medical Center (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 832, 842.)

Class “certification is essentially a procedural one that does not ask whether an action is legally or factually meritorious.” (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Super. Ct. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1023.) A class certification motion is not a license for a free-floating inquiry into the validity of the complaint’s allegations; rather, resolution of disputes over the merits of a case generally must be postponed until after class certification has been decided, with the court assuming for purposes of the certification motion that any claims have merit. (Fireside Bank v. Super. Ct. (2007) 40 Cal.4th at pp. 1083–1086; Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th at p. 443.)

Any doubts as to the propriety of class certification are to be resolved in favor of certification. (Richmond v. Dart Industries (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 473-75.)

Legal Standard

The California Supreme Court has summarized the clear requirements for the certification of a class. (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Super. Ct. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021.)

In order to certify a class, “[t]he party advocating class treatment must demonstrate the existence of an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class, a well-defined community of interest, and substantial benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives.” (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Super. Ct. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021; Gattuso v. Harte-Hanks Shoppers, Inc. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 554, 575; City of San Jose v. Super. Ct. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 458.)

The party seeking certification has the burden to establish the existence of both an ascertainable class and a well-defined community of interest among class members. (Washington Mutual Bank v. Super. Ct. (2001) 24 Cal.4th 906, 913, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 320, 15 P.3d 1071 (Washington Mutual).)

Ascertainable and Sufficiently Numerous Class

Ascertainability “goes to the heart of the question of class certification, which requires a class definition that is ‘precise, objective and presently ascertainable.’” (Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v. Super. Ct. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 836, 858.) There is “no set number required as a matter of law for the maintenance of a class action.” (Hebbard v. Colgrove, 28 Cal.App.3d 1017, 1030 (1972).) A class is ascertainable and sufficiently numerous “if it identifies a group of unnamed plaintiffs by describing a set of common characteristics sufficient to allow a member of that group to identify himself or herself as having a right to recover based on the description.” (Bartold v. Glendale Federal Bank (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 816, 828.) “Class members are ‘ascertainable’ where they may be readily identified without unreasonable expense or time by reference to official records.” (Thompson v. Automobile Club of Southern California (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 719, 728.)

The courts in California have consistently held that class certification should not be denied just because the class definition is overinclusive. (Bell v. Farmers Insurance Exchange (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 715, 743; Aguiar v. Cintas Corporation No. 2 (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 121, 136; Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, Ltd. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1524, 1532.) The class should be defined in terms of objective characteristics and common transactional facts that will enable identification of the class members when such identification becomes necessary. (Hicks v. Kaufman & Broad Home Corp., supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at 915.) The goal is to use terminology that will convey sufficient meaning “to enable persons hearing it to determine whether they are members of the class plaintiffs wish to represent.” (Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v. Super. Ct. (National Metals, Inc.), supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at 858.)

Community of Interest

There is a well-defined community of interest so long as there are predominant common questions of law or fact; class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; class representatives who can adequately represent the class; and class treatment is the superior method of adjudicating the case. (Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 470.)

“Commonality as a general rule depends on whether the defendant’s liability can be determined by issues common to all class members: ‘A class may be certified when common questions of law and fact predominate over individualized questions. As a general rule if the defendant’s liability can be determined by facts common to all members of the class, a class will be certified even if the members must individually prove their damages.... [T]o determine whether common questions of fact predominate the trial court must examine the issues framed by the pleadings and the law applicable to the causes of action alleged.’ ‘In examining whether common issues of law or fact predominate, the court must consider the plaintiff’s legal theory of liability.’” (Knapp v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 932, 941.) The moving party must present substantial evidence that common issues predominate. (Washington Mutual v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 906, 913.)

The typicality requirement’s purpose “is to assure that the interest of the named representative aligns with the interests of the class. Typicality refers to the nature of the claim or defense of the class representative, and not to the specific facts from which it arose or the relief sought. The test of typicality is whether other members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members have been injured by the same course of conduct.” (Seastrom v. Neways, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1496, 1502.) Ultimately, “when a defense unique to the class representative will be a major focus of the litigation, or when the class representative’s interests are antagonistic to or in conflict with the objectives of those [s]he purports to represent... denial of class certification is appropriate.” (Medrazo v. Honda of North Hollywood (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 89, 99.)

“The adequacy of representation component of the community of interest requirement for class certification comes into play when the party opposing certification brings forth evidence indicating widespread antagonism to the class suit.” (Capitol People First v. State Dept. of Developmental Services (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 676, 696-97.) To resolve the adequacy question, the court will evaluate “the seriousness and extent of conflicts involved compared to the importance of issues uniting the class; the alternatives to class representation available; the procedures available to limit and prevent unfairness; and any other facts bearing on the fairness with which the absent class member is represented.“ (Id. at 697.) A party’s claim of representative status will only be defeated by a conflict that ”goes to the very subject matter of the litigation.” (Id.)

“The primary criterion in determining adequacy of representation is whether the representative, through qualified counsel, vigorously and tenaciously protected the interests of the class.” (Simons v. Horowitz (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 834, 846.) “The adequacy inquiry... serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the class they seek to represent... To assure ‘adequate’ representation, the class representative’s personal claim must not be inconsistent with the claims of other members of the class.” (Johnson v. GlaxoSmithKline, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1509.)

Additionally, the class representative must “raise claims reasonably expected to be raised by the members of the class.” (City of San Jose, supra, 12 Cal. 3d at 464.) The fiduciary duty must be undertaken free of demonstrable conflicts of interest with other class members. (Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625-26 (1997).) Other cases have stated that “adequacy of representation” depends on whether plaintiff’s attorney is qualified to conduct the proposed litigation and plaintiff’s interests are not antagonistic to the interests of the class. (McGhee v. Bank of America (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 450.)

“Trial courts must pay careful attention to manageability when deciding whether to certify a class action. In considering whether a class action is a superior device for resolving a controversy, the manageability of individual issues is just as important as the existence of common questions uniting the proposed class. If the court makes a reasoned, informed decision about manageability at the certification stage, the litigants can plan accordingly and the court will have less need to intervene later to control the proceedings.” (Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 29.)

Substantial Benefits from Certification

“[A] class action should not be certified unless substantial benefits accrue both to litigants and the courts.” (Basurco v. 21st Century Ins. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 110, 120.) The plaintiff has the burden of establishing that class treatment will yield “substantial benefits” to both “the litigants and to the court.” (Blue Chip Stamps v. Superior Court (Botney) (1976) 18 Cal.3d 381, 385.)

The question is whether a class action would be superior to individual lawsuits. (Id.) “Thus, even if questions of law or fact predominate, the lack of superiority provides an alternative ground to deny class certification.” (Id.) Generally, “a class action is proper where it provides small claimants with a method of obtaining redress and when numerous parties suffer injury of insufficient size to warrant individual action.” (Id. at 120-121.)

Many courts have held that class treatment of wage and hour claims is clearly “superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” (Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 758, 773.) This is especially so as “public policy has long favored the ‘full and prompt payment of wages due an employee.’” (Pressler v. Donald L. Bren Co. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 831, 837; Sav-On, 34 Cal.4th at 340.)

Timelines

“A motion for class certification should be filed when practicable.” (Cal. Rules of Court 3.764(b).) “Notice of a motion to certify or decertify a class or to amend or modify a certification order must be filed and served on all parties to the action at least 28 calendar days before the date appointed for hearing. Any opposition to the motion must be served and filed at least 14 calendar days before the noticed or continued hearing, unless the court for good cause orders otherwise. Any reply to the opposition must be served and filed at least 5 calendar days before the noticed or continued date of the hearing, unless the court for good cause orders otherwise. The provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 1005 otherwise apply.” (Rules of Court 3.764(c)(1).)