What are taxable possessory interests?

Useful Rulings on Taxable Possessory Interests

Recent Rulings on Taxable Possessory Interests

BAHRAM JARIDIAN VS SUBARU OF AMERICA, INC., ET AL.

Malouf (1949) 95 Cal.App.2d 82, 107.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s fraud claim is barred by the statute of limitations. (Demurrer MPA, p. 8:16-17.) Defendant asserts that because “Plaintiff alleges the alleged Transmission Defect was concealed at the time plaintiff purchased the vehicle[, . . . ] any cause of action based on fraud expired after three years from the alleged lease date of July 18, 2015.” (Id. at p. 8:18-20.)

  • Hearing

SHEETZ V. COUNTY OF EL DORADO

Sperry Corp. (1989) 493 U.S. 52, 62, 110 S.Ct. 387, 107 L.Ed.2d 290, fn. 9 [“It is artificial to view deductions of a percentage of a monetary award as physical appropriations of property. Unlike real or personal property, money is fungible”].) In Ehrlich, we extended Nollan and Dolan slightly, recognizing an exception to the general rule of deference on distribution of monetary burdens, because the ad hoc, discretionary fee imposed in that case bore special potential for government abuse.

  • Hearing

DARIUSH G ADLI, ET AL. VS KEVIN D. FRAZER, ET AL.

Municipal Resource Consultants (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 267, 278.) “Once a petition to confirm an award is filed, the superior court must select one of only four courses of action: it may confirm the award, correct and confirm it, vacate it, or dismiss the petition.” (EHM Productions, Inc. v. Starline Tours of Hollywood, Inc. (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1063.) “It is well settled that the scope of judicial review of arbitration awards is extremely narrow.” (California Faculty Assn. v.

  • Hearing

KIAN MORADZADEH VS CITY OF LOS ANGELES, A CALIFORNIA PUBLIC ENTITY, ET AL.

City of Pasadena (1945) 27 Cal.2d 104, 107–108, 162 P.2d 625; Capogeannis[ v. Superior Court (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 668,] 676, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 796.)” (Id. at 1180.) The facts alleged in the government claim and the complaint indicate that there is a continuing nuisance. Here, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts for nuisance. However, Plaintiff failed to attach the government claim forming the basis of this cause of action. Therefore, the demurrer is sustained with leave to amend.

  • Hearing

MARIA DE LOS ANGELES RAMIREZ VS PROLAND MANAGEMENT COMPANY L

., Exhibit A (Vasquez Depo), 107:1-108:24.) Defendants contend that during the September 27, 2016 meeting, Gregg informed Contreras that he was being let go because of the Text Messages. (DSS ¶ 16; Taylor Decl., Exhibit A (Vasquez Depo), 108:17-25.) Plaintiff disputes that Contreras was let go and contends that Contreras in fact continued to work for Defendants because he showed up at Plaintiff’s residence in “approximately August of 2017 or 2018” wearing an employee jacket from Defendants.

  • Hearing

  • Type

    Employment

  • Sub Type

    Wrongful Term

(NO CASE NAME AVAILABLE)

Columbus Line, Inc. (2003) 107 Cal. App. 4th 1190, 1199-1200.) After the plaintiff meets this burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that a triable issue of material fact exists. (Code Civ Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) The notice of motion must state the grounds on which the motion is made and the documents or evidence relied upon. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.) “If summary adjudication is sought . . .

  • Hearing

CATHERINE BRUNI VS CITY OF ALHAMBRA

Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles Board of Commissioners (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 860, 868 (Morrison).) “In exercising its independent judgment, a trial court must afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the administrative findings, and the party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence.” (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 817.)

  • Hearing

  • Type

    Administrative

  • Sub Type

    Writ

JANE JB DOE VS LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, A CALIFORNIA LOCAL PUBLIC ENTITY, ET AL.

(Complaint ¶¶ 107-116.) In addition, the TAC alleges “LAUSD, VAZQUEZ and BENNETT had actual information during the period of 2015-2017, that actual abuses of individuals, including students, by GILLARD were occurring.” (Complaint ¶ 394.)

  • Hearing

  • Type

    Personal Injury/ Tort

  • Sub Type

    other

TURMEL WOODS VS CITY OF COMPTON, A MUNICIPALITY

Regents of University of California (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 899, 909.) The first cause of action in the FAC is based on a violation of Lab. Code § 1102.5; however, under Ortiz, despite being based on a Lab. Code § 1102.5, such cause of action is a common law tort and cannot be brought against Defendant. Therefore, the first cause of action is insufficient. Issue No.3: Punitive Damages The Court finds that Defendant’s argument as to punitive damages is unfounded.

  • Hearing

  • Type

    Employment

  • Sub Type

    Wrongful Term

LAGUNA GREENBELT INC VS. COUNTY OF ORANGE

The following portions of the declaratory relief claims survive this mofion: (1) Irvine's request for a judicial declarafion that sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4 of the PAA are unlawful, void, and unenforceable, that the invalidation of those sections does not void the rest of the PAA, and that if it does, the property tax transfer and exchange provisions of the Master Property Tax Exchange Agreement 80-2035, dated October 28, 1980, shall be established pursuant to

  • Hearing

KRAFVE VS. KARFVE

(Complaint, ¶¶ 76, 77, 81, 82, 86, 87 [sixth cause of action] ¶¶ 102, 103, 107, 108, 112, 113). The Complaint alleges that defendant knew they were false statements when she made them and plaintiff denies he ever sexually or physically abused B.K. (Complaint, ¶¶ 79, 84, 89, 105, 110, 115.)

  • Hearing

INTELLISOFT, LTD. V. ACER AMERICA CORPORATION, ET AL.

Hagan (1951) 107 Cal.App.2d 313, 320.) Permission to file a compulsory cross-complaint is governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 426.50 and “must be granted unless bad faith of the moving party is demonstrated where forfeiture would otherwise result. Factors such as oversight, inadvertence, neglect, mistake or other cause, are insufficient grounds to deny the motion unless accompanied by bad faith.” (Silver Organizations Ltd. v. Frank (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 94, 98–99.)

  • Hearing

SBH CAMDEN PROPERTIES, L.P. V. MIRASSOU, ET AL.

Gatke Corp. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 606, 611 (stating same); see also Everest Investors 8 v. Whitehall Real Estate Limited Partnership XI (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1107 (stating same); see also 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Steinberg (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 568, 592 (stating that “one cannot be liable for conspiracy if one is legally incapable of committing the underlying tort”).) As previously stated, SBH fails to allege that Taco Bell was personally bound by any duty violated by the purported wrongdoing.

  • Hearing

LEE VS TWO BUNCH PALMS HEARING RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY

(No. 107), Inc. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1227, 1232 [internal citation and punctuation omitted].) Plaintiff submits evidence that the document presented to him for signature consisted of two pages, which was described to him by Defendant’s employee to be the resort's guest rules.

  • Hearing

ALLIED PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY VS COMMERCE WEST INSURANCE COMPANY

Municipal Resource Consultants (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 267, 278.) “Once a petition to confirm an award is filed, the superior court must select one of only four courses of action: it may confirm the award, correct and confirm it, vacate it, or dismiss the petition.” (EHM Productions, Inc. v. Starline Tours of Hollywood, Inc. (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1063.) “It is well settled that the scope of judicial review of arbitration awards is extremely narrow.” (California Faculty Assn. v.

  • Hearing

CITRUS EL DORADO LLC VS STEARNS BANK

County of Los Angeles (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 107, 121. Even if all the elements have been met, the Court has the discretion not to apply the doctrine. Id. While Defendants provide evidence that Plaintiff asserted that Rescon was assigned the deed of trust at issue in its federal lawsuit (Defendants’ evidence, Exhibits 58, 60, and 61), they fail to establish all of the required elements of judicial estoppel.

  • Hearing

GEOFFREY BENNETT, AS ATTORNEY IN FACT FOR CLEAVES M. BENNETT, AND AS SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE OF THE CLEAVES M. BENNETT LIVING TRUST VS ELIZABETH CHAI-CHANG, ET AL.

Hapke (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 107, 140 [noting that the investment adviser/client relationship gives rise to a fiduciary duty as a matter of law].) Moreover, a mortgage broker owes a fiduciary duty to explain the possibility that the terms of loans might increase the risk of foreclosure, and that the true rate of interest, penalties and size of balloon payment are unfavorable terms. (Fuller v. First Franklin Financial Corp. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 955, 964-65.)

  • Hearing

  • Type

    Personal Injury/ Tort

  • Sub Type

    Fraud

HARRIETT E. HAYWOOD VS RTED AMERICA, LLC, ET AL

Franchise Mortgage Acceptance Corp. (2003) 107 Cal. App. 4th 921, 1026 (citations omitted). The motion is DENIED. Defendants are ordered to give notice.

  • Hearing

  • Type

    Real Property

  • Sub Type

    Foreclosure

HARRIETT E. HAYWOOD VS RTED AMERICA, LLC, ET AL

Franchise Mortgage Acceptance Corp. (2003) 107 Cal. App. 4th 921, 1026 (citations omitted). The motion is DENIED. Defendants are ordered to give notice.

  • Hearing

  • Type

    Real Property

  • Sub Type

    Foreclosure

XERA HEALTH LLC VS SCHEELE

Superior Court, 107 Cal. App. 4th 25, 30 (2003). G. The essential elements of a fraud cause of action (FAC count 5) are: (1) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity; (3) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage. Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638. H.

  • Hearing

  • Type

    Contract

  • Sub Type

    Breach

OWEN TRADE COMPANY, LTD. VS DURA BELL CERAMICS, INC., ET AL.

Greenwald, 107 Cal. App. 4th 1119, 1124 (2003). Defendants bring this motion under the discretionary provision of section 473(b). The discretionary portion of section 473(b) provides: “The court may, upon terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.

  • Hearing

MARKS VS CITY OF SAN DIEGO [E-FILE]

Ramona Water District, 12 Cal.App.5th 107 (2017). In that case, the court granted class certification but found that plaintiff had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The Supreme Court granted review, and it affirmed the Court of Appeal in reversing the undersigned on the exhaustion of remedies issue. 7 Cal. 5th 372 (2019). The case is assigned to another judge on remand, following Plantier's 170.6. Here, the City answered May 23, 2018. ROA 17.

  • Hearing

  • Type

    Other

  • Sub Type

    Intellectual Property

MARTHA ALVAREZ ROMAN VS IGNACIO A BERRIO JIMENEZ ET AL

Co. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 89, 107-108.) The court therefore denies Plaintiff’s request to enter court judgment by default against defendant Igya Dimirci. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 579, the court does not find good cause to render a separate judgment against defendant Ignacio A. Berrion Jimenez at this time. The court therefore exercises its discretion to deny Plaintiff’s request to enter court judgment by default against defendant Ignacio A.

  • Hearing

  • Type

    Personal Injury/ Tort

  • Sub Type

    Fraud

GARDEN GATE, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION VS CATHERINE WELLS

Steinberg (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 568, 593. “A court exercising its discretion to grant or deny a motion under section 425.16, subdivision (g) should remain mindful that the anti-SLAPP statute was adopted to end meritless suits targeting protected speech, not to abort potentially meritorious claims due to a lack of discovery.” Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 891–892.

  • Hearing

  • Type

    Business

  • Sub Type

    Intellectual Property

  • Judge

    H. Jay Ford

  • County

    Los Angeles County, CA

JANE JG DOE VS LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, A CALIFORNIA LOCAL PUBLIC ENTITY, ET AL.

MOTION TO STRIKE Moving Defendants move to strike all of the following from the Complaint: Prayer at page 117, lines 18.5-19.5 Paragraph 260, page 53, line 22.5 Paragraph 382, page 80, line 28 through page 81, line 7 Paragraph 392, page 82, lines 5.5 through 12.5 Paragraph 486, page 102, lines 17.5-23.5 Paragraph 493, page 104 lines 14-20 Paragraph 501, page 107, lines 9-15 Paragraph 512, page 110, line 23 to page 111, line 1 Paragraph 519, page 112, lines 21.5-27.5 Prayer, Item 7, page 117, lines

  • Hearing

  • Type

    Personal Injury/ Tort

  • Sub Type

    other

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