Negligence in Products Liability Actions in California are governed by principles of Common Law and the Judicial Council of California’s Jury Instructions (“CACI”).
To establish a claim for “a manufacturing or design defect under a negligence theory...”
Plaintiff must prove:
Defendant was legally negligent in
Proving negligence requires:
A person who rents products to others for money is negligent if they:
“Here, as in Howard, Plaintiffs are pursuing theories of negligence and design defect against Defendant. As a result, evidence of industry customs or standards is admissible. While Howard assesses the admissibility of such evidence in the summary judgment context, it cites to Hernandez v. Badger Construction Equipment Co. (1994) 28 Cal. App. 4th 1791, 1830-1831 – as noted above – for the proposition that compliance with regulations, directives or trade custom does not necessarily eliminate negligence but instead simply constitutes evidence for jury consideration with other facts and circumstances.” Qer Lee Vs. Cobbs Bus Service LL, 34-2009-00035502-CU-PA-GDS (1/22/18) (https://trellis.law/ruling/34-2009-00035502-CU-PA-GDS/qer-lee-vs-cobbs-bus-service-llc/20180122679928).
Plaintiff shifts the initial burden of proof to Defendant by producing produce evidence of:
A Defendant can disclaim liability:
Defendant can disclaim liability for Plaintiff’s claimed harm by proving:
A defendant can disclaim liability for Plaintiff’s claimed harm by proving:
Defendant may disclaim liability for design about the Product’s dangers by proving:
Defendant may disclaim liability for failure to warn about the Product’s dangers by proving:
“Misuse of a product, such as to defeat strict products liability, is an affirmative defense: Product misuse, an affirmative defense, is a superseding cause of injury that absolves a tortfeasor of his or her own wrongful conduct only when the misuse was “ 'so highly extraordinary as to be unforeseeable.' ” (Perez v. VAS S.p.A. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 658, 685, 115 Cal.Rptr.3d 590; see Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 573, fn. 9, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 882 P.2d 298 [complete defense of superseding cause appropriate when “an independent event intervenes in the chain of causation, producing harm of a kind and degree so far beyond the risk the original tortfeasor should have foreseen that the law deems it unfair to hold him responsible”]; see generally CACI No. 1245 [“Affirmative Defense—Product Misuse or Modification”].) “However, foreseeability is a question for the jury unless undisputed facts leave no room for a reasonable difference of opinion.” (Torres v. Xomox Corp. (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1, 19, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 455.) Chavez v. Glock, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal. App. 4th 1283, 1308.
“The elements of a products liability claim based on failure to warn are: (1) defendant manufactured, distributed, and/or sold the product; (2) the product had potential risks, side effects, and/or allergic reactions that were known at the time of manufacture, distribution, and/or sale; (3) the potential risks, side effects, and/or allergic reactions presented a substantial danger to users of the product; (4) ordinary consumers would not have recognized the potential risks, side effects, allergic reactions; (5) defendant failed to adequately warn or instruct of the potential risks, side effects, and/or allergic reactions; (6) plaintiff used the product in a reasonably foreseeable way; ; (7) the lack of sufficient instructions or warnings was a substantial factor in causing name of plaintiff's harm. CACI 1205.
“Another affirmative defense, specific to failure to warn, is that of sophisticated user. “The sophisticated user defense exempts manufacturers from their typical obligation to provide product users with warnings about the products' potential hazards. (In re Asbestos, supra, 543 F.Supp. at p. 1151.) The defense is considered an exception to the manufacturer's general duty to warn consumers, and therefore, in most jurisdictions, if successfully argued, acts as an affirmative defense to negate the manufacturer's duty to warn. (Ibid.)” Johnson v. American Standard, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal. 4th 56, 65. A manufacturer is not liable to a sophisticated user of its product for failure to warn of a risk, harm, or danger, if the sophisticated user knew or should have known of that risk, harm, or danger. It would be nearly impossible for a manufacturer to predict or determine whether a given user or member of the sophisticated group actually has knowledge of the dangers because of the infinite number of user idiosyncrasies. For example, given users may have misread their training manuals, failed to study the information in those manuals, or simply forgotten what they were taught. However, individuals who represent that they are trained or are members of a sophisticated group of users are saying to the world that they possess the level of knowledge and skill associated with that class. If they do not actually possess that knowledge and skill, that fact should not give rise to liability on the part of the manufacturer. Id., 43 Cal. 4th at 71.
“Although California law recognizes the differences between negligence and strict liability causes of action, the sophisticated user defense is applicable to both. 43 Cal. 4th at 71. The elements of negligence are: (1) defendant’s legal duty to conform to a standard of conduct to protect the plaintiff; (2) defendant failed to meet this standard of conduct; (3) causation; (4) damages. Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal. 4th 913, 917.
“Here, JLG’s motion is premised on the contention that Plaintiff unlatched the mid-rail chain. Each of its arguments stem from here: the unlatched chain (among other actions) was unforeseeable misuse, the chain wasn’t defective it just wasn’t used, no defect in the chain caused the fall given that the chain was unlatched and out of position, the chain didn’t fail to meet the consumer expectation test since it wasn’t used, no warning failure caused the accident when Plaintiff knew he was supposed to latch the chain but did not.
“But whether the mid-chain was unlatched is not an undisputed fact. There is circumstantial evidence on both sides that would permit the trier of fact to draw conflicting inferences. [Gillette Depo. 105-08, 11-31; Evans Depo. at 99-101, 145-47, 150, 221-24, 227-28, 232, 33 and exs. 5 and 12; Gillette Depo. at 86, 103-04; Figueroa Depo. at 171.]
“The sophisticated user defense is an affirmative defense that must be separately pleaded and proved as to factual elements that are in addition to the strict liability or negligence claim itself. CACI 1244. The defendant must plead and prove that the plaintiff, because of his position training, experience, knowledge or skill, knew or should have known of the product’s risk or danger. Id...
“It is less clear whether ‘open and obvious danger’ is an affirmative defense (which a defendant must plead and prove) or part of the denial that a given defendant had a duty to warn (which the plaintiff must plead and prove). Also, while JLG does not allege an affirmative defense called ‘open and obvious,’ arguably – and JLG argues it on reply -- the allegations under ‘assumption of the risk’ are sufficient.
“Whether the danger Plaintiff succumbed to was open and obvious depends at least in part on what danger he succumbed to – that is, how did he fall? Again, however, this is not a matter of undisputed fact. Moreover, whether the set of facts surrounding the lift and the accident reflect an open and obvious danger should be a matter weighed and decided by the jury. See Chavez v. Glock, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1308 (‘’foreseeability is a question for the jury unless undisputed facts leave no room for a reasonable difference of opinion.’ (Torres v. Xomox Corp. (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1, 19, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 455.)”); Webb v. Special Electric Co., Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 167, 180 (‘Reasonable reliance depends on all attendant circumstances and is typically a question of fact for the jury.’). Camacho Vs. JLG Industries, Inc., 30-2017-00902499-CU-PO-CJC (11/14/2019) (https://trellis.law/ruling/30-2017-00902499-CU-PO-CJC/camacho-vs-jlg-industries-inc/20191114b4b00f).
Evidence that a Misuse or Modification of a Product contributed substantially to the Plaintiff’s harm can be considered in a negligence case as in Strict Liability;
“Otis argues that both these indemnity clauses are “Type III” and that under MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 413, 420 any negligence by Sierra (indemnitee) or a third party would bar indemnification by Otis (indemnitor). This all or nothing rule has not been applied strictly in later indemnity cases. (See, e.g., Hernandez v. Badger Construction Equipment Co. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1791.) As Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc. v. Pylon, Inc. (1975) 13 Cal. 3d 622, explained, the active-passive negligence dichotomy was not dispositive, and instead “whether an indemnity agreement covers a given case turns primarily on contractual interpretation, and it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the agreement that should control.” (Id. at 632-33.)” Zapotoczny vs. Schindler Elevator, MSC14-01279 (8/29/2017) (https://trellis.law/ruling/MSC14-01279/zapotoczny-vs-schindler-elevator/201709292f832e).
“Defendant argues the warning on the product was adequate and bars Plaintiff’s claims. “An adequate warning is a sufficient defense to a strict liability action,” and it “would also negate any negligence or willful misconduct.” (Temple v. Velcro USA, Inc. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 1090, 1094.) Interpretation of a warning in a written document is a question of law for the trial court to determine. (Id. at p. 1095.) While an adequate warning is not “invariably ‘a sufficient defense to a strict liability action’” (Springmeyer v. Ford Motor Co. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1541, 1557), it may be where there is evidence of “conscious, deliberate disregard of a safety notice or measure.” (Id. at p. 1560.)
“Here, the warning stated “Sunburn Alert,” that the use of the product could increase the possibility of sunburn, and that the user should use sunscreen. Plaintiff testified she read the box about being susceptible to sunburn when using the product. Defendant argues Plaintiff was exposed to sun outside and when driving with the car window down. Plaintiff testified that she was in and out of the car during the day delivering packages and drove with the window down at times. Plaintiff’s daughter testifed Plaintiff would drive with the windows down if there was a breeze. Defendant points out the blisters occurred only on Plaintiff’s left side of the neck and shoulder and back of the neck. Plaintiff testified the blisters occurred where the sun was shining in the window of her car.
“Defendant has established a prima facie case that Plaintiff disregarded the safety notice about the possibility of sunburn on the areas of her body exposed to the sun when she was driving and out of the car. Plaintiff did not oppose the motion or dispute any of Defendant’s facts… In light of the foregoing, Defendant’s unopposed motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.” Allison Nichols vs. Sephora USA Inc Et Al, BC689458 (10/17-2019) (https://trellis.law/ruling/BC689458/allison-nichols-vs-sephora-usa-inc-et-al/2019101702c7cf).
“‘[T]hird party negligence which is the immediate cause of an injury may be viewed as a superseding cause when it is so highly extraordinary as to be unforeseeable.’ (Torres v. Xomox Corp., supra, 49 Cal. App. 4th at p. 18; see also Rest.2d Torts, § 447.) ‘[F]oreseeability is question for the jury unless undisputed facts leave no room for a reasonable difference of opinion,’ and ‘[t]hus, the issue of superseding cause is generally one of fact.’ ( Torres v. Xomox Corp., supra, 49 Cal. App. 4th at p. 19; see also Ford Motor Co. v. Wagoner, supra, 192 S.W.2d at p. 845.) Springmeyer v. Ford Motor Co. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1541, 1558.” Hilario Cruz vs. Solomon Methenge, BC493949 (5/18/17) (https://trellis.law/ruling/BC493949/hilario-cruz-vs-solomon-methenge/20170518dbf3d6).
Under the judicial doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, a Plaintiff makes a prima facie case of negligence by showing:
“The court is not persuaded by Plaintiff's reliance on res ipsa loquitor as to the strict liability and warranty claims. Tresham v. Ford Motor Co. (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 403 specifically precludes application of this doctrine to either of these claims.
“Historically, strict liability in tort evolves from warranty and as in warranty it does not involve any form of negligence. (3) "The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur relates to cases involving negligence and has no application to an alleged breach of warranty. [Citations.]" (Trust v. Arden Farms Co., 50 Cal.2d 217, 223 [324 P.2d 583, 81 A.L.R.2d 332].) There is no reason in law or logic why the doctrine embedded in the instruction requested by appellants should be extended to include the type of case before this court. As stated in McCurter v. Norton Co., 263 Cal.App.2d 402, 408 [69 Cal.Rptr. 493]: "Appellant does not argue that in a strict liability case the burden of proof resting on him to show that the article was defective when it left the hands of the manufacturer, can be satisfied by invoking the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Indeed, such an attempt would be futile. (4) When a party relies on the rule of strict liability the requirement of showing a defect cannot be satisfied by reliance on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur." Tresham, 275 Cal.App.2d at 407–408. Nor is the court persuaded by Plaintiff's reliance on Gherna on this issue because the discussion of res ipsa loquitur is in the context of the negligence cause of action, not the strict liability and warranty causes of action.” Sadowski Vs. Volvo Car USA LLC, 37-2018-00031698-CU-PA-CTL (8/12/2019) (https://trellis.law/ruling/37-2018-00031698-CU-PA-CTL/sadowski-vs-volvo-car-usa-llc/20190912eac4a2).
“A cause of action for negligent products liability requires a showing that the defendant negligently caused a defect in a product, the defect existed when it left the defendant’s hands, and the defect caused the plaintiff’s injuries. (Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 379, 383.) A failure to warn can constitute a defect. (Oxford v. Foster Wheeler LLC (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 700, 717). A demurrer can be sustained where one cause of action is duplicative of another cause of action. (Palm Springs Villas II Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Parth (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 268, 290.)
“The complaint alleges Demurring Defendant Kew owned, operated, maintained, repaired, inspected, and controlled a McDonalds where Plaintiff purchased a cup of coffee… The cup malfunctioned and caused the ultra-hot contents to spill onto Plaintiff’s body causing harm… Demurring Defendant misrepresented to the public, including Plaintiff, that the cup was safe and free from defects and the product within was safe for consumption… Demurring Defendant failed to disclose that the product was harmful… Demurring Defendant failed to disclose the harmful dangers of the product and its packaging despite said dangers being known and longstanding… Demurring Defendant concealed that individuals that ingested or consumed and/or handled the products faced a substantial risk of suffering severe and permanent negative injuries, including the risk of death...
The Court finds Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a cause of action for negligent products liability. Plaintiff’s allegations show that facts have been alleged to support each element of negligent products liability.” Yvonne Kor vs. McDonald’s 16007, 19STCV19179 (11/4/2019) (https://trellis.law/ruling/19STCV19179/yvonne-kor-vs-mcdonalds-16007-et-al/20191104472f77).
Negligent Products Liability Fletchline argues a claim for negligent products liability based on a negligent design/manufacture theory or a negligent failure to warn theory can only be asserted against a designer/manufacturer/retailer. Plaintiff argues, in opposition, that Fletchline was essentially a “manufacturer,” as it was the entity that physically put the product together.
Jan 09, 2017
Los Angeles County, CA
Demurrer – Negligent Products Liability A cause of action for negligent products liability requires a showing that the defendant negligently caused a defect in a product, the defect existed when it left the defendant’s hands, and the defect caused the plaintiff’s injuries. (Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 379, 383.) A failure to warn can constitute a defect. (Oxford v. Foster Wheeler LLC (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 700, 717).
Oct 01, 2019
Los Angeles County, CA
The Court finds Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a cause of action for negligent products liability. Plaintiff’s allegations show that facts have been alleged to support each element of negligent products liability. Demurring Defendant chooses to focus its attention on the title of Plaintiff’s second cause of action in the demurrer, as opposed to the substance of the allegations in this cause of action.
Nov 04, 2019
Personal Injury/ Tort
Products Liability
Los Angeles County, CA
Moving Defendant has met its burden under CCP 437c(o)(2) of showing that Plaintiffs cannot establish the elements of a cause of action for strict products liability, negligent products liability and/or negligence. (See Material Fact Nos. 1-24, which the court finds have been established.) By way of opposition, Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of raising a triable issue of material fact. No evidence supports a defect in the manufacture of the tractor.
Feb 26, 2018
Personal Injury/ Tort
Products Liability
Ventura County, CA
PARTY’S REQUEST Plaintiff asks the Court to grant leave for Plaintiff to file a second amended complaint (“SAC”) to allege a third cause of action for strict and negligent products liability against Doe Defendants.
Jan 23, 2020
Los Angeles County, CA
., and Merit Bioacquisition Co. for medical malpractice, medical battery, medical malpractice – lack of informed consent, strict products liability – design and/or manufacturing defect, negligent products liability – failure to warn, negligence per se, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, and misrepresentation.
Jan 21, 2020
Los Angeles County, CA
., Inc. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 413, 432; see also FAC ¶¶ 42-55.) 2nd cause of action, negligent products liability. The FAC alleges facts sufficient to constitute this cause of action. The FAC alleges duty, breach, and causation. (See Gonzalez v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 780, 793; see also FAC ¶¶ 58-66.) The FAC does not clearly establish the learned intermediary affirmative defense on its face. (See Stella v. Asset Management Consultants, Inc., (2017) 8 Cal.
Jul 01, 2020
Orange County, CA
As indicated by Hyundai in Reply, “although Plaintiff only pled two counts against [Hyundai] (strict products liability and negligent products liability), each of the above claims is actually a separate cause of action for summary adjudication purposes.” (Reply p.2, fn. 1.)
May 04, 2017
Los Angeles County, CA
Simply because Defendant may not have had the authority to rent the subject vehicle does not support causes of action for strict liability, negligent products liability, or breach of warranty. Although creative, Plaintiff is attempting to fit a square peg into a round hole. The Court cannot ascertain at this time whether the omission of certain defendants from the first complaint renders this Complaint a sham. RFJN is granted.
Jan 16, 2018
Orange County, CA
Valley asserts causes of action for: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability; (3) strict products liability-manufacturing defect [count 1]; (4) strict products liability - manufacturing defect [count 2]; (5) negligent products liability [count 1]; (6) negligent products liability [count 2]; and (7) equitable indemnity. (FAC, 8-49.) This demurrer challenges only the third and fourth causes of action. Western argues that S.C.
Apr 11, 2017
Contract
Breach
San Diego County, CA
Valley asserts causes of action for: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability; (3) strict products liability-manufacturing defect [count 1]; (4) strict products liability - manufacturing defect [count 2]; (5) negligent products liability [count 1]; (6) negligent products liability [count 2]; and (7) equitable indemnity. (FAC, 8-49.) This demurrer challenges only the third and fourth causes of action. Western argues that S.C.
Apr 11, 2017
Contract
Breach
San Diego County, CA
Valley asserts causes of action for: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability; (3) strict products liability-manufacturing defect [count 1]; (4) strict products liability - manufacturing defect [count 2]; (5) negligent products liability [count 1]; (6) negligent products liability [count 2]; and (7) equitable indemnity. (FAC, 8-49.) This demurrer challenges only the third and fourth causes of action. Western argues that S.C.
Apr 11, 2017
Contract
Breach
San Diego County, CA
Valley asserts causes of action for: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability; (3) strict products liability-manufacturing defect [count 1]; (4) strict products liability - manufacturing defect [count 2]; (5) negligent products liability [count 1]; (6) negligent products liability [count 2]; and (7) equitable indemnity. (FAC, 8-49.) This demurrer challenges only the third and fourth causes of action. Western argues that S.C.
Apr 11, 2017
Contract
Breach
San Diego County, CA
While causation is an element for all causes of action, the Motion does not address the allegations in the negligence, negligent products liability and premises liability causes of action that plaintiff was seeking damages for medical costs, pain and suffering, emotional distress, lost wages and lost companionship all on behalf of plaintiff and as a survivor of Mr. Dickens.
Sep 27, 2018
Personal Injury/ Tort
other
San Diego County, CA
While causation is an element for all causes of action, the Motion does not address the allegations in the negligence, negligent products liability and premises liability causes of action that plaintiff was seeking damages for medical costs, pain and suffering, emotional distress, lost wages and lost companionship all on behalf of plaintiff and as a survivor of Mr. Dickens.
Sep 27, 2018
Personal Injury/ Tort
other
San Diego County, CA
While causation is an element for all causes of action, the Motion does not address the allegations in the negligence, negligent products liability and premises liability causes of action that plaintiff was seeking damages for medical costs, pain and suffering, emotional distress, lost wages and lost companionship all on behalf of plaintiff and as a survivor of Mr. Dickens.
Sep 27, 2018
Personal Injury/ Tort
other
San Diego County, CA
Plaintiff brought causes of action for: (1) General Negligence; (2) Strict Products Liability; (3) Negligent Products Liability; (4) Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability; (5) Fraudulent Concealment; and (6) Battery. Machado has reached a settlement with defendants HGC and BFC and applies for a determination of good faith. II. Standard California Code of Civil Procedure § 877.6(b) allows a party to request determination by the court that a settlement was made in good-faith.
Dec 20, 2018
Maurice A. Leiter or Salvatore Sirna
Los Angeles County, CA
The first amended complaint alleges personal injuries, strict product liability, negligent products liability, and negligence.
Jul 06, 2018
Los Angeles County, CA
Accordingly, demurrer is SUSTAINED with 10 days leave to amend. 3RD CAUSE OF ACTION NEGLIGENCE: Negligence is duplicative of the 3rd cause of action for Negligent Products Liability. Therefore, Plaintiff is ordered to merge her negligence allegations into the 2nd cause of action.
Dec 15, 2020
Personal Injury/ Tort
Products Liability
Lori Ann Fournier or Olivia Rosales
Los Angeles County, CA
The Complaint asserts causes of action for: Strict Products Liability Negligent Products Liability Loss of Consortium A defendant moving for summary judgment/adjudication has met his burden of showing a cause of action has no merit if the defendant can show one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established. (CCP § 437c(p)(2).)
Jan 28, 2019
Los Angeles County, CA
The complaint alleges strict products liability for a design defect, a manufacturing defect, and a failure to warn, as well as alleging negligent products liability and medical malpractice for the death of Peter Koga, which was caused from complications that resulted from an open-heart surgery and use of a Stockert Heater-Cooler System 3T on April 25, 2019. On September 3, 2019, Plaintiffs filed an application to admit Robin A.
Nov 07, 2019
Personal Injury/ Tort
Products Liability
Los Angeles County, CA
On November 15, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint, asserting the following causes of action: (1) Negligence/Premises Liability; (2) Negligence Per Se; (3) Wrongful Death (based on negligent products liability); (4) Wrongful Death (by Plaintiffs in their individual capacities); and (5) Survivor Action.
May 09, 2017
Los Angeles County, CA
Id., ¶32. 6th cause of action for negligence, 7th cause of action for strict products liability – failure to warn, and 8th cause of action for negligent products liability – failure to warn Defendants argue that they have no duty to plaintiff based on the Learned Intermediary Doctrine.
Mar 08, 2019
Los Angeles County, CA
Plaintiff brought causes of action for: General Negligence; Strict Products Liability; Negligent Products Liability; Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability; Fraudulent Concealment; and Battery. On December 20, 2018, this court approved a good faith settlement between Plaintiff and Defendants Helen Grace Chocolates and BFC Financial Corporation.
Jul 16, 2019
Salvatore Sirna or Gary Y. Tanaka
Los Angeles County, CA
The complaint alleges strict and negligent products liability, breach of express and implied warranties, and negligence for a milling machine malfunctioning and killing Decedent Tuan Anh Cao on January 20, 2017. On November 1, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint to name Defendants Mighty Enterprises, Inc., Machine Group, Inc., Acromil Corporation, and She Hong Industrial Co. LTD. On January 17, 2019, the Court dismissed Defendant Acromi Corporatioon without prejudice.
Feb 19, 2020
Personal Injury/ Tort
Products Liability
Los Angeles County, CA
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