Juror Misconduct in California

Jury Misconduct In a related argument, plaintiff contends the statement attributed to the anonymous juror constitutes juror misconduct for which a new trial must be granted. Misconduct has not been established here. When a party seeks a new trial based upon jury misconduct, the court must undertake a three-step inquiry to determine: (1) whether the evidence of misconduct is admissible; (2) whether the facts establish misconduct; and (3) whether the misconduct is prejudicial. (Barboni v.

As to the juror misconduct claim, a motion for a new trial may be granted if juror misconduct "materially affected the substantial rights of a party. (Code Civ. Proc., § 657, subd. (2).) A party moving for a new trial on the ground of juror misconduct must establish both that misconduct occurred and that the misconduct was prejudicial. (Ibid.; People v. Duran (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 103, 113, 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 635.)." Ovando v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 42, 57.

Plaintiff asserts 15 acts of juror misconduct and/or attorney-party misconduct: (1) Juror 10 (Chapman) speaking/joking with two attorneys for Signature Properties, Inc. and Mr. Bayless in court cafeteria; (2) Juror 10 (Chapman) talking/joking with Mr. Bayless in court cafeteria about Juror 10 having thrown candy to either Mr.

To determine if a new trial is warranted upon the ground of juror misconduct, the court must make a three-step inquiry: 1. is evidence of the misconduct admissible? 2. Do the facts establish misconduct? 3. is the misconduct prejudicial? (See, Sierra View Local Health Care Dist v. Sierra View Med. Plaza Assocs., LP (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 478,484; Whitlock v. Foster Wheeler, LLC (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 16 149, 160.

As for defendant’s motion for new trial on the ground of juror misconduct, the motion is based on alleged concealed bias on voir dire. The Court finds the proffered evidence is insufficient to establish juror misconduct. It is undisputed that the subject juror is an acquaintance of Mr. Bixby’s paralegal. There is no evidence, however, the subject juror concealed this fact in response to any question from counsel or the Court during voir dire or at any time during trial. Ms.

Juror Misconduct Based on the discussion in connection with the claim of irregularity in the proceedings, there is no evidence of juror misconduct as well. As stated above, Patty Johnson’s declaration is largely inadmissible and does not establish any failure to deliberate or any juror misconduct. The motion for new trial on grounds of juror misconduct is therefore DENIED.

Upon review of the admissible evidence, the Court finds that no juror misconduct occurred. The alleged misconduct in Ms. Heil's and Ms. Holland's declarations is contradicted by the declarations from Ms. Shields, Mr. Gabriel, Mr. Robinson and Mr. Rodgers. The Court does not doubt that the deliberations were contentious and that there were strong personalities in the room. However, this appears to be an example of juror disagreement rather than juror misconduct.

In ruling on a request for new trial based on juror misconduct, the Court undertakes a three-step inquiry. First, the Court must determine whether the affidavits supporting the motion are admissible. Second, the Court determines whether the facts establish misconduct. Third, if misconduct is shown, the Court must determine whether the misconduct was prejudicial. (Sierra View Local Health Care District v.

When ruling on a jury misconduct claim, the court is required to undertake a three step inquiry: (1) whether the affidavits are admissible; (2) if so, whether the facts establish misconduct; and (3) if so, whether the misconduct was prejudicial. The trial court has broad discretion on each of these issues. Juror misconduct raises a presumption of prejudice, and unless the prevailing party rebuts the presumption by showing the misconduct was harmless, a new trial should be granted. (Enyart v.

Thus, the court finds that this evidence does not establish juror misconduct.

Plaintiff's motion for new trial based upon jury misconduct is DENIED. Juror Vergeer's declaration does not establish that juror misconduct occurred. Juror Vergeer's speculation as to the thoughts and motives of Juror Nerdrum are inadmissible and irrelevant.

On August 24, 2017 plaintiff filed a motion for new trial asserting the following grounds: there was juror misconduct in that a juror stated facts outside the record of the trial that the juror also lived in an HOA and if he sees a hole that needs filling, he fills it; there was juror misconduct in that a juror stated facts outside the record of the trial that the juror would not call anyone and just do it (fill the hole); there was juror misconduct resulting in an irregularity in that the jury disregarded a

Juror Misconduct 1. Juror Haiken Defendants allege that Juror Haiken committed juror misconduct by raising during deliberations an opinion based on education he received outside of trial; specifically, that based on business case studies he had studied in business school, he suspected that the creation of Defendant Johns-Manville Manufacturing Company, Inc.

Alleged Juror Misconduct Plaintiffs allege 4 areas of juror misconduct, which they argue necessitates a new trial: Introduction of Extraneous Evidence Disregarding Jury Instructions Consideration of Stricken Evidence Pressure On Juror Gonzalez to Reach a Verdict Juror misconduct allegations must be analyzed in 3 steps: Is the jurors’ testimonial evidence admissible under Evid. Code §1150(a)? Do the admissible facts establish misconduct? Was the misconduct prejudicial? People v.

The point is that while evidence about 'mental processes or reasons for assent or dissent [citation] is not admissible as a general proposition, there is at least one state of mind that we must take into account and that is where the juror has prejudged the case or was biased. The duality in the juror's statement is that it describes a particular state of mind and it discloses bias or shows that the juror has prejudged the case. . . . [¶] [A] statement of bias is misconduct because bias is misconduct.

Juror Misconduct (Code Civ. Proc., § 657, subd. (2)) A court may grant a new trial based upon juror misconduct. (Code Civ. Proc., § 657, subd. (2).) As discussed above, Statements in attorney Eduardo Martorell’s declaration as to what a juror told him and the email that was allegedly sent by a juror to Plaintiff’s office manager are inadmissible hearsay and are of “little evidentiary value” in determining juror misconduct. (People v. Smith, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 524 fn. 12.; People v.

Juror Tetherton: I STOPPED AT TWO THOUGH. I DIDN’T REALLY VOTE ON THE REST. Court: OH. Juror Tetherton: BECAUSE IT SAID DON’T GO ANY FARTHER. Court: NO CONVERSATION. Juror Tetherton: OKAY. Defendant contends that this is juror misconduct because all jurors are required to deliberate and vote on each issue to be decided in the case. The record reflects, however, that Juror Tetherton indicated that she voted on subsequent questions. (Gourde Decl., ¶ 4; Ex. A, 16:20-23.)

I cannot conclude that there was misconduct on that contention or, if there was, that it was prejudicial. As for the contention that there was misconduct about the fact one juror wanted a read back and did not get it was not compelling. Although a juror should have an ample opportunity to hear whatever read-backs would be helpful it is incumbent upon the juror to persist and I do not read that as misconduct or prejudicial. 4. Plaintiff contends a juror went outside the evidence. I disagree.

Even if the Court were to consider the above “evidence”, it does not demonstrat prejudicial juror misconduct. As to the argument a new trial should be granted based on juror misconduct for Juro Dibiaso’s use of a cellphone, Plaintiff offers no evidence to suggest either that the telephone wa ever used for an improper purpose or that its presence distracted jurors. No presumption o prejudice, therefore, arises and the motion is denied on this basis. (People v.

Plaintiff’s juror affidavits are admissible and clearly establish juror misconduct based on the jury forewoman’s home experiment.

The Court also concludes Plaintiffs' claim of juror misconduct has not been adequately demonstrated pursuant to Evidence Code 1150. A juror affidavit must contain details about alleged misconduct and mere conclusions about jurors' mental processes are insufficient per Toste v Calportland Const. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 362) Declarations recounting statements, conduct or events 'open to sight, hearing and other senses and thus subject to corroboration' are admissible to establish juror misconduct."

Jury Misconduct The Plaintiff argue that the jurors engaged in misconduct because they refused to deliberate. Any juror conduct that interferes with a party’s constitutional right to unbiased and unprejudiced jurors constitutes misconduct. Weathers v. Kaiser Found. Hosps. (1971) 5 Cal. 3d 98, 110.

Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing juror misconduct and the standards are set forth in Barboni v. Tuomi (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 340, 345, 349. Much of the juror Lam’s declaration was not competent.

Whether taken individually or together as a whole, this Court finds that there was no prejudicial defense misconduct sufficient to justify granting a new trial. Juror Inattentiveness There were reports that Juror #18 had been inattentive at times during trial testimony. This Court addressed the issue with the Juror which apparently resolved the issue as there were no further reports of that jurors inattention.

In its original tentative ruling, the Court did not find authority in Code of Civil Procedure section 657 to modify a jury verdict, but found that if there was prejudicial juror misconduct, a new trial would be the appropriate remedy.

The question before the court is whether Awans statements by themselves constitute juror misconduct. A juror may commit misconduct by receiving or proffering to other jurors information about the case that was not received in evidence at trial. ( In re Lucas (2004) 33 Cal.4th 682, 696 ( Lucas ).) But jurors cannot be expected to shed their backgrounds and experiences at the door of the deliberation room. ( Ibid. ; accord Bandana Trading Co., Inc. v. Quality Infusion Care, Inc.

b) Plaintiffs objections to the declarations of Juror #8, Crystal Aubert and Jorge Cabrera are overruled. Similarly, these jurors attest to the condition or events occurring either within or without the jury room to rebut Plaintiffs evidence and is admissible. 2) Plaintiff has not established juror misconduct. Plaintiff has the burden of proving juror misconduct. Donovan v. Poway Unified School Dist. (2008) 167 Cal.App. 4th 567, 625.

Irregularity in the Proceedings and Jury Misconduct under Code of Civil Procedure sections 657(1) and 657(2) When a party seeks a new trial based upon jury misconduct, a court must undertake a three-step inquiry. The court must first determine whether the affidavits supporting the motion are admissible. If the evidence is admissible, the court must then consider whether the facts establish misconduct. Finally, assuming misconduct, the court must determine whether the misconduct was prejudicial.

Mesecher first states the general rules on the admissibility of evidence to prove juror misconduct, and cognizable misconduct. "While 'jurors may testify to "overt acts" -- that is, such statements, conduct, conditions, or events as are "open to sight, hearing, and the other senses and thus subject to corroboration"--[they] may not testify to "the subjective reasoning processes of the individual juror ...'"

The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to make a sufficient showing of juror misconduct. See Code Civ. Proc. § 657(2); People v. Doresey (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 694, 703-04. No juror affidavits were submitted. Code Civ. Proc. § 658. Moreover, the declaration of Mr. Marino is speculative and does not establish misconduct. See Evid. Code § 1150. The Court also finds that Plaintiff has not shown that newly discovered evidence compels a new trial. See Code Civ. Proc. § 657(4).

Silverstein’s declaration as to what jurors told him are inadmissible hearsay and are of “little evidentiary value” in determining juror misconduct. (People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 524 fn. 12.; see People v. Bryant (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1468 [motion for new trial based on juror misconduct properly denied when evidence of alleged misconduct was sworn hearsay]; Burns v. 20th Century Ins.

The primary ground is juror misconduct. First, the objections by Defendant to the Declaration of Juror 11 are well taken and sustained. Evidence Code 1150 states that evidence that purports to show deliberative error by one or more jurors is inadmissible to impeach the verdict. Issues relating to being rushed to reach a verdict are also inadmissible. Bandana Trading Co., Inc. v. Quality Infusion Care, Inc. (2008) 164 CA4th 1440, 1446.

On appeal, whether prejudice arose from juror misconduct is a mixed question of law and fact subject to de novo review. (See Donovan, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 626.) As noted above, the first step in considering a motion for new trial based on juror misconduct is to determine whether the evidence of the misconduct is admissible. (People v. Sanchez (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 460, 475.)

Here, no juror talked about a back injury. No juror improperly discussed the case before deliberations. The jurors’ modest award of under $25,000 in general damages and just over $100,000 in special damages does not show that the misconduct, if any, affected the verdict. Defendant contends that a juror committed misconduct because he contested the defense expert’s opinion.

Irregularity in Proceedings of the Jury and Juror Misconduct (Code Civ.

The Court does not find that any of these claims of error or juror misconduct have merit.

Juror misconduct raises a presumption of prejudice, and unless the prevailing party rebuts the presumption by showing the misconduct was harmless, a new trial should be granted. (Enyart v. City of Los Angeles (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 499, 507.)

Plaintiff has not shown irregularities in the proceedings, an order or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial, juror misconduct or bias, or error in law.

First, Plaintiff argues that the jury, in their award of economic damages, engaged in misconduct by reducing the amount of relocation assistance to which Plaintiff was entitled under the Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance. As a preliminary matter, this does not constitute juror misconduct. Juror misconduct involves juror prejudice or bias. (Evid.

Whether the Court Erred in Failing to Dismiss Juror No. 11 (Irregularity in the Proceedings of the Jury and/or Misconduct of the Jury) Plaintiff argues that Juror No. 11 committed misconduct by not responding truthfully to the Court’s questions about whether he knew the parties and/or witnesses, and that the Court erred by overruling Plaintiff’s counsel’s request to excuse Juror No. 11. (Motion, pgs. 17-20.)

Misconduct of the jury Plaintiffcontends that Juror No. 3 committed misconduct by concealing his bias in favor of defendant. There is no evidence that this juror knew of defendant prior to trial or that his impressions of defendant were not developed during trial. 5. Error in law, exclusion of European clinical trial document: The record reflects the objections that were made and were ruled on by the Court.

Therefore, with no juror affidavits or otherwise admissible evidence of any juror misconduct, let alone misconduct arising to the level requiring a new trial, Plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial must be DENIED.

Moreover, the Court believes the juror’s declaration is inadmissible based upon Ford v Bennacka (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 330, 336 [The declaration lacked objective and verifiable incidents of juror misconduct. The declaration does not suggest any juror violated the Court's instruction to follow the law by recounting his or her own outside experience on a question of law.

First, while plaintiff’s attorneys aver that they had no prior knowledge of any alleged jury misconduct (CCP 657(2) prior to verdict, there is no evidence that plaintiff herself lacked such knowledge; evidence of both are required. (Weathers v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1981) 5 Cal.3d 98, 103-105.) Second, the court finds that the conflicting juror affidavits, as well as the conflicting evidence at trial, do not show that the jury’s verdict was contrary to any instructions, or otherwise against law.

In denying the motion, the Court notes the lack of competent evidence that would support a finding of juror misconduct and/or that the conduct alleged does not rise to the level of "misconduct." With respect to the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court is of the opinion that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. The motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is also denied.

Irregularity in the proceedings of the jury (657(1) and Juror Misconduct (Code Civ. Proc. § 657(2)) Plaintiff contends that juror, Jones engaged in misconduct and an irregularity occurred because Mr. Jones concealed a bias against police officers on voir dire and pre-judged the credibility of Officer Port. Plaintiff has submitted one juror declaration in support of his contentions.

The second step is that if the court finds the evidence is admissible, it must then consider whether the facts establish misconduct. Lastly, once misconduct has been established, prejudice is presumed and reversal is required unless the reviewing court finds, upon examination of the entire record, there is no substantial likelihood that any juror was improperly influenced to the defendant's detriment.

The second step is that if the court finds the evidence is admissible, it must then consider whether the facts establish misconduct. Lastly, once misconduct has been established, prejudice is presumed and reversal is required unless the reviewing court finds, upon examination of the entire record, there is no substantial likelihood that any juror was improperly influenced to the defendant's detriment.

Williss declaration is concrete evidence of juror misconduct and the insufficiency of the evidence to support the refusal to award emotional distress damages. Juror misconduct raises a rebuttable presumption that the misconduct was prejudicial, i.e., that there is a substantial likelihood that the juror was biased and that the misconduct affected the verdict. ( Ovando v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 42, 58 [internal citations omitted].)

Mesecher first states the general rules on the admissibility of evidence to prove juror misconduct, and cognizable misconduct. "While 'jurors may testify to "overt acts" -- that is, such statements, conduct, conditions, or events as are "open to sight, hearing, and the other senses and thus subject to corroboration"--[they] may not testify to "the subjective reasoning processes of the individual juror ...'"

Properly executed juror declarations are required to establish juror misconduct. People v Bryant (2011) 191 CA4th 1457, 1468. Evidence Code § 1150(a) limits the type of evidence that is admissible concerning juror misconduct. It provides that Evidence may be received regarding statements made, or conduct, conditions, or events occurring inside or outside the jury room that likely influenced the verdict improperly, but only if it is otherwise admissible.

Juror Misconduct Finally, Defendants contend that the jury ignored instructions and rendered its verdict based on bias and change, rather than the law.

Juror Misconduct On the third day of testimony, Juror No. 8 volunteered to the Court that he had forgotten a casual relationship with a deputy who worked inside the courthouse, but was not associated with the case. Because he had forgotten, he did not disclose it during voir dire. The Court questioned the juror, who stated he could be impartial. The Court determined that the juror properly could perform his duty; Plaintiff did not object to the juror’s continuing to serve on the case.

First, Plaintiff argues that the jury, in their award of economic damages, engaged in misconduct by reducing the amount of relocation assistance to which Plaintiff was entitled under the Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance. As a preliminary matter, this does not constitute juror misconduct. Juror misconduct involves juror prejudice or bias. (Evid.

Finally, the primary reason for reversal in Smith was juror misconduct. (Smith, supra., 100 Cal.App.3d at p. 955.) Smith did not reverse the judgment based solely on misconduct in argument by the defense counsel. (Id., at p. 960.) Based on the above, the court DENIES Plaintiff’s (Tiffany Avey) Amended Motion for a New Trial filed on 10-2-19. Defendant is to give notice.

Lastly, assuming misconduct, the trial court must determine whether the misconduct was prejudicial. ( People v. Dorsey (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 694, 703704.) In support of the motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct grounds, Plaintiff submits the declaration of one juror, Wendy Kheel (Kheel). Plaintiff argues this evidence shows the jury award amount was reached by using an improper quotient verdict. The Court disagrees.

Juror declarations are admissible to the extent that they describe overt acts constituting jury misconduct, but they are inadmissible to the extent that they describe the effect of any event on a juror's subjective reasoning process. [Citation.] Accordingly, juror declarations are inadmissible to the extent that they purport to describe the jurors' understanding of the instructions or how they arrived at their verdict. [Citations.]” (Bell v.

Juror declarations are admissible to the extent that they describe overt acts constituting jury misconduct, but they are inadmissible to the extent that they describe the effect of any event on a juror's subjective reasoning process. [Citation.] Accordingly, juror declarations are inadmissible to the extent that they purport to describe the jurors' understanding of the instructions or how they arrived at their verdict. [Citations.]” (Bell v.

The Court finds that the declarations of Villaseñor, Schwer and Spada refute the allegations of juror misconduct raised by the lone dissenting juror, juror Sweatt. Insufficient evidence The Court may grant a new trial if the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to justify the verdict or other decision, or the verdict or other decision is against law.

Code, § 1150 ["[A] court may not consider evidence of a juror's subjective process in deciding whether to grant a new trial based on purported juror misconduct."].) Additionally, "[h]earsay evidence offered in support of a new trial motion that is based on alleged jury misconduct ordinarily is insufficient to establish an abuse of discretion in either denying the motion or declining to conduct an evidentiary hearing." (People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 55.)

"Jury Misconduct” “Proper juror affidavits in support of a new trial motion are evidence of the matters stated. Counter-affidavits must be filed to challenge their content; otherwise, the juror affidavits are ‘deemed admitted.’” Lankster v. Alpha Beta Co. (1993) 15 CA4th 678, 681. Juror affidavits are competent to impeach the jury verdict under Evidence Code § 1150.

The Court discusses the merits of this arguments in the following section on juror misconduct. The Court additionally notes that the Stipulation was attached to the jury instructions.

Plaintiff has not shown irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party; any order of the court or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial; misconduct of the jury; inadequate damages; or insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or the verdict or other decision is against law. CCP §657(1), (2), (5), (6). The Court has reviewed the declaration of Juror No. 5.

With respect to the Sexual Violence and Sexual Harassment Policy, plaintiff presents evidence that, prior to defendant’s acquisition of Toluca Lake Health Clinic, plaintiff reported one incident of sexual misconduct. (Resp. to UMF 24, citing Tsang Decl. ¶ 7 & Ex. 1.)

This is not a request for a lawful offset, credit, or reduction and the parties did not define this phrase to allow the Defendant to alter the verdict based on claims of juror or attorney misconduct. Instead, the Defendant’s arguments about juror misconduct are raised in a motion for a new trial. See e.g., CCP section 657. The parties expressly agreed that they could not bring motions for a new trial.

Even if the jurors' statements were admissible, the fact that a juror discouraged others from asking questions, rushed others to complete the special verdict form, and referred to his or her own expertise to support his/her arguments does not rise to the level of prejudicial misconduct. Bandana Trading Co., Inc. v. Quality Infusion Care, Inc. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1440, 1446.

No juror declarations were presented indicating to the contrary. Finally, the verdict has already been reduced by $175,000. THEREFORE, the motion for new trial is DENIED.

City of Bakersfield (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 606, 623 [“Juror declarations are admissible to the extent that they describe overt acts constituting jury misconduct, but they are inadmissible to the extent that they describe the effect of any event on a juror's subjective reasoning process. [Citation.] Accordingly, juror declarations are inadmissible to the extent that they purport to describe the jurors' understanding of the instructions or how they arrived at their verdict.”].)

No admissible evidence in support of juror misconduct. Defendants objections to Plaintiffs reply: SUSTAINED. 2. Defendants motion to strike/tax costs: GRANTED. The following items are taxed (see Notice, 2:1-9): Items 4b ($1,196.05); 4f ($1307.50); 4g ($500); 4h ($350), totaling $3,353.55; and Items 8b(1) through (5) totaling $9,500. The total reduction is $12,853.55. Plaintiffs memorandum of costs initially sought $22,271.27.

Second, although juror declarations are admissible to show misconduct during deliberations, the California Supreme Court has explained, the only improper influences that may be proved under Evidence Code section 1150 to impeach a verdict are those open to sight, hearing, and the other senses and thus subject to corroboration. (People v. Hutchinson (1969) 71 Cal.3d 342.)

Proc. § 657(1)) or juror misconduct (Code Civ. Proc. § 657(2)). Plaintiffs have produced absolutely no admissible evidence of juror misconduct; nor have they shown they brought the issue with the display of the photo enlargements to the court's attention when the court could have done something about it. Nor was it "misconduct" for defense counsel to offer the best photos of the subject vehicles he had available to him.

Jury Misconduct Plaintiffs contend that the jury awarded punitive damages against Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Miranda Chen only because she made hostile comments towards the jury during the second phase of trial, and thus, the jury engaged in misconduct. A party moving for a new trial on the ground of juror misconduct must establish both that misconduct occurred and that the misconduct was prejudicial. [Citation.] ( Stokes v. Muschinske (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.)

Juror One was a criminal case that involved allegations of juror misconduct and the Facebook posts at issue were themselves the misconduct. Although the trial court quashed the subpoena issued by the real party for overbreadth, it nonetheless issued its own order requiring the juror to turn over to the court for an in camera review all of his Facebook posts made during trial.

Without any admissible evidence of juror misconduct, the Court is denying the new trial motion based on alleged juror misconduct.[ii] THE REQUEST FOR ADDITUR Notwithstanding the Court’s denial of the new trial motion, the Court has concluded that the damages awarded by the jury to both Ms. Kirn and Ms. Rozen were inadequate.

Defendant does acknowledge that during his closing argument, defense counsel said the following: "Would you [juror] think you had done something wrong if you had checked your mirrors - and that you had executed a lane change and somebody runs into your car?"

Nature of Proceedings: Motion New Trial This is plaintiff’s motion for a new trial; filed 5/29; supported by the declarations of Maxwell Blecher, Roberta Overby, Yolanda Overbach, and Amador Escalante, as well as other exhibits including portions of the reporter’s transcript that plaintiffs believe are helpful; Plaintiffs contend the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence; there was juror misconduct (one juror concealed her past negative experiences with doctors creating a bias against

The Court perceived no unethical 2 behavior, and no conduct that rose to the level of misconduct. 3 2. There Was No Jury Misconduct. 4 In alleging juror misconduct, Plaintiff complains that (1) the Court imposed time limits on 5 attorney voir dire, (2) a hospital administrator got seated on the jury, (3) that juror appeared 6 inattentive at times, and (4) after the jury was dismissed, that juror spoke with defense counsel in 7 the hallway outside the courtroom.

Sherman (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 245, the affidavits about how a juror agreed to switch a vote from not guilty to guilty were not allowed. Id. at 256-57. Lauren H. v. Kannappan seemed to allow affidavits about compromise by jurors, but the case says that a compromise verdict is not necessarily juror misconduct. (96 Cal.App.4th 834, 840, 839).

Juror Misconduct Plaintiff also argues cursorily that a new trial should be granted because of the misconduct of two jurors. Plaintiff argues that during deliberations juror Christean expressed a blanket disinclination to award money damages under any circumstances whatsoever, in a case where a survivor seeks damages for wrongful death of a family member. Juror Damato assertedly expressed support for Christean’s views and stated that she “felt uncomfortable” awarding damages in such a situation.

Having no other evidence in this regard, the Motion as to any purported juror intimidation therefore is denied. Moreover, even if Ms. Davido's declaration were admissible, the Court rejects the contention that this limited snapshot of Mr. Perez's conduct rises to the level of prejudicial misconduct. See Bandana Trading Co., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at 1446.

There is an exception under Evidence Code § 1150, but only for “a statement that reflects a juror’s reasoning processes if the statement itself amounts to juror misconduct, comparable to an objective fact such as reading a novel during trial, or consulting an outside attorney for advice on law relevant to the case.” (Id. at p. 284, emphasis in original.)

“It is not unreasonable to require a plaintiff who has chosen to be instructed in a particular activity to bear the risk that he or she will not be able to meet the challenges posed by the instructor, at least in the absence of intentional misconduct or recklessness on the part of the instructor.” ( Bushnell v. Japanese-American Religious & Cultural Center (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 525, 534.)

Plaintiff also appears to allege juror misconduct. There was no evidence presented to substantiate the claim and the Court finds there was no juror misconduct. Similarly, Plaintiff alleges an exhibit binder provided to him by defense counsel was different from the exhibit binder Defendant produced for its own use at trial, as well as the exhibit binder Defendant submitted to the Court.

Proc., §§ 656-657.)1 Here, Plaintiff raises two grounds for a new trial: (A) insufficient evidence to justify the verdict (§ 657(6)) and (B) juror misconduct (§ 657(2)). Plaintiff’s latter argument contends the jury committed misconduct by failing to follow the law and the jury instructions.

Misconduct of the jury is the second subdivision, so the motion must be made upon affidavits. The declaration does not address this misconduct of the jury argument. The motion itself simply speculates that since the jury found as it did, in the face of what plaintiffs characterize as a mountain of evidence in their favor, there must have been some misconduct. This is insufficient to establish juror misconduct; if it were not, every unsuccessful party could argue that there had been juror misconduct.

Plaintiff exercises peremptory challenge as to juror 13. Defense exercises peremptory challenge as to juror 11. Plaintiff exercises peremptory challenge as to juror 20. Defense exercises peremptory challenge as to juror 10. Plaintiff exercises peremptory challenge as to juror 2. The Defense passes.

Had this been a Court trial – or had the Court been sitting as a juror – it is possible that the Court might have weighed the evidence differently. However, this does not mean that the verdict was not supported by the weight of the evidence. Further, no misconduct occurred that affected the verdict. Plaintiff received a fair trial. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.

Plaintiff challenge for cause as to juror number 29 is denied. Defense challenge for cause as to juror number 34 is granted. Peremptory challenges commence. Plaintiff exercises peremptory challenge as to juror Jennifer Roman #22. Defense exercises peremptory challenge as to juror Samantha Thein #28. Plaintiff exercises peremptory challenge as to juror Erwin Ilustrisimo #25.

The court excuses the following juror for cause: #18 M. Dufek. Plaintiff exercises peremptory challenge as to juror #10 J. Judd. Defense exercises peremptory challenge as to juror #6 S. Pitpitandenny. Plaintiff exercises peremptory challenge as to juror #4 A. Gonzales. Plaintiff exercises peremptory challenge as to juror #1 D. Gonzales. Defense exercises peremptory challenge as to juror #24 D. Caballero-Rico.

Plaintiff exercises peremptory challenge as to juror #5 P. Roberts. Defense exercises peremptory challenge as to juror #11 A. Lomeli. Defense exercises peremptory challenge as to juror #20 K. Ledesma. Defense exercises peremptory challenge as to juror #8 C. Devlin. Defense exercises peremptory challenge as to juror #31 M. Ubertino. Plaintiff exercises peremptory challenge as to juror #32 T. Freligh. Plaintiff exercises peremptory challenge as to juror #33 F. Kern.

Plaintiff fails to introduce any evidence to show that a new trial is warranted based on juror misconduct or an error of law. Whitlock v. Foster Wheeler, LLC, 160 Cal.App.4th 149, 160 (2008). The July 11, 2019 memo advising plaintiff that he was being placed on administrative leave is not grounds for a new trial. This was not a document that could have been presented at trial.

Alternate juror S. Rodriguez's potential transportation problem next week. 9:34 a.m. All 14 jurors are present in the courtroom. 9:36 a.m. The following individuals are sworn to try the cause: Juror 1: J. Palmer, Juror 2: M. Custer, Juror 3: S. Berger, Juror 4: D. Orgel, Juror 5: R. Platten, Juror 6: A. Ramirez, Juror 7: K. Kotavdekar, Juror 8: D. Valdovinosvaldovinos, Juror 9: G. Adame, Juror 10: A.

Simply put, P has failed to meet his burden in introducing admissible evidence of the alleged juror misconduct. Ps motions for JNOV and New Trial are DENIED. B. Ps Motion to Tax Costs Ps motion to tax costs is DENIED as moot because D has never filed a Memorandum of Costs to tax. Per Cal.R.Ct. § 3.1700(a)(1), Memorandums of Costs are due within 15 days of service of the Clerks Notice of Entry of Judgment.

Lane CASE NO: 56-2019-00524183-CU-PA-VTA Pursuant to stipulation of the Counsel: Juror #10 J. Borgeson is now the Alternate and the Alternate Juror A. Camuccio is now seated as Juror #10. Further, the Clerk is directed to contact the Alternate juror A. Camuccio forthwith to report to Courtroom 21. At 10:46 a.m., Court is in recess.

Outside the presence of the prospective jurors: Defendants' challenge for cause as to juror number #39 is Denied. Peremptory Challenges Commence. Plaintiff exercises peremptory challenge #4 as to juror #40. Defendants' exercises peremptory challenge #6 as to juror #39. Plaintiff exercises peremptory challenge #5 as to juror #41. Defendants' exercises peremptory challenge #7 as to juror #42. Plaintiff exercises peremptory challenge #6 as to juror #43.

Defendant challenge for cause as to juror number #8 is Denied. Defendant challenge for cause as to juror number #12 is Granted. Defendant challenge for cause as to juror number #20 is Denied. Peremptory Challenges Commence. Plaintiff exercises peremptory challenge #1 as to juror #10 Sean Enloe. Defendant exercises peremptory challenge #1 as to juror #16 Ethel Brown. Plaintiff exercises peremptory challenge #2 as to juror #6 Arturo Gama.

Plaintiff challenge for cause as to juror #30 M. Diedrich is granted, Plaintiff's challenge for cause as to juror #10 J. Miller is denied, Defense challenge for cause as to juror #2 C. Coleman is granted, Defense challenge for cause as to juror #7 E. Perez is denied, Defense challenge for cause as to juror #23 A. Miller is granted, Juror #24 J. Knestaut is excused by stipulation of the parties., Defense challenge for cause as to juror #26 M. Lapides is granted, Juror #27 R. Limas and juror #29 T.

Plaintiff challenge for cause as to juror number #9 is Denied. Plaintiff challenge for cause as to juror number #17 is Denied. Defense challenge for cause as to juror number #15 is Granted. Peremptory challenges commence. Plaintiff exercises peremptory challenge as to juror P. Gehr #1. Defense exercises peremptory challenge as to juror D. Johnson #6. Plaintiff exercises peremptory challenge as to juror J. Dziwak #9.