“The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473(b).)

A motion for relief from judgment must be made within six months after judgment was entered. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473(b).) The six month time limit is jurisdictional. (Rutan v. Summit Sports, Inc. (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 965, 970.) After expiration of the 6-month period, a defendant may obtain relief by showing “lack of notice” of the proceedings and relief must be sought within 2 years of the default judgment or 180 days after service of written notice that the default or default judgment has been entered, whichever is earlier. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473.5.) This provision likewise requires that “a copy of the answer, motion, or other pleading proposed to be filed in the action” be filed and served at the same time as the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473.5(b).)

“Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, and shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473(b).)

“Notwithstanding any other requirements of this section, the court shall, whenever an application for relief is made no more than six months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by an attorney's sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, vacate any

1. resulting default entered by the clerk against his or her client, and which will result in entry of a default judgment, or
2. resulting default judgment or dismissal entered against his or her client, unless the court finds that the default or dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney's mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.”

(Code Civ. Proc. § 437(b).)

“[W]hen relief under section 473 is available, there is a strong public policy in favor of granting relief and allowing the requesting party his or her day in court. Beyond this period there is a strong public policy in favor of the finality of judgments and only in exceptional circumstances should relief be granted.” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 981-82.)

Where an “attorney affidavit of fault” is filed, there is no requirement that the attorney's mistake, inadvertence, etc. be excusable. Relief must be granted even where the default resulted from inexcusable neglect by defendant's attorney. (Standard Microsystems Corp. v. Winbond Electronics Corp. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 868, 897.) Relief is mandatory. (Beeman v. Burling (1990) 216 Cal.App.3d 1586, 1604.) The court is not concerned with the reasons for the attorney's mistake, whether excusable or inexcusable. (Billings v. Health Plan of America (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 250, 256.) Thus, as long as the motion is timely and the attorney has submitted a declaration stating that the default, default judgment or dismissal was entered due to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise or neglect, relief is mandatory, regardless of whether the error was reasonable or not. (Garcia v. Hejmadi (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 674, 681-682.) As long as it appears that the default was actually the result of the attorney’s mistake or neglect, and not the client’s fault, the court must grant relief. (Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group (2002) 28 Cal.4th 249, 257.)

Although the language of the mandatory provision of section 473, subdivision (b), on its face, “affords relief from unspecified ‘dismissal’ caused by attorney neglect, our courts have, through judicial construction, prevented it from being used indiscriminately by plaintiffs' attorneys as a ‘perfect escape hatch’ to undo dismissals of civil cases.” (Gotschall v. Daley (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 479, 482-483.) Courts have limited the application of the mandatory provision to those dismissals procedurally equivalent to defaults. (Gotschall v. Daley (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 479, 482-483.) Section 473, subdivision (b) was never intended to be a “catch-all remedy for every case of poor judgment on the part of counsel which results in dismissal.” (Gotschall v. Daley (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 479, 482-483.)

Otherwise, the court must look at whether the mistake or neglect was the type of error that a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances might have made. (Bettencourt v. Los Rios Community College Dist. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 270, 276.) The court will not grant relief if the defendant’s default was taken as a result of mere carelessness or other inexcusable neglect. (Luz v. Lopes (1960) 55 Cal.2d 54, 62.) Mistake is not a ground for relief when “the court finds that the ‘mistake’ is simply the result of professional incompetence, general ignorance of the law, or unjustifiable negligence in discovering the law.” (Henderson v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 215, 229-230.) The party seeking relief under section 473(b) on basis of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect has the burden of showing a satisfactory excuse for the occurrence of that mistake, inadvertence, or neglect. (Austin v. Los Angeles Unified School District (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 918, 929; Eigner v. Worthington (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 188, 196.)