Complaints in California Superior Court

The well-pleaded Complaint together with the declaration of Plaintiff support an award of damages in the sum of $50,000 against Mr. Walshin together with an award of prejudgment interest in the sum of $15,416.67 as calculated in the separate declaration of Mr. Walshid dated 8/30/2017. In addition, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of costs in the sum of $435.

The well-pleaded Complaint together with the supporting declarations and exhibits thereto support entry of judgment in the principal sum of $28,366.40 and costs of suit in the sum of $534, or the total sum of $28,900.40. The proposed judgment is appropriate in form and is signed by the court. The court directs the clerk to enter judgment as requested on or after the date and time of hearing.

As Plaintiff has not alleged a well-pleaded complaint capable of being cured, the action is DISMISSED.

Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, it is error to enter a default on a complaint that fails to state a cause of action against the defaulting defendant. Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 539. The court voided the default judgment apparently under this rule.

The well-pleaded Complaint and the evidence in support of the judgment indicate that Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment in the principal sum of $53,553.31, interest in the amount of $2,244.84, attorney’s fees pursuant to the agreement between the parties in the amount of $1,961.07 and costs of $539.75.

Under the well pleaded complaint rule, it is error to enter a default judgment on a complaint that fails to state a cause of action against the defaulting defendant. ( Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 539.) Plaintiff Luis Liceas complaint fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action against defendant Kathy Kuo Designs, Inc.

[T]he district courts [patent] jurisdiction is determined by reference to the well-pleaded complaint, not the well-tried case . . . . ( Applera Corp. , supra 173 Cal.App.4th at 781 (quoting Christianson , supra, 486 U.S. at 814).) And as plaintiff is the master of the complaint, neither federal defense[s] raised in the answer nor federal counterclaim[s] can be considered in determining jurisdiction under section 1338(a). ( Id. (quoting Holmes Group v.

Moreover, as of January 24, 2018, La Daga Investments, LLC is in default, and a defaulting party admits the allegations in a well-pleaded complaint. (Vasey v. California Dance Co., Inc. (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 742, 749.) Therefore, Plaintiff has borne the burden of showing the probably validity of the claim and his application for writ of attachment is granted. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §489.220, a flat amount undertaking of $10,000 is required before issuance of the writ.

Under the well pleaded complaint rule, it is error to enter a default judgment on a complaint that fails to state a cause of action against the defaulting defendant. ( Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 539.) The complaint alleges seven causes of action: (1-5) violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), (6) wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and (7) violation of Labor Code section 1102.5.

Under the well pleaded complaint rule, it is error to enter a default judgment on a complaint that fails to state a cause of action against the defaulting defendant. ( Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 539.) Where the liability of the individual defendants relies upon disregard of the corporate entity by application of the alter ego doctrine, a complaints bare conclusory allegation[s] are insufficient for a default judgment against the individuals. ( Vasey v. California Dance Co.

It is plaintiffs responsibility, however, to prove its claims by submitting a well-pleaded complaint or, on application for default, submitting facts elsewhere that compensate because they are themselves well pleaded. (See Kim , supra , 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 288.) Plaintiff should resolve this defect by resubmitting Request for Default Judgment with a declarations that provides more factual detail to the claim.

A well-pleaded complaint “set[s] forth the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, not the evidence by which plaintiff proposes to prove those facts.” (Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 211–212, 197 Cal.Rptr. 783, 673 P.2d 660, fn. omitted; see also Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 330, 169 P.3d 559 [“[T]he complaint ordinarily is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts.”].)

However, that is not how a Plaintiff can allege factual allegations in a well-pleaded complaint. It is not for the defendants or the Court to divine from attachments or exhibits what a plaintiff alleges the defendants did or failed to do to give rise to a personal injury or wrongful death claim. One of the attachments to the FAC indicates that Plaintiffs father died in 1992, over 30 years before this lawsuit was filed.

A well-pleaded complaint “set[s] forth the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, not the evidence by which plaintiff proposes to prove those facts.” (Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 211–212, 197 Cal.Rptr. 783, 673 P.2d 660, fn. omitted; see also Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 330, 169 P.3d 559 [“[T]he complaint ordinarily is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts.”].)

Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808–809 (1988), this exclusivity covers “those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal patent law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law, in that patent law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded claims.” Despite the simplicity with which the rule is stated, application has proven tricky.

“Under section 1338(a) of title 28 of the United States Code, federal district courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction over “any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents”...Section 1338 jurisdiction extends to any case “in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal patent law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law, in that patent law is a necessary

Under the well pleaded complaint rule, it is error to enter a default judgment on a complaint that fails to state a cause of action against the defaulting defendant. ( Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 539.) Plaintiffs only well-pleaded allegations are that three pairs of plaintiffs entered contracts with defendants to pay for sale and installment of windows and doors (Comp., ¶¶ 24-26), they each paid a down payment (¶ 27), and defendants failed to perform (¶ 28).

A well-pleaded complaint “set[s] forth the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, not the evidence by which plaintiff proposes to prove those facts.” (Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 211–212, 197 Cal.Rptr. 783, 673 P.2d 660, fn. omitted; see also Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 330, 169 P.3d 559 [“[T]he complaint ordinarily is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts.”].)

A well-pleaded complaint “set[s] forth the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, not the evidence by which plaintiff proposes to prove those facts.” (Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 211–212, 197 Cal.Rptr. 783, 673 P.2d 660, fn. omitted; see also Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 330, 169 P.3d 559 [“[T]he complaint ordinarily is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts.”].)

A well-pleaded complaint “set[s] forth the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, not the evidence by which plaintiff proposes to prove those facts.” (Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 211–212, 197 Cal.Rptr. 783, 673 P.2d 660, fn. omitted; see also Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 330, 169 P.3d 559 [“[T]he complaint ordinarily is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts.”].)

A well-pleaded complaint “set[s] forth the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, not the evidence by which plaintiff proposes to prove those facts.” (Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 211–212, 197 Cal.Rptr. 783, 673 P.2d 660, fn. omitted; see also Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 330, 169 P.3d 559 [“[T]he complaint ordinarily is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts.”].)

A well-pleaded complaint “set[s] forth the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, not the evidence by which plaintiff proposes to prove those facts.” (Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 211–212, 197 Cal.Rptr. 783, 673 P.2d 660, fn. omitted; see also Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 330, 169 P.3d 559 [“[T]he complaint ordinarily is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts.”].)

Successive attempts at filing a well-pleaded Complaint will, however, require separate motion. III. DISCUSSION Defendant demurs to the FAC on the grounds that plaintiff states facts insufficient to constitute neither a cause of action for breach of lease nor declaratory relief. a. Breach of lease.

Successive attempts at filing a well-pleaded complaint will, however, require separate motion. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41 subd. (e).) The FAC is plaintiffs second attempt at pleading, thus leave will be granted absent a showing that plaintiff cannot maintain the cause of action addressed by demurrer, even where plaintiff alleges additional facts. III.

A well-pleaded complaint “set[s] forth the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, not the evidence by which plaintiff proposes to prove those facts.” (Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 211–212, 197 Cal.Rptr. 783, 673 P.2d 660, fn. omitted; see also Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 330, 169 P.3d 559 [“[T]he complaint ordinarily is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts.”].)

A well-pleaded complaint “set[s] forth the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, not the evidence by which plaintiff proposes to prove those facts.” (Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 211–212, 197 Cal.Rptr. 783, 673 P.2d 660, fn. omitted; see also Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 330, 169 P.3d 559 [“[T]he complaint ordinarily is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts.”].)

A well-pleaded complaint “set[s] forth the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, not the evidence by which plaintiff proposes to prove those facts.” (Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 211–212, 197 Cal.Rptr. 783, 673 P.2d 660, fn. omitted; see also Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 330, 169 P.3d 559 [“[T]he complaint ordinarily is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts.”].)

A well-pleaded complaint “set[s] forth the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, not the evidence by which plaintiff proposes to prove those facts.” (Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 211–212, 197 Cal.Rptr. 783, 673 P.2d 660, fn. omitted; see also Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 330, 169 P.3d 559 [“[T]he complaint ordinarily is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts.”].)

Successive attempts at filing a well-pleaded Complaint will, however, require separate motion. III. REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE Cross-defendants submitted RJN, which ask that the Court take judicial notice pursuant to Evidence Code § 452 of the following: Recorded Rescission of Trustee’s Deed dated May 12, 2020, recorded on May 19, 2020. A true and correct copy is attached to RJN as Exhibit A.

Successive attempts at filing a well-pleaded Complaint will, however, require separate motion. III. DISCUSSION Defendant demurs to the SAC on the basis that plaintiffs’ causes of action for IICR and NIEPA are insuffiencley stated and are uncertain. Defendant also moves to strike plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages. a. Plaintiffs claim for IICR is insufficiently stated to constitute a cause of action therefor.

Successive attempts at filing a well-pleaded Complaint will, however, require separate motion. III. DISCUSSION Khoei demurs to: (1) plaintiff’s entire Complaint; (2) plaintiff’s cause of action for injunctive relief; and (3) plaintiff’s cause of action for extrinsic fraud. a. Plaintiff’s Complaint is vague and ambiguous, but Plaintiff states causes of action for injunctive relief and extrinsic fraud.

A well-pleaded complaint “set[s] forth the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, not the evidence by which plaintiff proposes to prove those facts.” (Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 211–212, 197 Cal.Rptr. 783, 673 P.2d 660, fn. omitted; see also Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 330, 169 P.3d 559 [“[T]he complaint ordinarily is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts.”].)

Successive attempts at filing a well-pleaded complaint will, however, require separate motion. III. DISCUSSION Lusting demurs to Defendants Nehorayan’s claim for conversion and negligence on the grounds that neither is sufficiently stated in the SACC to constitute a cause of action. a. Demurrer is overruled as to the first cause of action for conversion in the SACC.

Taylor (1987) 481 U.S. 58, 63—defensive preemption does not appear on the face of well-pleaded complaint.) Conflict preemption will defeat a state law claim if it “relates to” an ERISA plan under section 514(a)’s express preemption language. (Darcangelo v. Verizon Communications, Inc. (4th Cir. 2002) 292 F.3d 181, 187.) Courts have found that Congress used the phrase “relate to” in its broadest sense, and thus the U.S.

The federal district court in this case later clarified how such counterclaims give rise to federal removal: In typical cases, the well-pleaded complaint rule requires that jurisdiction be analyzed on the sole basis of the complaint. Here, since Plaintiff is the master of the complaint and chose to assert only state law claims, it would typically be a simple question and answer. Recent change to the law relating to patents has changed that typical approach.

Indeed, the court was and remains concerned with respect to Plaintiff’s multiple chances at filing a well-pleaded complaint. (Court’s Ruling on November 1, 2019.) However, the court must also consider the fact that Plaintiff was in a disadvantageous position when her former counsel did not timely relay all information related to this lawsuit to Ms. Liosi-Traut. (Liosi-Traut Am. Decl. ¶ 3-13.) The former counsel’s actions/omissions provide good cause to grant leave to amend.

Successive attempts at filing a well-pleaded complaint will, however, require separate motion. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41 subd. (e).) Here, this is plaintiffs second attempt at pleading, so leave will be granted absent a showing that plaintiff cannot maintain a cause of action. III. DISCUSSION Here, defendants demur to plaintiffs causes of action on grounds of sufficiency, uncertainty, and statute of limitations defenses. a.

Successive attempts at filing a well-pleaded Complaint will, however, require separate motion. III. REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE Plaintiff requests that the Court take judicial notice pursuant to California Evidence Code §§ 452, 453, et seq. and CRC 3.1306(c) of: (A) Plaintiff’s Voluntary Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Petition (the “Petition”) filed May 10, 2006, and designated as Ex. A (RJN, PDF pp. 3-5.); (B) Schedule A: Real Property of the Petition and Plaintiff’s declaration, designated as Ex.

“The general rule is that subject matter jurisdiction is determined from the face of a well- pleaded complaint. (Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, supra, 414 U.S. at p. 676, 94 S.Ct. at p. 781.) When the complaint is in an area completely preempted by federal law, the well-pleaded complaint rule is supplemented, with regard to federal-question jurisdiction, by the “complete preemption doctrine.”

Because a demurrer simply challenges the sufficiency of the well-pleaded complaint, West’s demurrer on unconscionability grounds must fail. B. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, West’s demurrer to Sunbelt’s third-party cross-complaint is OVERRULED. Sunbelt is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling. DATED: July 13, 2020 _____________________ Hon. Theresa M.

Successive attempts at filing a well-pleaded Complaint will, however, require separate motion. III.

Successive attempts at filing a well-pleaded Complaint will, however, require separate motion. III.

Successive attempts at filing a well-pleaded Complaint will, however, require separate motion. III.

Successive attempts at filing a well-pleaded Complaint will, however, require separate motion. III.