Violations of the Ralph and Bane Acts in California

Page 1 of 3 The Court finds that Plaintiffs prevailed on their Ralph Act claims and their Bane Act claims and are entitled to an award of $25,000.00 each on the Ralph Act claim and $4,000.00 each on the Bane Act claim. The Court finds Plaintiffs are also entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to Civil Code Sections 52(b)(3) and 52.1(i).

Page 1 of 3 The Court finds that Plaintiffs prevailed on their Ralph Act claims and their Bane Act claims and are entitled to an award of $25,000.00 each on the Ralph Act claim and $4,000.00 each on the Bane Act claim. The Court finds Plaintiffs are also entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to Civil Code Sections 52(b)(3) and 52.1(i).

Page 1 of 3 The Court finds that Plaintiffs prevailed on their Ralph Act claims and their Bane Act claims and are entitled to an award of $25,000.00 each on the Ralph Act claim and $4,000.00 each on the Bane Act claim. The Court finds Plaintiffs are also entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to Civil Code Sections 52(b)(3) and 52.1(i).

Page 1 of 3 The Court finds that Plaintiffs prevailed on their Ralph Act claims and their Bane Act claims and are entitled to an award of $25,000.00 each on the Ralph Act claim and $4,000.00 each on the Bane Act claim. The Court finds Plaintiffs are also entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to Civil Code Sections 52(b)(3) and 52.1(i).

Page 1 of 3 The Court finds that Plaintiffs prevailed on their Ralph Act claims and their Bane Act claims and are entitled to an award of $25,000.00 each on the Ralph Act claim and $4,000.00 each on the Bane Act claim. The Court finds Plaintiffs are also entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to Civil Code Sections 52(b)(3) and 52.1(i).

Page 1 of 3 The Court finds that Plaintiffs prevailed on their Ralph Act claims and their Bane Act claims and are entitled to an award of $25,000.00 each on the Ralph Act claim and $4,000.00 each on the Bane Act claim. The Court finds Plaintiffs are also entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to Civil Code Sections 52(b)(3) and 52.1(i).

Plaintiffs’ causes of action for violation of the Ralph Act and the Bane Act allege conduct intended to cause injury to Plaintiffs, thereby adequately establishing the malice necessary for punitive damages. (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1).)

Defendant Drake is not entitled to summary adjudication as to the Ralph Act claim. On the same analysis, defendant Regents is not entitled to summary adjudication as to the Ralph Act claim. Plaintiff’s Bane Act Claim Defendant Drake’s motion for summary adjudication as to plaintiff’s Bane Act claim contained in plaintiff’s second cause of action is DENIED. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f).) Defendant Drake has not shown that plaintiff cannot establish the elements required to prove the Bane Act claim.

Tenth Cause of Action- Bane Act and Eleventh Cause of Action- Ralph Act Crescent argues that these claims fail to allege any violations against it and are time-barred. According to Crescent, Crescent cannot be liable for a Bane Act or a Ralphs Act violation based on the alleged conduct of the security guard Corrales employed by Defendant Green Knight Security, because Corrales was not Crescents employee.

Concluding that such conduct constitutes a violation of the Bane Act would, transform every battery claim into a Bane Act claim. This result would be contrary to much of Californias Bane Act jurisprudence, which makes clear that the Bane Act was passed primarily as hate crime legislation ( Jones v. Kmart Corp (1998) 17 Cal.4th 329, 338) and was meant to narrowly supplement the Ralph Act ( Stamps v. Superior Court (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1447).

Demurrer to the fourth cause of action for violation of the Ralph Act and fifth cause of action for violation of the Bane Act is sustained without leave to amend. The pleading does not allege that the demurring defendants were parties who engaged in the alleged threatening or violent conduct. [§ 33.]

Ralph Act and Bane Act The Ralph Act is delineated in Civil Code Section 51.7.

Sustain demurrer to third cause of action for Bane Act Violation. Sustain demurrer to fourth cause of action for Ralph Act Violation, without leave to amend. 20 days leave to amend on first through third causes of action.

Such allegations are insufficient to state a claim under the Bane Act. For these reasons, CDCR’s demurrer to the first cause of action is sustained. Second Cause of Action: Violation of Ralph Act Civil Code section 51.7 (the “Ralph Act”) provides that all persons have the right to be free of “violence, or intimidation by threat of violence, committed against their persons,” committed because of their political affiliation or any characteristic defined in Civil Code section 51.

Second Cause of Action: Violation of Ralph Act Civil Code section 51.7 (the “Ralph Act”) provides that all persons have the right to be free of “violence, or intimidation by threat of violence, committed against their persons,” committed because of their political affiliation or any characteristic defined in Civil Code section 51. A person aggrieved under the Ralph Act may bring a civil action to recover damages, “a civil penalty of $25,000, exemplary damages, and an award of attorney fees.” ( D.C. v.

Demurring defendant DRMC challenges the first (Unruh), second (Ralph Act), and third (Bane Act) causes of action based on failure to state facts and uncertainty. To withstand a demurrer the complaint must contain “a statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10.)

Ralph Act & Bane Act The Ralph Act is delineated in Civil Code Section 51.7.

There is no need to consider whether DIAZ can be held liable as a supervisor for his subordinates’ Ralph Act violations where there are no violations. The Bane Act is similar.

Violation of the Ralph Act, CC 51.7 5. Violation of the Bane Act, CC 52.1 6. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress RULING : The unopposed demurrer is sustained without leave to amend. This action arises out of an incident that occurred at a Trader Joe’s store in Chatsworth, California.

Ninth Cause of Action: Violation of the Ralph Act Civil Code section 51.7 (the “Ralph Act”) provides that all persons have the right to be free of “violence, or intimidation by threat of violence, committed against their persons,” committed because of their political affiliation or any characteristic defined in Civil Code section 51. A person aggrieved under the Ralph Act may bring a civil action to recover damages, “a civil penalty of $25,000, exemplary damages, and an award of attorney fees.” ( D.C. v.

The demurrer to the fourth COA for violation of the Bane Act is OVERRULED.

Violation of the Bane Act The Bane Act prohibits interference, threats, or intimidation that violates an individual's constitutional rights. (Civ. Code 52.1) Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot establish a violation of the Bane Act because Defendants did not act with the intent to violate Plaintiffs constitutional rights. Plaintiff asserts Defendants interfered with his First Amendment right to protest. This is sufficient to create of triable issue of fact as to violation of the Bane Act.

Act.

As to the fifth cause of action for violation of the Ralph Act Plaintiff alleges the sexual battery she endured violates the Ralph Act. (Civ. Code, § 51.7.)

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action for violation of Civil Code, section 51.7 (the “Ralph Act”), and Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action for violation of Civil Code, section 52.1 (the “Bane Act”) fail because Plaintiff does not allege he was threatened or that his rights were interfered with because of his membership in a protected class.

The First Amended Complaint alleges assault; battery; breach of contract; NIED; malice; Ralph Act violation; Bane Act violation; premise liability; and vicarious liability. Defendants Chompol Properties, erroneously named as Surly Goat, Inc., and Sweeney, an officer of Chompol, demur and move to strike irrelevant matter and punitive damages.

On January 24, 2017, plaintiff filed a complaint for, according to the caption page, (1) sexual batter, (2) Ralph Act violation, (3) Bane Act violation, (4) gender violence, and (5) Unruh Act violation. The complaint’s body includes only four causes of action, none of which are for a Bane Act violation.

SUSTAIN the demurrer to the second cause of action for violation of the Ralph Act and to the third cause of action for violation of the Bane Act without leave to amend. OVERRULE the demurrer to the fourth cause of action for declaratory relief. 1st CofA: The first cause of action for negligence is pleaded on behalf of both Plaintiffs, although there is no dispute that APRL did not file a government tort claim. Nor are there any allegations that Deputy Lesso breached any duty owed to APRL. (FAC, ¶¶ 23-25.)

In language closely similar to that in the Ralph Act, the Bane Act prohibits interference or attempts to interfere by "threat, intimidation, or coercion" with the exercise of statutory or constitutional rights. (Civ. Code sec. 52.1(b); see In re Michael M. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 718, 725 ["The Bane Act and related California statutes dealing with discriminatory threats and violence are California's response to the alarming increase in hate crimes."].)

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff filed this action alleging causes of action against Trader Joe’s and Milosevich for: (1) False Imprisonment; (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (3) Violations of Unruh Civil Rights Act, CC 51; (4) Violation of the Ralph Act, CC 51.7; (5) Violation of the Bane Act, CC 52.1 and (6) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress.

Plaintiffs Second Cause of Action for Violation of the Ralph Act fails as a matter of law because CDCR did not aid, abet, and/or conspire with Officer Kardouni. 13. Defendant CDCR is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs Bane Act and Ralph Act claims because Plaintiff suffered no harm as a result of Officer Kardounis alleged conduct.

Additionally, the court notes that Jones held that violations of the Ralph Act, Civil Code section 5 1.7, would constitute a basis for a Bane Act cause of action because the Ralph Act provides a person with “the right to be free from any violence, or intimidation by threat of violence, committed against their persons or property because of their race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, political affiliation, sex, sexual orientation, age, disability, or position in a labor dispute, or because another

Bane Act Similar to the Ralph Act, allegations for the Bane Act are incorporated by reference and infer intimidation (Complaint, ¶ 64). “Complaints generally incorporate prior allegations into subsequent causes of action.” Kajima Engineering & Construction, Inc. v. City of L. A. (2002) 95 Cal. App. 4th 921, 931-32. When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally, reasonably and in context. MKB Management, Inc. v. Melikian (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 796, 802; McKenney v.

Second Cause of Action: Violation of Ralph Act Civil Code section 51.7 (the “Ralph Act”) provides that all persons have the right to be free of “violence, or intimidation by threat of violence, committed against their persons,” committed because of their political affiliation or any characteristic defined in Civil Code section 51. A person aggrieved under the Ralph Act may bring a civil action to recover damages, “a civil penalty of $25,000, exemplary damages, and an award of attorney fees.” ( D.C. v.

The first amended complaint ("FAC") asserts causes of action for (1) sexual assault; (2) sexual battery; (3) gender violence; (4) violation of the Ralph Act; (5) violation of the Bane Act; (6) sexual harassment; and (7) negligence. Plaintiff moves to summarily adjudicate the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd causes of action.

Third and Fifteenth Causes of Action – Ralph Act, Harassment Delgado argues that the complaint lacks factual allegations to show that Delgado’s conduct was motivated by Plaintiff’s protected characteristic, as required for a cause of action under the Ralph Act and Government Code section 12940, subdivision (j). (Demurrer at pp. 10-11.)

Uber case was correctly decided, the demurrer to the third (assault), fourth (Ralph Act), fifth (Bane Act), seventh (IIED), eighth (conversion), and ninth (false imprisonment) causes of action is sustained. Because this is a purely legal issue, leave to amend is denied. The Court notes that Defendants make additional arguments concerning the Ralph Act, Bane Act, and fraud causes of action.

Defendants assert that Plaintiffs Bane Act claims against them fail for the same reasons as to Plaintiffs Ralph Act, discussed below. (Motion, 25-27.) In opposition, Plaintiff asserts that triable issues of material fact exist with regard to the Bane Act cause of action for the same reasons as the Ralph Act cause of action. (Opposition, 11-14.)

The facts alleged do not constitute a violation of The Bane Act. Banging on a door, even in a loud manner, is not sufficient to constitute threats, intimidation or coercion. More importantly, the facts do not disclose actual interference with any rights. Even liberally construed, the facts rise to nothing more than an attempt to interfere with the exercise and enjoyment of rights. The demurrer is sustained without leave to amend.

Therefore, the Court finds that Sergeant Santamaria and the Backup Officers are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the Bane Act cause of action. Violation of Bane Act Against Remaining Officers Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the Bane Act by subjecting Plaintiffs to an unlawful arrest and the use of excessive force during the arrest. (Compl., ¶ 52.)

Moreover, with respect to any claims resulting from alleged violations of the Ralph Act (Civ. Code ? 51.7) or the Bane Act (Civ. Code ? 52.1), Plaintiff fails to allege that any violent acts or threatened violent acts were committed by anyone, let alone the moving party. Plaintiff alleges verbal abuse by another named defendant but this is not sufficient to state a constitutional deprivation of rights per Title 42 U.S.C. ? 1983. (Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero (9th Cir. 1987) 830 F.2d 136, 139.)

BACKGROUND On November 16, 2021, Plaintiff Walther Medina filed the operative second amended complaint against Defendants Montebello Unified School District (MUSD) and Anthony Martinez, asserting causes of action for (1) violation of Ralph Act; (2) sexual battery; (3) gender violence; (4) violation of Unruh; (5) violation of Bane Act; (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (7) negligence; and (8) violation of Education Code.

BACKGROUND: Plaintiff commenced this action on 10/24/16 against defendants for: (1) battery; (2) assault; (3) sexual battery; (4) discrimination; (5) harassment; (6) retaliation; (7) failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, or retaliation; (8) violation of the Ralph Act; (9) violation of the Tom Bane Act; (10) gender violence; (11) declaratory relief; (12) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (13) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (14) failure to pay wages; (15) failure to pay

violation of the Ralph Act (against the County and Henry) 11. violation of the Bane Act (against the County and Henry) Individual Defendants now demur to the 4th, 9th, 10th and 11th causes of action for failure to state sufficient facts.

Conclusion For the reasons set forth above, the court sustains the City Defendants’ demurrer to the fourth cause of action for violation of the Bane Act, the fifth cause of action for violation of the Ralph Act, and the sixth cause of action for violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, without leave to amend.

Ninth Cause of Action for Violation of the Bane Act The Bane Act, enacted in 1987, prohibits all interference or attempted interference with another’s rights under federal and California law by "threats, intimidation, or coercion." (Civ. Code, § 52.1, subd. (a).)

Plaintiffs Second Cause of Action for Violation of the Ralph Act fails as a matter of law because CDCR did not aid, abet, and/or conspire with Officer Kardouni. 13. Defendant CDCR is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs Bane Act and Ralph Act claims because Plaintiff suffered no harm as a result of Officer Kardounis alleged conduct.

Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action: Violations of the Bane Act and Ralph Act "The essence of a Bane Act claim is that the defendant, by the specified improper means (i.e., threats, intimidation or coercion), tried to or did prevent the plaintiff from doing something he or she had the right to do under the law or to force the plaintiff to do something that he or she was not required to do under the law. (Austin B. v. Escondido Union School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal. App. 4th 860, 883.)

Party: None The instant motion is DENIED BACKGROUND: Plaintiffs commenced this action on 1/15/16 against defendants, asserting 31 causes of action for FEHA violations; violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Ralph Act, and Bane Act; assault; battery; breach of contract; breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; unjust enrichment; conversion; fraud; failure to indemnify; Labor Code violations; unfair business practices; whistleblower retaliation; intentional infliction of emotional

The second cause of action alleges violation of the Ralph Act.

Plaintiffs Sixth Cause of Action still amalgamates several civil rights claims into one, but Plaintiff has removed his claim for a violation of the Ralph Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 51.7.). As such, Defendants argument that school districts cannot be liable under the Ralph Act is moot. Plaintiffs claims of violations of the Bane Act (Cal. Civ. Code §52.1), Cal. Civ. Code §43, and the right to free education (Art. IX, Section 5 of the Cal. Constitution) remain.

Violation of the Ralph Act, CC 51.7 5. Violation of the Bane Act, CC 52.1 6. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress RELIEF REQUESTED IN MOTION TO STRIKE : An order striking allegations regarding punitive damages contained in the 1 st (¶25), 2 nd (¶31), 4 th (¶42) and 5 th (¶48) causes of action and the prayer (No.3) for punitive damages.

The demurrer to the fourth cause of action for violation of the Bane Act and the fifth cause of action for violation of the Ralph Act is overruled to the extent it is based on the ground that the second amended complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute these causes of action. The second amended complaint alleges facts that indicate defendant FORSYTHE may have directed violence toward plaintiffs, and thus may have violated these civil rights statutes.

The FAC alleges five causes of action: (1) violation of Bane Act (Civil Code § 52.1), (2) violation of Ralph Act (Civil Code § 51.7), (3) battery against Doe 1, (4) negligent hiring and retention, (5) negligent supervision. On June 14, 2021, Plaintiff filed the Second Amended Complaint (SAC).

Plaintiff’s operative TAC included causes of action for: Common Carrier Negligence (Uber); Sexual Battery (Humberto); Assault (Humberto); Violation of Ralph Act (Humberto); Violation of Bane Act (Uber, Humberto); Violation of Civil Code §52.4 (Humberto); IIED (Humberto); Conversion (Humberto); False Imprisonment (Humberto); Negligence (Humberto); Intentional Misrepresentation (Uber); Negligent Misrepresentation (Uber).

The operative SAC includes causes of action for: Common Carrier Negligence (Uber); Sexual Battery (Humberto); Assault (Humberto); Violation of Ralph Act (Humberto); Violation of Bane Act (Uber, Humberto); Violation of Civil Code §52.4 (Humberto); IIED (Humberto); Conversion (Humberto); False Imprisonment (Humberto); Negligence (Humberto); Intentional Misrepresentation (Uber); Negligent Misrepresentation (Uber).

· Regarding the Bane Act, Calderon failed to allege that the County has engaged in any intimidation, threat or interference with a Constitutional right. He addresses the illegal conduct of gangs at his workplace but failed to allege any interference with his work. · Calderons Ralph Act claim suffers from the same deficiencies of his claim under the Bane Act. · Plaintiff cannot obtain punitive damages from co-Defendant County of Los Angeles.

Accordingly, collateral estoppel applies to Plaintiffs Ralph Act claim.

As pled, these allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action under the Ralph Act or the Bane Act. IV. Second Cause of Action—Violation of Gov.

The gravamen of this complaint for: (1) false arrest, (2) false imprisonment, (3) negligence, (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“iied”), (5) violation of the Bane Act CC § 52.1, (6) violation of the Ralph Act CC § 51.7 and (7) negligent hiring and training is that Plaintiff (“P”) was lawfully arrested for brandishing a firearm but the arrest became unlawful at some point during the one and one-half hours that P was left in the patrol car with temperature in the car reaching approximately 140

Plaintiff does not address any Ralph Act violation in her opposition MPA. Accordingly, for purposes of summary adjudication, there is no evidence to establish a Ralph Act violation. County is granted summary adjudication of this claim, contained within the second cause of action. 2. Bane Act i.

The operative First Amended Complaint alleges causes of action for (1) Ralph Act, (2) sexual battery, (3) gender violence, (4) Unruh Civil Rights Act, (5) Bane Act, (6) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, (7) Negligence, and (8) Education Code. On June 4, 2021, Defendant Montebello Unified School District filed a Motion to Continue Trial. Plaintiff did not oppose the Motion.

As to the seventh cause of action for violation of the Ralph Act Plaintiff alleges that defendant violated his rights under the Ralph Act. (FAC, ¶¶ 1, 21-22, 98, 100-101.)

SUSTAIN the demurrer to the second cause of action for violation of the Ralph Act and the third cause of action for violation of the Bane Act without leave to amend. OVERRULE the demurrer as to the fourth cause of action for declaratory relief. 1st CA: APRL did not file a government tort claim and there are no allegations that Deputy Lesso breached any duty owed to APRL. (See FAC, ¶¶ 23-25.)

The First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleges seven causes of action: 1) false arrest, 2) false imprisonment, 3) negligence, 4) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), 5) violation of Bane Act, 6) violation of Ralph Act, and 7) negligent hiring and training. Defendant County of Riverside demurs to the 1st, 2nd, 6th and 7th causes of action in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint on the grounds that they fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

Kmart Corp (1998) 17 Cal.4th 329, 338) and was meant to narrowly supplement the Ralph Act to deter violence. ( Stamps v. Superior Court (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1447.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to sustain a cause of action for the Bane Act and the Ralph Act.

The gravamen of this complaint for (3) negligence, (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“iied”), (5) violation of the Bane Act CC § 52.1, (6) violation of the Ralph Act CC § 51.7, (7) negligent hiring and training, (8, 9) violations of 42 USC § 1983 and 910) is that Plaintiff (“P”) was lawfully arrested for brandishing a firearm but the arrest became unlawful at some point during the one and one-half hours that P was left in the patrol car with temperature in the car reaching approximately 140 degrees

FIFTH, SIXTH, AND SEVENTH CAUSES OF ACTION - VIOLATION OF RALPH ACT, GENDER VIOLENCE AND THE BANE ACT The motion for summary adjudication of the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh causes of action for retaliation is GRANTED. Defendants assert that they are immune from liability for the foregoing violations under the Government Tort Claims Act. The Government Claims Act applies to the Bane Act. (Civil Code 52.1.) (Towery v. State of California (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 226, 231-236.)

Defendant also demurrers to Plaintiffs allegations that he violated the Ralph Civil Rights Act (Ralph Act). Defendant argues that Plaintiffs allegations are too conclusory.

County of Los Angeles (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 947, 959 [Bane Act was intended to address only egregious interferences with constitutional rights, where the act of interference with a constitutional right must itself be deliberate or spiteful, beyond just any tort, such as negligence].) The Court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently pled the facts pertaining to the Bane Act.

Page 4 of 13 On 6/13/23, Plaintiff filed this case against the City and its employees alleging twelve separate claims against them related to that event: (1) Bane Act Civil Rights – interference by threat, intimidation; (2) Bane Act Civil Rights – threats, violence based on disability; (3) Bane Act - Civil Conspiracy; (4) Ralph Civil Rights Act; (5) Unruh Civil Rights Act; (6) Unruh Act – Discrimination based on disability; (7) Bane Act – reckless disregard; (8) Bane Act - Intentional Infliction of

Page 4 of 13 On 6/13/23, Plaintiff filed this case against the City and its employees alleging twelve separate claims against them related to that event: (1) Bane Act Civil Rights – interference by threat, intimidation; (2) Bane Act Civil Rights – threats, violence based on disability; (3) Bane Act - Civil Conspiracy; (4) Ralph Civil Rights Act; (5) Unruh Civil Rights Act; (6) Unruh Act – Discrimination based on disability; (7) Bane Act – reckless disregard; (8) Bane Act - Intentional Infliction of

Page 4 of 13 On 6/13/23, Plaintiff filed this case against the City and its employees alleging twelve separate claims against them related to that event: (1) Bane Act Civil Rights – interference by threat, intimidation; (2) Bane Act Civil Rights – threats, violence based on disability; (3) Bane Act - Civil Conspiracy; (4) Ralph Civil Rights Act; (5) Unruh Civil Rights Act; (6) Unruh Act – Discrimination based on disability; (7) Bane Act – reckless disregard; (8) Bane Act - Intentional Infliction of

Page 4 of 13 On 6/13/23, Plaintiff filed this case against the City and its employees alleging twelve separate claims against them related to that event: (1) Bane Act Civil Rights – interference by threat, intimidation; (2) Bane Act Civil Rights – threats, violence based on disability; (3) Bane Act - Civil Conspiracy; (4) Ralph Civil Rights Act; (5) Unruh Civil Rights Act; (6) Unruh Act – Discrimination based on disability; (7) Bane Act – reckless disregard; (8) Bane Act - Intentional Infliction of

Page 4 of 13 On 6/13/23, Plaintiff filed this case against the City and its employees alleging twelve separate claims against them related to that event: (1) Bane Act Civil Rights – interference by threat, intimidation; (2) Bane Act Civil Rights – threats, violence based on disability; (3) Bane Act - Civil Conspiracy; (4) Ralph Civil Rights Act; (5) Unruh Civil Rights Act; (6) Unruh Act – Discrimination based on disability; (7) Bane Act – reckless disregard; (8) Bane Act - Intentional Infliction of

Page 4 of 13 On 6/13/23, Plaintiff filed this case against the City and its employees alleging twelve separate claims against them related to that event: (1) Bane Act Civil Rights – interference by threat, intimidation; (2) Bane Act Civil Rights – threats, violence based on disability; (3) Bane Act - Civil Conspiracy; (4) Ralph Civil Rights Act; (5) Unruh Civil Rights Act; (6) Unruh Act – Discrimination based on disability; (7) Bane Act – reckless disregard; (8) Bane Act - Intentional Infliction of

Page 4 of 13 On 6/13/23, Plaintiff filed this case against the City and its employees alleging twelve separate claims against them related to that event: (1) Bane Act Civil Rights – interference by threat, intimidation; (2) Bane Act Civil Rights – threats, violence based on disability; (3) Bane Act - Civil Conspiracy; (4) Ralph Civil Rights Act; (5) Unruh Civil Rights Act; (6) Unruh Act – Discrimination based on disability; (7) Bane Act – reckless disregard; (8) Bane Act - Intentional Infliction of

Page 4 of 13 On 6/13/23, Plaintiff filed this case against the City and its employees alleging twelve separate claims against them related to that event: (1) Bane Act Civil Rights – interference by threat, intimidation; (2) Bane Act Civil Rights – threats, violence based on disability; (3) Bane Act - Civil Conspiracy; (4) Ralph Civil Rights Act; (5) Unruh Civil Rights Act; (6) Unruh Act – Discrimination based on disability; (7) Bane Act – reckless disregard; (8) Bane Act - Intentional Infliction of

Page 4 of 13 On 6/13/23, Plaintiff filed this case against the City and its employees alleging twelve separate claims against them related to that event: (1) Bane Act Civil Rights – interference by threat, intimidation; (2) Bane Act Civil Rights – threats, violence based on disability; (3) Bane Act - Civil Conspiracy; (4) Ralph Civil Rights Act; (5) Unruh Civil Rights Act; (6) Unruh Act – Discrimination based on disability; (7) Bane Act – reckless disregard; (8) Bane Act - Intentional Infliction of

Page 4 of 13 On 6/13/23, Plaintiff filed this case against the City and its employees alleging twelve separate claims against them related to that event: (1) Bane Act Civil Rights – interference by threat, intimidation; (2) Bane Act Civil Rights – threats, violence based on disability; (3) Bane Act - Civil Conspiracy; (4) Ralph Civil Rights Act; (5) Unruh Civil Rights Act; (6) Unruh Act – Discrimination based on disability; (7) Bane Act – reckless disregard; (8) Bane Act - Intentional Infliction of

Page 4 of 13 On 6/13/23, Plaintiff filed this case against the City and its employees alleging twelve separate claims against them related to that event: (1) Bane Act Civil Rights – interference by threat, intimidation; (2) Bane Act Civil Rights – threats, violence based on disability; (3) Bane Act - Civil Conspiracy; (4) Ralph Civil Rights Act; (5) Unruh Civil Rights Act; (6) Unruh Act – Discrimination based on disability; (7) Bane Act – reckless disregard; (8) Bane Act - Intentional Infliction of

Page 4 of 13 On 6/13/23, Plaintiff filed this case against the City and its employees alleging twelve separate claims against them related to that event: (1) Bane Act Civil Rights – interference by threat, intimidation; (2) Bane Act Civil Rights – threats, violence based on disability; (3) Bane Act - Civil Conspiracy; (4) Ralph Civil Rights Act; (5) Unruh Civil Rights Act; (6) Unruh Act – Discrimination based on disability; (7) Bane Act – reckless disregard; (8) Bane Act - Intentional Infliction of

Page 4 of 13 On 6/13/23, Plaintiff filed this case against the City and its employees alleging twelve separate claims against them related to that event: (1) Bane Act Civil Rights – interference by threat, intimidation; (2) Bane Act Civil Rights – threats, violence based on disability; (3) Bane Act - Civil Conspiracy; (4) Ralph Civil Rights Act; (5) Unruh Civil Rights Act; (6) Unruh Act – Discrimination based on disability; (7) Bane Act – reckless disregard; (8) Bane Act - Intentional Infliction of

Page 4 of 13 On 6/13/23, Plaintiff filed this case against the City and its employees alleging twelve separate claims against them related to that event: (1) Bane Act Civil Rights – interference by threat, intimidation; (2) Bane Act Civil Rights – threats, violence based on disability; (3) Bane Act - Civil Conspiracy; (4) Ralph Civil Rights Act; (5) Unruh Civil Rights Act; (6) Unruh Act – Discrimination based on disability; (7) Bane Act – reckless disregard; (8) Bane Act - Intentional Infliction of

In Isaias Cervantess first (assault), second (battery), third (negligence), fifth (Bane Act), and seventh (Ralph Act) causes of action, Plaintiffs allege Vega and Miramontes used violence and unreasonable force. (See, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 59-60, 71, 83, 103, 119.)

Discussion: COMPLAINT: Asserts causes of action for (1) battery, (2) sexual battery, (3) assault, (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (5) acts of violence in violation of Ralph Act (CC § 51.7), (6) threats of violence in violation of the Ralph Act (CC § 51.7), (7) violation of the Bane Act (CC § 52.1), (8) gender violence (CC § 52.4), (9) domestic violence (CC § 1708.6). It generally alleges that plaintiff grew up in Cambodia in poverty and without an education.

Violation of Ralph Act Civil Code § 51.7 (all defendants); 5. Violation of Bane Act Civil Code § 51.7 (all defendants); 6. Civil Damages Arising out of Gender Violence (Doe 1 – Humberto); 7. IIED (all defendants); 8. Conversion (all defendants); 9. False Imprisonment (all defendants); 10. Negligence (Doe 1 – Humberto); 11. Intentional Misrepresentation (Uber). On 7/21/20, the Court heard Uber’s demurrer to the complaint.

On January 24, 2017, plaintiff filed a complaint and on August 14, 2017, the operative first amended complaint for (1) sexual battery, (2) Ralph Act violation, (3) Bane Act violation, and (4) gender violence. On October 12, 2017, Popkin filed this opposed motion for a protective order regarding an upcoming site inspection. Neither side requests sanctions.

The complaint has 17 causes of action, (1) General Negligence, (2) Intentional Tort, (3) Intentional Tort, (4) Premises Liability, (5) Fraud - Concealment, (6) Domestic Violence, (7) Bane Act, (8) Ralph Act, (9) Conspiracy, (10) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, (11) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, (12) Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations, (13) Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Relations, (14) Tortious Invasion of Privacy, (15) Unfair Competition, (16) Damages

City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 67 [touchstone of a Bane Act claim is the use of the threats, intimidation, and coercion in order to interfere with a plaintiff’s state or federal constitutional or legal right”].) Additionally, the Bane Act was passed primarily as hate crime legislation ( Jones v. Kmart Corp (1998) 17 Cal.4th 329, 338) and was meant to narrowly supplement the Ralph Act ( Stamps v.

In their renewed motion, Plaintiffs argue there is a substantial probability of prevailing on their claims for malice, oppression, assault and battery, and their claims for Bane Act violation (fifth cause of action) and Ralph Act violation (sixth cause of action). Plaintiff resubmits Plaintiff Kathleen’s declaration that was filed with the initial motion.

Defendants assert the Bane Act claims (Counts 9, 11, and 12) fail. The elements of a Bane Act claim are stated in CACI No. 3066: 1.

Eighth Cause of Action for Violation of the Bane Act “The essence of a Bane Act claim is that the defendant, by the specified improper means (i.e., ‘threats, intimidation or coercion’), tried to or did prevent the plaintiff from doing something he or she had the right to do under the law or to force the plaintiff to do something that he or she was not required to do under the law. (Jones [v. Kmart Corp. (1998)] 17 Cal.4th [329,] 334 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 844, 949 P.2d 941] [Jones ].)” (Austin B. v.

The fourth cause of action states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for the Ralph Act. Under the Ralph Act, a plaintiff must establish the defendant threatened or committed violent acts against the plaintiff or their property, and a motivating reason for doing so was a prohibited discriminatory motive, or that the defendant aided, incited, or conspired in the denial of a protected right. (Gabrielle A. v.

On 9/8/2023, Plaintiff Frances Reynolds (Plaintiff) filed suit against Ross Dress for Less, Inc., Ross Stores, Inc., and Luis Ruiz (collectively, Defendants), alleging: (1) defamation per se; (2) defamation per quod; (3) violation of the Unruh Act; (4) violation of the Ralph Act; (5) violation of the Bane Act; (6) assault; (7) negligence; and (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress. Now, Defendants move to strike portions of Plaintiffs Complaint.

Fifth Cause of Action – Gender Violence Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action alleges violations of the Ralph Act (Civil Code §51.7) and the Bane Act (Civil Code §52.1).

Bane Act (Civil Code § 52.1); 6. Ralph Act (Civil Code § 51.7). Meet and Confer Defendants set forth a meet and confer declaration in sufficient compliance with CCP § 430.41. (Decl., Gabriel N. Kontarovsky, ¶¶ 7-13.) Demurrer A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law and raises only questions of law. ( Schmidt v. Foundation Health (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1702, 1706.)