Slander of title requires “disparagement of another's land which is relied upon by a third party and which results in a pecuniary loss.” (Smith v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 625, 630.) “California has adopted the definition of slander of title set forth in section 624 of the Restatement of Torts reading as follows: ‘One who, without a privilege to do so, publishes matter which is untrue and disparaging to another's property in land, chattels or intangible things under such circumstances as would lead a reasonable man to foresee that the conduct of a third person as purchaser or lessee thereof might be determined thereby is liable for pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the impairment of vendibility thus caused.’” (Howard v. Schaniel (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 256, 262-263; Gudger v. Manton (1943) 21 Cal.2d 537, 545.)

“The gravamen of an action for ‘disparagement of title,’ also known as ‘slander of title,’ differs from that of an action for personal defamation. Disparagement of title occurs when a person, without a privilege to do so, publishes a false statement that disparages title to property and causes pecuniary loss. ‘The elements of the tort are (1) publication, (2) absence of justification, (3) falsity and (4) direct pecuniary loss.’ What makes conduct actionable is not whether a defendant succeeds in casting a legal cloud on plaintiff’s title, but whether the defendant could reasonably foresee that the false publication might determine the conduct of a third person buyer or lessee. The thrust of the tort of disparagement or slander of title is protection from injury to the salability of property.” (Truck Insurance Exchange v. Bennett (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 75, 84-85.)

Disparagement may be either direct (Baker v Kale (1947) 83 Cal.App.2d 89) or indirect (Cavin Mem. Corp. v Requa (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 345). “If the publication is reasonably understood to cast doubt upon the existence or extent of another’s interest in land, it is disparaging to the latter’s title. The main thrust of the cause of action is protection from injury to the salability of property, which is ordinarily indicated by the loss of a particular sale, impaired marketability or depreciation in value.” (Sumner Hill Homeowners’ Assn., Inc. v. Rio Mesa Holdings, LLC (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 999, 1030.)

Publication requires the communication of the disparaging material to a third person, and may occur orally, in writing, or by conduct. (Southcott v Pioneer Title Co. (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d 673.) “The manner in which the injurious falsehood is communicated is immaterial. It is generally communicated by words written or spoken that assert the statement. Disparaging matter is often published by filing a mortgage or other lien for record. As in the case of libel or slander, there may be a sufficient publication by any form of conduct that is intended to assert or is reasonably understood as an assertion of a disparaging statement. Thus a landowner who encloses a part of his neighbor's adjoining premises in such a way as to indicate that it is a part of his own has as effectively disparaged his neighbor’s property in the land so enclosed as though he had expressly stated that he himself had title to it.” (Rest.2d Torts, § 630, com. b.)

“[D]isparagement and ensuing damage may be established by other than showing a loss of a particular potential sale.” (Glass v. Gulf Oil Corp. (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 412, 424.) Section 633 of the Restatement of Torts reads: “The pecuniary loss for which a publisher of injurious falsehood is subjected to liability is restricted to

1. the pecuniary loss that results directly and immediately from the effect of the conduct of third persons, including impairment of vendibility or value caused by disparagement, and
2. the expense of measures reasonably necessary to counteract the publication, including litigation to remove the doubt cast upon vendibility or value by disparagement.”

(Rest. 2d, Torts, § 633.)

“Although a slander of title claim does not seek transfer of an interest in the property, such a claim may be prosecuted only by someone with an interest in the property. ‘“An action for slander of title is maintainable only by one who possess[es] an estate or interest in the property.”’” (Chao Fu, Inc. v. Chen (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 48, 58.)

“A cause of action for slander of title accrues, and the statute begins to run, when plaintiff could reasonably be expected to discover the existence of the claim.” (Stalberg v. Western Title Insurance Co. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1223, 1230.) Code of Civil Procedure, section 340, subdivision (c) states the limitations period for traditional libel and slander claims is one year. However, the courts have explicitly distinguished claims for commercial disparagement or “trade libel” from traditional libel and slander claims brought by individuals and held these business torts are not subject to the one-year statute of limitations in section 340. (Guess, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 473, 478-79.)